Philosophical Psychology

ISSN: 0951-5089

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  1.  9
    What does it actually mean that Premotor Theory is about embodied attention?Jacek Bielas & Łukasz Michalczyk - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):885-903.
    One of the most vigorously debated issues in attention labs concerns the nature of the coupling between the sensory-motor system and covert spatial attention. Proponents of the Premotor Theory of Attention (PToA) claim that attention should be accounted for in terms of motor preparation for goal-directed actions such as eye or hand movements. For others, it is a supramodal psychological entity that is independent of our sensorimotor machinery. Both parties also seek to articulate this controversy in terms of cognitive science (...)
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  2.  25
    Affective scaffolding and chronic illness.Eleanor Alexandra Byrne - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):921-946.
    ABSTRACT Current attempts to understand unusually high rates of psychiatric illness in complex, chronic illnesses can be guilty of operating within an explanatory framework whereby there are two options. Either (a) that the psychiatric predicaments are secondary to the bodily condition, and (b) that they are primary. In this paper, I draw upon philosophical work on affect, contemporary empirical work, and qualitative first-person patient data to illustrate a much messier reality. I argue that affective experience is generally more complex in (...)
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  3. Empirical evidence for moral Bayesianism.Haim Cohen, Ittay Nissan-Rozen & Anat Maril - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):801-830.
    Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed “moral Bayesianism,” from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, ifP(A∩B)=0thenP(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B), known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the one (...)
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  4.  16
    The shared project, but divergent views, of the Empiricist associationists.Mike Dacey - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):759-781.
    Despite its long period of dominance, the details of associationism as developed by the British Empiricists in the 18th and 19th centuries are often ignored or forgotten today. Perhaps as a result, modern understandings of Empiricist associationism are often oversimplified. In fact, there is no single core view that can be viewed as definitional, or even weaker, as characteristic, of the tradition. The actual views of associationists in this tradition are much more diverse than any such view would allow, even (...)
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  5.  17
    Reforming responsibility practices without skepticism.Marcelo Fischborn - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):904-920.
    Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso argue that humans are never morally responsible for their actions and take that thesis as a starting point for a project whose ultimate goal is the reform of responsibility practices, which include expressions of praise, blame, and the institution of legal punishment. This paper shares the skeptical concern that current responsibility practices can be suboptimal and in need of change, but argues that a non-skeptical pursuit of those changes is viable and more promising. The main (...)
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  6.  10
    The role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in moral cognition: A value-centric hypothesis.Anna K. Garr - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):970-987.
    Trends in moral psychology largely support the role that emotion plays in moral cognition with human lesion studies offering the most compelling evidence to date. Specifically, data from ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) patients on moral judgment tasks has suggested the necessity of having intact emotion to behave in morally appropriate ways. However, patients with vmPFC damage also have deficits in a variety of complex judgment and decision-making tasks, regardless of whether emotion is involved. This paper argues that a basic information (...)
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  7.  35
    Why empathy is an intellectual virtue.Alkis Kotsonis & Gerard Dunne - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):741-758.
    Our aim in this paper is to argue that empathy is an intellectual virtue. Empathy enables agents to gain insight into other people’s emotions and beliefs. The agent who possesses this trait is: (i) driven to engage in acts of empathy by her epistemic desires; (ii) takes pleasure in doing so; (iii) is competent at the activity characteristic of empathy; and, (iv) has good judgment as to when it is epistemically appropriate to engage in empathy. After establishing that empathy meets (...)
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  8.  39
    How consciousness creates life-meaning A review of _Understanding Human Conduct: The Innate and Acquired Meaning of Life_ , by Sam S. Rakover, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2021, 198 pp., $95 (hardback), ISBN: 9781793632401. [REVIEW]Asha Lancaster-Thomas - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):988-991.
    This book is about the meaning of life, which is clearly one of the of the most important – if not the most important – topics one could write about. In Understanding Human Conduct, Sam S. Rakover...
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  9.  6
    Against Sethi’s response to the Argument from Hallucination.David Mathers - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):782-800.
    Sethi (2020) attempts to show that even if we keep Price’s intuition: the claim that having an experience as of an F make us aware of an instance of Fness, we can still block the Argument from Hallucination, and so reject the conclusion that we are aware of mind-dependent rather than mind-independent items when we undergo successful perceptions. In an attempt to demonstrate this, she formulates the Argument from Hallucination so that it relies on the principle that if the existence (...)
