Year:

  1.  9
    Self-Knowledge, Belief, Ability.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):333-349.
    Matthew Boyle [. “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 : 223–241. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x] has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim compelling, but argue that its tenability depends (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  6
    Trigger Warning: No Proximal Intentions Required for Intentional Action.Marcela Herdova - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383.
    In this paper, I argue that some intentional actions are not triggered by proximal intentions; i.e. there are actions which are intentional, but lack relevant proximal intentions in their immediate causal history. More specifically, I first introduce various properties of intentions. I then argue that some actions are triggered by mental states which lack properties typically ascribed to intentions, yet these actions are still intentional. The view that all intentional actions are triggered by proximal intentions is thus false.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  13
    Downward Causation and Supervenience: The Non-Reductionist’s Extra Argument for Incompatibilism.Joana Rigato - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):384-399.
    Agent-causal theories of free will, which rely on a non-reductionist account of the agent, have traditionally been associated with libertarianism. However, some authors have recently argued in favor of compatibilist agent-causal accounts. In this essay, I will show that such accounts cannot avoid serious problems of implausibility or incoherence. A careful analysis of the implications of non-reductionist views of the agent (event-causal or agent-causal as they may be) reveals that such views necessarily imply either the denial of the principle of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  18
    Following the Law Because It’s the Law: Obedience, Bootstrapping, and Practical Reason.Paul Schofield - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):400-411.
    Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  3
    Introduction.Krzysztof Dołęga, Luke Roelofs & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):179-186.
    The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  5
    Explaining Embodied Emotions – with and Without Representations.Rebekka Hufendiek - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):319-331.
    Embodied accounts have offered a theoretical framework in which emotions are understood to be patterned embodied responses that are about core relational themes. Some authors argue that this intentionality should be understood in terms of some kind of non-conceptual representation format, while others suggest a radical enactivist framework that takes emotions to be intentional but not representational. In this paper I will argue that the abstract nature of the core relational themes emotions are about and the interrelatedness of emotions with (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  10
    Much Ado About Nothing? Why Going Non-Semantic is Not Merely Semantics.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):187-203.
    This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  9
    Enactivism and Predictive Processing: A Non-Representational View.Michael David Kirchhoff & Ian Robertson - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):264-281.
    This paper starts by considering an argument for thinking that predictive processing (PP) is representational. This argument suggests that the Kullback–Leibler (KL)-divergence provides an accessible measure of misrepresentation, and therefore, a measure of representational content in hierarchical Bayesian inference. The paper then argues that while the KL-divergence is a measure of information, it does not establish a sufficient measure of representational content. We argue that this follows from the fact that the KL-divergence is a measure of relative entropy, which can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  19
    Making Too Many Enemies: Hutto and Myin’s Attack on Computationalism.Jesse Kuokkanen & Anna-Mari Rusanen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):282-294.
    We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Tolerant Enactivist Cognitive Science.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):226-244.
    Enactivist (Embodied, Embedded, etc.) approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind are sometimes, though not always, conjoined with an anti-representational commitment. A weaker anti-representational claim is that ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is not compulsory when giving psychological explanations. A stronger anti-representational claim is that the very idea of ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion. This paper criticises some of the arguments made by Hutto & Myin (2013, 2017) for the stronger anti-representational claim and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  20
    Enactive or Inactive? Cranially Envatted Dream Experience and the Extended Conscious Mind.M. G. Rosen - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):295-318.
    When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  16
    Representation and Mental Representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.
    This paper engages critically with anti-representationalist arguments pressed by prominent enactivists and their allies. The arguments in question are meant to show that the “as-such” and “job-description” problems constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content. In response to these challenges, a positive account of what makes a physical or computational structure a mental representation is proposed; the positive account is inspired partly by Dretske’s views about content and partly by the role of mental representations in contemporary cognitive scientific (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  5
    Predictive Minds and Small-Scale Models: Kenneth Craik’s Contribution to Cognitive Science.Daniel Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):245-263.
    I identify three lessons from Kenneth Craik’s landmark book “The Nature of Explanation” for contemporary debates surrounding the existence, extent, and nature of mental representation: first, an account of mental representations as neural structures that function analogously to public models; second, an appreciation of prediction as the central component of intelligence in demand of such models; and third, a metaphor for understanding the brain as an engineer, not a scientist. I then relate these insights to discussions surrounding the representational status (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  9
    The Touch of King Midas: Collingwood on Why Actions Are Not Events.Giuseppina D’Oro - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):160-169.
