Abstract:This study explores the relationship between beauty and intellect, often represented as diametrical opposites, in Chinese and Jewish texts, particularly with reference to Confucian and rabbinic texts. Four discourses concerning the nexus of beauty and intellect are presented: antagonistic, complementary, authentic, and epistemic. In both traditions, although more so in Confucianism, intellect is sometimes elided with moral virtue, adding another element to the discussion. The comparison of this theme in distant traditions seeks to highlight their shared resistance to a single (...) interpretation or a consistent outlook: while Confucian texts tend to embrace a complementary discourse, along the lines of a physiognomic tradition, competing views can be detected. Likewise, the rabbinic tradition inherits the biblical view that "beauty is vain" but still manifests some cases of a complementary discourse. (shrink)

Abstract:Through an intercultural dialogue—Chinese and Western—this article explores the possibility of building cultural diversity and pluralism in philosophy. It focuses, first, on building a dialogue between Levinas' and Zhu Xi's apparent (philosophical) affinity for ethics at the level of meaning of the concept of transcendence in the Neo-Confucian and Levinasian ethical contexts and, second, on uncovering and analyzing the inapparent differences at the level of cultural presuppositions on which this apparent affinity is based. I offer that both Levinas and Zhu (...) Xi distinguish the impulse to care for the other—out of which the human relationship emerges—as rooted not in the ontological self but in an ethical transcendence: the other's face (Levinas) and the human authentic nature as mandate of heaven (Zhu Xi). The article comparatively interprets them and their cultural presuppositions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Dharma of Justice in the Sanskrit Epics: Debates on Gender, Varna, and Species by Ruth VanitaBrian Black (bio)The Dharma of Justice in the Sanskrit Epics: Debates on Gender, Varna, and Species. By Ruth Vanita. Oxford: Oxford Unity Press, 2021. Pp. 298. Hardcover £70.00, isbn 978-0-19-285982-2. Ruth Vanita's The Dharma of Justice in the Sanskrit Epics: Debates on Gender, Varna, and Species examines how the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa (...) discuss questions of justice. She reads the epics as bhakti texts to focus on their depictions of discrimination based on social categories such as gender, varṇa, species, age, and disability. The book claims that the epics criticize oppression in two main ways: by articulating philosophical ideas about social justice and by celebrating characters of a low social status. Six of the twelve chapters are devoted to themes related to gender, including marriage, independence, consent, gender-crossing, parenting, and masculinity. Focusing on the words and actions of characters in the narrative, Vanita does not directly address the question of whether we can take the marginal voices in the text as representing authentic voices of its social context. She also sidesteps the issue of patriarchy: "Every written text ever composed is, in the widest sense, patriarchal, since it was composed in a male-dominated society. Patriarchy is the air we breathe. Therefore, explaining the meaning of a text as patriarchal is as useful as explaining people's actions by the fact that they breathe" (p. 22). I was left wondering, however, if this explanation serves the interests of her study. In a book about oppressed characters, it seems crucial to say more about how systems of oppression operate. Even if we assume that all societies are patriarchal, this does not mean that they are all patriarchal in the same ways or to the same degree. Vanita is an imaginative reader, whose often speculative interpretations offer some valuable perspectives and raise interesting questions. One of the most refreshing features of the book is its extensive discussions of a number of characters and sub-stories rarely analyzed in scholarly literature. In particular, I enjoyed reading Vanita's take on the Mahābhārata's story of Diśā and Aṣṭāvakra (Mbh 13.19–22), where she shows her sensitivity to the ambiguities of this intriguing episode. This story, which appears in the Anuśāsana Parvan, begins when the ascetic Aṣṭāvakra wants to marry the sage Vadānya's daughter, Suprabhā. Before offering his consent, Vadānya sends Aṣṭāvakra to visit the aged female sage Diśā. As Vanita observes, this episode "maps a landscape of desire" [End Page 1] (p. 77) and raises a number of interesting questions about female sexuality as well as female independence. Vanita sees Diśā's motives, rather than merely testing Aṣṭāvakra's desires, as combining her role as a teacher with her own sexual yearnings. Vanita concludes that Diśā's message is that "desire cannot be entirely overcome" (p. 82). From this, she sees Diśā as advocating the conversion of "feverish agitation into happiness within marriage" (p. 83). Vanita's analysis of this story is both engaging and compelling, yet her claim that this episode is an integral part of Yudhiṣṭhira's education as a king remains undeveloped. I wanted to hear more about how this one story fits into the context of the countless others that Bhīṣma recounts to Yudhiṣṭhira. Moreover, her conclusion at the end of the chapter (ch. 4), that the epics "celebrate single women" (p. 85), seems a bit of a stretch considering the few examples she discusses. In chapter 6, Vanita revisits the encounter between Sulabhā and King Janaka (Mbh 12.308), which she discussed in detail twenty years ago.1 Her return to this episode examines the sexual power dynamics between the female sage and the legendary king from Upaniṣadic lore. As Vanita observes, Sulabhā takes the form of a beautiful young woman to test Janaka's claim to be liberated. Vanita explains:We may expect ordinary people to notice a person's looks first of all, but one who claims to be... (shrink)

Abstract:The concept of civic friendship, perhaps originating from Aristotle, has re-emerged in recent studies. Scholars argue the relevance of this concept in liberal democratic societies today because it can potentially strengthen or re-establish the sense of community or public-spiritedness. Moreover, there is a need to describe the characteristic virtue/s that will buttress civic friendship. This article proposes the Confucian virtue of ren as a possible foundation for such a relationship. As it is discussed here, ren can contribute to the resolution (...) of problems that emerge in liberal democratic societies today because it can counteract the negative tendency—that is, neglecting the other or the relationship with the other—of an individualist understanding of liberal democratic values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not by Zhihua YaoChong Fu (bio)Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not. By Zhihua Yao. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 186. Hardcover £29.99, isbn 978-1-35-012148-5. Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not, by Zhihua Yao, cogently strings together different Buddhist schools' varied philosophical approaches to the cognition of nonexistent objects (...) (asadālambanajñāna) or non-cognition (anupalabdhi). Non-being and the knowledge of non-being have long been central to nearly every philosophical tradition. Buddhist philosophy, in particular, invests extraordinary intellectual effort to deal with these topics, since non-being (asat/abhāva) occupies a central role in the Buddhist doctrine. Yao acutely reconstructs a brief history of this philosophical enterprise of Buddhism from the early sectarian period to the time when the so-called logico-epistemological school prevailed. The book consists of an introduction and eight chapters. These eight chapters are basically based on Yao's previously published articles. They are further arranged into two parts: (1) "Cognition of Nonexistent Objects: A Historical Development" and (2) "Epistemological Approaches to Nonexistence." The first part discusses how philosophers from the Mahāsāṃghika, the Dārṣṭāntika, and the Yogācāra analyze the cognition of nonexistent objects. The philosophical development concerning this particular topic is masterfully articulated by Yao. This mastery is best shown in his unveiling of Yogācāra's philosophical inheritance from its Abhidharma legacy. In addition, his reconstruction deepens our understanding of the intricate history of sectarian Buddhism in a broader sense. The second part centers on the philosophical issues of nonexistence raised by the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Yao's translation, presentation, and comparison of these philosophical arguments is strikingly lucid and comprehensive. Overall, one salient contribution of this book is that it highlights the importance of Pāli and Chinese sources in studying the history of Buddhist philosophy, especially Indian Buddhist philosophy. In Part 1, Yao's reconstruction of sectarian Buddhist philosophies is heavily based on the Pāli text Kathāvatthu and the Chinese translations of Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Śāriputrābhidharma, Vijñānakāya, Mahāvibhāṣā, *Janakaparamopadeśa, and Nyāyānusāra, whose Sanskrit or Prakrit originals have long been lost. In part 2, in [End Page 1] addition to comprehensively assessing Sanskrit and Tibetan materials, Yao detects a much-hidden philosophical development from Īśvarasena to Dharmakīrti by relying on Chinese commentaries composed by Chinese and Korean monks in the Tang Dynasty. Chapter 1 is of the most importance in the book; in it, Yao traces "an early origin of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects among the Mahāsaṃghikas and some Vibhajyavādins under their influence" (p. 13). Yao sensitively points out that "the thesis that latent defilements (Pāli: anusaya/Skt: anuśaya) have no objects constitutes the first step toward the formation of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects" (p. 19). The next step, as Yao analyzes it, is the proposition of awareness (Pāli: ñāṇa/Skt: jñāna) without objects due to the Mahāsaṃghikas and its sub-schools. Yao's philosophical reconstruction is eloquent and perceptive, especially when he outlines a crucial conceptual transition from the awareness that is without objects (anālambanaṃ jñānam) to the awareness that has nonexistent objects as its objects (asadālambanajñāna). However, one of the main supporting materials that he believes mentions the awareness that has nonexistent objects as its objects -- a passage from the Śāriputrābhidharma -- might be found less supportive without a more detailed justification. This passage is concerned with the concept of wu jingjie zhi 無境界智:What is the awareness without objects (wu jingjie zhi 無境界智)? There is no awareness without objects. Or, the awareness that arises when conceptualizing the past and the future dharmas is called the awareness without objects.1《舍利弗阿毘曇論》卷 9〈4 智品〉：「云何無境界智？無無境界智。復次思惟過 去未來法智生，是名無境界智。」(CBETA 2022.Q4, T28, no. 1548, p. 593c16–18)。Yao chooses an alternative reading based solely on the Taisho Edition, which interpolates one more 境 in 無無境界智 as 無境無境界智. This reading might result in a wholly different meaning: "What is awareness without objects? Any awareness that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophy of Taste by Huanan GongChunpeng Hao (bio)Philosophy of Taste. By Huanan Gong. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2022. Pp. xii + 312. Paperback ¥59.00, isbn 978-7-108-07489-8. Postmodern thought in Western philosophy often criticizes the tradition of logocentrism and ocularcentrism. This tradition of philosophical observation can be found in Pythagoras' definition of the philosopher, who is a spectator as distinct from the sportsman and the merchant in the (...) Great Games. The attitude of observation reflects the logical, objective, and neutral characteristics of philosophy. Especially in Plato's philosophy we could find this objectified "observation" (p. 18). This tradition laid the foundation of Western philosophy. Since then, philosophy has developed "metaphysics," "ontology," "epistemology," "rationalism," "idealism," and other themes. However, if we examine the original meaning of the word "philosophy," it only refers to the "love" (philia) of "wisdom" (sophia). The Chinese "love of wisdom" is different from that of Western philosophers. Professor Gong Huanan's Philosophy of Taste is a work about "taste" and "Dao". It represents a different path from the ancient Greek philosophical tradition. In the book, Gong reveals how the Chinese use these three core concepts ("taste", "sense" and "xiang") to identify things, discuss nature, understand the Dao and live in the world, thus outlining a world of Chinese culture that is different from that of the West. He delves into the principles and rich meanings inherent in these fundamental concepts of Chinese philosophy, and then explores ways of reconstructing Chinese philosophy drawing on contemporary resources (p. 307). There are seven chapters in Philosophy of Taste. In Chapters 1 and 2, which offer a discussion on "taste," Gong gives a broad overview of the definition of "taste" and its scope in Chinese thought; Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the subject of "sense," which moves from taste to the relationship between the senses and the mind. Finally, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the main discussion is on "xiang" (象, shape, appearance), where the author distinguishes between "xiang" and "form". "Xiang" in Chinese culture has no form, so it has little relevance to vision, and there is no Western ocularcentrism in China (p. 192). Gong also discusses expressions in the Chinese tradition that equate wisdom with sight and hearing, for example, cong ming 聪明 (intelligent, clever, bright), which is synonymous with wisdom, originally refers to good hearing and [End Page 1] good sight (p. 36). However, Chinese culture is diverse and not "monotheistic." There are many ways of attaining wisdom or the Dao, and Buddhism uses the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind as a method of practice to attain it (p. 19). For it is basically through the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, etc. that one receives information, and among them the sense of taste of the tongue is a viewpoint with Chinese characteristics. Chinese people are very fond of eating, but eating does not simply mean desire and unruliness--there is thought in it. As The Doctrine of the Mean or Zhongyong 中庸 says, "There is no body but eats and drinks. But they are few who can distinguish flavors" (p. 1). The Chinese word for "sense" (ganjue 感觉) has two parts, one is feel (gan 感) and another is awareness (jue 觉). Everyone has the ability to sense, but few have awareness. Only those who have both can know the truth. "Taste" seems to be closer to feeling and is an attribute of objects, of which there are several kinds, such as sour, sweet, bitter, and spicy. But it is not unrelated to the perceiver, for without the organ of perception, there would be no taste. This organ of taste reception is the tongue. In Chinese, "tongue" is also known as the root of the soul, or the opening of the mind (p. 25). The tongue and the mind work together to create the activity of the sense of taste. In short, the sense of taste is the unification of the attributes of things and the human mind in sensation. It is the same as knowing the Dao, which is in everything around us, but one needs to have a "heart" to discover it (p. 89). Gong holds that, in Chinese thought... (shrink)

Abstract:The commentaries of Wang Bi (226–249 c.e.), who coined a substantial part of the xuanxue 玄學 tradition, represent one of the most systematic attempts in early China to explore language as limited in its capabilities of expression and how language can be used to deal with issues beyond the reach of language itself. However, few studies on Wang Bi explore his philosophy of language. Therefore, the relationship between what can and cannot be expressed through language, and what lies beyond these (...) limits, is explored via a comparison with the early works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who himself described this issue as "the cardinal problem of philosophy." I argue that Wang Bi and Wittgenstein share a similar hermeneutical approach, centered on the deficiency of language in mapping determinate sense beyond the manifest world. The factuality of the universe is therefore ineffable and "mystical," and silence becomes an indispensable means of expression. (shrink)

Abstract:This article contextualizes the thought of the Zhuangzi 莊子 via the Classic of Poetry (Shijing 詩經), the most canonical textual tradition from the Warring States (fifth century to 221 b.c.e.) into the early imperial period. First, it reads the fantastical vignettes from the opening of chapter 1 "Free-and-Easy Wandering" (Xiaoyao you 逍遙遊), as parodies of Shi poetics. Second, it argues that the themes of "wandering" (you 遊) and "lodging" (yu 寓) stand as critical alternatives to the Shi preoccupation with homeward, (...) ruler-centric movements. Such connections open up new ways of understanding the development of Zhuangzian thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rethinking Daoism as Activism:The Political Wisdom of Daoist Texts as a Response to the Contemporary Environmental CrisisLisa Indraccolo (bio)To propose a reading of Daoism as a form of social activism at first might sound almost paradoxical. This trend of thought is in fact well known for promoting, as a healthy, sustainable way of life for both the individual1 and the surrounding natural environment, what might actually seem the exact (...) opposite of social activism. The present discussion aims at showing that Daoism can actually be understood and practiced as a form of proactive social engagement, taking as a starting point Eric S. Nelson's recent work Daoism and Environmental Philosophy: Nourishing Life (2021), and in particular chapter 5, "Early Daoist biopolitics and a new Daoist political ecology" (pp. 100–118). As will be shown, it is a rather unique kind of social activism that differs from both science-based environmentalism and militant public activism. This article further problematizes certain reductionist tendencies that are still very much alive in the contemporary academic debate about and interpretations of early Daoism, and in particular of its political philosophy. This issue is particularly relevant when we proceed to address Daoist ecopolitics, and especially its applicability to the environmental crisis. From this perspective, Nelson convincingly persuades the reader of the potential and the contemporary relevance of certain pragmatic aspects, and in particular practices or "virtuous attitudes," theorized by early Daoist ecopolitical discourse in tackling environmental issues of global concern.Nelson's contribution addresses wuwei 無為, the well-known Daoist way of proactive non-action or "effortless action,"2 or, as Nelson persuasively interprets it, "attuned action,"3 "attuned responsiveness,"4 or "attuned, effortless, non-calculative unforced responsiveness,"5 thereby providing a substantial contribution to further refining the concept with an even more successful translation. Wuwei means acting without either being subjected to or exerting coercion, and in accordance or in "attunement" with the natural course of things. As Nelson suggests, such a way of acting and behaving could be systematically applied to radically rethink and revolutionize contemporary non-eco-friendly and eventually self-sabotaging, dysfunctional forms of human aggregation and interaction.In this most valuable enterprise, Nelson's book achieves two additional goals, touching upon two other critical and closely interconnected issues. First, Nelson draws attention to and provides substantial evidence to support the existence of a fairly coherent theoretical system as the basis of Daoist [End Page 781] political philosophy, with a focus on its political ecology, which has often been overlooked or neglected in favor of other apparently more appealing aspects of Daoist thinking. Nelson's analysis provides a fundamental contribution to a most necessary "demystification" of Daoist philosophy. By unveiling its substantially political underlying goals and agenda, his study thereby reconciles Daoist thought and brings it into a more coherent dialogue with the intellectual landscape of the Warring States period, during which we might assume that the two main received texts associated with this tradition, the Laozi 老子 and the Zhuangzi 莊子, started to assume the form in which they were eventually transmitted.Second, in doing so, Nelson's book contributes to the gradual ongoing process of "decolonization" of Chinese philosophy in a twofold way. It further invites considerations about certain latent "orientalistic" tendencies that are evidently still very much alive in the way in which Western scholarship approaches the study of early Chinese philosophy, and in preconceived ideas about certain texts and trends of thought and their imaginary conceptual boundaries, in which it still indulges at times. Moreover, Nelson proposes concrete ways in which ancient Daoist ideas and practices could be enacted in today's world to tackle the current ecological crisis by acting upon society in order to promote radical changes in people's attitude, not only toward the environment, but also toward each other, "therapeutically fostering a more appropriate ecological culture"6 and rethinking the very same concept of society and the principles that are its basis. Nelson shows the universality of the message of Daoist thought (and thereby, one might be tempted to say, contributes to substantiating the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy)7 and its relevance to the contemporary debate on climate and the environmental crisis. Such a... (shrink)

Abstract:The Kumulipo has become one of the best-known compositions in Kanaka (Hawaiian) culture. This article focuses on sections 8–11 of the chant, which describe the coming forth of humanity in the context of the shift from Pō (darkness) to Ao (light). This shift is a pivotal moment in the chant, and it signals something distinctive about being human, namely the ability to organize complex societies on the basis of moʻokūʻauhau (genealogies). This ability is rooted in an awareness of oneself as (...) a being uniquely situated in time and place among a myriad of other beings all originating in the fecundity of Pō. Such self-awareness enables the construction of relational differences that support robust communities by means of kinship and other networks, but it also provides humanity with the ability to contend over our place in the genealogical cartography of the world and to ruin the otherwise flourishing world. The Kumulipo, as such, highlights an ambivalence associated with the rise of humanity. (shrink)

Abstract:The Buddha seems ambivalent in his position about whether all our feelings can be ascribed to karma, even if indirectly. He unequivocally states: "Karma distinguishes beings as inferior and superior," which covers various aspects of life that affect our feelings. On the other hand, again and again he criticizes some religions for holding the doctrine "whatever a person experiences is caused by karma," or puts aside karma in favor of obvious causation. This issue can be addressed in several ways: the (...) Buddha implies a distinction between past and present karma, and the unthinkable nature of karma entails the question "Who are qualified to pronounce karma?" Also, the Buddha is careful to avoid a fatalistic view of karma doctrine, his skill in means leads to the inconsistency of his mode of expression, and the two levels of truth allow him to speak in conformity with worldly conventions endorsed by "the wise.". (shrink)

