This paper takes as point of departure the centrality of recognition in the contemporary political landscape. More specifically, it focuses on those struggles for recognition known as identity politics. We depart from the hypothesis that modern theories of recognition, more specifically those advanced by Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, cannot adequately accommodate the demand for the recognition of difference. Our contribution with this article is to argue that, in a discussion of struggles for recognition, the distinction between affirmative and transformative (...) strategies must be taken into account. We argue that affirmative approaches to recognition risk resulting in the negation of difference and reproducing the exclusive social order. By thinking through the implications of an affirmative approach to recognition, we aim to contribute to the understanding of failed attempts at recognition. We conclude with a tentative outline of the conditions for a transformative approach that aspires to meet the demands of actors in movements for social justice and avoid the problems of the affirmative approach. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hume’s Treatise, scholars have been divided on how to interpret the ontology of Humean relations. In particular, is Hume’s theory of relations consistent with positivism, (skeptical) realism, or anti-realism? In this essay, I propose a novel distinction separating impressions and ideas from relations such that relations are construed as forming a distinct category equal to impressions and ideas. In so doing, I interpret Hume as fundamentally agnostic toward the ontology of relations.