Year:

  1.  7
    Causes of Cultural Disparity: Switches, Tuners, and the Cognitive Science of Religion.Andrew Buskell - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1239-1264.
    Cultural disparity—the variation across cultural traits such as knowledge, skill, and belief—is a complex phenomenon, studied by a number of researchers with an expanding empirical toolkit. While there is a growing consensus as to the processes that generate cultural variation and change, general explanatory frameworks require additional tools for identifying, organising, and relating the complex causes that underpin the production of cultural disparity. Here I develop a case study in the cognitive science of religion, and demonstrate how concepts and distinctions (...)
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  2.  4
    The Multisensory Base of Bodily Coupling in Face-to-Face Social Interactions: Contrasting the Case of Autism with the Möbius Syndrome.Anna Ciaunica, Leonhard Schilbach & Ophelia Deroy - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1162-1187.
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  3.  4
    Confabulation and Rational Obligations for Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1215-1238.
    ABSTRACTThis paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why (...)
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  4.  7
    An a Priori Solution to the Replication Crisis.David Trafimow - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1188-1214.
    ABSTRACTPossibly, the replication crisis constitutes the most important problem in psychology. It calls into question whether psychology is a science. Existing conceptualizations of replicability depend on effect sizes; the larger the population effect size, the greater the probability of replication. This is problematic and contributes to the replication crisis. A different conceptualization, not dependent on population effect sizes, is desirable. The proposed solution features the closeness of sample means to their corresponding population means, in both the original and replication experiments. (...)
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  5.  9
    Rethinking the Explanatory Power of Dynamical Models in Cognitive Science.Dingmar van Eck - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1131-1161.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical (...)
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  6.  7
    Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content.Martin Weichold - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1265-1268.
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  7.  3
    Effect of Stress on a Cognitive Autopoietic System.Juan Fernando Cardenas - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1074-1096.
    ABSTRACTA cognitive autopoietic system is a dynamic, self-generating, organized and self-organizing thing which self-regulates with respect to an external medium. The present model of the effect of stress on a cognitive autopoietic system captures the notion of how a priori cognitive structures, combined with external sensations, constitute the basis for the development of cognitive structures and their architecture. The ESCA model integrates the fact that the mind–environment relation has a twofold effect: on one hand, it enables self-regulation of mind, but (...)
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  8.  8
    Moral Psychology of the Fading Affect Bias.Andrew J. Corsa & W. Richard Walker - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1097-1113.
    We argue that many of the benefits theorists have attributed to the ability to forget should instead be attributed to what psychologists call the “fading affect bias,” namely the tendency for the negative emotions associated with past events to fade more substantially than the positive emotions associated with those events. Our principal contention is that the disposition to display the fading affect bias is normatively good. Those who possess it tend to lead better lives and more effectively improve their societies. (...)
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  9.  5
    Detection, Not Perception: A Reply to Glazer.Eric Funkhouser - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1120-1125.
    ABSTRACTThis article responds to Glazer’s claim that signals must be perceptible as well as his purported counterexample to my conditions for signaling. I defend a broader sense of signal detection that allows for imperceptible signals. While we disagree over the belief-signaling thesis, Glazer and I have great agreement over the social functions of belief.
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  10.  5
    Are Beliefs Signals?Trip Glazer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1114-1119.
    ABSTRACTEric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false.
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  11.  1
    Dispositional Optimism and Luck Attributions: Implications for Philosophical Theories of Luck.Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1027-1045.
    ABSTRACTWe conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism (...)
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  12.  11
    Showing Our Seams: A Reply to Eric Funkhouser.Neil Levy - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):991-1006.
    ABSTRACTIn a recent paper published in this journal, Eric Funkhouser argues that some of our beliefs have the primary function of signaling to others, rather than allowing us to navigate the world. Funkhouser’s case is persuasive. However, his account of beliefs as signals is underinclusive, omitting both beliefs that are signals to the self and less than full-fledged beliefs as signals. The latter set of beliefs, moreover, has a better claim to being considered as constituting a psychological kind in its (...)