Abstract:This article investigates Ahn Changho's notion of 'mutual love', the central features of which present a picture of society in which the selfish desires of free-spirited individuals can be regulated through the self-cultivation of mutual love. Specifically, first, by analyzing Ahn Changho's reconfiguration of the Confucian ideal of parent-child intimacy with mutual love, I will argue that his notion of mutual love sheds light on a hybrid imaginary of modernity that cannot be reduced to either the anti-Western rehabilitation of Confucian (...) 'filial piety' or the pro-Western adaptation of 'individuality'. Second, scrutinizing Ahn Changho's empirical criticism of early modern Korea, which has been termed 'the absence of mutual love', it is proposed that his pragmatic vision of individuality is shaped through non-domination as an alternative to the Weberian framework of modernization in which the processes of individualization and rationalization are unduly opposed to those of cultivating a commonality in a society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Techniques of the Self:Nourishing Life as Art of LivingLi Manhua (bio)Daoism and Environmental Philosophy: Nourishing Life. By Eric S. Nelson. London and New York: Routledge, 2021.This essay proposes an account of the techniques of the self in early Daoism in light of Eric S. Nelson's Daoism and Environmental Philosophy: Nourishing Life (Routledge, 2021). It argues that the techniques of the self involved in nourishing life (yangsheng 養生) are indispensable (...) to the creation of the interdependent human-nature rapport that Nelson considers. Such interdependence does not require a moralistic stance that negates the self or forsakes individual desires in the cause of the environment—as in some of the existing Western ecological discourse—but a new form of self-relation involving the practice of a set of techniques of the self that relates the human to the non-human. The present contribution begins by arguing that the practice of nourishing life entails a series of bodily and spiritual techniques (shu 術) of the self, with the example of Cook Ding. This is followed by my exposition of different categories of such techniques, and why the techniques of nourishing the spirit (shen 神) are prioritized over those of the preservation of the bodily form (xing 形). Finally, I extend my discussion on the specific techniques of nourishing the spirit with regard to his chapter "Emptying Ecology," where Nelson argues that undoing fixations of the self and being responsive (ying 應) to things are attainable through deconstructive, skeptical, and paradoxical communicative strategies (p. 80).To start with, Nelson regards nourishing life as a way of living and speaking that goes beyond the binary opposition or a hierarchical relation between the human and other forms of life in some Western ecological philosophies:In the current crisis conditions, it appears that humans need every motivating ecology available whether it be light or dark green, anthro- or bio-centric, shallow or deep. All of these contending discourses are equalized in a Daoist ecology of shifting perspectives and ways of speaking. A benefit of dao-centric models—that as inflections of the "way" encompass and extend beyond notions of "bios" (specific life) and "zōe" (life in general)—is that they contest the binary oppositions and stratified hierarchies that have dominated recent Western environmental discourses: anthropocentrism/biocentrism, and humanism/posthumanism [End Page 762] (although the latter finds biocentrism still too anthropocentric in positing the very distinction between them).(p. 31, my emphasis)In other words, a non-hierarchical and non-opposing rapport between the human and the non-human lies in a practice of changing perspectives and, more concretely and importantly, adjusting communicative ways. Such a way of perceiving and speaking beyond boundaries between the individual and the general forms of life (sheng 生) is epitomized by the practice of nourishing life of Cook Ding in the third chapter of the Zhuangzi 庄子, titled "The Master of Nourishing Life" (Yangsheng zhu 養生主). When Ding—Lord Wenhui's chef—cuts up an ox, he avoids violent and forced slaughter, slitting through the tender parts of the animal without touching any bone. As such, by concentrating only on the intestines of the ox, his movement is so agile that the knife produces a musical rhythm.More precisely, Nelson regards the example of Ding as "a cultivated and practiced process in which nature can come to be itself" (p. 36). In the context of the Zhuangzi, nature (tian 天) as an extension of the Dao goes beyond the "one-and-many" anthropocentric paradigm wherein humans have exclusive knowledge of the One, namely the unifying principle of reality (Chai 2018, p. 265). In this sense, specific life forms, bios, are undifferentiated from the wholeness of the One in the generic life, zōe. In other words, as the root of all life lies in Dao in terms of the onto-cosmological attunement of nothingness (wuwei 無為), our bodies (shen 身) mirror Heaven or Nature (tian 天) and the Earth (di 地) in the way they attune to the flow of vital energetic dynamics, responding to the myriad things and Heaven and Earth in an organic totality. This is manifest in Ding, as he nourishes life by turning his daily activity into a practice of encountering non-human life forms... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Confucian Liberalism: Mou Zongsan and Hegelian Liberalism by Roy TsengMilan Matthiesen (bio)Confucian Liberalism: Mou Zongsan and Hegelian Liberalism. By Roy Tseng. Albany: SUNY Press, 2023. Pp. 405. Hardcover $95.00, isbn 978-1-4384-9111-0.With Confucian Liberalism, Roy Tseng sets a new landmark in the contemporary discourse on Confucian political theory. His intricate account of the political philosophy of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) and other New Confucian philosophers, in conjunction with his (...) study of T.H. Green's (1836–1882) and other British idealists' liberalism, offer a fresh and novel approach to Confucianism and liberalism alike. Throughout the eight chapters of his book, Tseng develops the concept of "Confucian liberalism." This concept stays faithful to civil liberties, but grounds democracy on an ethics of self-realization and a perfectionist ideal of the state, "where the government helps the people to 'attain accomplishment according to the individual's nature' (jiu geti er shuncheng 就個體而順成)" (p. 125). On the one hand, this framework attempts to circumvent the overbearing tendencies of traditional Confucianism, whose moral imperatives had prohibited the development of an independent sphere of politics. On the other hand, it reintroduces the Confucian concept of humaneness (ren 仁) as an answer to the lack of common meaning in modern societies. On the one hand, Tseng therefore dissociates himself from anti-Confucian liberals such as Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919–1969) or Zhang Foquan 張佛泉 (1907–1994), who had proclaimed the incompatibility of Confucianism and liberal values. On the other hand, he also differentiates himself from what he calls "antiliberal Confucians." Especially recently, the latter have attracted much attention by proposing a political vision opposed to the perceived foreign and "Western" concept of liberalism. Under labels such as "political Confucianism" (Jiang Qing 蔣慶), "socialist Confucianism" (Chen Lai 陳來), "politics of benevolence" (Kang Xiaoguang 康曉光), "Confucian meritocracy" (Bai Tongdong 白彤東), or "Confucian political perfectionism" (Joseph Chan 陳祖為), they have had a profound impact on the discourse of Confucian political theory. Turning toward the [End Page 1] political works of Mou Zongsan and the British idealists, Tseng neither advocates for the inherent elitism and anti-Western sentiments of antiliberal Confucianism, nor does he fully subscribe to the radically iconoclast ideals of the anti-Confucian liberals who had denied all value of tradition and saw Confucianism as a mere obstacle toward a modernized China. Another aspect of Tseng's study that stands out from the current field of research on Mou Zongsan is his reading of Mou's conceptual framework through the lens of Hegel. While many prominent researchers, e.g. Li Minghui 李明輝, point toward Mou's reliance on Kantian ideas and concepts, Tseng convincingly argues that Mou's appropriation of the idealist framework, as well as many concepts utilized by Mou, are fundamentally Hegelian, therefore warranting a shift in perspective. Confucian Liberalism is subdivided into three parts and eight chapters. Part I, titled "Confucian Ethics," introduces the reader to Mou Zongsan's moral philosophy by providing a comparative analysis of Mou, Kant, Hegel, and the British idealists, primarily represented by T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley (1846–1924). In part II, "Civil Liberalism," Tseng then moves on to elaborate on the New Confucian view of politics. Here, he pays close attention to Mou's revaluation of Confucian politics through the Hegelian framework, the notion of "civility," and the concept of "humane government." Turning again to Mou and Green, the final part, "Perfectionist Liberalism," presents the political vision of a democratic state underpinned by a strong belief that the primary task of the state is to provide an environment for the individual citizens that allows them to fully realize their moral capabilities. The third part further argues that the values upheld by New Confucianism not only do not contradict the liberal values of human dignity, tolerance, and equal respect, but are in fact able to lay a moral foundation for modern democracies that is able to overcome the weaknesses of mainstream liberalism, manifested in atomism, nihilism, and egoism. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the core principles and concepts of Mou Zongsan's moral metaphysics. Following Mou's own approach, Tseng applies a comparative method in this introductory chapter, meticulously delineating the varying philosophical influences that shaped Mou's... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown by Mohammad AzadpurSayeh Meisami (bio)Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown. By Mohammad Azadpur. London: Routledge, 2020. Pp. 128. Paperback $48.95, isbn 978-1-03-204868-9. It is a herculean task to put into a meaningful conversation two philosophical discourses which are centuries apart not only in time but in methods and missions. This may even be regarded as a futile attempt from the (...) perspective of evolutionist ideology which tends to see in the temporal progress of human civilization a one-way approximation to truth. The evolutionist ideology of modernity regardless of its various manifestations and methodologies, is an epitome of modern western intellectual narcissism. For example, despite their conflicting methods and philosophical systems, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel equally follow the modernist ideology of progress culminating in the Eurocentric hegemony of scientism which treats pre-modern philosophical traditions as historical/ornamental things of the past which belong in the museums of intellectual history. However, the Eurocentric model has been exposed in its many faces and come under powerful criticisms by both western and non-western intellectuals over the past few decades. One important critical stronghold belongs to contemporary Islamic philosophers who have embarked on a revival of Islamic philosophy in its own right. The best among these philosophers do not repeat the mistake of othering; instead they work on facilitating conversations. The last two books by Mohammad Azadpur are important contributions to this endeavor. The philosophical goal of Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna, as described by its author, is to use Avicenna's texts as a shield against "the unwarranted philosophical encroachment of natural science enthusiasts on epistemology and metaphysics" (p. 4). To accomplish this goal, Azadpur offers a deep study of analytic philosophers, most prominently Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, in comparison with each other on the one hand and with the medieval Persian philosopher, Avicenna (d. 1037) on the other. He finds himself justified in this comparison as Sellars and McDowell themselves "place value on engaging the history of philosophy" (p. 1). The aim of the comparison is to show that despite the usefulness of the analytical toolkit for a more sophisticated reading of Avicenna's position on the relation between sense perception and intellection, the latter provides a more consistent view of the problem in the absence of the [End Page 1] scientism that Sellars suffers from. Meanwhile, we find Sellars under the influence of Kant and in comparison to some key figures of analytic philosophy such as W. V. Quine, Richard Rorty, and Donald Davidson. Within the confinement of these pages, it is impossible to review all the ideas and arguments in Azadpur's book, but here is what the reader can expect to find therein in a nutshell. After an informative Introduction that captures the gist of the book, the author devotes Chapter One to Sellars' criticism of an empiricist legacy in epistemology which is famously referred to as "the Myth of the Given," namely, the grounding of empirical knowledge in sensory experience without the latter having any grounds in the conceptual/linguistic space of reason. While not denying "non-inferential" knowledge about the world, Sellars rejects "the thesis that the non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact is itself unjustified by other knowledge." (p. 9). To explain Sellars' position with an example, to know what is "blue" is to recognize it as belonging to a "this-such" nexus in the space of reason/language. This means that my reception of something as "blue" is not the mere result of natural interactions between my vision and the world, but also due to the place of "blue" among a host of other concepts such as red, yellow, green in my conceptual/linguistic space of reason. In his criticism of the empiricist myth, Sellars commends Kantian epistemology for presenting sensibility and understanding in cooperation with each other. However, he does not consider Kantian theory of sense perception sufficient to explain sensory justification because he believes that in the absence of a full-fledged scientific account, Kant's theory of sense impressions lingers at the level of "empty abstractions." Azadpur strongly disagrees with Sellars' criticism... (shrink)

