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  1.  6
    Comments on Talking to Our Selves by John Doris.Nomy Arpaly - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):753-757.
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  2.  52
    Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.
    Valence is a central component of all affective states, including pains, pleasures, emotions, moods, and feelings of desire or repulsion.This paper has two main goals. One is to suggest that enough is now known about the causes, consequences, and properties of valence to indicate that it forms a unitary natural-psychological kind, one that seemingly plays a fundamental role in motivating all kinds of intentional action. If this turns out to be true, then the correct characterization of the nature of valence (...)
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  3.  14
    Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas.Raffaella De Rosa - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):704-723.
    Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate and caused in us by bodies. Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating two questions that need to be kept distinct while inquiring about the (...)
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  4.  6
    Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas.Raffaella De Rosa - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):704-723.
    Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate and caused in us by bodies. Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating two questions that need to be kept distinct while inquiring about the (...)
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  5.  8
    Précis of Talking to Our Selves.John M. Doris - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):751-752.
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  6.  8
    Making Do Without : A Response to Arpaly, Tiberius, and Kane.John M. Doris - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):771-790.
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  7.  48
    Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.
    In this paper I revisit Gilbert Harman's arguments for a "clutter avoidance" norm. The norm -- which says that we ought to avoid cluttering our minds with trivialities -- is widely endorsed. I argue that it has some fairly dramatic consequences for normative epistemology.
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  8.  12
    What Makes a Person Liable to Defensive Harm?Kerah Gordon‐Solmon - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):543-567.
    On Jeff McMahan's influential ‘responsibility account’ of moral liability to defensive killing, one can forfeit one's right not be killed by engaging in an ordinary, morally permissible risk-imposing activity, such as driving a car. If, through no fault of hers, a driver's car veers out of control and toward a pedestrian, the account deems it no violation of the driver's right to save the pedestrian's life at the expense of the driver's life. Many critics reject the responsibility account on the (...)
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  9.  1
    What Makes a Person Liable to Defensive Harm?Kerah Gordon‐Solmon - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):543-567.
    On Jeff McMahan's influential ‘responsibility account’ of moral liability to defensive killing, one can forfeit one's right not be killed by engaging in an ordinary, morally permissible risk-imposing activity, such as driving a car. If, through no fault of hers, a driver's car veers out of control and toward a pedestrian, the account deems it no violation of the driver's right to save the pedestrian's life at the expense of the driver's life. Many critics reject the responsibility account on the (...)
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  10.  60
    Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.
    Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional (...)
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  11.  8
    Selfhood, Agency, and Responsibility: Reflections on John Doris’ Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency.Robert Kane - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):765-770.
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  12.  29
    Strong Contextual Felicity and Felicitous Underspecification.Jeffrey C. King - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):631-657.
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  13.  28
    How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):681-703.
    According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” or “crazy”. A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason (...)
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  14.  4
    Comments on John Doris, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency.Valerie Tiberius - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):758-764.
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  15.  21
    Embodied Agency.Hong Yu Wong - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):584-612.
    Is bodily awareness a condition on bodily action? I approach this question by weaving an argument based on considerations from action theory, the phenomenology of embodied agency, and from the psychology and neuroscience of action. In this paper, I discuss two accounts on which bodily awareness is a condition on bodily action. The first is an influential philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy, which claims that bodily awareness is necessary for the online control of bodily action. I argue that there are empirical (...)
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  16.  16
    Comments on Emotions, Values, and Agency by Christine Tappolet.Nomy Arpaly - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):520-524.
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  17.  27
    Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification.Alexandria Boyle - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):284-303.
    That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self-aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self-awareness in question is psychological or bodily self-awareness. This paper argues that whilst self-recognition does not require psychological self-awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self-awareness would leave something out. That is that self-recognition requires ‘objective self-awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self-identification and so are (...)
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  18.  18
    The Logical Problem and the Theoretician's Dilemma.Hayley Clatterbuck - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):322-350.