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  10.  33
    Dark personality traits and anti-natalist beliefs: The mediating roles of primal world beliefs.Madeleine K. Meehan, Virgil Zeigler-Hill & Todd K. Shackelford - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):947-969.
    ABSTRACT The literature regarding the Dark Triad of personality (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism) has expanded rapidly during recent years with researchers evaluating the connections that these personality traits have with a variety of phenomena including philosophical beliefs and moral decision-making. The goal of the present study was to replicate and extend recent research concerning the associations that the Dark Triad had with anti-natalist beliefs (i.e., that it is morally wrong to procreate) by using multidimensional conceptualizations of these dark personality (...)
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  11.  33
    The heuristics theory of emotions and moderate rationalism.András Szigeti - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):861-884.
    This paper argues that emotions can play an epistemic role as justifiers of evaluative beliefs. It also presents the heuristics theory of emotion as an empirically informed explanation of how emotions can play such a role and why they in practice usefully complement non-affective evaluative judgments. As such, the heuristics theory represents a form of moderate rationalism: it acknowledges that emotions can be epistemically valuable, even privileged in some sense, but denies that they would be uniquely privileged. I argue that (...)
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  12. Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction.Mason Westfall - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):831-860.
    What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me” and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level – the plurality problem. The things that (...)
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  13.  38
    Mental disorders in entangled brains.Awais Aftab - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):583-595.
    In this commentary on Anneli Jefferson’s book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?,” I offer an overview of her central thesis, and then propose my own modified account of when we are justified in calling mental disorders as “brain disorders.” In doing so, I draw on recent work in neuroscience that understands the relationship between brain and behavior in complex, dynamic, and computational terms. In particular, I disagree with Jefferson’s criterion of sufficiency, that a particular brain process should always realize a (...)
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  14.  11
    Is externalism really a threat to biological psychiatry?M. Cristina Amoretti - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):606-617.
    1. In her latest book (Jefferson, 2022), “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?”, Anneli Jefferson (AJ) argues that mental disorders can be considered brain disorders when they involve brain dysfun...
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  15.  10
    The complexity of brain disorders and the worldliness of mental disorders Are mental disorders brain disorders?, by Anneli Jefferson, Oxford, Routledge, 2022, 108 pp., £48.99, ISBN: 9780367421380. [REVIEW]Matthew R. Broome - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):736-740.
    In this recently published book, Jefferson provides a lucid and detailed examination of, and answer to, its provocative title. In doing so, the focus of Jefferson’s analysis is largely on what a br...
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  16.  42
    Brain Disorders, Dysfunctions, and Natural Selection: Commentary on Jefferson.Justin Garson - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):558-569.
    I argue that despite the merits of Jefferson’s account of a brain disorder, which are many, the notion of function she deploys is unsuitable to the overall goals of that account. In particular, Jefferson accepts Cummins’ causal role theory of function and dysfunction. As the causal role view, in its standard elaborations, is wedded to human interests, goals, and values, it cannot serve as a value-neutral anchor for her hybrid “harm-dysfunction” account of disorder. I argue that the selected effects theory, (...)
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  17.  33
    Alienation and identification in addiction.Philip Gerrans - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):684-706.
    A recent strand in the philosophical literature on addiction emphasizes problems with diachronic self-control. Hanna Pickard, for example, argues that an important aspect of addiction consists in inability to identify with a non-addicted future self. This literature sits alongside another that treats addiction as the product of neural changes that “hijack” mechanisms of reward prediction, habit formation decision making and cognitive control. This hijacking literature originates in accounts that treat the neural changes characteristic of addiction as a brain disease. This (...)
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  18.  41
    Partial realization and biological normality: Jefferson’s account of brain dysfunction reinterpreted.Fabian Hundertmark - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):596 - 605.
    In her book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?” (2022), Anneli Jefferson proposes that brain processes that always realize mental dysfunctions are brain dysfunctions. This paper explores possible interpretations of two underdeveloped aspects of this thesis. First, it argues that “realization” should be interpreted as partial rather than full realization. Second, it argues that the “always” should only quantify over biologically normal situations. Taken together, these changes can account for the fact that some psychological dysfunctions are partially realized by functional mechanisms, (...)
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  19.  24
    Brain disorders reconsidered – a response to commentaries.Anneli Jefferson - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):644-657.
    In this paper, I respond to commentaries on my book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?”. The topics I discuss are: accounts of function and dysfunction, constraints on the relationship between processes at the level of the brain and the mind, externalism in psychiatry, implications for moral responsibility and the question whether my account is a form of conceptual engineering. I defend my account and argue that the key criterion for whether mental disorders are brain disorders is whether we can map (...)
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  20.  24
    Capacity, attributability, and responsibility in mental disorder.Jeanette Kennett - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):618-630.
    In this commentary on Anneli Jefferson’s Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders? I endorse her capacitarian approach to responsibility but suggest that the effects of at least some mental/brain disorders on the agent’s psychology show that we cannot neatly separate the epistemic condition from the control condition when assessing agential capacity. I then discuss the labeling issue in the context of rival attributionist accounts of responsibility which hold that agents are responsible if their actions are attributable to them. The incorporation of (...)
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  21.  15
    The normativity in psychiatric nosology. An analysis of how the DSM-5’s psychopathology conceptualisation can be integrated.Fredrik D. Moe & Paola de Cuzzani - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):707-732.
    The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) uses the conceptualization of psychopathology to make psychiatric diagnoses operational. The use of explicit operational criteria appears to be based on an implicit neo-positivist epistemology. Operationalism involves an excessive focus on quantitative descriptions of behavior manifestations, contesting that psychopathology is understood as a deviation from the normal or the average in a given population. Consequently, the normal and the psychopathological become homogeneous. Our analysis investigates if this neo-positivist epistemology narrows (...)
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  22.  14
    Mental disorders in focus.Daniel Montero-Espinoza - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):545-551.
    This issue contains a book symposium on Anneli Jefferson’s book, Are mental disorders brain disorders?. It is a delight that the symposium brings together a variety of perspectives from philosopher...
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  23. Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):658-683.
    It is widely agreed that obsessive-compulsive disorder involves irrationality. But where in the complex of states and processes that constitutes OCD should this irrationality be located? A pervasive assumption in both the psychiatric and philosophical literature is that the seat of irrationality is located in the obsessive thoughts characteristic of OCD. Building on a puzzle about insight into OCD (Taylor 2022), we challenge this pervasive assumption, and argue instead that the irrationality of OCD is located in the emotions that are (...)
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  24.  15
    Studying the mind through its disorders Psychopathology and philosophy of mind: what mental disorders can tell us about our minds, edited by Valentina Cardella and Amelia Gangemi, Routledge, 2021, 306 pp., 2 B/W Illustrations, 136$ (Hardback), ISBN: 9780367444587 Abingdon, Oxfordshire. [REVIEW]Juliette Vazard - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):733-736.
    By manifesting dysfunctions of fundamental psychological mechanisms such as emotions, reasoning, and language, symptoms of mental disorders can inform us on their nature and functions. In this volume, Valentina Cardella and Amelia Gangemi bring together a collection of articles which draw from psychopathology in order to further our study of the human mind. Contributors include philosophers of mind and language, clinical psychologists, and a historian, all applying their respective methodological tools with the aim of learning from mental disorders about the (...)
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  25.  21
    The how and why of approximating Bayesian ideals.Nicholas Makins - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (2):528-543.
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  26.  42
    Mental disorders as processes: A more suited metaphysics for psychiatry.Elly Vintiadis - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (2):487-504.
    In this paper I argue that thinking in terms of process metaphysics and seeing the mind and mental disorders as processual in nature allows for a more complete understanding of mental disorders than is allowed by non-processual frameworks, while it also allows us to incorporate what we currently know about them. In addition, it can address problems in psychiatry that arise when we ask the wrong kinds of questions that naturally arise within a non-processual metaphysical framework. In this paper I (...)
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  27.  27
    Trusting groups.Matthew Bennett - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):196-215.
    Katherine Hawley was skeptical about group trust. Her main reason for this skepticism was that the distinction between trust and reliance, central to many theories of interpersonal trust, does not apply to trust in groups. Hawley’s skeptical arguments successfully shift the burden of proof to those who wish to continue with a concept of group trust. Nonetheless, I argue that a commitments account of the trust/reliance distinction can shoulder that burden. According to that commitments account, trust is a distinctive kind (...)
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  28.  72
    Therapeutic trust.J. Adam Carter - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):38-61.