Abstract:Daoist thought often takes nothingness as a foundational source of generation that can also be harnessed to good government. This study re-interprets the Daodejing's original discourse on nothingness in terms of an original condition, which it connects to the variety of philosophically significant wu-compounds found throughout the text. It examines two early articulations of this discourse by drawing a contrast between the thought of Laozi and the thought of Heshang Gong.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Daoism, Practice, and Politics:From Nourishing Life to Ecological PraxisEric S. Nelson (bio)I. Daoism's Multiple ModelsManhua Li, Yumi Suzuki, and Lisa Indraccola have offered evocative insights, questions, and alternatives in their contributions concerning the arguments of Daoism and Environmental Philosophy: Nourishing Life (Nelson 2021). The present brief response and sketch of the book will not address every point in their essays, but I will strive to reply, directly and indirectly, (...) to their primary concerns.First, it should be noted that I take a pluralistic conception of 'Daoisms' as my point of departure. This is necessary since Daoist studies have been hampered by overly ahistorical and one-sided definitions that prioritize one philosophical or religious moment (such as skepticism or mysticism) in historically complex and varied transmissions that encompass a multiplicity of texts and perspectives. Due to the fact of the plurality of incompatible kinds of Daoism in Chinese antiquity and in subsequent history, my text considers a range of early Daoist and Daoist-related perspectives in the context of their potential consequences for environmental philosophy, ethics, and politics. Consequently, my approach is primarily philosophical without limiting any text to being exclusively philosophical, religious, or rigidly committed to one perspective, which would be untrue to the sources themselves.Second, examining distinctive tendencies (modifying Graham 1989 and Liu 1994) in the Daodejing 道德經, the Zhuangzi 莊子, and related texts enables us to articulate distinctive and conflicting ecological, ethical, and political paradigms. In place of constructing a mythologizing ideological construction of 'Chinese culture' and Daoism as intrinsically 'Green', a familiar essentializing tendency that has provoked skepticism regarding the very possibility of Daoist environmental philosophy, my book provides a different 'critical Daoist' strategy. This alternative entails that Daoist exemplars can be deployed as therapeutic models in the present, while at [End Page 792] the same time confronting their ideological codifications and uses. Early Daoist sources have roamed on long intercultural journeys. The Daodejing and the Zhuangzi have provided elements for European thinking about civilization, technology, and nature from Martin Buber and Martin Heidegger (Nelson 2017) to Peter Sloterdijk's 'Euro-Taoism' (Sloterdijk 1989) to contemporary progressive Green movements (Joshi 2022) and even ecofascism (Lubarda 2020). Similarly, in the current Chinese context, Green Daoism has both critical and authoritarian ideological functions in visions of 'ecological civilization' (shengtai wenming 生態文明) (Schönfeld and Chen 2019) and fears of a 'green leviathan'. Accordingly, it is not accidental that my anarchistic and participatory democratic interpretation of one key thread, which I call 'ziranist' and clarify below, in early Daoist and Wei-Jin mysterious-learning (xuanxue 玄學) discourses, has led to the most intense discussions and controversies about this book. These include the contributions by Li, Suzuki, and Indraccola that propose questions and alternative possibilities concerning agency and responsiveness, authority and self-determination, freedom and fate, and adaptation and intervention, as well as purposive techniques and anti-purposive uselessness.Third, this hermeneutical strategy points toward the tertiary aspect of our preliminary definition of Daoism. It does not primarily name a philosophical theory or a religious worldview. It concerns shifting, overlapping, and diverging ensembles of discourse and practice. This is not the vague ahistorical idea of 'a way of life' but rather refers to how philosophy is enacted through a specific configuration of—to adopt early Greek expressions—logos as dis-course (e.g., argumentation, hermeneutics, logic, rhetoric), ethos (e.g., comportment, orientation, a way of dwelling), and praxis (practices of the self, with others, and with things and nature). Thus, the Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi collections can be analyzed textually and conceptually as having multiple threads (drawing on a variety of authors and sources) that form constellations in the received texts with better and worse historical, practical, and conceptual readings. My interpretive strategy in this discussion, which does not exclude other approaches, is that these texts express forms of practical instead of merely speculative philosophy. They are suggestive of an ethos of relational freedom, irreducible to rules and techniques, which dismantles hypostatized experiential and linguistic fixations, including moralistic fixations, in order to freely encounter the myriad things and enact and practice the dao in one's own singular way.'Critical Daoism', therefore, serves as a pluralistic, diagnostic, and practical designation... (shrink)

Abstract:Within various contexts, such as politics and parenting, Confucianism has been criticized on the basis that it endorses 'unquestioning obedience' to authority. In recent years, several philosophers have argued against this view by appealing to textual evidence from Classical Confucian philosophers. This article examines Wang Yangming's views on this subject, arguing that Wang teaches that criticism of those who stand in a socially superior role relation is not only permitted, but encouraged. From this, the implications that Wang's analysis has for (...) contemporary discussions of disagreement between epistemic superiors and inferiors and epistemic peerhood are considered. It will be argued that Wang's position is much closer to the total evidence view than the preemptive view. Relatedly, it is suggested that Wang provides a novel proposal about how to recognize or disregard epistemic 'superiors', especially in the context of moral knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:In Dialogue with the Mahābhārata by Brian BlackKrishna Mani Pathak (bio)In Dialogue with the Mahābhārata. By Brian Black. New York: Routledge, 2021. Pp. xii + 2158. Paperback £38.99, isbn 978-0-367-43600-1. Brian Black's In Dialogue with the Mahābhārata is a brilliant book that exhibits three distinct features which can certainly help an inquiring mind understand not only the structure and nature of the text of the Mahābhārata but also (...) the meanings contained in it, alongside aspects of Hindu historiography. It investigates the text through literary, philosophical, and social perspectives that Black argues emerge in the dialogues over strī-dharma, puruṣa-dharma, and the social identity and status of women (see for example, pp. 117, 124, 130, 140). The work's literary character can be seen in Black's analysis of the text and its epical narratives. In this book, the story of the Mahābhārata is presented by Black as a web of narratives wherein every verbal encounter and dialogue among all the participating interlocutors refers to a specific meaning and (deterministic) role played by these divine and terrestrial characters as interlocutors: "All the main human characters are incarnations and/or descendants of divine figures…and [experience] intense emotional reactions to their own situations and the actions of others" (p. 5). For instance, most male and female characters in the narratives of the Mahābhārata, including Vyāsa (the author), who is said to have "the power of omniscience," and Kṛṣṇa, who is God Himself, help the readers extrapolate how the entire series of trailing events in the Mahābhārata is destined to happen. This is what Black highlights when he writes that "as author of the narrative, [Vyāsa's] appearances within it often move the story along, as well as offer lenses through which to understand its cosmic implications" and that he "draws on his omniscience to provide an explanation of the marriage that transcends the knowledge of ordinary humans" (p. 61). Further, Black emphasizes destiny's (active) role when he writes that "the story of Draupadī's previous birth invites reading the Mahābhārata as a karmic narrative in which the actions and decisions of characters create the conditions for subsequent events in the central story" (p. 76). Perhaps for this reason, Black highlights his methodological approach to the text and its literary character in the beginning of the book to explain that the Mahābhārata is more like a complex narrative than any other Hindu legend or mythology and is difficult to understand without contextualizing its dialogues and [End Page 1] their historical connections. Besides, the temporal aspect of the conversations between the characters is another literary condition to connect various sub-narratives to the main story. Black uses the term "dialogue" in three different ways while examining the text of the Mahābhārata, and this is how he proposes the text should be explored by the inquisitive mind:I understand the term "dialogue" in three main ways: (1) as verbal encounter: the conversations, discussions, and debates between characters within the text; (2) as intra-textuality: the relationship between different dialogues in different sections of the text; and (3) as hermeneutics: my interpretive approach to the text. In most of the remainder of this Introduction, I will prepare the way for the subsequent chapters by discussing each of these three understandings of dialogue and how they are related to the book as a whole. (p. 4)Black observes that most scholars, both from the East and the West, have tried to understand the text of the Mahābhārata and its embedded stories from different perspectives, taking them merely as dialogues or a product of dialogical relations, and hardly anyone has explored the most fundamental aspect of dialogue in the Mahābhārata, i.e., "the verbal exchanges between characters" that he takes as the book's starting point (p. 1). Black's literary perspective has made the book an interesting and illuminating read, despite the fact that most of the characters of the Mahābhārata have either a divine origin... (shrink)

