In “Divine Forgiveness and Legal Pardon,” William Lane Craig compares divine forgiveness to legal pardon, claiming that this is a “more accurate” way of thinking about God’s forgiveness because of God’s status as Ruler and Judge. Craig’s analogy is an admirable attempt to provide a biblical account of divine forgiveness, but the analogy is at best incomplete because God is not simply Ruler and Judge but also loving Creator and Father. A father does not pardon his children; he loves and (...) forgives them. In this paper, I evaluate Craig’s analogy and relate it to the atonement. (shrink)

This essay, will focus on Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland’s discussion on emergent properties, thin particular hylomorphism, and the relevance of their book, The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism, to advance the question that both philosophers and scientists ask regarding “strong artificial intelligence,” that is, whether computers will ever be conscious as technological devices as the programs that run on them get more and more complex.

This article addresses the following metaethical questions: how many intrinsic values are there? Robert Adams holds the view that there is only one intrinsic value, a view called “intrinsic value monism,” but does not present any arguments in favor of this view. This paper makes the case that there are good reasons for upholding value monism. I argue that our ability to weigh different values against each other supports value monism and that monotheistic worship also supports monism.

On hylomorphism and a concrete view of Christ’s human nature, a human person might be defined ontologically by a real definition. Per the definitions of hylomorphism and concretism, both views depend on a thick particular “human person.” I call the dependence between the person and its definition the principle of ontological priority (POP) and I analyze how POP affects the views given two theological puzzles, namely, the disembodied intermediate state, and, following Chalcedon, a single person in Christ. I find that (...) the entailment of the thick particular is unfavorable for both hylomorphism and concretism. Consequently, their real definitions need to be redefined. (shrink)

It has become commonplace to speak of proteins as sophisticated nanomachines, cells as miniature factories, and genomes as containing information in the form of code. Given that in our experience all other instances of machines, factories, and codes involve intelligent agency in their production, such descriptions, taken literally, suggest that the structures and operations of living things are best explained in terms of intelligent design. Not everyone agrees, however, that these descriptions should be taken literally. In this article, I evaluate (...) arguments for taking these descriptions metaphorically rather than literally and find them wanting. It will not do, therefore, to reject hypotheses of intelligent design on the grounds that we can only speak metaphorically of proteins as machines, cells as factories, and genomes as containing code. (shrink)

Code-switching is the adjustment of one’s speech, behaviors, or appearance across various contexts. Sometimes we code-switch to adapt to the communication norms of different groups, and sometimes we code-switch from social necessity. In many cases, code-switching is not morally blameworthy. It demonstrates an agent’s discernment or practical wisdom in navigating various situations. However, not all cases of code-switching are compatible with a good moral character. Many cases of code-switching involve a kind of impression management or doublespeak that can compromise integrity. (...) This article examines the conditions under which code-switching is duplicitous. More specifically, it explores code-switching regarding theological identity and plausible psychological and spiritual repercussions of code-switching for the agent. (shrink)

I argue that hindsight can counter the evidential problem of evil (EPOE). Specifically, if hindsight shows that an incident of evil that was previously accepted as pointless is actually justified, and the incident is a representative example of seemingly pointless evil, then that generates skepticism about the genuine pointlessness of other cases of seemingly pointless evil. Boethius’s life is used to illustrate this argument. Objections are then addressed, and it is shown that the reasoning behind those objections actually supports skeptical (...) theism, thus undermining the EPOE regardless. Finally, a stronger hindsight argument is presented to comprehensively defeat the EPOE. (shrink)

Proponents of “early high Christology” maintain that the New Testament teaches that God created the world through Jesus (John 1:3; 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16–17; Heb. 1:2, 10). Contemporary philosophical theologians sympathetic to Nicene orthodoxy appeal to this trend in order to justify their understanding of the person and nature of Jesus as divine. This article argues from the logic of the word “through” that the belief that God created the world through Jesus is incompatible with the Nicene doctrine of (...) the consubstantiality of Father and Son, and considers what options remain for pro-Nicene theologians. (shrink)

The modal version of the ontological argument (MOA) for God’s existence is controversial, primarily, at its first premise, the premise that reads “possibly, there exists a maximally great being.” So, what’s needed is an argument for the possibility of a maximally great being, a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, has these properties essentially, and is such that it exists necessarily. Ironically, I think that such an argument can be found in the literature on the problem of evil, literature (...) generally devoted to arguments against God’s existence. In particular, I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s “free will defense” (FWD) gives us such an argument. Moreover, since most philosophers agree that the FWD is successful, I argue that most philosophers should agree that FWD gives us a successful argument for the first premise of MOA. Thus, I argue that if most philosophers agree FWD is successful, then most philosophers should agree that God exists. There are several pressing objections to this line of reasoning that I consider in the paper. I argue that these objections fail. (shrink)

In “Early High Christology and Contemporary Pro-Nicene Theology,” Steven Nemes raises a dilemma. Either one may affirm what the New Testament teaches about the Word “through” whom all things were created, or one may affirm that the Father and Son are consubstantial (as the Nicene Creed teaches), but not both. I show that Nemes’s argument begs the question and that Nemes fails to represent how pro-Nicene theologians interpreted such prepositions (for example, “through”) in the New Testament. Contrary to what Nemes (...) contends, there is no inconsistency in believing what John 1:3 teaches and that the divine persons are consubstantial. (shrink)