    This paper develops and defends a new account of therapeutic trust, its nature and its constitutive norms. Central to the view advanced is a distinction between two kinds of therapeutic trust – default therapeutic trust and overriding therapeutic trust – each which derives from a distinct kind of trusting competence. The new view is shown to have advantages over extant accounts of therapeutic trust, and its relation to standard (non-therapeutic) trust, as defended by Hieronymi, Frost-Arnold, and Jones.
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  29.  31
    Beliefs, values and emotions: An interactive approach to distrust in science.Katherine Furman - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):240-257.
    Previous philosophical work on distrust in science has argued that understanding public distrust in science and scientific interventions requires that we pay careful attention not only to epistemic considerations (that is, beliefs about science), but also to values, and the emotional contexts in which assessments of scientific credibility are made. This is likely to be a truncated list of relevant factors for understanding trust/distrust, but these are certainly key areas of concern. The aim of this paper is not to further (...)
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  30.  35
    Trust as the glue of cognitive institutions.Shaun Gallagher & Enrico Petracca - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):216-239.
    In this paper we consider the importance of trust, in the context of economic institutions, and specifically with respect to questions about market mechanisms and the role of social interactions. We review recent advances in institutional economics closely tied to developments in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, involving extended and enactive cognition. We argue that the analysis of different conceptions of institutional mind extension, in Denzau and North’s shared mental models, Clark’s extended mind, and a more enactive approach that (...)
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  31.  32
    An overview on trust and trustworthiness: individual and institutional dimensions.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):1-17.
    Philosophical Psychology is dedicating this issue on trust and trustworthiness to Katherine Hawley (1971–2021) for two reasons. First, she was an expert in the area. Hawley was one of the most rele...
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  32.  7
    The dynamics of interpersonal trust: Implications for care at times of psychological crisis.Michael Larkin & Zoë Boden-Stuart - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):148-166.
    ABSTRACT“Trust” can describe many different positive features of our social relationships with others. In this exploratory paper, we reflect on some of the ways in which people orient themselves toward others in the context of a psychological crisis, a time when trust may be threatened or eroded. We draw upon qualitative data extracts from two previously reported studies, in order to illustrate and develop some observations about the dynamics of relational trust during such periods of acute distress. We show how (...)
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  33. Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice.Aidan McGlynn - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):126-147.
    A theme running through Katherine Hawley’s recent works on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the relations between these and Miranda Fricker’s notion of testimonial injustice offers a perspective from which we can see several limitations of Fricker’s own account of testimonial injustice. This paper clarifies the aspects of Fricker’s account that Hawley’s criticisms target, focusing on her objections to Fricker’s proposal that its primary harm involves a kind of epistemic objectification and her characterization of testimonial injustice in terms (...)
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  34.  43
    Trust’s Meno problem: Can the doxastic view account for the value of trust?Ross F. Patrizio - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):18-37.
    The doxastic view (DV) of trust maintains that trust essentially involves belief. In a recent paper, Arnon Keren (Citation2020) gestures toward a new objection to the view, labeled Trust’s Meno Problem (TMP), which calls into question the DV’s ability to explain the widely held intuition that trust has distinct and indispensable value. As of yet, there has been no attempt to take up TMP on behalf of DV. This paper aims to fill precisely this lacuna. I do so in three (...)
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  35. An analysis of bias and distrust in social hinge epistemology.Anna Pederneschi - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):258-277.
    Philosophical literature has focused on the concept of trust, but often considers distrust merely as an afterthought. Distrust however, because of its pervasive role in our everyday lives, can be quite damaging. Thus, understanding the rationality of distrust is crucial for understanding our testimonial practices. In this paper I analyze whether it is rational or irrational to distrust an informant on the basis of identity bias. My aim is to show that distrust is irrational when based on negative identity bias. (...)
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  36. Speaker trustworthiness: Shall confidence match evidence?Mélinda Pozzi & Diana Mazzarella - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):102-125.
    Overconfidence is typically damaging to one’s reputation as a trustworthy source of information. Previous research shows that the reputational cost associated with conveying a piece of false information is higher for confident than unconfident speakers. When judging speaker trustworthiness, individuals do not exclusively rely on past accuracy but consider the extent to which speakers expressed a degree of confidence that matched the accuracy of their claims (their “confidence-accuracy calibration”). The present study experimentally examines the interplay between confidence, accuracy and a (...)