The Nikāyas contain several apophatic descriptions of a state of cessation that occurs during the life of an individual. Furthermore, some texts suggest that this cessation paradoxically coincides with liberating insight. This article attempts to draw out philosophical implications of these passages and to reconstruct the ideas serving as their basis. To make better sense of these ideas, the article compares early Buddhist views with certain developments in modern philosophy of mind. It argues that cessation of khandha-s and saḷāyatana-s may (...) be viewed as suspension of various aspects of globally available phenomenal consciousness. It hypothesizes that this suspension is necessary due to the latter's processed character, which precludes direct cognition of reality. It attempts to account for a cognitive nature of cessation by suggesting the possibility of the mind (citta) working independently of phenomenal consciousness. It also considers the issue of cognitive content of cessation and of its expressibility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cognition and Practice: Li Zehou's Philosophical Aesthetics by Rafal BankaJana S. Rošker (bio)Cognition and Practice: Li Zehou's Philosophical Aesthetics. By Rafal Banka. Albany, New York: SUNY, 2022. Pp. vii+ 230. Hardcover $95,00, isbn 978-1-4384-8923-4. In his book Cognition and Practice: Li Zehou's Philosophical Aesthetics, Rafal Banka delves into the cognitive philosophy of Li Zehou, one of the most significant and influential Chinese philosophers of our time. Banka not (...) only provides a deeper understanding of Li's work, but he also places his studies on beauty and aesthetic experience in close proximity to current international research in philosophical aesthetics that places great importance on the embodiment and embeddedness of the subject. By delving into Banka's analysis of the cognitive dimensions of Li Zehou's aesthetics, readers can gain a deeper understanding of how this philosopher approaches the intersection of aesthetics and cognition. Through Banka's interpretation, Li's specific view on the intricate relationship between sensory perception and mental processes is highlighted, offering readers the potential for a more nuanced conception of his philosophical perspective. Banka's contribution to our understanding of Li's theories of cognition is deeply intertwined with the methodological framework and theoretical approach used in his work. The former is based upon an analytical perspective that enables him to identify key themes and concepts in Li's cognition theory, as well as to critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of his approach. By employing this framework, Banka provides a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of Li's cognitive dimensions that is grounded in rigorous examination. In addition to the methodological framework, the comprehensive theoretical approach that Banka applies in his study is also integral to understanding Li Zehou's contribution to the theory of perception on an international level. The book is divided into three distinct parts, each of which explores a different aspect of Li's philosophy. In the first part, Banka examines Li's main sources of inspiration, specifically the philosophers and philosophies that have significantly influenced and contributed to his own work. This section primarily focuses on classical Confucianism, Marxist historical materialism, and Li's unique reinterpretations of Immanuel Kant's philosophies, particularly those presented in his second and third critiques. [End Page 1]In the first three chapters that constitute this first part, Banka offers a clear and comprehensive analysis of how Li Zehou has viewed Kant's apriorism through the lens of Confucianism and integrated it with Marxist materialist foundations, revealing the coherence with his theory of anthropological ontology. By highlighting the interconnectedness of these diverse influences, Banka illuminates the unique synthesis of ideas that form the foundation of Li's philosophy. Through his detailed analysis, Banka shows how Li Zehou managed to create a synthesis between the dynamic elements of historical materialism on the one hand, and Kant's transcendentalism on the other. In Li's system, the concepts of the empirical and the transcendental are interacting in a dynamic, correlative and mutually complementary way. They are both parts of a processual philosophy in which movement is always followed by a standstill. In such a worldview, they always appear as essentially interrelated and interdependent realms of life. Banka provides a comprehensive explanation of the theoretical foundations that underpin the interactive and complementary nature of these two systems. This has culminated in the development of Li's groundbreaking new theory on the transformation of the empirical into the transcendental. In the second part of the book, the author delves into Li's own philosophical system, specifically focusing on his concepts of "subjectality" and beauty. These concepts are not axiologically theorized but instead arise from subjective interactions between human beings and the external world. Through a detailed and logically consistent analysis, the author demonstrates how Li's aesthetics is compatible with contemporary experience-oriented theories that are redefining the discipline on an international level. In chapters 4 and 5, the much-discussed concept of subjectality is viewed from a highly productive perspective, starting from the very center of the notion itself, where a subject actively interacts with the external reality, which in turn shapes its inwardness. The author convincingly demonstrates... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Nature (Ziran 自然) of Technological and Economic Development in Early DaoismYumi Suzuki (bio)I. IntroductionEric Nelson's Daoism and Environmental Philosophy: Nourishing Life provides comprehensive guidance on how early and later Daoist thought could offer both ideological and practical solutions to contemporary environmental issues. Nelson does not simple-mindedly claim that Daoists are environmentalists or that Daoism is comparable with modern environmental thought. His monograph has a more sophisticated, and also (...) more ambitious and consequently philosophically provocative, goal: to evolutionally develop old Daoist thought to directly address contemporary philosophical discourses on the environment.1I have summarized elsewhere what I find to be the most significant and meaningful contributions this book has made.2 I think its goal has successfully been achieved in various ways: Nelson gives careful and accurate interpretations to each passage from the original texts.3 What he calls "the new Daoism" deployed on the basis of these interpretations is reasonable and uncontroversial. The monograph overall offers an exemplary model of how wisdom acquired through studying the history of philosophy can be adapted to cogitating on newly emerging philosophical questions, despite differences in the intellectual contexts that we are required to warily distinguish. Moreover, by focusing on the Daoist tradition in East Asia, it well demonstrates how other systems of philosophical thought can be usefully employed to critically reflect on fundamental assumptions that an existing system is already committed to and that could be the very cause of relevant philosophical and pragmatic problems.While I mostly agree with his arguments in chapters 1–4 and 6, the only part I found unsatisfactory is chapter 5, "Early Daoist Biopolitics and a New [End Page 771] Daoist Political Ecology" (pp. 100–118). The present review aims to elaborate reasons for my resistance to Nelson's all-out endorsement of what he regards as the sociopolitical implications of Daoism. When it comes to politics, it appears to me, early Daoist texts such as the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi express often disappointingly ambiguous and agnostic attitudes toward what can be done with respect to their doctrinal opponents and outsiders. My suggestion is that if we examine the explorations of their contenders, that is, mainly Confucians and Legalists, concerning political and technological devices, they may present an altogether less biased and more balanced range of solutions to a question Nelson raises regarding an environmental challenge associated with a competitive globalized economy and rapidly developing technologies in our modern age.II. A Challenge to the Current Environmental MovementChapter 5 begins with the following statement:Appeals to encountering the myriad things in their environmental contexts and relations are necessary for an ecological transformation of existing cultures and societies. Yet an environmental ethos and culture of nature is not sufficient given how systematically reproduced social-economic processes in advanced capitalist societies meditate, entangle, and obstruct the transformative potential of such encounters. To this extent, an adequate environmental philosophy must concurrently be social-political philosophy that can offer an environmentally oriented critique of existing social structures and institutions that directly and indirectly harm creatures and degrade ecosystems in myriad ways such that transformations must transpire in economic and societal structures as well as at the level of individual cultivation and reflections.(p. 100)Nelson maintains that even though it is cardinal to transform the ways in which the myriad things encounter and mutually correspond with each other, as well as alter their own existential state, by cultivating an environmental ethos and culture of nature in each individual and society, one of the most serious challenges for such transformations could originate with already existing capitalist, materialist, and consumerist social structures and institutions widely prevailing and deeply embedded in the highly complex economic and political systems of our age.This, I think, captures the core problem of modern environmentalism. An individual, a group of people such as nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations, or a single city or country might be convinced by the Daoist "biospiritual" mode of life. Nevertheless, it appears to be far more difficult in practice to have certain countries or multinational mega-firms abandon their steadfast, primary commitment to national, industrial, commercial, or corporate missions to pursue their own benefits that deprioritize or... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophical Enactment and Bodily Cultivation in Early Daoism: In the Matrix of the Daodejing by Thomas MichaelJing Tan (bio) and Xiangfei Bao (bio)Philosophical Enactment and Bodily Cultivation in Early Daoism: In the Matrix of the Daodejing. By Thomas Michael. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. Pp. x + 278. Hardcover $115.00, isbn 978-1-3502-3665-3. Thomas Michael's Philosophical Enactment and Bodily Cultivation in Early Daoism: In the Matrix of the Daodejing (hereafter (...) Philosophical Enactment) brings forward new perspectives and pathways to one of the most important topics concerning the reconstruction of early Daoist history. The author has contributed two other original and insightful monographs to the study of Daoism, including In the Shadows of the Dao: Laozi, the Sage, and the Daodejing (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015) and The Pristine Dao: Metaphysics in Early Daoist Discourse (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005). Together with his newly published research article "The Original Text of the Daodejing: Disentangling Versions and Recensions" (Religions 13, No. 4, (2022): 325), Michael has displayed his erudition and expertise in the study of early Chinese religion and philosophy in both a sinological and philosophical way. His Philosophical Enactment sheds new light on the history of early Daoism. Writing the history of early Daoism is not easy, as Daoism is not ready-made and has no clear boundaries. The difficulty lies not only in its entanglement with, for instance, Confucianism and Legalism, but also in when Daoism began and how it transformed. Narrating the origin and the vicissitude of Daoism requires a prescribed narrative logic or a choice of philosophical paradigm. Piling up materials is not history writing. A typical pattern in writing the history of early Daoism is distinguishing the Daoist school of philosophy (daojia 道家) from Daoist religion (daojiao 道教).1 Indeed, this distinction brings much convenience to the history writing of Daoism and has been adopted by many scholars. Though some do not explicitly state this distinction, the structure of their writings indicates it.2 The distinction between daojia and daojiao was recognized by scholars long before Fung Yu-Lan 馮友蘭 (1895-1900) published his A Brief History of Chinese Philosophy in 1948. [End Page 1] Xu Dishan 許地山 (1893-1941) believes that such a distinction can be traced back to the "Three Ranks" (sanpin shuo三品說) in Liu Xie's 劉勰 (ca. 465-532) "On Eliminating Doubts" (Miehuo lun滅惑論).3However, the received distinction between daojia and daojiao is a retrospective one. It is the product of modern discipline classification and is based on the modern understanding of philosophy and religion. Such a distinction must have been unknown to the people before and during the Han. This distinction may also cause difficulties, for instance, how to classify Ge Hong 葛洪 (283-343) and his works. Wang Ka 王卡 (1956-2017) categorized Ge Hong as a Daoist philosopher,4 while Tang Yijie 湯一介 (1927-2014) assigns Ge Hong to Daoist religion. Tang even asserts that Ge Hong established a theoretical system for Daoist religion. 5 The practice of distinguishing and dichotomizing the Daoist school of philosophy and Daoist religion has been opposed by many researchers. The French Sinologist Henri Maspéro (1883-1945) argues that daojia and daojiao are not so distinct as is often received; they both belong to the same ancient tradition. Maspéro's opposition to the dichotomy was also supported by Joseph Needham (1900-1995), Kristof Schipper (1934-2021), and others.6Although many scholars find it difficult to sharply separate the Daoist school of philosophy from Daoist religion,7 and also find it improper to dichotomize these two concepts, they still commonly accept the distinction and then trying to bridge the two. However, the dilemma faced by scholars compels us to wonder about the appropriateness of the philosophical paradigm dictating this distinction. In other words, do we have a more appropriate alternative? Thomas Michael's Philosophical Enactment provides us with a new perspective for reconsidering the problem of the relationship between the Daoist school of philosophy and Daoist religion, while also being an excellent example of the history writing of early Daoism. According to the general view, the Daodejing belongs to Daoist philosophy because it offers systematic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:All Mine!: Happiness, Ownership, and Naming in Eleventh-Cenury China by Stephen OwenNguyen T. Thanh-Huyen (bio)All Mine!: Happiness, Ownership, and Naming in Eleventh-Cenury China. By Stephen Owen. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021. Pp. 208. Paperback $30.00, isbn 978-0-231-20311-1. Reading Stephen Owen's new book, All Mine!: Happiness, Ownership, and Naming in Eleventh-Century China (hereafter All Mine!), many readers will find that the perspectives of eleventh-century Song scholar-officials on finding (...) happiness in material things are still highly relevant to the increasingly materialistic culture in China and the world in the present day. Under the Song dynasty, the pursuit of happiness through material objects is "what contemporaries themselves recognized as uncomfortable topics" (p. 14). In writing this book, Owen attempts to survey a literary phenomenon in which material-contingent happiness permeated Song literature despite the moral surveillance of classical ideology on happiness and ownership that stretched back to the Lunyu (Analects of Confucius). At the same time, the author elucidates how material-contingent happiness in literature drove and was driven by the sociocultural changes and the growth of commercialization in the Song. All Mine! is a fine balance between literary study and intellectual history. Owen's approach tends to be all-inclusive, as he covers a diverse range of genres (including prose, poetry, miscellany, and biography) and texts with which readers generally have different levels of familiarity. For every text, Owen provides thorough explanation on its background, allusions, and references, while also offering in-depth cultural, aesthetic, and structural analysis. He calls our attention to the subtle differences between similar texts, such as the biographies of Ouyang Xiu 歐陽脩 and Tao Yuanming 陶淵明, to show how they deliver entirely different ideas about happiness and ownership and signal a radical transition from the old to a new world of values. Regarding intellectual history, the book studies the conflicts between different discourses on happiness. Owen reveals different forces of censorship against happiness of acquisition and ownership, presenting them especially clearly with Ouyang Xiu's stories in Chapter 1 ("The Biography of the Retired Layman Six") and Chapter 2 ("The Magistrate of Peach Blossom Spring"). The author also pays close attention to the act of naming as a form of ownership. As he points out, the process of Song literati trying to "get the right name" for objects and sites often converged with the process of elaborating different [End Page 1] person-thing relationships based on the social status of the owner and the characteristics of the object of ownership, thereby grounding the principles for judging the morality of material-contingent happiness. Readers can also see the happiness-ownership paradox in literature as closely related to the commercialization of elite-praised goods that was flourishing in Song society. This validates Owen's choice "to think of cultural and historical phenomena as ecosystems or solar systems in constant change, each particular changed by and changing the whole" (p. 13). Perhaps the most impressive chapters in the book are 3 and 5, which deal with the Song's perspective on ownership as transient and unstable, and its relationship with happiness. Chapter 3 explores the pervasive awareness that "things are held by power, not by right" (p. 67). The source of "power" could be financial, social, political, and military advantage, or something humans can't control, like death. Owen relates many sad Song stories of elites whose things were taken by someone with greater power. The most interesting one is perhaps that of Su Dongpo 苏東坡 and his "Nine Blossoms Mountain in a Jug," in which Su was not willing to give up the little world that he attached to this rock mountain, despite being very conscious about the dangers of possession. "It is alright if the superior man lets his interests be temporarily invested in things, but it is not alright if he lets his interest remain in those things," the author writes (p. 72). Chapter 3 contains many examples of "names as a form of ownership." Ownership of physical things can be transient and infringeable, but the writings on names of objects and sites by famous Song literati like Ouyang Xiu and Su Dongpo... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zhuangzi: A New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang as Interpreted by Guo Xiang by Richard John LynnZiqiang Zhao (bio)Zhuangzi: A New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang as Interpreted by Guo Xiang. By Richard John Lynn. New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. Pp. ixxxix + 712. Hardcover $140.00, isbn 978-0-231-12386-0. The Zhuangzi occupies an important place in the history of Chinese literature, philosophy, and religion. (...) English translations of the Zhuangzi have roughly a 140-year history. There have been twelve full English translations, from the first full translation by Frederic Henry Balfour (1846-1909), published in 1881, to the translation by Richard John Lynn considered here. Within this framework, Lynn's translation of the Zhuangzi undoubtedly represents great progress in the English translations of the Zhuangzi and Zhuangzi studies. Based on Guo Xiang's 郭象 (252–312) commentaries, Lynn's is a new type of translation, aptly titled Zhuangzi: a New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang as Interpreted by Guo Xiang (hereafter New Translation). Lynn's New Translation consists of seven main sections, namely, a "Translator's Note," "Introduction," the main body of the translation–the thirty-three Chapters of the Zhuangzi further divided into "The Sayings of Master Zhuang: The Inner Chapters," "The Sayings of Master Zhuang: The Outer Chapters, and "The Sayings of Master Zhuang: The Miscellaneous Chapters"-- four Appendices, two Glossaries, Bibliography, and an Index. In the "Translator's Note," Lynn explains the arrangement and format of the translation, the preliminary research work, the translation techniques, and the selection of Guo Xiang's commentaries as the base text. The translator devotes nearly ninety pages to the introduction of the translation. In this section, Lynn explains what distinguishes his translation from previous translations. He then introduces the specific content of the introductory section, which consists of twenty parts. This section attempts to explain the social context in which the basic assumptions and intentions of Guo Xiang's thoughts were established, the reasons for the formation of Guo Xiang's commentary and Guo Xiang's rise to power that provided an opportunity to "be in the position of recorder for the senior tutor to carry out the duties of 'capital commandant' as his deputy" (p. xxvii). This begins with trying to sort out the controversy over Guo Xiang's annotations and attempts to resolve it. Next, there are attempts to define the basic features of Guo Xiang's thought, locate them in the context of a particular era, and analyze them from the perspective of contemporary [End Page 1] philosophy. Finally, there is an exploration of the relationship between the Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang's commentary, as well as Guo Xiang's relation to Buddhism. Lynn also examines the history and recension of the Zhuangzi, and briefly introduces the basic features of the Zhuangzi. This part of the introduction consistently discusses Guo Xiang's commentary on the Zhuangzi through a logical and clear exposition. It offers readers an opportunity to understand Guo Xiang's commentary in a way which makes it easier for them to follow the rationale behind the translation. The next section is the main body of the translation of the Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang's commentary. Lynn translates the Inner, Outer, and Miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi following Guo Xiang's distinctive reading. The titles are all in pinyin, and are explained in English translation in brackets, except for Chapter 21, Chapter 23, Chapter 25, and Chapter 32. The translation itself adopts the same form as Guo Xiang's annotated text. The text from the Zhuangzi is in bold and above the corresponding commentary. Importantly, the Zhuangzi itself is translated according to Guo Xiang's commentary, and not the other way around. Lynn also explains or introduces some proper nouns, names of people etc., by adding notes. These notes not only reflect the ideas contained in the Zhuangzi in a more detailed and concrete way, but also facilitate the reader's understanding of its connotations. In the process of translation, translators adopt strategies, and Lynn is no exception. Specifically, for the translation of each chapter title, Lynn adopted both "domestication" and "foreignization" strategies (Baker... (shrink)

