The Taizhou school of philosophy, followers of Wang Yangming, places significant emphasis on the body, which has led to theoretical challenges concerning the potential dissipation of natural desires. Critics contend that while Taizhou philosophy acknowledges the natural state of human existence, it fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the existence of evil and tends to overlook the crucial role of deliberate moral practice by idealizing the natural as morally perfect. Drawing on insights from embodied cognition, this article aims to (...) shed light on the nuanced perspectives of Taizhou moral philosophy and address common criticisms regarding its approach to evil and moral practice. I will explore Taizhou’s holistic understanding, which integrates mind and body, self and others, offering fresh insights into the interplay between deliberation and spontaneity within moral practices. As a comparative and interdisciplinary endeavor, this work seeks to bridge the divide between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions and between moral philosophy and empirical science. This article not only aims to enhance our understanding of Taizhou philosophy but also strives to illuminate broader implications for ethical behavior and moral reasoning in a diverse, global context. (shrink)

Jīva Gosvāmin (16th–17th c.), one of the most important of the early Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theologians, argues for a unique theory of mystical pluralism that shares critical parallels with the highly influential constructivist thesis advanced by Steven Katz, albeit separated by more than four hundred years. These parallels suggest a shared insight into the cognitive dynamics underpinning mystical experiences, which research on cognition and learning, conceptual processing, and perception helps explain. These researches suggest the practices with which Jīva is concerned serve (...) as strategies that help one increasingly learn and internalize a particular conception of divine reality, what it is like to experience it, and an expectation that one will experience it. As these become increasingly internalized, they influence one’s perceptions and experiences relative to what one has learned, creating favorable conditions for the emergence of experiences that reflect, at least to some extent, what one expects to experience. (shrink)

With the aim of bringing Vaibhāṣika’s distinctive fundamental ontology into clearer view, here I argue that the Vaibhāṣika describe two general kinds of ontological dependence relations that generate different kinds of ontological structure: (1) ordering relations that generate hierarchical ontological structure and (2) existential dependence relations among the dharma s that co-temporaneously bundle or asynchronously causally relate them. Ordering relations are defined in terms of the distinction between ultimately real and conventionally real entities. Existential dependence relations among dharma s are (...) defined in terms of dependent origination ( pratītyasamutpāda ): the view that all phenomena that occur in time are dependent on other phenomena for their occurrence in the present moment. The Vaibhāṣika position is worthy of our philosophical attention because it challenges two commonly held views: (1) that fundamentality is to be understood in terms of ontological independence and (2) that causal dependence is distinct from ontological dependence. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of qinqin 親親 (familial closeness) within Chinese culture, challenging traditional definitions of family through the lens of authenticity and diversity. It critically examines Roger T. Ames’ concept of optimizing symbiosis and Sun Xiangchen’s analysis of qinqin in familial being-between-generations. Through Ames’ concept of zoetological difference, the author exposes possible misunderstandings of qinqin and its root shengsheng 生生 (incessant living, growing, birthing) as something merely biological or dogmatic, as well as the practical consequences of those misunderstandings (...) both historically and contemporarily. Ames’ and Sun’s concepts are used to counter these misunderstandings. By analyzing familial relationships beyond mere biological connections and patriarchal dogmas, the author argues for a broader understanding of family that includes non-traditional structures like DINK and LGBTQ families. The article then opens up the possibility of forming non-patriarchal families while preserving the zoetological-existential urge to keep meaning and love flowing between generations. (shrink)

The term xing 性 plays a central role in Liu Zhi’s philosophy, as both a placeholder for Islamic thought originating in the Arabian and Persian West and a Chinese concept with a rich philosophical history in its own right. This essay analyzes the meaning of “object” in Liu Zhi’s thought, the evolution of knowledge and power in his account of the creation process, and his theorization of the “return to the Real” to argue that xing is best understood as God’s (...) absolute subjectivity that inhabits, in latent form, the hearts of all humans. It concludes by situating Liu Zhi’s conception of the relation between God, human, and world in the broader Islamic philosophical tradition. (shrink)

