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  1.  33
    Part and Whole, Again1.Karen Bennett - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):7-25.
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  2.  20
    Is There a Humean Account of Quantities?Phillip Bricker - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):26-51.
    Humeans have a problem with quantities. A core principle of any Humean account of modality is that fundamental entities can freely recombine. But determinate quantities, if fundamental, seem to violate this core principle: determinate quantities belonging to the same determinable necessarily exclude one another. Call this the problem of exclusion. Prominent Humeans have responded in various ways. Wittgenstein, when he resurfaced to philosophy, gave the problem of exclusion as a reason to abandon the logical atomism of the Tractatus with its (...)
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  3.  55
    Real Definitions.Fabrice Correia - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):52-73.
    I offer and defend an account of real definitions. I put forward two versions of the account, one formulated in terms of the notion of generalised identity and of a suitable notion of grounding, and the other one formulated in terms of the former notion and of a suitable notion of comparative joint-carvingness. Given a plausible assumption, and turn out to be equivalent. I give a sketch of a unified account of the three notions involved in and from which the (...)
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  4.  53
    Constitutive Explanation.Shamik Dasgupta - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):74-97.
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  5. Naive Metaphysics.Kit Fine - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):98-113.
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  6.  22
    Free Will and Ultimate Explanation.Boris Kment - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):114-130.
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  7.  57
    Copredication and Property Inheritance.David Liebesman & Ofra Magidor - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):131-166.
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  8.  30
    Normative Accounts of Fundamentality.Kris McDaniel - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):167-183.
    I describe a number of views in which metaphysical fundamentality is accounted for in normative terms. After describing many different ways this key idea could be developed, I turn to developing the idea in one specific way. After all, the more detailed the proposal, the easier it is to assess whether it works. The rough idea is that what it is for a property to be fundamental is for it to be prima facie obligatory to theorize in terms of that (...)
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  9.  18
    Anything I Can Do , You Can Do Better : Truthmaking and Non‐Presentist Dynamism.Kristie Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):184-203.
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  10.  11
    Phenomenal Feel as Process.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):204-222.
    Phenomenal character is the what-it's-likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first-personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third-personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism.
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  11.  22
    How to Be a Substantivalist Without Getting Shifty About It.Zee R. Perry - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):223-249.
    According to substantivalism, spacetime points and regions are real entities whose existence is not dependent on matter. In this paper, I motivate and defend a version of substantivalism which takes the totality of spacetime as fundamental, and show how this position avoids certain problem cases, in particular the objection from static Leibniz shifts, and better conforms to how we think about space in physics. I argue that, even though the static Leibniz shifts do not show ordinary substantivalism is committed to (...)
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  12.  19
    The World is the Totality of Facts, Not of Things.Agustín Rayo - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):250-278.
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  13. Ground by Law.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):279-301.
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  14.  71
    Laws for Metaphysical Explanation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):302-321.
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  15.  28
    The Naïve Conception of Properties.Benjamin Schnieder - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):322-342.
    The semantic rules that govern ordinary property discourse appear to give rise to a version of Russell's antinomy. Do we therefore have an inconsistent conception of properties? This paper firstly develops a consistent conception of properties and secondly argues that we may indeed interpret ordinary property discourse as expressing the consistent conception rather than an inconsistent one.
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  16.  8
    To Have and to Hold.Tatjana Solodkoff & Richard Woodward - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):407-427.
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  17.  10
    Personal Volatility.Meghan Sullivan - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):343-363.
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  18.  38
    Metaphysics and Conceptual Negotiation.Amie L. Thomasson - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):364-382.
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  19.  17
    Ideology in a Desert Landscape.Alessandro Torza - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):383-406.
    On one influential view, metaphysical fundamentality can be understood in terms of joint-carving. Ted Sider has recently argued that some first order quantifier is joint-carving, and modal notions are not joint-carving. After vindicating the theoretical indispensability of quantification against recent criticism, I will defend a logical result due to Arnold Koslow which implies that and are incompatible. I will therefore consider an alternative understanding of Sider's metaphysics to the effect that some first order quantifier is joint-carving, and intensional notions are (...)
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  20.  11
    To Have and to Hold.Tatjana von Solodkoff & Richard Woodward - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):407-427.
    Realists about fictional entities often distinguish the properties that a fictional character has and the properties a character holds. Roughly, this is the distinction between the properties that a character really possesses and the properties it fictionally possess. But despite the popularity of this distinction in realist circles, it gives rise to a number of subtle issues about which fictional realists can and do disagree. In this paper, we aim to clarify these issues and defend three related theses. One: that (...)
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  21.  36
    Sophisticated Modal Primitivism.Tobias Wilsch - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):428-448.
    Summary: The paper provides an argument for modal primitivism, the view that necessity is not defined and is therefore part of the structure of reality. It then raises the explanation-challenge for primitivists: how can modal truths be explained by hyper-intensional truths, if necessity is not defined in terms of hyper-intensional phenomena? To address the challenge, the paper introduces 'sophisticated modal primitivism' which gives a substantive analysis of the notion of a 'source of necessity'. The final part of the paper offers (...)
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