    It is the ambition of natural science to provide complete explanations of reality. Collingwood argues that science can only explain events, not actions. The latter is the distinctive subject matter of history and can be described as actions only if they are explained historically. This paper explains Collingwood’s claim that the distinctive subject matter of history is actions and why the attempt to capture this subject matter through the method of science inevitably ends in failure because science explains events, not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  21
    Nietzsche’s Account of Self-Conscious Agency.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):122-137.
    This essay is an overview of Nietzsche’s philosophy of action. I discuss the central features of Nietzsche’s account and the ways in which it departs from standard accounts. Section 1 discusses Nietzsche’s view of the opacity of human action. I focus on the way in which the agent’s experience of the world is shaped by unnoticed and unconscious factors. Section 2 asks what role self-consciousness has in the production of action. Section 3 turns to the way in which Nietzsche understands (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  12
    Kant and Hegel on Purposive Action.Arto Laitinen, Erasmus Mayr & Constantine Sandis - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):90-107.
    This essay discusses Kant and Hegel’s philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow, we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section 2 (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  7
    Human Action and Virtue in Descartes and Spinoza.Noa Naaman-Zauderer - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):25-40.
    In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, by which human (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  17
    Agents, Objects, and Their Powers in Suarez and Hobbes.Thomas Pink - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):3-24.
    The paper examines the place of power in the action theories of Francisco Suarez and Thomas Hobbes. Power is the capacity to produce or determine outcomes. Two cases of power are examined. The first is freedom or the power of agents to determine for themselves what they do. The second is motivation, which involves a power to which agents are subject, and by which they are moved to pursue a goal. Suarez, in the Metaphysical Disputations, uses Aristotelian causation to model (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  9
    Hume’s Better Argument for Motivational Skepticism.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe & Richard McCarty - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):76-89.
    On a standard interpretation, Hume argued that reason is not practical, because its operations are limited to “demonstration” and “probability.” But recent critics claim that by limiting reason’s operations to only these two, his argument begs the question. Despite this, a better argument for motivational skepticism can be found in Hume’s text, one that emphasizes reason’s inability to generate motive force against contrary desires or passions. Nothing can oppose an impulse but a contrary impulse, Hume believed, and reason cannot generate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  16
    Philosophy of Action From Suarez to Anscombe.Constantine Sandis - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):1-2.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  8
    Action, Knowledge and Embodiment in Berkeley and Locke.Tom Stoneham - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):41-59.
    Embodiment is a fact of human existence which philosophers should not ignore. They may differ to a great extent in what they have to say about our bodies, but they have to take into account that for each of us our body has a special status, it is not merely one amongst the physical objects, but a physical object to which we have a unique relation. While Descartes approached the issue of embodiment through consideration of sensation and imagination, it is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  27
    Remarks on the “Thickness” of Action Description: With Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Anscombe.Julia Tanney - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):170-177.
    This paper considers insoluble difficulties for the supposition that intentions, “acts of will”, and reasons for acting, construed as mental events, could be the special ingredient that would render bodily movements into voluntary or intentional actions. Yet, the distinction between mere bodily movements and actions is often made by introducing intentions, acts of will, and reasons for acting. How is this to be reconciled? Criticising the tendency to view the “thick descriptions” of everyday discourse through a metaphysical scheme that relies (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  2
    Before Ethics: Scientific Accounts of Action at the Turn of the Century.Anna C. Zielinska - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):138-159.
    This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  18
    Action, Interaction and Inaction: Post-Kantian Accounts of Thinking, Willing, and Doing in Fichte and Schopenhauer.Günter Zöller - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):108-121.
    This article features the contributions of Fichte and Schopenhauer to a philosophical account of action against the background of Kant's earlier and influential treatment of the topic. The article first presents Kant's pertinent contributions in the areas of general epistemology and metaphysics, general practical philosophy, the philosophy of law and ethic. Then the focus is on Fichte's further original work on the issue of action in those same areas. Finally, the article turns to Schopenhauer's radical revision of the Kantian and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Sympathetic Action in the Seventeenth Century: Human and Natural.Chris Meyns - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations (1):1-16.
    The category of sympathy marks a number of basic divisions in early modern approaches to action explanations, whether for human agency or for change in the wider natural world. Some authors were critical of using sympathy to explain change. They call such principles “unintelligible” or assume they involve “mysterious” action at a distance. Others, including Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, appeal to sympathy to capture natural phenomena, or to supply a backbone to their metaphysics. Here I discuss (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues