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  1.  3
    The Simple Argument for Subclassical Logic.Jc Beall - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):30-54.
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  2.  46
    Delimiting the Boundaries of Inference.Paul Boghossian - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):55-69.
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  3.  9
    From Logical Expressivism to Expressivist Logic: Sketch of a Program and Some Implementations1.Robert Brandom - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):70-88.
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  4.  26
    Antiobjects.Josh Dever - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):89-106.
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  5.  19
    Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
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  6.  12
    First‐Order Logical Validity and the Hilbert‐Bernays Theorem.Gary Ebbs & Warren Goldfarb - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):159-175.
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  7.  9
    In Praise of a Logic of Definitions That Tolerates Ω‐Inconsistency.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):176-195.
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  8.  9
    Intuitions as Inferential Judgments.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):7-29.
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  9.  19
    Dummett on Indefinite Extensibility.Øystein Linnebo - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):196-220.
    Dummett’s notion of indefinite extensibility is influential but obscure. The notion figures centrally in an alternative Dummettian argument for intuitionistic logic and anti-realism, distinct from his more famous, meaning-theoretic arguments to the same effect. Drawing on ideas from Dummett, a precise analysis of indefinite extensibility is proposed. This analysis is used to reconstruct the poorly understood alternative argument. The plausibility of the resulting argument is assessed.
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  10.  42
    Varieties of Inference?Anna‐Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.
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  11.  46
    An Object‐Based Truthmaker Semantics for Modals.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):255-288.
    Possible worlds semantics faces a range of difficulties for at least certain types of modals, especially deontic modals with their distinction between heavy and light permissions and obligations. This paper outlines a new semantics of modals that aims to overcome some of those difficulties. The semantics is based on an a novel ontology of modal objects, entities like obligations, permissions, needs, as well as epistemic states, abilities, and essences. Moreover, it is based on truthmaking, in the sense of Fine’s recent (...)
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  12.  22
    Rationally Determinable Conditions.Ram Neta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):289-299.
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  13.  7
    Paradoxes and Structural Rules From a Dialogical Perspective.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Rohan French - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):129-158.
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  14.  26
    Paradoxical Propositions.Graham Priest - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):300-307.
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  15.  32
    Logical Nihilism: Could There Be No Logic?Gillian Russell - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):308-324.
    Logical monists and pluralists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the monists say there is just one, the pluralists that there are more. Could it turn out that both are wrong, and that there is no logic at all?
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  16. Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.
    There are many domains about which we think we are reliable. When there is prima facie reason to believe that there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability about a domain given our background views about the world, this generates a challenge to our reliability about the domain or to our background views. This is what is often called the reliability challenge for the domain. In previous work, I discussed the reliability challenges for logic and for deductive inference. I argued (...)
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  17.  46
    On the Explanatory Power of Truth in Logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.
    Philosophers are divided on whether the proof- or truth-theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The paper demonstrates the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic by showing that and how it can provide (i) an explanatory characterization —both semantic and proof-theoretical—of logical inference, (ii) an explanatory criterion for logical constants and operators, (iii) an explanatory account of logic’s role (function) in knowledge, as well as explanations of (iv) the characteristic features of logic —formality, strong modal force, generality, (...)
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  18.  32
    A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.
    There are three well-known models of how to account for perceptual belief within a probabilistic framework: (a) a Cartesian model; (b) a model advocated by Timothy Williamson; and (c) a model advocated by Richard Jeffrey. Each of these models faces a problem—in effect, the problem of accounting for the defeasibility of perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge. It is argued here that the best way of responding to this the best way of responding to this problem effectively vindicates the Cartesian model. (...)
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  19.  26
    Alternative Logics and Applied Mathematics.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):399-424.
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  20.  35
    Logical Non‐Cognitivism.Crispin Wright - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):425-450.
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