Abstract:Zhuangzi's understanding of human nature has not been extensively discussed in the English literature. The Chinese discussions of it, though many, largely tend either to be carried away into the Confucian conventional debate on the moral goodness and badness of human nature or to explain it away by overemphasizing Zhuangzi's stress on the uniqueness of the human individual. In this article, with the intention to pin down what is really meant by human nature in the Zhuangzi, it will first be (...) examined what the word xing connotes for Zhuangzi and then argued that Zhuangzi characterizes human nature in terms of the heart-mind (xin 心), understood both functionally as what animates the body and essentially as a universally significant power that enables the human being to behave in a way similar to the way that the Dao 道 acts in the universe. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Zhuangzi:Personal Freedom and/or Incongruity of Names?Paul J. D'Ambrosio (bio)Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom (hereafter Origins) has sparked much scholarly debate. Already numerous presentations, various types of discussions, and reviews have appeared based on Origins. The present review focuses specifically on the Zhuangzi chapter. The entire project actually began, Jiang writes, fifteen years ago as a book on (...) the Zhuangzi. Through his research Jiang realized he needed to learn more about the objects of philosophical ridicule and critique in the Zhuangzi. Origins is the result of this decade-and-a-half study.Origins provides a somewhat novel framework for reading Warring States period philosophy. Summarizing the basic structure of his project Jiang writes: "I make the case that the philosophical dialectics between the partialist humaneness and imperialist justice formed the fundamental dynamics underlying the mainstream moral-political project during the classic period, with the musing on personal freedom as the outlier" (p. 35). As Karyn Lai puts it, Origins revolves around a "predictable set of inherited pre-Qin texts associated with key figures, traditionally called the "Masters" (zi 子) text" (Lai 2022, p. 181). Some models inherited by the "masters," such as yinyang 陰陽 thinking or ming 名 (names) and shi 實 (actualities), are nearly absent in Origins and would cast new light on the project as well [End Page 458] as the tradition. In this review I will first outline Jiang's reading of the Zhuangzi before considering how a richer appreciation of the Chinese tradition, especially its own methodological tools, frameworks, and concepts, could bolster the exciting contributions Origins stands to make. We will start with Jiang's big picture view of the Zhuangzi.In Origins the Zhuangzi is taken to be a completely unique text. It does not engage in the moral and political discourse the other "masters" texts are subsumed by, and instead of supporting either partialist humaneness or impartialist justice it "muses" on personal freedom. Jiang defines: "Personal freedom is understood as the appreciation and cultivation of personal space wherein one can be left alone and enjoy the company of like-minded friends without being entangled in the sociopolitical world" (p. 36). There are two significant points to note about Jiang's understanding of freedom. First, it is almost a word-for-character definition of how the "Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove" have been described by many. Research on these philosophical works could significantly enrich Jiang's reading, albeit from a different angle. Second, Guo Xiang's 郭象 (d. 312) emphasis on, and philosophical explorations of, du 獨 (an interconnected type of "lone") would further fill out how freedom and relationality—which are both attributed to the Zhuangzi by Jiang—are connected.In addition to a "fierce advocacy for personal freedom" Jiang classifies the Zhuangzi as a "singular outlier" for ridiculing the "misguided character of [the contestations between humaneness and justice] and warn[ing] against their potential for inhumanity and injustice" (p. 49). Indeed, the Zhuangzi does demonstrate that these discussions can elicit "the very opposite of what was intended by the participants of the mainstream discourse" (p. 49). Its criticisms are even more penetrating when we appreciate its deeper point about "names being the guests of actualities" (Zhuangzi 1:4). From this perspective the Zhuangzi is not against systems of humaneness or justice as such. It rather points out that humaneness does not have a single referent, nor could that referent be reliably distinguished. The name "humane" does not guarantee humane action, or really anything in particular. The same is true for "justice." We will return to these points below.Jiang's chapter on the Zhuangzi begins by defending moral and political readings of the text. It is an outlier from the perspective of the "humanity-justice" framework, but this only means that the moral-political discourse Zhuangists were engaged in was different. The result was that already by the early Han and by the time of Sima Qian 司馬遷 (d. 86 b.c.e.) "Zhuangzi's teachings were … of little use to contemporary political discourse" (p. 288). Jiang should be delighted to know that the Wei-Jin period, which had inestimable... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi MorisatoLance H. Gracy (bio)Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond. By Takeshi Morisato. England: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019. Pp. viii + 269. Hardcover $116.00, isbn 978-1-350-09251-8.Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi Morisato is an informative and (...) insightful read on metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and relevant areas of interest. Morisato's stated objective in the introduction is (a) to investigate the possibility of comparative philosophy through William Desmond's metaxological way of thinking, and (b) to examine how the "absolute dialectic" in Tanabe Hajime's metanoesis can help us understand the relationship between one framework of thinking and another (p. 16). Morisato's book proceeds in five parts. Part One orients the reader to the scope of the project through an overview of comparative philosophy and its methodological frameworks--namely, the metaxological methodology of William Desmond, which deals importantly with the (modern) predicament of religion as expressed in the "transcendental univocity" of the Kantian system; and the metanoetic methodology of Tanabe Hajime, which deals importantly with the issue of "rational progress" in Hegelian dialectic. Yet each intellectual framework deals with both Kant's and Hegel's systems. Part Two addresses what the problem of religion in Kantian and Hegelian philosophy is in more detail. Part Three, "Metaxology and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," and Part Four, "Metanoetics and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," offer a more detailed account concerning how Desmond's and Tanabe's philosophies tackle conceptual problems in modern philosophy of religion. Morisato's conclusion follows from these along with an endnotes section, bibliography, and index.According to Morisato, overcoming the problem of comparative philosophy--i.e., the "philosophical problem of comparing two systems of thinking rooted in different cultural and intellectual contexts" (p. 22)--means, at least in part, clarifying the extent to which philosophers of different culturalintellectual contexts and backgrounds share, as "kindred spirits" or as "intellectual companions," a consonance of thought regarding their philosophical perspectives. Desmond and Tanabe represent just such a pair, whose consonance of thought, expressed by Morisato en passant and expressed more definitively in the conclusion, is unified in a struggle against hegemonic structures in the [End Page 1] philosophy of religion, specifically those of Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of religion. William Desmond (1951–present) is a Catholic philosopher who currently holds the David R. Cook Chair in Philosophy at Villanova University. He has worked extensively on metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and German idealism. Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) was a Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto school and is perhaps most well-known for his Philosophy as Metanoetics. Morisato does a commendable job elucidating issues in modern systems of religion, which have undoubtedly been influenced by Kant's and Hegel's systems. As it concerns Kant, contemporary philosophy of religion still struggles with the claims of transcendental idealism, particularly its reduction of religious belief to mere postulates of practical reason. And as it concerns Hegel, what seems to be an unending, "progressive" self-return of dialectical monism has deeply influenced the way, and manner, in which religious adherents deal with societal views of the individual and individuals' views of society. By this token, Morisato's attempt to get beyond the so-called "extirpation" of the source of religious truth as the "creative power behind our understanding of reality and our existence" is refreshing, to say the least (p. 46). In what follows, I offer a relatively brief overview of Morisato's book and conclude with a reflection on the text.Morisato's critique of the Kantian and Hegelian systems begins with the argument that Kantian transcendental univocity implies that reason's autonomy, as dictates of the moral law as absolute duties, not only precedes divine legislation, but becomes one with it or else is reduced to it. In other words, for Kant, the rational-moral universal is divine law. However, reason's autonomy fails to comprehend the divine origination of finite particulars due to... (shrink)