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  13.  6
    The Sound-Board Account of Reasoning: A One-System Alternative to Dual-Process Theory.Joshua Mugg - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1046-1073.
    ABSTRACTIn order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed (...)
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  14.  1
    Addiction: A Philosophical Perspective, by Candice L. Shelby, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016, 207 Pp., $109.99 , ISBN: 9781137552846. [REVIEW]Stephen Setman - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1126-1129.
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  15.  7
    Helplessness: The Inability to Know-That You Don’T Know-How.Amos Arieli & Yochai Ataria - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):948-968.
    The sense of helplessness stands at the very core of the traumatic experience. This paper suggests that a sense of helplessness arises when, despite the functioning of the cognitive system and awareness of circumstances and feelings, an individual is unable to access practical knowledge. As a result, the subject becomes a victim of one’s own inability to perform, or act, in the real world.
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  16. Beliefs as Inner Causes: The (Lack of) Evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.
    Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as (...)
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  17. Distributed Learning: Educating and Assessing Extended Cognitive Systems.Richard Heersmink & Simon Knight - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):969-990.
    Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualising how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalising cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how (...)
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  18.  20
    Is Compatibilism Intuitive?Daniel Lim & Ju Chen - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):878-897.
    Eddy Nahmias, with various collaborators, has used experimental data to argue for the claim that folk intuition is generally compatibilist. We try to undermine this claim in two ways. First, we argue that the various formulations of determinism he uses are not conceptually equivalent, jeopardizing the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from the resulting data. Second, prompted by these conceptual worries we supplement the typical quantitative surveys that dominate the extant literature with short qualitative interviews. This, in turn, (...)
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  19.  5
    Alignment and Commitment in Joint Action.Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):831-849.
    Important work on alignment systems has been applied to philosophical work on joint action by Tollefsen and Dale. This paper builds from and expands on their work. The first aim of the paper is to spell out how the empirical research on alignment may be integrated into philosophical theories of joint action. The second aim is then to develop a successful characterization of joint action, which spells out the difference between genuine joint action and simpler forms of coordination based on (...)
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  20.  32
    Happiness, Pleasures, and Emotions.Mauro Rossi - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):898-919.
    In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...)
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  21.  4
    Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence From Experience.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):920-947.
    ABSTRACTEmpiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of monothematic (...)
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  22.  3
    Collective Intentionality: A Basic and Early Component of Moral Evolution.Christopher Boehm - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):680-702.
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  23.  28
    “Second-Personal Morality” and Morality.Stephen Darwall - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):804-816.
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  24.  2
    Remarks on Joint Commitment and its Relation to Moral Thinking.Margaret Gilbert - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):755-766.
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  25.  2
    The Origins of Morality: Social Equality, Fairness, and Justice.Melanie Killen - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):767-803.
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  26.  15
    Naturalizing Tomasello’s History of Morality.Philip Pettit - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):722-735.
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  27.  5
    From Shared Intentionality to Moral Obligation? Some Worries.Neil Roughley - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):736-754.
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  28.  7
    Socioecological Pressures, Proximal Psychological Mechanisms and Moral Normativity. Situating Tomasello’s Natural History of Human Morality.Neil Roughley - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):639-660.
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  29.  1
    Response to Commentators.Michael Tomasello - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):817-829.
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  30.  9
    Precís of a Natural History of Human Morality.Michael Tomasello - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):661-668.
    ABSTRACTHere I summarize the main points in my 2016 book, A Natural History of Human Morality. Taking an evolutionary point of view, I characterize human morality as a special form of cooperation. In particular, human morality represents a kind of we > me orientation and valuation that emanates from the logic of social interdependence, both at the level of individual collaboration and at the level of the cultural group. Human morality emanates from psychological processes of shared intentionality evolved to enable (...)