    The theory-theory of human uniqueness posits that the capacity to theorize, in a way strongly analogous to theorizing in scientific practice, was a key innovation in the hominid lineage and was responsible for many of our unique cognitive traits. One of the central arguments that its proponents have used to support the claim that animals are not theorists, the logical problem, bears strong similarities to Hempel's theoretician's dilemma, which purports to show that theories are unnecessary. This similarity threatens to undermine (...)
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  19.  12
    The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts.John Cusbert & Kristie Miller - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):410-432.
    The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the (...)
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  20.  51
    Propositions Are Not Simple.Matt Duncan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):351-366.
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  21.  15
    Remembering Events: A Reidean Account of Memory.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):304-321.
    Thomas Reid offers an explanation of how memory of events is possible. This paper presents, criticize,s and amends his view that memory not only preserves our knowledge of the external world, but also contributes to such knowledge, by being essential for the perception of events. Reid’s views on memory are in line with his generalanti-skeptical commitments, and thus attractive, for several reasons. One reason is that, just like perception, memory is not infallible, but it can constitute or, at least, ground (...)
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  22.  17
    Neo‐Pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions.Joshua Gert - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):454-478.
    This paper offers a neo-pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo-pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, (...)
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  23. Social Construction and Grounding.Aaron M. Griffith - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):393-409.
    The aim of this paper is to bring recent work on metaphysical grounding to bear on the phenomenon of social construction. It is argued that grounding can be used to analyze social construction and that the grounding framework is helpful for articulating various claims and commitments of social constructionists, especially about social identities, e.g., gender and race. The paper also responds to a number of objections that have been leveled against the application of grounding to social construction from Elizabeth Barnes, (...)
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  24.  8
    Manifesting Emotion.David Hunter - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):507-511.
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  25.  17
    Constructivism, Strict Compliance, and Realistic Utopianism.Ben Laurence - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):433-453.
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  26. Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
    After presenting evidence about categorization behavior, this paper argues for the following theses: 1) that there is a border between perception and cognition; 2) that the border is to be characterized by perception being modular (and cognition not being so); 3) that perception outputs conceptualized representations, so views that posit that the output of perception is solely non-conceptual are false; and 4) that perceptual content consists of basic-level categories and not richer contents.
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  27.  9
    The Value of Reactive Attitudes: Critical Response to Christine Tappolet's Emotions, Values and Agency.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):512-519.
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  28.  17
    On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information.Ittay Nissan‐Rozen - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):479-493.
    I argue—from a Humean perspective—for the falsity of what I call the “Admissibility of Historical Information Thesis”. According to the AHIT, propositions that describe past events are always admissible with respect to propositions that describe future events. I first demonstrate that this thesis has some counter-intuitive implications and argue that a Humean can explain the intuitive attractiveness of the AHIT by arguing that it results from a wrong understanding of the concept of chance. I then demonstrate how a Humean “best (...)
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  29.  9
    Emotions, Reasons, and Epistemology.Gopal Sreenivasan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):500-506.
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  30.  15
    Précis of Emotions, Values, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):494-499.
  31.  6
    Replies.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):525-537.
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  32.  34
    Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.
    According to a popular closure principle for epistemic justification, if one is justified in believing each of the premises in set Φ and one comes to believe that ψ on the basis of competently deducing ψ from Φ—while retaining justified beliefs in the premises—then one is justified in believing that ψ. This principle is prima facie compelling; it seems to capture the sense in which competent deduction is an epistemically secure means to extend belief. However, even the single-premise version of (...)
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  33. Upward Grounding.T. Scott Dixon - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):48-78.
    Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond (...)
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  34. Truths Qua Grounds.Ghislain Guigon - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):99-125.
    A number of philosophers have recently found it congenial to talk in terms of grounding. Grounding discourse features grounding sentences that are answers to questions about what grounds what. The goal of this article is to explore and defend a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of grounding discourse. We are familiar with David Lewis's applications of the method of counterpart theory to de re modal discourse. Counterpart-theoretic interpretations of de re modal idioms and grounding sentences share similar motivations, mechanisms, and applications. I shall (...)
