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  1.  13
    Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy.Olivia Bailey - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):128-143.
    Are extremists (incels, neo-nazis, and the like) characteristically answerable for their moral and political convictions? Is it necessary to offer them reasoned arguments against their views, or is it instead appropriate to bypass that kind of engagement? Discussion of these questions has centered around the putative epistemic autonomy of extremists. The parties to this discussion have assumed that epistemic autonomy is solely (or at least primarily) a matter of epistemic independence, of believing based on epistemic reasons one has assessed for (...)
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  2.  2
    Empathizing across sensibilities.Patrik Engisch & Julia Langkau - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):184-196.
    Empathic perspective taking involves a phenomenally rich reaction to another’s mental state, in an attempt to understand the other by feeling with them. But can we take just any perspective, even if the person we aim to understand seems fundamentally different from us? In this paper, we will explore the possibility of empathically understanding others that are different from us with respect to one aspect of their mental life: their sensibility.
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  3.  21
    Wide computationalism revisited: distributed mechanisms, parismony and testability.Luke Kersten - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):1-18.
    Recent years have seen a surge of interest in applying mechanistic thinking to computational accounts of implementation and individuation. One recent extension of this work involves so-called ‘wide’ approaches to computation, the view that computational processes spread out beyond the boundaries of the individual. These ‘mechanistic accounts of wide computation’ maintain that computational processes are wide in virtue of being part of mechanisms that extend beyond the boundary of the individual. This paper aims to further develop the mechanistic account of (...)
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  4. Learning to walk and talk (again): what developmental psychology can teach us about online intersubjectivity.Lucy Osler & David Ekdahl - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):237-250.
    Since the advent of the internet, researchers have been interested in the intersubjective possibilities and constraints that digital environments offer users. Some argue that seemingly disembodied digitally-mediated interactions are severely limited when compared to their embodied face-to-face counterparts; others are more optimistic about the possibilities that such technologies afford. Yet, both camps tend towards offering static accounts of online intersubjectivity. What we think these approaches fail to take into account is how users’ intersubjective capabilities on digital platforms can evolve and (...)
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  5.  4
    Simulation trouble and gender trouble.Luke Roelofs - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):171-183.
    Is it impossible to imaginatively simulate what it’s like to be someone with a different gender experience – to understand them empathically? Or is it simply difficult, a challenge requiring effort and dedication? I first distinguish three different sorts of obstacle to empathic understanding that are sometimes discussed: Missing Ingredient problems, Awkward Combination Problems, and Inappropriate Background Problems. I then argue that, although all three should be taken seriously, there is no clear reason to think that any of them are (...)
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  6.  1
    Empathy as a means to understand people.Thomas Schramme - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):157-170.
    Misunderstanding other people can be interpreted as the result of an insufficient performance of people’s skills to understand other persons and their experiences. But what does understand mean in these contexts? And what are the relevant skills that need to be engaged to successfully understand other people? I argue that understanding other people is a form of recognition of the epistemic validity of another person’s perspective. I claim that minimal understanding does not require an endorsement of another person’s perspective. This (...)
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  7. Why severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):144-156.
    When we learn about a severe moral transgression that has been committed, we are often not only horrified but also puzzled. We are inclined to raise questions such as ‘Why did they do this?’ or exclaim: ‘I cannot understand why anyone would do such a thing!’. This suggests that there is something difficult to understand about severe moral wrongs. In this paper, I offer an explanation of the phenomenon that severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand. I begin by (...)
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  8.  1
    ‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction.Katharina Anna Sodoma, Elizabeth Ventham & Christiana Werner - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):123-127.
    One of the reasons why empathy is a topic of enduring interest is the role it can play in understanding others. Empathy can help us to predict each other’s future actions and explain past ones; to...
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  9.  2
    Empathising in online spaces.Elizabeth Ventham - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):225-236.
    This paper aims to better understand and account for potential difficulties in empathising with each other in online spaces. I argue that two important differences between online and in-person communication are both to do with what information comes across in equivalent interactions. Firstly, there are ways in which less information comes across in online interactions (both consciously and unconsciously). Secondly, agents have greater control over what information comes across in online interactions. I argue that these differences can cause problems in (...)
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  10.  4
    Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices.Christiana Werner - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2):197-211.
    This article focuses on unjust credibility deficits in cases of testimony about emotional reactions towards acts of oppression. It argues that the injustice in these cases is not rooted in the hearer’s identity prejudices against the speaker, but the hearer's problematic way of dealing with his simulation of being in the speaker's situation. The simulation is in itself not morally problematic. However, I focus on a case where the hearer either recklessly or negligently fails to consider knowledge about the differences (...)
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  11.  16
    Aesthetic selves as objects of interpersonal understanding.Nicholas Wiltsher - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (2).
    This paper raises puzzles concerning our grasp of others’ aesthetic selves. I first articulate a conception of an aesthetic self, understood as an autonomously adopted orientation to objects of aesthetic value, encompassing the embrace of aesthetic reasons and the qualitative appreciative states that follow. This articulation is motivated by the commonplace observation that people’s aesthetic identities are important to them. Given this importance, we might think it salutary to grasp other people’s aesthetic selves, under the general auspices of ‘interpersonal understanding’. (...)
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  12.  86
    A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’.Tom Frankfort - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations:1-11.
    Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and then say it. One way to argue for the thesis is to show that the content of a token thought cannot be fully represented by a token mental state before the production of the utterance which expresses it. I make an argument for that claim based on speech act theory. (...)
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  13. Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties.Marcus William Hunt - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations:1-17.
    The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent’s sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there (...)
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