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  31.  1
    The Moral Capacity as a Biological Adaptation: A Commentary on Tomasello.Carel P. van Schaik & Judith M. Burkart - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):703-721.
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  32.  2
    Multilevel Selection and Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Morality: A Translation Manual.David Sloan Wilson - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):669-679.
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  33.  83
    Religious Authority and the Transmission of Abstract God Concepts.Nathan Cofnas - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):609-628.
    According to the Standard Model account of religion, religious concepts tend to conform to “minimally counterintuitive” schemas. Laypeople may, to varying degrees, verbally endorse the abstract doctrines taught by professional theologians. But, outside the Sunday school exam room, the implicit representations that tend to guide people’s everyday thinking, feeling, and behavior are about minimally counterintuitive entities. According to the Standard Model, these implicit representations are the essential thing to be explained by the cognitive science of religion. It is argued here (...)
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  34.  35
    Knowledge and Availability.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573.
    The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.
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  35.  19
    Is the Sense of Bodily Ownership Related to Pre-Reflective Bodily Awareness? A Reply to Kuhle.Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):629-637.
    There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily awareness: the sense of bodily (...)
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  36.  10
    Are Emotions Perceptions of Value ? A Review Essay of Christine Tappolet’s Emotions, Values, and Agency.Charlie Kurth, Haley Crosby & Jack Basse - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):483-499.
    In Emotions, Values, and Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.
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  37.  2
    New Perspectives on Theories Linking Cognition, Emotion, and Context: A Proposal From the Theory of Analysis of Demand.Laura Petitta, Valerio Ghezzi & Lixin Jiang - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):505-532.
    Both scholars and practitioners acknowledge that the major factors explaining behavior are cognition, emotion, and context. However, existing theories tend to only focus on a combination of two. Furthermore, not all models are rooted in a specific theory of mind. Finally, there is no consistent definition of ‘mind.’ To address these issues, we review the major models explaining behavior. We then describe the Theory of Analysis of Demand, an interactionist model of functioning of mind that thoroughly addresses the conjoint interplay (...)
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  38.  13
    Do We Need Visual Subjects?Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):574-594.
    It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called, “Many Properties problem”, i.e. it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some elements of content as subjects, to which (...)
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  39.  6
    Reply to Kurth, Crosby, and Basse’s Review of Emotions, Values, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):500-504.
    In this reply, I argue that the worries raised by Kurth and this coauthors are not fatal for the perceptual theory of emotions. A first point to keep in mind in discussing the analogy argument in favor of that account is that what counts is the overall balance of similarities and differences, given their respective weight. In any case, I argue that none of the alleged differences between sensory perceptual experiences and emotions are such as to rule out that emotions (...)
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  40.  33
    Emotion as the Categorical Basis for Moral Thought.Demian Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):533-553.
    I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.
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  41.  11
    A New Look at the Attribution of Moral Responsibility: The Underestimated Relevance of Social Roles.Pascale Willemsen, Albert Newen & Kai Kaspar - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):595-608.
    What are the main features that influence our attribution of moral responsibility? It is widely accepted that there are various factors which strongly influence our moral judgments, such as the agent’s intentions, the consequences of the action, the causal involvement of the agent, and the agent’s freedom and ability to do otherwise. In this paper, we argue that this picture is incomplete: We argue that social roles are an additional key factor that is radically underestimated in the extant literature. We (...)
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  42.  6
    The Multiple Realization Book.Danny Booth - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):431-445.
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  43.  9
    Criterial Problems in Creative Cognition Research.Melvin Chen - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):368-382.
    In creative cognition research, the Romantic view about creative cognition is traditionally rejected in favor of the modern view. The modern view about creative cognition maintains that creativity is neither mysterious nor unintelligible and that it is indeed susceptible to analysis. The paradigmatic objects of analysis in creative cognition research have been creative output and the creative process. The degree of creativity of an output is assessed in accordance with certain criterial definitions. The degree of creativity of a cognitive process (...)