This essay performs a detailed contrastive analysis of two differing concepts of anxiety: Heidegger’s Angst and Xu Fuguan’s youhuan yishi, employing the method of transcultural philosophical sublation. This dialectical approach, deeply rooted in the traditional Chinese philosophy of mutual complementarity between opposing ideas, thoughtfully integrates Heidegger’s notion of Sorge (care) with the Confucian principle of ren (humaneness) as complementary rather than contradictory elements. This conceptual framework highlights the critical importance of balancing personal authenticity with social responsibility, offering a unified and (...) nuanced perspective on both individual and collective ethics, and proposes innovative strategies to effectively address the complexities of modern life. (shrink)

In recent years, a distinctive trend known as “Chinese-language philosophy” ( Hanyu zhexue 漢語哲學) has emerged, signifying a paradigm shift in Chinese philosophical studies. This movement seeks to re-establish the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy in a novel manner. While it has gained substantial traction within Chinese academia, it has found little resonance among international scholars of Chinese philosophy. This prompts a critical examination: What does “Chinese-language philosophy” encompass? What were the circumstances of its emergence and the reasons for its prominence (...) within Chinese academia? Is Chinese philosophy inherently a language-specific philosophy? These questions form the core of our exploration, intending to clarify the name and nature of “Chinese-language philosophy.” We caution against an overemphasis on the role of language in philosophy, as it may lead to a language-centric ontology that overlooks the fundamental underpinnings shared by all philosophical traditions across cultures and inherent in all human languages—namely, the lived experiences and social practices of human beings. (shrink)

I explore Nishida Kitarō’s logic of basho (place) synergistically with the notion of “place” in the nō play Eguchi 江口 and its role in interweaving seemingly opposed ideas. Place names in nō have a special status, whereby they function not so much as references to actual physical places but rather as poetic concepts with predicative associated layers. Often accompanying such evocations is the frequent employment of kakekotoba 掛詞 (pivot words), whereby different sentences are hinged together mid-phrase by superimposing multiple predications (...) onto the same phonetic signifier. While cryptic against the backdrop of Aristotelian logic, looking at them instead in terms of the logic of basho gives us a more coherent picture of “place” functioning. Construing both the sonic conflations and the references to poetry as instances of the mechanics of place operating, this approach furthers our understanding of how Nishida’s logic of place can function in praxis, detailing some of its actual mechanics. (shrink)

According to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, mindfulness of the body involves seeing the body in a threefold way: ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, and ajjhattabahiddhā. This article attempts to show how an investigation of bodily perception, following the approach adopted by the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can serve as the basis for a philosophically grounded understanding of the Pāli words ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā. The interpretation that emerges is the distinction between “right here” and “out there”: two mutually dependent, internally related domains that are experienced as (...) what Merleau-Ponty called the “chiasm” or the “intertwining.” This is different from the standard interpretations found in the Abhidhamma, the Pāli commentaries, the Visuddhimagga, and the instructions of most contemporary meditation teachers. It is hoped that the interpretation offered here can give some exposure to a movement within Theravāda Buddhism, initiated by Ñāṇavīra Thera but slowly gaining traction, characterized by a phenomenological reading of the Pāli sutta s. (shrink)