Abstract:There is debate about the ontological status of conventional entities in Abhidharma thought. Buddhist texts often draw a distinction between two different kinds of entities, ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat), but are often unclear about what the distinction entails. The debate about whether past and future dharmas are ultimately real reveals that Sam.ghabhadra and Vasubandhu—two prominent Abhidharma philosophers—fundamentally disagree about whether reality consists in one or many modes of being. Saṃghabhadra's Sarvāstivāda position is best understood as (...) the ontologically pluralist view that a dharma can enjoy three distinct but equally fundamental temporal modes of being. Vasubandhu's position is that reality is univocal, that everything is real in the same sense. Because Saṃghabhadra is a pluralist and Vasubandhu is not, Saṃghabhadra affirms the reality of conventional entities whereas Vasubandhu does not. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Ideas Concerning Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology:A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇiEberhard Guhe (bio)Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology (see Phillips 2020) is surely a landmark achievement in the realm of research on Navya-Nyāya. It is a work of reference not only for specialists but also for a broader audience of philosophically interested readers. Phillips has demonstrated (...) his expertise on Nyāya in general in many previous publications. At present, there is probably hardly anybody else who would have been better qualified to accomplish the mammoth task of translating and elucidating such a complex and voluminous Sanskrit work as the Tattvacintāmaṇi. It should however be noted that there is another edition and annotated translation of the Tattvacintāmaṇi (excluding the Upamānakhaṇḍa) by V.P. Bhatta (see Bhatta 2005, 2012, 2021), which is rather addressed to specialists, who are proficient in Sanskrit. The two volumes on the Anumānakhaṇḍa were published in 2021 (one year after the publication of Phillips' three volumes). Considering the enormous size of such a book project, the result cannot be expected to be completely flawless. The present review focuses on the introduction in volume 1 and on volume 2. I will address some minor issues, primarily methodological ones, but I will also address a few more serious (albeit surely accidental) translation errors (especially in the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-section of the Vyāptivāda), which can lead to a misunderstanding of Gaṅgeśa's stance on a pivotal topic of the Navya-Naiyāyikas, namely the correct definition of the concept of pervasion (vyāpti).IThe introduction is very insightful. However, logicians will probably stumble over Phillips' methods of formalization. Some examples are given below. [End Page 498](1) The language of Phillips' formalizations looks a bit like a first-order language. Thus, for example, he uses "Ha" as a formal equivalent of the sentence "The mountain is smoky" (see vol. 1, p. 18). An obvious deviation from first-order conventions consists in the fact that Phillips uses at least two types of negation. Propositional negation is expressed by means of the symbol "~" (see vol. 2, p. 668; unfortunately, this symbol is not mentioned in vol. 1, pp. 18–19, where Phillips introduces his formalization techniques). Moreover, Phillips uses the negation symbol "¬," which he applies to capital Roman letters, in order to express a kind of term negation. Thus, for example, "¬H" may serve as a term referring to "the absence of the probans" (vol. 2, p. 623). To be precise, the type of absence which "¬H" refers to is a so-called "relational absence" (saṃsargâbhāva). Phillips formalizes the so-called "mutual absences" (anyonyâbhāva) differently (see below).Although "¬Hc" (see vol. 1, p. 18) looks like an ordinary first-order wff, it should more accurately be read as "The absence of H is located at c." Properly speaking, we should then also read atomic wffs like "Hc" as "H is located at c," where "H" should not be regarded as an expression of a predicate like "… is smoky," but rather as a general term, that is, as a formal counterpart of expressions like, for example, "smoke."Unfortunately, Phillips renders the meaning of wffs of the form "¬ϕx" not as "the absence of H is located at x," but in a somewhat simplified manner, which obscures the fact that he treats the negation symbol "¬" as a means to express a term negation: "And negation is term negation, not propositional negation [author's note: as we have just seen, this is not true of all kinds of negation which Phillips refers to in his formalizations, since he uses the "~" in a different sense]; thus, the negative sign '¬' in '¬ϕx' is defined as 'ϕ is absent at x'" (vol. 1, p. 19).Moreover, the use of different kinds of letters for the variables in "¬ϕx" (Greek and Roman) seems to suggest that the absentee should always be the referent of a general term. However, expressions of the form "the absence of a is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Discussion of Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China:Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal FreedomTao Jiang (bio)I am grateful to all six commentators for their careful reading of and thoughtful engagements with my book, especially to Sungmoon Kim for spearheading this group effort. In the book, Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom, I try to tell a new story (...) about the foundational period of Chinese philosophy, with a focus on the deliberations of normative values in the respective texts. I make three key points. First, the central intellectual challenge during the Chinese classical period was how to negotiate the relationships between the personal, the familial, and the political domains (sometimes also characterized as the relationship between the private and the public) when philosophers were re-imagining and re-conceptualizing a new moral-political order. Philosophers offered a dazzling array of competing visions for that newly imagined order. Second, the competing visions can be characterized as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the guiding norms of the newly imagined order, with the Confucians, the Mohists, the Laoists, and the so-called fajia thinkers being the major participants. This was the mainstream intellectual project that dominated the classical debate and set the terms and the parameters of that debate. Third, Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were the outliers of the mainstream moral-political discourse during this period. They rejected the very parameters of humaneness versus justice in the mainstream debate and instead represented a lone voice advocating personal freedom. For the Zhuangists, the mainstream debate was intellectually banal, morally misguided, and politically dangerous. One critical overall context for these [End Page 475] philosophical endeavors is that they took place within an evolving understanding of Heaven and its relationship with humans.Loy Hui-chiehLet me begin with Loy Hui-chieh's comment on the book's methodology, laid out in the Introduction to my book, as it pertains to the broader norms of practices in contemporary analytic philosophy and Chinese philosophy. The purpose of the methodological reflection in the Introduction is to provide some tools in dealing with the challenges to Chinese philosophy from Sinology (historical and philological approaches to classical Chinese texts) and Western philosophy within Western academia. I argue that scholars of Chinese philosophy, situated between Sinology and Western philosophy in the West, need to be mindful of the constructed nature of the scholarly objects shaped by disciplinary norms and practices. Specifically, scholars of Chinese philosophy, in their philosophical endeavors, construct their scholarly objects based on the operative but often implicit ideas of inherited text, textual author, and textual intent, as opposed to Sinologists who are more motivated by their scholarly objects of original text, historical author, and authorial intent.Loy's comment frames my methodological reflections primarily through the lens of history of philosophy. There is another critical element in this endeavor, namely the philosophical lineage upon which the study of philosophy in the West has been built, conceptually and institutionally. With respect to history of philosophy, Loy's questions concern the presentist orientation in analytic philosophy and its relationship with history of philosophy. As he aptly points out, analytic philosophers are ultimately uninterested in the correct interpretation of who said what in the history of philosophy. Rather their interest lies in philosophical issues and problems themselves, irrespective of how/when/by whom those issues are formulated. Scholars in history of philosophy seek to convince analytic philosophers that the texts and the ideas they study should be recognized as good philosophy by contemporary standards, not just their historical values. The presentist bias is clear. Of course, we do not have to subscribe to such a norm since the present is not necessarily the be-all and end-all of everything philosophers are concerned with, or at least it should not be. Otherwise, our philosophical reflections, even those with the presentist concerns, would be significantly impoverished. As a profession, contemporary philosophers regularly draw upon history of ideas, especially from the Hellenistic and early modern European traditions, to frame their arguments and to seek new inspirations. Such a practice is heavily dependent on the... (shrink)