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  44.  11
    Marr, Mayr, and MR: What Functionalism Should Now Be About.M. Chirimuuta - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):403-418.
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  45.  4
    Some Concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s View.Mark Couch - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430.
    This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors’ framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say about (...)
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  46. The Good of Boredom.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):323-351.
    I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.
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  47.  63
    Two Types of Debunking Arguments.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):383-402.
    Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories (...)
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  48.  17
    Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion.Polina Kukar - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):479-482.
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  49.  7
    Epistemic Presentism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):458-478.
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  50.  7
    Responses to Critics.Thomas Polger & Lawrence Shapiro - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):446-457.
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  51.  19
    Two Flaws Concerning Belief Accounts of Implicit Biases.Baston Rene - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):352-367.
    The current scientific discourse offers two opposing viewpoints about the roots of implicit biases: are they belief states or subdoxastic attitudes? The goal of this paper is to show that belief accounts of implicit biases are too demanding and lack a satisfying reasoning theory. Firstly, I will outline the concept of attitude and its relation to implicit biases. Next, I will briefly outline Mendelbaum’s view, who gives a paradigmatic example of a belief account of implicit biases. Afterward, I will concern (...)
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  52.  86
    The Elements of Emotion.Chad Brockman - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):163-186.
    I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion. In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three (...)
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  53.  27
    What Kind of Kind is Intelligence?Serpico Davide - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):232-252.
    The model of human intelligence that is most widely adopted derives from psychometrics and behavioral genetics. This standard approach conceives intelligence as a general cognitive ability that is genetically highly heritable and describable using quantitative traits analysis. The paper analyzes intelligence within the debate on natural kinds and contends that the general intelligence conceptualization does not carve psychological nature at its joints. Moreover, I argue that this model assumes an essentialist perspective. As an alternative, I consider an HPC theory of (...)
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  54.  74
    Philosophical Expertise Beyond Intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.
    In what sense, if any, are philosophers experts in their domain of research and what could philosophical expertise be? The above questions are particularly pressing given recent methodological disputes in philosophy. The so-called expertise defense recently proposed as a reply to experimental philosophers postulates that philosophers are experts qua having improved intuitions. However, this model of philosophical expertise has been challenged by studies suggesting that philosophers’ intuitions are no less prone to biases and distortions than intuitions of non-philosophers. Should we (...)
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  55.  25
    Nozick’s Experience Machine: An Empirical Study.Frank Hindriks & Igor Douven - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):278-298.
    Many philosophers deny that happiness can be equated with pleasurable experiences. Nozick introduced an experience machine thought experiment to support the idea that happiness requires pleasurable experiences that are “in contact with reality.” In this thought experiment, people can choose to plug into a machine that induces exclusively pleasurable experiences. We test Nozick’s hypothesis that people will reject this offer. We also contrast Nozick’s experience machine scenario with scenarios that are less artificial, and offer options which are less invasive or (...)
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  56.  14
    The Paradoxical Self: Awareness, Solipsism and First-Rank Symptoms in Schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):210-231.
    Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought insertion (...)
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  57.  31
    The Implications of Rejecting Free Will: An Empirical Analysis.Stephen Morris - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):299-321.
    While skeptical arguments concerning free will have been a common element of philosophical discourse for thousands of years, one could make the case that such arguments have never been more numerous or forceful than at present. In response to these skeptical attacks, some philosophers and psychologists have expressed concern that the widespread acceptance of such skeptical attitudes could have devastating social consequences. In this paper, I set out to address whether such concerns are well-founded. I argue that there is reason (...)
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  58.  10
    What is Reflective Self-Awareness For? Role Expectation for Situational Collaboration in Alliance Animal Society.Shanyang Zhao - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):187-209.