As global tourism and global profiteering businesses keep aggravating the global ecological crisis, the need for global mutual understanding across cultures increases. But digitally drunk human consumers, generally, do not want what they need most, for example, clean air or cultural epistemic humility. Despite almost a century-long tradition of academic verbiage about “cosmopolitanism” and “postcolonial rectification” of the routine erasing, blanketing, and exoticization of non-Western philosophical cultures, constructive and mutually instructive philosophical dialogue across cultures has just barely begun. But only (...) a small minority of philosophers in Europe and America would deny that philosophy needs to be... Read More. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Taoism, Teaching, and Learning: A Nature-Based Approach to Education by John P. Miller, with Xiang Li and Tian RuanJing Dang (bio)Taoism, Teaching, and Learning: A Nature-Based Approach to Education. By John P. Miller, with Xiang Li and Tian Ruan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022. Pp. 134, Paperback $29.95, ISBN 978-1-4875-4095-1.John Miller’s Taoism, Teaching, and Learning: A Nature-Based Approach to Education (hereafter Taoism, Teaching, and Learning) develops a (...) nature-based account of modern education grounded in Daoism (or Taoism), a school of thought often misunderstood in the West. Daoism has historically been categorized both as a religion (dao jiao 道教) and as a philosophy (dao jia zhe xue 道家哲學); in many cases the spiritual and mystical side of Daoism impresses itself on the reader at the expense of its scientific and philosophical side--as happened with the European missionaries who first exported Daoism to the West. Yet Daoism, especially in relation to pedagogy, cuts across this philosophical/mystical distinction. Happily, Miller and his students, Xiang Li and Tian Ruan, betray no such tendency to pigeon-hole Daoism into one or the other of these categories. The authors adopt a connected and holistic concept of Daoism, which they use to inform and justify their approach to modern education. As such, in the eight chapters of this book, we can see a natural and sensible connection between a holistic Daoism--spiritual, mystical and philosophical--and modern philosophical and educational theories, including Montessori’s cosmic education, Steiner Education, holistic education, and the pedagogical practices of meditation and mindfulness.Miller’s modus operandi is to apply Daoist concepts to contemporary (especially Western) educational issues, both theoretically and practically. In terms of the Daoist belief in the interconnectedness of all things, Miller questions modern subject divisions. When we divide education into geometry, mathematics and so on, we fragment the natural oneness of knowledge and reality as the Daoists would have it. Instead, Miller advocates faith in nature and looks to curricula that reflect the wholeness of nature, such as “cosmic education” and “holistic education” (Chapters 2 and 6). Through such education “we see the relationship between the physical, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual dimensions of life” (p. 27), and feel the support from the invisible and unproven world.Miller makes excellent use of the Daoist concepts of yin (陰) and yang [End Page 1] (陽), which signify the complementary balance and interplay between opposites. He uses the yinyang paradigm to explore the need for balance in a wide range of interesting and important pedagogical situations; for instance, group collaboration versus individual competition, knowledge versus imagination, intuition versus reason, qualitative versus quantitative, etc. (Chapter 5). He also implements yinyang to unpack the model of creative thinking laid down by Graham Wallace (pp. 66 -70); here, yin and yang are applied to a process within the individual. As we move from confusion to enlightenment, we enact within ourselves a dance between our yin and yang factors.Under the heading “Self-Cultivation” (Chapter 3), Miller attempts to evaluate a number of pedagogical strategies with broad ties to Daoism; namely, “silence,” “contemplation,” “calmness,” “sincerity,” “non-violence and embracing the feminine,” and “humility”. These are informed by Miller’s own personal experience of teaching and applying meditation at the University of Toronto. This provides a useful connection between the spiritual and philosophical dao 道, the mystical and the practical. More generally, these strategies recall Daoist wuwei 無爲 (non-coercive or spontaneous action) and ziran 自然 (spontaneity), which Miller subsequently applies to teaching and mindfulness in Chapter 4 (more on which below).Whereas Miller’s contribution is more theoretical, the two chapters written by his students showcase concrete examples of Daoist pedagogy in the classroom. Li’s chapter (Chapter 1) details a class of high school students learning from nature. Here we find a student club centered around a garden, where the students are allowed to wander in the direction of their interests, rather than imbibing the lessons of the teacher according to a top-down lesson plan. Ruan’s chapter (Chapter 7) looks to the various ways play can be utilized in kindergartens for children’s holistic development, including their social, intellectual, spiritual, physical... (shrink)

Scholars who wonder how the Buddha would take sides in the traditional debate on the existence of free will generally believe that it is possible to attribute to him a single point of view capable of reconciling apparent inconsistencies that arise from the reading of the scriptural pages that might be related to this issue. The thesis of this article is that the Buddha’s position on the question of free will is in fact far from being univocal. Rather, in each (...) of the three philosophical registers that can be identified in his teachings, different answers to the same question are implicit—in the personalist dimension of the Buddhadharma, a libertarian language is spoken; the reductionist register of the nonself doctrine, on the other hand, necessarily implies a hard determinist position; and finally, in the antimetaphysical context of the middle path, we find a suspension of judgment regarding the determinism/free will dilemma. (shrink)

I argue that as we move in the twenty-first century we need a new paradigm in global philosophy, which I call “interjacency.” Philosophical authenticity in an age of rapid globalization must take a new form, one which respects the fact that one’s intellectual location is to lie both among and between many worlds of thought. My argument will be that JanMohamed’s important typology for the border intellectual therefore needs to be supplemented; that, in addition to syncretic and specular border intellectuals, (...) a third type must be recognized: the interjacent border intellectual. I detect early hints of a movement in this direction in the original philosophical writings of twentiethcentury philosophers in India, whose dominant paradigm of self-understanding nevertheless remained syncretism, transculturalism, and fusion, and have found more evident articulations in recent mixed-race philosophy and mestizo theory. Living in the cracks between cultures, it is increasingly evident, is a freeing and enabling way to live. (shrink)

