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  1.  65
    Time, and Time Again.Sam Baron & Yi-Cheng Lin - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):259-282.
    A number of philosophers uphold a metaphysical symmetry between time and hypertime, in this sense: in so far as hypertime exists, the nature of hypertime should agree with the nature of time. Others allow that we can mix and match the metaphysics of time and hypertime. Thus, it may be that time really passes, but hypertime does not or vice versa. In this paper, we provide a preliminary defense of the mix and match approach. We outline a number of arguments (...)
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  2.  13
    I, Volkswagen.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):283-304.
    Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don’t hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don’t hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call ‘moral self-awareness’. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives seem to lack the capacity for moral self-awareness. I solve the problem by giving an account of how collectives have (...)
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  3.  21
    Aristotle on the Concept of Shared Life.Sophia Connell - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):508-511.
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  4.  31
    Gene Editing, Identity and Benefit.Thomas Douglas & Katrien Devolder - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):305-325.
    Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion—the benefit argument—and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in which the gene-edited child would have been brought (...)
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  5.  1
    Gene Editing, Identity and Benefit.Thomas Douglas & Katrien Devolder - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):305-325.
    Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion—the benefit argument—and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in which the gene-edited child would have been brought (...)
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  6. The Varieties of Agnosticism.Filippo Ferrari & Luca Incurvati - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):365-380.
    We provide a framework for understanding agnosticism. The framework accounts for the varieties of agnosticism while vindicating the unity of the phenomenon. This combination of unity and plurality is achieved by taking the varieties of agnosticism to be represented by several agnostic stances, all of which share a common core provided by what we call the minimal agnostic attitude. We illustrate the fruitfulness of the framework by showing how it can be applied to several philosophical debates. In particular, several philosophical (...)
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  7.  8
    Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making.Sarah A. Fisher - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):512-514.
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  8.  20
    The Metaphysics of Quantities.Toby Friend - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):515-519.
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  9.  40
    Persistence Without Personhood: A New Model.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):346-364.
    I am a person. But am I fundamentally and essentially a person? The animalist says no. So must the phenomenal continuity theorist, or so I will argue. Even if, contra animalism, we cannot survive zombification, being a subject of experience is not sufficient for being a person, and phenomenal continuity is not sufficient for our survival as the same person over time. These observations point the way to a positive account of personhood, and provide further insight into the conditions under (...)
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  10.  14
    Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture.Anthony Simon Laden - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):520-522.
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  11.  55
    Authorial Intention, Readers’ Creation, and Reference Shift.Jeonggyu Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):381-401.
    This paper deals with the identity problems of fictional objects, focusing on Anthony Everett's and Stuart Brock's leading criticisms against fictional creationism, the view that fictional objects are abstract objects created by our acts involving literary practices. My primary aim is to argue that creationism based on referentialism has enough resources to individuate fictional objects and hence can address the alleged identity problems: every alleged problematic case regarding the identity of fictional objects is well explained in terms of the notions (...)
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  12.  12
    Guided by Voices. Moral Testimony, Advice, and Forging a ‘We’.Gloria Mähringer - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):523-525.
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  13.  59
    Augustine’s Master Argument for the Incorporeality of the Mind.Tamer Nawar - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):422-440.
    In De Trinitate 10, Augustine offers an argument that seemingly proceeds from certain premises about self-knowledge to the conclusion that the mind is incorporeal. Although the argument has sometimes been compared to later Cartesian arguments, it has received relatively little philosophical attention. In this paper, I offer a detailed analysis and original interpretation of Augustine's argument and argue that it is not vulnerable to some of the main objections which have been raised against it. I go on to argue that (...)
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  14. Agency, Power, and Injustice in Metalinguistic Disagreement.Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):1- 24.
    In this paper, I explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. This occurs when one speaker has greater control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in a context. I argue that some forms of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement are deeply worrying, namely those that involves certain power imbalances. In such cases, a speaker possesses illegitimate control in metalinguistic disagreement owing to the operation of identity prejudice. I call this metalinguistic injustice. The wrong involves restricting a speaker from participating (...)
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  15.  33
    Death, Creation, and Future Bias.Michael Rabenberg - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):465-477.
    A much discussed question in the philosophy of death is whether both of the following claims are true: (1) it is at least typically appropriate to prefer dying further in the future to dying less far in the future; and (2) it is at least typically appropriate not to prefer having been created further in the past to having been created less far in the past. Some philosophers have tried to defend (1) and (2) by appeal to the alleged appropriateness (...)
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  16. Why We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action.Matthew Rachar & Javier Gomez Lavin - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):478-507.
    What do we owe each other when we act together? According to normativists about collective action, necessarily something and potentially quite a bit. They contend that collective action inherently involves a special normative status amongst participants, which may, for example, involve mutual obligations to receive the concurrence of the others before leaving. We build on recent empirical work whose results lend plausibility to a normativist account by further investigating the specific package of mutual obligations associated with collective action according to (...)
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  17.  20
    The Value of Emotions for Knowledge.Steffen Steinert - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):526-528.
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  18. Quantum Gravity and Mereology: Not So Simple.Sam Baron & Baptiste Le Bihan - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):19-40.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of extended simples on the grounds that they are needed by fundamental physics. The arguments typically appeal to theories of quantum gravity. To date, the argument in favour of extended simples has ignored the fact that the very existence of spacetime is put under pressure by quantum gravity. We thus consider the case for extended simples in the context of different views on the existence of spacetime. We show that the case for (...)
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  19.  69
    Saving Sensitivity.Brett Topey - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):177-196.
    Sensitivity has sometimes been thought to be a highly epistemologically significant property, serving as a proxy for a kind of responsiveness to the facts that ensure that the truth of our beliefs isn’t just a lucky coincidence. But it's an imperfect proxy: there are various well-known cases in which sensitivity-based anti-luck conditions return the wrong verdicts. And as a result of these failures, contemporary theorists often dismiss such conditions out of hand. I show here, though, that a sensitivity-based understanding of (...)
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