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  1.  21
    Consciousness and Content in Perception.Bill Brewer - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):41-54.
    Normal perception involves conscious experience of the world. What I call the Content View, (CV), attempts to account for this in terms of the representational content of perception (Brewer, 2011, esp. ch. 4). I offer a new argument here against this view. Ascription of personal level content, either conceptual or nonconceptual, depends on the idea that determinate predicational information is conveyed to the subject. This determinate predication depends upon the exercise of certain personal level capacities for categorization and discrimination. Exercise (...)
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  2.  6
    Seeing Things.Berit Brogaard - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):55-72.
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  3.  15
    The Metaphysical Implications of the Moral Significance of Consciousness.Brian Cutter - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):103-130.
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  4.  11
    Perception and Reflection.Anil Gomes - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):131-152.
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  5.  14
    Psychosemantics and the Rich/Thin Debate1.E. J. Green - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):153-186.
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  6.  7
    Visual Expectations and Visual Imagination.Dominic Gregory - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):187-206.
    Our visual experiences of objects as located in external space, and as having definite three-dimensional shapes, are closely linked to our implicit expectations about what things will look like from alternative viewpoints. What sorts of contents do these expectations involve? One standard answer is that they relate to what things will look like to us upon changing our positions. And what sorts of mental representations do the expectations call upon? A standard answer is that they involve our powers of visual (...)
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  7.  24
    Selfless Experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):207-243.
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  8.  6
    Generative Explanation in Cognitive Science and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Lisa Miracchi - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):267-291.
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  9.  8
    The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms.Jessie Munton - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):317-347.
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  10.  6
    De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves1.L. A. Paul - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.
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  11.  66
    The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.
    The Significance Argument (SA) for the irreducibility of consciousness is based on a series of new puzzle-cases that I call multiple candidate cases. In these cases, there is a multiplicity of physical-functional properties or relations that are candidates to be identified with the sensible qualities and our consciousness of them, where those candidates are not significantly different. I will argue that these cases show that reductive materialists cannot accommodate the various ways in which consciousness is significant. I also will argue (...)
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  12.  21
    The Hard Problem of the Many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.
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  13.  4
    Dissolving Type‐B Physicalism.Helen Yetter‐Chappell - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):469-498.
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  14. The Evolutionary Argument for Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives:293-316.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – which characterize what it is like, or how it feels, for a subject to be in conscious states – have no physical effects. One of the earliest arguments against epiphenomenalism is the evolutionary argument (James 1890/1981; Eccles and Popper 1977; Popper 1978), which starts from the following problem: why is pain correlated with stimuli detrimental to survival and reproduction – such as suffocation, hunger and burning? And why is pleasure correlated with stimuli (...)
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