A fundamental difference in Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) and the Post-Śaṅkarādvaitins’ (PSA) exegeses of Advaita Vedānta lies in the pedagogic method of adhyāropa-apavāda (deliberate attribution of characteristics to the attribute-less brahman and its corresponding/complementary contradiction). For SSS, adhyāropāpavāda is the sole method to negate avidyā (ignorance); other Upaniṣadic methods— lakṣaṇā and netivāda —are subsumed under it. For the PSA, on the other hand, adhyāropāpavāda plays a subsidiary, less consequential role in engendering gnosis; the primary role is that of mahāvākyas (the (...) “great” Vedāntic statements). SSS denounces the PSA—with the sole exception of Sureśvarācārya —for their (purportedly incorrect) interpretation of the method; he contends that it has led to the lamentable reification of concepts in Advaita Vedānta and ultimately undermined its basic tenets. In this article, I articulate SSS’ position. (shrink)

A widespread view denies that there is a concept of the sublime in Chinese thought and philosophical aesthetics. This denial is a mistake. We examine texts and artworks that indicate that the experience of the sublime can be found in Chinese aesthetics and theories of art and aesthetic experience. To show this, we first present an overview of the sublime extracted from western writers: we describe the sublime experience’s structure, objects, and status as a mixed (but ultimately pleasant) experience. These (...) themes are then taken as a guide for the analysis of Chinese terms relating to the sublime (such as chónggāo 崇高). We then examine Chinese sources from both the classical and late modern periods. Moreover, we respond to two objections. We conclude that the sublime is not confined to western or European experiences or to movements within those traditions, such as Romanticism. (shrink)

There is something deeply broken in how modern industrialized societies relate to the natural world. Many ecological theorists, as well as ecologically engaged Buddhists, draw on Buddhist ideas and practices to construct alternative, more wholesome ways of relating to the natural world. This can be understood as a kind of post-comparative global or “fusion” philosophy at work. In this essay, I reflect on fusion philosophy, Buddhism, and the ecological crisis. I argue against the common practice of naturalizing Buddhism, of adapting (...) Buddhism in order to make it conform with specifically modern ideas about the natural world, and advocate for drawing on Buddhist and animist ways of knowing and being to challenge these ideas and help repair our relationship with the more-than-human world. Specifically, I draw on Buddhist meditative practices, phenomenological critique, and recent thinking about the relational and emotional dimensions of knowledge to suggest a path toward a relational, animist epistemology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Xiong Shili’s Treatise on Reality and Function by Xiong ShiliLinda Anna Pietrasanta (bio)Xiong Shili’s Treatise on Reality and Function. By Xiong Shili, an Annotated Translation by John Makeham. Oxford Chinese Thought Series. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. xliii + 252, Paper $39.95, ISBN 978-0-19-768869-4.John Makeham’s translation of Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885-1968) Tiyong lun 體用 論 [Treatise on Reality and Function] is a major steppingstone for the (...) study of Xiong’s thought. This text, especially when compared to his earlier works, has been largely overlooked both by his contemporaries and scholars interested in his philosophy up to the present day. After all, writing about Buddhism and focusing on the examination of the metaphysical problem of ti and yong during the 1950s--the Tiyong lun was redacted between 1956 and 1957--had considerably less grasp on the general Weltanschauung of the time, compared to the 1920s and 1930s when Xiong produced his most influential works. However, the Tiyong lun is crucial for gaining a comprehensive understanding of Xiong’s philosophical system, as it represents the culmination of his intellectual endeavours. And with this translation, alongside his 2015 translation of the Xin Weishi lun 新唯識論 [Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness], John Makeham provides English-speaking readers with the essential tools to do so. In fact, Xiong himself described the Tiyong lun as a revision of his Xin Weishi lun, making Makeham’s choice of translating precisely these two treatises even more fitting.The Treatise consists of four chapters, with a fifth one--titled Ming xin pian 明心篇 [Explaining Mind]--originally included but later removed and published as a separate book. Generally speaking, the first and fourth chapters--Ming bian 明 變 [Explaining Transformation] and Chengwu 成物 [Forming Material Things]--are primarily focused on presenting the author’s distinctive philosophical position, while the two central chapters--Fofa shang 佛法上 [Buddhist Teachings, A] and Fofa xia 佛法下 [Buddhist Teachings, B]--offer a thorough critique of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Buddhism.The main aim of the Treatise is to solve “the cosmological problem of the non-duality of Reality and function” (p. 5). Reality (ti 體) is glossed by Xiong as benti 本體 or shiti 實體, understood as the unconditioned, constitutive foundation and origin of ‘its’ function (yong 用), which refers to the realm of phenomena that, in turn, take Reality (ti) as their essence or intrinsic nature. The [End Page 1] fundamental idea underlying Xiong’s entire philosophical endeavour is that ti and yong are not two separate realms (contrary, for example, to the traditional creationist framework of monotheistic religions, where the principle transcends the things it creates) and must be understood as literally “not two” (bu er 不二).The Tiyong lun, although written in the 1950s during the Communist era, does not directly address political issues. As mentioned, it focuses on the problem of ti-yong and, therefore, is a text that should (in Xiong’s view at least) be considered abstracted from its specific historical context, since the conclusion of the non-duality of Reality and function is absolute and universal. However, it is interesting to note that Xiong includes a brief critique of materialism (weiwuzhuyi 唯物主義 ) in the text--again by means of the ti-yong framework--which is somewhat unusual given the materialistic foundation of Marxism (and Communism, as its derivation). Beyond the specific case of the Tiyong lun, the issue of Xiong’s relationship with Communist hegemony is debated.1 On the one hand, the fact that he managed to write and publish a metaphysical work such as the Tiyong lun during the 1950s shows that he retained some leeway and room for manoeuvre. This was likely due to the fact that, by this point, his philosophical works were not as influential as those written during the Republican era. On the other hand, especially in the case of his post-1949 works on ethics (such as Yuan Ru 原儒 [To the Origin of the Ru]), it should be noted that Xiong began to employ Marxist terminology and even attempted a “Marxisation” of the figure of Confucius. However, this is not strongly reflected in the Tiyong lun.Although the scope of the Treatise is laid out straightforwardly, it is a... (shrink)