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  37. Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation.Mona Simion & Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):87-101.
    Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive (...)
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  38. Negotiating Domains of Trust.Elizabeth Stewart - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):62-86.
    When trust is broken, how should we determine who is at fault? Previous discus- sions of broken trust typically attribute the fault to trusters who place trust foolishly or trustees who act in an untrustworthy manner. These discussions take for granted the ability of the truster and trustee to communicate and understand the boundaries of what is being entrusted, that is, the domain of trust. However, the boundaries of entrusted domains are not always clear to either party which can result (...)
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  39.  24
    Modesty's Inoffensive Self-Presentation.Derick Hughes - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37:1-23.
    Philosophers often characterize modesty as a disposition that primarily or exclusively involves individual attitudes about one’s worth in relation to others. Borrowing from William James, I offer an interpersonal view of modesty that requires an emotional disposition sensitive to causing others offense based upon one’s self-presentation. On this view, modesty is a trait with the following three necessary features: (1) the modest person, A, endorses a norm of self-presentation M, (2) A is justified in believing that another person, B, endorses (...)
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  40.  19
    Norm-induced forgetting: When social norms induce us to forget.Marta Caravà - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    Sometimes subjects have sufficient internal and external resources to retrieve information stored in memory, in particular information that carries socially charged content. Yet, they fail to do so: they forget it. These cases pose an explanatory challenge to common explanations of forgetting in cognitive science. In this paper, I take this challenge and develop a new explanation of these cases. According to this explanation, these cases are best explained as cases of norm-induced forgetting: cases in which forgetting is caused by (...)
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  41.  28
    Reappraisal as a means to self-transcendence: Aquinas’s model of emotion regulation informs the extended process model.Anne Jeffrey, Catherine Marple & Sarah Schnitker - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology.
    Recent work in positive psychology demonstrates the importance of self-transcendence: understanding oneself to be part of something greater than the self, such as a family, community, or tradition of sacred practice. Self-transcendence is positively associated with wellbeing and a sense of meaning and purpose. Philosophers have argued that self-transcendent motivation has a central role in good character, or virtue. Positive psychologists are just now beginning to integrate the aim of developing such motivation in character interventions. In this paper we draw (...)
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  42.  97
    Are dream emotions fitting?Melanie Rosen & Marina Trakas - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology:1-31.
    When we dream, we feel emotions in response to objects and events that exist only in the dream. One key question is whether these emotions can be said to be “essentially unfitting”, that is, always inappropriate to the evoking scenario. However, how we evaluate dream emotions for fittingness may depend on the model of dreams we adopt: the imagination or the hallucination model. If fittingness requires a match between emotion and evaluative properties of objects or events, it is prima facie (...)
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  43. Attentional Discrimination and Victim Testimony.Ella Kate Whiteley - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology.
    Sometimes, a form of discrimination is hard to register, understand, and articulate. A rich precedent demonstrates how victim testimonies have been key in uncovering such “hidden” forms of discrimination, from sexual harassment to microaggressions. I reflect on how this plausibly goes too for “attentional discrimination”, referring to cases where the more meaningful attributes of one social group are made salient in attention in contrast to the less meaningful attributes of another. Victim testimonies understandably dominate the “context-of-discovery” stage of research into (...)
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  44.  4
    Tendril Intentionality.Chauncey Maher - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology.
    In _Representation in Cognitive Science_, Nicholas Shea offers a theory of representation, of what it is for something to be a representation or have intentionality. Some things have intentionality derivatively. They have it in virtue of something else that has it. Not all intentionality can be like this. Some items must have original intentionality. That is what Shea offers a theory of. Near the end of the book, he makes a provocative suggestion about plants: if his theory is correct, then (...)
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  45. Emotions in conceptual spaces.Michał Sikorski & Ohan Hominis - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology.
    The overreliance on verbal models and theories in psychology has been criticized for hindering the development of reliable research programs (Harris, 1976; Yarkoni, 2020). We demonstrate how the conceptual space framework can be used to formalize verbal theories and improve their precision and testability. In the framework, scientific concepts are represented by means of geometric objects. As a case study, we present a formalization of an existing three-dimensional theory of emotion which was developed with a spatial metaphor in mind. Wundt (...)
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  46.  35
    Allegedly impossible experiences.Sofia Jeppsson - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology.
    In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople’s testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they (...)
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