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  35.  21
    Acts According to Hyman.Jennifer Hornsby - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):238-242.
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  36.  12
    Replies to My Critics.John Hyman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):249-261.
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  37.  13
    Précis of Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):237-237.
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  38. Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):79-98.
    Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind. Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as an awareness of a tree or an awareness of an awareness of (...)
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  39.  17
    Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):150-171.
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
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  40. What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.
    When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too (...)
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  41. Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
    According to a view I’ll call Epistemic Normativism, knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues against EN in two stages and defends a positive non-normativist alternative. After clarifying the target in §1, I consider in §2 some arguments for EN from the premise that knowledge entails justification. I first raise some worries about inferring constitution from entailment. I then rehearse the reasons why some epistemologists reject the Entailment Thesis (...)
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  42.  33
    In Defense of De Se Content.Stephan Torre - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):172-189.
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  43.  63
    Hyman on Knowledge and Ability.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):243-248.
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  44.  1
    Motherhood and Mistakes About Defeasible Duties to Benefit.Fiona Woollard - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):126-149.
    Discussion of the behaviour of pregnant women and mothers, in academic literature, medical advice given to mothers, mainstream media and social media, assumes that a mother who fails to do something to benefit her child is liable for moral criticism unless she can provide sufficient countervailing considerations to justify her decision. I reconstruct the normally implicit reasoning that leads to this assumption and show that it is mistaken. First, I show that the discussion assumes that if any action might benefit (...)
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  45.  14
    Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.
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  46.  21
    Do Not Revise Ockham's Razor Without Necessity.Sam Baron & Jonathan Tallant - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):596-619.
    Ockham's razor asks that we not multiply entities beyond necessity. The razor is a powerful methodological tool, enabling us to articulate reasons for preferring one theory to another. There are those, however, who would modify the razor. Schaffer, for one, tells us that, ‘I think the proper rendering of Ockham's razor should be ‘Do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity’’. Our aim, here, is to challenge such re-workings of Ockham's razor.
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  47.  20
    The Dominance Principle in Epistemic Decision Theory.R. A. Briggs - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):763-775.
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  48. Essentialism and the Nonidentity Problem.Shamik Dasgupta - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):540-570.
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  49.  12
    Remarks on Richard Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.James M. Joyce - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):755-762.
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  50.  6
    Comments on Richard Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Matthew Kotzen - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):776-783.
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  51.  4
    Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):749-754.
  52.  7
    Replies to Commentators on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):784-800.
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  53.  13
    Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
    Much has been written about Kemp Smith's famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has (...)
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  54.  4
    Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
    Much has been written about Kemp Smith's famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has (...)
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  55. Aesthetic Testimony and the Test of Time.Jon Robson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):729-748.
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  56.  81
    The Will to Make‐Believe: Religious Fictionalism, Religious Beliefs, and the Value of Art.Andrea Sauchelli - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):620-635.
    I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make-believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may include certain acts of pretence. I also argue that a plausible reason to be (...)
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  57. An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.
    The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness—a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order propositions. The argument for this will require a generalization of (...)
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  58.  27
    Evidence and Inference.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):299-317.
    I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend our knowledge. This entails Williamson's equation of knowledge with evidence.
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  59.  15
    The Adequacy of Resemblance Nominalism About Perfect Naturalness.Ralf Busse - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):443-469.
    Resemblance Nominalism About Perfect Naturalness is the view that perfect naturalness of classes is best defined by a conceptual primitive of resemblance between particulars. The adequacy of RNPN is defended by outlining nominalism as the strictly anti-constitutive view that the particulars’ being the fundamental ways they are is not constituted by anything further, supplying a doubly plural contrastive and graded resemblance predicate that allows for a definition of perfect naturalness on an actualist basis, and proving a representation and a uniqueness (...)
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  60.  17
    Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):276-298.
    Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of (...)