In this article, I briefly discuss contemporary debates about methodological issues in philosophy in Africa to raise concerns about the uptake of diverse philosophical resources at the heart of the global post-comparative method and suggest that the feasibility of the post-comparative method depends on the availability of robust and rich philosophical resources furnished by different traditions and their systematic uptake.

Recently, much attention has been given to Buddhism as a precursor to contemporary holistic theories, and more specifically to the Huayan school’s radical holistic metaphysics (often given the metaphorical name of The Net of Indra), as well as to Huayan’s most elaborate theoretician, Fazang. Nevertheless, contemporary interpretations of Fazang have been weighted by either too strict an adherence to atomistic logic or by unfortunate translations. In this article, I present new translations of the key passages of Fazang’s “The Rafter Dialogue,” (...) as well as a philosophical commentary that explains his departure from atomism. I then proceed to argue that the six characteristics Fazang attributes to a whole that cannot be reduced to its parts are both sufficient and necessary for holism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis by James ChambersReza Adeputra Tohis (bio)Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis. By James Chambers. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023. Pp. xvii + 449, Hardcover €129.99, ISBN 978-3-031-40980-6.James Chambers’s Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis (hereafter Marx and Laozi) attempts to connect the thoughts of Karl Marx, the philosopher and socialist revolutionary, with Laozi, the legendary founding figure of Daoism. Although they come from (...) vastly different cultural and philosophical backgrounds, in Marx and Laozi Chambers seeks to demonstrate that there is a dialectical synthesis between Marx’s materialist thought and Laozi’s aesthetic philosophy. The author’s primary aim is to explore the possibility of establishing a constructive dialogue between these two distinct traditions of thought. While acknowledging that the main challenge of his endeavor lies in the fundamental differences between Marx’s materialist perspective on social life and Laozi’s aesthetic approach to personal harmony, Chambers suggests that these seemingly unrelated views can actually complement each other, arguing that a dialectical approach can indeed render these differences complementary, leading to a more comprehensive perspective on philosophical and social issues. This approach positions Laozi as a “philosopher-artist,” complementing Marx’s role as a “philosopher-scientist.”Chambers employs a methodology that involves analyzing key texts from Marx and Laozi’s Daodejing through a dialectical lens. The author also uses this hermeneutical approach to find common ground between the key concepts of these two thinkers, such as dialectical materialism in Marx’s philosophy and Dao in Laozi’s teachings. Chambers does not fail to highlight the importance of understanding the historical and cultural contexts of each philosopher to uncover deeper meanings in their works.Marx and Laozi is divided into thirteen chapters, each exploring different aspects of Marx’s and Laozi’s thought. The Introduction provides an essential foundation for understanding the author’s approach to reading and interpreting three major thinkers: Hegel, Marx, and Laozi. Chambers emphasizes the need for readers to recognize that Marx and Laozi have very different characteristics in their methodologies and philosophical aims. Marx, with his dialectical materialist approach, focuses on history and social change through class struggle. In contrast, Laozi focuses on personal harmony and offers a more comprehensive [End Page 1] philosophical outlook encompassing concepts such as Dao and Wu Wei (non-action). Hegel is introduced as a crucial mediator in the dialogue between Marx and Laozi. Chambers argues that without understanding how Hegel views the world through idealism, it is difficult to fully appreciate how Marx developed his scientific materialism as a