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  1. Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.
    Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist (...)
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  2.  39
    Vice Epistemology has a Responsibility Problem.Heather Battaly - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):24-36.
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  3.  20
    Empirical Reason: Questions for Gupta, McDowell, and Siegel.Bill Brewer - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):311-323.
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  4.  13
    Empirical Reason: Answers to Gupta, McDowell, and Siegel.Bill Brewer - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):366-377.
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  5.  11
    Knowledge, Safety, and Gettierized Lottery Cases: Why Mere Statistical Evidence is Not a (Safe) Source of Knowledge.Fernando Broncano‐Berrocal - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):37-52.
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  6.  26
    Testimonial Hinges.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):53-68.
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  7.  96
    Tales From an Apostate.Kristie Dotson - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):69-83.
  8. Checking Again.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):84-96.
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  9.  23
    A Normative Account of Epistemic Luck.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):97-109.
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  10.  34
    Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.
    Having an etiological function to F is sufficient to have a competence to F. Having an etiological function to reliably F is sufficient to have a reliable competence, a competence to reliably F. Epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Epistemic warrant requires reliable competence. Warrant divides into two grades. The first consists in normal functioning, when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as (...)
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  11. How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.
    In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement–the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)–are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I (...)
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  12.  8
    Experience and its Rational Significance II: Replies to Brewer, McDowell, and Siegel.Anil Gupta - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):378-389.
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  13.  10
    Experience and its Rational Significance I: Contributions to a Debate.Anil Gupta - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):324-337.
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  14. Skepticism: Impractical, Therefore Implausible.Michael Hannon - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):143-158.
    The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are regularly dismissed. I will argue, however, that (...)
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  15.  31
    The Capacity to Know and Perception.Andrea Kern - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):159-171.
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  16.  24
    Guidance, Epistemic Filters, and Non‐Accidental Ought‐Doing.Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):172-183.
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  17.  21
    Skepticism and Epistemic Asymmetry.Adam Leite - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):184-197.
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  18.  29
    On Fundamental Responsibility.Anna Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.
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  19.  29
    On Fundamental Responsibility.Anna‐Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.
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  20.  27
    Do Epistemic Reasons Bear on the Ought Simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.
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  21.  27
    Comments on Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel.John McDowell - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):338-347.
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  22.  14
    Responses to Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel.John McDowell - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):390-402.
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  23.  28
    Beyond Accuracy: Epistemic Flaws with Statistical Generalizations.Jessie Munton - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):228-240.
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  24.  27
    Expanding the Scope of Reflective Knowledge: From MINE to OURS.Joseph Shieber - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):241-253.
    Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher‐order awareness of her own mental states, and is structured by relations of coherence. -/- Although Sosa's distinction is extremely appealing, it also faces serious problems. In particular, the sorts of processes that would be required for reflective knowledge, as Sosa understands it, are not processes that (...)
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  25. The Uneasy Heirs of Acquaintance.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):348-365.
    My contribution to the first round of a tetralog with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. Each of us has written a response to the writings of the other three philosophers on the topic "Empirical Reason". My initial contribution focuses on what we know a priori about perception. In the second round, we will each respond to the each writer's first-round contributions.
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  26. Replies to Brewer, Gupta, and McDowell.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):403-410.
    "The Uneasy Heirs of Acquaintance" is my first-round contribution to a 4-way exchange with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. In the first round, each of us writes a commentary on the other three, and in the second round we reply to each other's first-round contributions. This is my second-round contribution.
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  27.  17
    Knowledge‐First Functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.
    This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.
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  28.  17
    Demoting Promoting Objections to Epistemic Consequentialism.Daniel J. Singer - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):268-280.
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  29. Credences and Suspended Judgments as Transitional Attitudes.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.
    In this paper, I highlight an interesting difference between belief on the one hand, and suspended judgment and credence on the other hand. This difference is the following: credences and suspended judgments are suitable to serve as transitional as well as terminal attitudes in our reasoning, whereas beliefs are only appropriate as terminal attitudes. The notion of a transitional attitude is not an established one in the literature, but I argue that introducing it helps us better understand the different roles (...)
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  30.  5
    Belief, Desire and the Prediction of Behaviour.José L. Zalabardo - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):295-310.
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