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  61.  42
    Distinguishing Knowledge Possession and Knowledge Attribution: The Difference Metaphilosophy Makes.Kristie Dotson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):475-482.
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  62.  38
    Simple Probabilistic Promotion.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379.
    Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to (...)
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  63.  65
    Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.Michela Massimi - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):342-359.
    In this paper, I assess recent claims in philosophy of science about scientific perspectivism being compatible with realism. I clarify the rationale for scientific perspectivism and the problems and challenges that perspectivism faces in delivering a form of realism. In particular, I concentrate my attention on truth, and on ways in which truth can be understood in perspectival terms. I offer a cost-benefit analysis of each of them and defend a version that in my view is most promising in living (...)
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  64.  88
    The Epistemology of Propaganda.Rachel McKinnon - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):483-489.
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  65.  24
    Rethinking Propaganda and Ideology: Some Comments on Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works.Charles W. Mills - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):490-496.
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  66.  15
    Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):318-341.
    Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type, where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in a theory that accommodates the idea (...)
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  67.  22
    How Propaganda Works, Precis.Jason Stanley - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):470-474.
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  68.  18
    Replies.Jason Stanley - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):497-511.
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  69. Intellectual Humility as Attitude.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):399-420.
    Intellectual humility, I argue in this paper, is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward one's cognitive make-up and its components, together with the cognitive and affective states that constitute their contents or bases, which serve knowledge and value-expressive functions. In order to defend this new account of humility I first examine two simpler traits: intellectual self-acceptance of epistemic limitations and intellectual modesty about epistemic successes. The position defended here addresses the shortcomings of both ignorance and accuracy based accounts of (...)
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  70. Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
    Some philosophers have argued that putative logical disagreements aren't really disagreements at all since when you change your logic you thereby change the meanings of your logical constants. According to this picture classical logicians and intuitionists don't really disagree, they just mean different things by terms like “not” and “or”. Quine gave an infamous “translation argument” for this view. Here I clarify the change of logic, change of meaning (CLCM) thesis, examine and find fault with Quine's translation argument for the (...)
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  71.  14
    Précis of Senses of the Subject.Judith Butler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):214-214.
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  72.  22
    Reply From Judith Butler.Judith Butler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):243-249.
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  73. Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...)
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  74.  50
    Melancholy Whiteness.Kate Manne - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):233-242.
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  75.  29
    Hard Problems Between Minds and Bodies.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):224-232.
  76.  43
    The Ineffable and the Ethical.Amia Srinivasan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):215-223.
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  77. The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
    For many epistemologists, and for many philosophers more broadly, it is axiomatic that rationality requires you to take the doxastic attitudes that your evidence supports. Yet there is also another current in our talk about rationality. On this usage, rationality is a matter of the right kind of coherence between one's mental attitudes. Surprisingly little work in epistemology is explicitly devoted to answering the question of how these two currents of talk are related. But many implicitly assume that evidence -responsiveness (...)
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  78.  79
    Phenomenal Externalism's Explanatory Power.Peter W. Ross - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):613-630.
    I argue that phenomenal externalism is preferable to phenomenal internalism on the basis of externalism's explanatory power with respect to qualitative character. I argue that external qualities, namely, external physical properties that are qualitative independent of consciousness, are necessary to explain qualitative character, and that phenomenal externalism is best understood as accepting external qualities while phenomenal internalism is best understood as rejecting them. I build support for the claim that external qualities are necessary to explain qualitative character on the basis (...)
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  79.  38
    Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
    In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to (...)
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  80. Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:367-392.
    A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value-bearers he has already created. (...)
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  81. Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
    In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to (...)
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  82. Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:110-133.
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  83. What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.
    What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of (...)
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  84. Frege’s Puzzle is About Identity After All.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity statements. (...)
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  85. Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
    We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting—not just emotionally, but epistemically. But should they? It can be disturbing to learn that one's beliefs reflect the influence of such irrelevant factors. The pervasiveness of such influence has led some to worry that we are not justified in many of our beliefs. That same pervasiveness has led others to (...)
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