response to Hegel’s idealism. Here, Hegel serves as both an antagonist and a foundation for the subsequent development of Marx’s thought (pp. 3–22).Chapter 2, titled “Hegel’s Idealism,” further explores how Hegel developed his concept of idealism, particularly how this idealism relates to change and the fear of change. Chambers investigates how Hegel views the finite and infinite as interrelated concepts in a type of dialectics. This discussion is crucial to explaining how Marx adopted some of Hegel’s concepts, altering them to support his own more materialist views. The author also discusses how Hegel’s interpretation of reality is often misunderstood as mentalistic, while in fact Hegel perceives reality as dialectical, where what is real is a synthesis resulting from the dialectical interaction between idea and matter. This point is significant for understanding Marx’s subsequent critiques and revisions of dialectics within his materialist framework, where matter is considered more primary than ideas (pp. 49–69).Chapter 3, “Hegel’s Confrontation with Laozi,” critiques Hegel’s interpretation of Laozi, arguing that Hegel failed to capture the essence of Dao and Wu Wei. This is hardly surprising within the context of Western philosophy, especially considering that it is heavily centered on logic and abstract categories, and thus cannot easily accommodate notions such as Dao and Wu Wei. Hegel regarded Laozi as a figure trapped in unstructured mysticism, whereas, according to Chambers, Laozi actually offers a rich approach to understanding the cosmos and the role of individuals within it. This section is also critical towards what the author takes to be Hegel’s Eurocentric... (shrink)

This article argues that xing 性 in the Zhuangzi 莊子 should not be understood as “human nature” but as “human condition.” It introduces the problem of interpreting xing as “human nature” by surveying relevant English-language literature before detailing the interpretive paradigm of Chinese accounts, showing how the latter’s appropriation of the language of substance ontology hinders an accurate portrayal of Daoist xing. It argues that xing should be interpreted in connection to the concept of ming 命 understood as contingent, natural, (...) and temporal “external conditions.” It argues that xing are “internal conditions” that function in conjunction with ming as “external conditions” where “habit” ( xi 習) mediates their interaction. (shrink)

A new vocabulary has prominently entered the discourse of comparative philosophy. Such philosophy, and philosophy as such, is often supposed to be “global,” “cosmopolitan,” “fusion,” or “post-comparative.” The intention is to have a more global scope in what counts as philosophy and to be more inclusive of standpoints. A key term is “positionality.” In this article, I first translate a tension between globality and positionality into the problem of the possibility of a non-relativist perspectivism. Based on Borges’s Funes el memorioso (...) and The Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant, I explore hard-to-reconcile variants of perspectivism, particularly as to whether perspectives add up epistemically. I then turn to the example of sovereignty, questioning what the addition or juxtaposition of perspectives means for the practice of global post-comparative philosophy. In conclusion, I revisit my equating the issue of positionality with perspectivism and inquire into the possibility of meaningful fusion. (shrink)

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “_X_ takes _Y_ as _svabhāva_” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “_X_ takes _Y_ as _svabhāva_” can be understood as “_X_ is reduced to _Y_.” Here, _svabhāva_ functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the third layer of the reduction system, (...) the article suggests that _svabhāva_ has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” can be understood as “ X is reduced to Y.” Here, svabhāva functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the third (...) layer of the reduction system, the article suggests that svabhāva has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)