    Most research on animal self-awareness focuses on the question of what self-awareness is, however, the present study addresses the question of what self-awareness is for. It is argued that different forms of self-awareness are needed for conspecific collaboration in different types of animal societies. In the order of the increasing level of fluidity in conspecific cooperation, animal societies are divided into three main types: caste society, individualized society, and alliance society. Accordingly, three forms of self-awareness are differentiated: awareness of one’s (...)
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  59.  6
    Neuro-Philosophy and the Healthy Mind: Learning From the Unwell Brain. [REVIEW] Da Dong & Hengwei Li - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):154-158.
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  60.  5
    Neuro-Philosophy and the Healthy Mind: Learning From the Unwell Brain.Hengwei da DongLi - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):154-158.
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  61.  11
    The Construction of Human Kinds. [REVIEW]Lacey J. Davidson - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):143-146.
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  62.  29
    Lottery Judgments: A Philosophical and Experimental Study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.
    In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects’ judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and “mixed” evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people’s lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to (...)
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  63.  16
    Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind and Empirical Research. [REVIEW]Doğan Erişen - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):150-154.
  64.  5
    Extraordinary Science and Psychiatry: Responses to the Crisis in Mental Health Research. [REVIEW]Phoebe Friesen - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):146-150.
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  65.  48
    Can You Believe It? Illusionism and the Illusion Meta-Problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...)
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  66.  24
    Mental Representation and Two Kinds of Eliminativism.Jonny Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):1-24.
    The battle over the proper place of mental representation in cognitive science is often portrayed as a clash between realism and eliminativism. But this simple dichotomy belies the variety of different ontological positions available. This article investigates the various stances that one can adopt toward the ontology of mental representation, and in so doing, shows that eliminativism is in fact best understood as two distinct positions: a posteriori eliminativism and a priori eliminativism. Furthermore, I show that a priori eliminativism faces (...)
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  67.  15
    21% Versus 79%: Explaining Philosophy’s Gender Disparities with Stereotyping and Identification.Debbie Ma, Clennie Webster, Nanae Tachibe & Robert Gressis - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):68-88.
    This study tests the hypothesis that the perception of philosophy as a male-oriented discipline contributes to the pronounced gender disparity within the field. To assess the hypothesis, we determined the extent to which individuals view philosophy as masculine, and whether individual differences in this correspond with greater identification with philosophy. We also tested whether identification with philosophy correlated to interest in it. We discovered, first, that the more women view philosophy as masculine, the less they identify with it, and second, (...)
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  68.  18
    Reflexive Theories of Consciousness and Unconscious Perception.Graham Peebles - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):25-43.
    A core commitment of the reflexive theory of consciousness is that conscious states are themselves necessarily the contents of mental states. The strongest argument for this claim—the necessity of inner-content for consciousness—is the argument from unconscious perception. According to this argument, we find evidence for the necessity claim from cases of alleged unconscious perception, the most well-known and widely discussed of these being blindsight. However, the reflexive theory cannot partake in this argument and therefore, must rely on at least one (...)
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  69.  22
    The Experimental Critique and Philosophical Practice.Tinghao Wang - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):89-109.
    Some experimental philosophers have criticized the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy. One worry about this criticism is that it is just another version of the general skepticism toward the evidential efficacy of intuition, and is thereby subject to the same difficulties. In response, Weinberg provides a more nuanced version of the criticism by targeting merely the philosophical use of intuition. I contend that, though Weinberg’s approach differs from general skepticism about intuition, its focus on philosophical practices gives rise to a (...)
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  70.  8
    Cognitive Pluralism. [REVIEW]Daniel Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):139-143.
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  71.  3
    Confabulation and Rational Requirements for Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology.
    This paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why (...)
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  72.  88
    Are the States Underlying Implicit Biases Unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian Answer.Beate Krickel - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic for implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski et al. (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious (...)
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