This paper attempts to reconcile two ideas that seem fundamentally opposed to one another: the reality of the self and the doctrine of no-self. Buddhism offers a form of spiritual equanimity that turns on the denial of a self. Nonetheless, there seem to be good reasons to hold onto the reality of the self. The existence of a self enables us to account for praise and blame, the hopes for oneself that motivate actions, and attachments to the selves of others (...) in bonds of love and affection. I show how it may be possible to reconcile the reality of the self with a particular interpretation of the no-self doctrine by engaging with the work of thinkers from the phenomenological tradition such as Merleau-Ponty, Zahavi, Gallagher, and Petitmengin. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mencius and Xunzi between Humaneness and JusticeSungmoon Kim (bio)In his now classic Disputers of the Tao (1989), A. C. Graham aptly captured the central feature of the ancient Chinese world of thought in terms of the dispute about the Way between competing philosophical schools. But it has since long remained an intellectual challenge how to understand and evaluate the unfolding of the philosophical schools in ancient China [End Page (...) 439] coherently from a philosophical standpoint. Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China attempts to meet this long overdue challenge, and it does so admirably with philological rigor and philosophical insight.What is central to Jiang's framework is the conceptual tripod of humaneness, justice, and personal freedom, which he generally understands as "the moral norm that is agent/recipient relative" (especially, natural inclinations toward one's family/kin members), "impartial judgment on the merits of persons and states of affairs," and "the appreciation and cultivation of personal space where one can be left alone … without [being] entangled in the sociopolitical world," respectively.1 Jiang begins with Confucius by presenting him as the first major thinker in Chinese history who wrestled with the tension between humaneness and justice. According to Jiang, Confucius' seminal idea of impartial justice was critically re-appropriated by the Mohists, who advocated "impartial care" (jian ai 兼愛), while his idea of partial humaneness was later developed by Mencius, who upheld "familial virtues" as the pivot of Confucian morality and politics—although, as will be discussed shortly, this represents only one dimension of Mencius' philosophical system. Jiang understands the later development of the Laoist, the fajia ist (commonly known as "Legalist"), and the Zhuangist thoughts, largely as critical responses to the Confucian (especially the Mencian) argument for partial humaneness and the congruity between the familial and the political by naturalizing Heaven (thereby decoupling the political from the familial), developing an objective political system independent of the ruler's moral virtue, and insulating private persons from human relationality and the intervention of the state. Finally, Jiang argues that while Han Feizi's political thought presents the culmination of the early Chinese concern with impartial justice, Xunzi reformulated Confucianism by synthesizing humaneness and justice.I find Tao Jiang's overall argument, buttressed by extensive philological examinations, well-structured and penetrating, and I have no doubt that this book will make an important contribution to Chinese moral and political philosophy. Like many great books, however, Jiang's book makes numerous novel yet controversial claims, and this review aims to engage with several key questions Jiang raises with regard to Mencius and Xunzi, the two giants of classical Confucianism.The Two Strands of Mencius?In interpreting Mencius, Tao Jiang's core argument is that there is "a deep tension at the heart of the Mencian system."2 This tension, according to Jiang, rises from the two incompatible strands in Mencian thought, the "extensionist" strand and the "sacrificialist" strand: [End Page 440][W]hile the extensionist Mencius operates on the assumption, normative within Confucianism, of congruity between the personal, the familial, and the political domains, the sacrificialist Mencius recognizes a tension between the familial and the political that can be hard to reconcile or even irreconcilable under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the sacrificialist Mencius radically separates the familial from the political and ultimately prioritizes the former over the latter, by embracing the necessity for sacrifice as a way that, at times, is required to save the familial.3The extensionist Mencius presents the normative (i.e., partial humane) strand of Confucianism, which stipulates the seamless continuity between the personal, the familial, and the political, as best demonstrated in Mencius' statement that "the root of the world lies in the state; the root of the state lies in the family; the root of the family lies in oneself."4 That is, the extensionist strand of Mencius highlights the transformative force of moral self-cultivation that achieves the unity between the inner self and the outer world through the Heaven-decreed human nature, thus denying the categorial separations between ethics and politics, between moral virtue and political virtue, and between private and public. In Jiang's view, the extensionist strand captures... (shrink)

Abstract:In the writings of the Chinese Madhyamaka master Jizang (549–623 c.e.), we often read arguments that deduce universal affirmation from universal negation. In previous scholarship, this seemingly paradoxical reasoning was often explained by ascribing to Jizang a type of transcendental realism—the view that reality transcends our ordinary language, logic, and reason—and reading it as his unique way of capturing such a transcendental nature of reality. More recently, an attempt at formalizing this transcendental realist interpretation of Jizang was made by Yasuo (...) Deguchi, who suggests that Jizang could have been tinkering with a type of dialethism. This article challenges the transcendental realist interpretation of Jizang by studying strong anti-realist tendencies found across his writings, and proposes a way to understand his deduction of universal affirmation from universal negation within the boundaries of ordinary reasoning and coherently with his anti-realist philosophy by introducing the modalities of "categorical truth" and "conditional truth.". (shrink)

Abstract:The Confucian classic Great Learning (Daxue 大學) articulates in a sequence eight human aims for the good life. There have been various interpretations of the relations of these aims. This essay problematizes these interpretations and proposes a solution that the sequence of these Confucian human aims is developmentally temporal yet not stage-exclusive. I illustrate such an account by drawing on the model of Erik Erikson's developmental theory. Accordingly, while there is a temporal progression in achieving these aims, they nevertheless should (...) be pursued concurrently throughout most of a person's life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality by Edward Y.J. ChingMaria Hasfeldt Long (bio)The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality. By Edward Y.J. Ching. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. Pp. vii + 204. Hardcover $99.00, isbn 978-3-030-77923-8.In recent years, the study of Korean Neo-Confucianism as an international field has (...) been growing exponentially. Compared to former decades, the number of international publications has grown significantly over the last ten years, with Edward Y.J. Chung as one of the most active scholars. The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality is the culmination of an almost decade-long study of the Korean Neo-Confucian scholar, Yi Hwang Toegye (1501–1570). With a focus on the moral and spiritual aspects of the theories of Toegye, Chung maps out a brilliant overview of the philosopher's worldview and literary works. Chung's primary objective is to provide "thought-provoking" and fresh insights into one of the most important Korean Neo-Confucian thinkers in history, as well as shed light on Neo-Confucian thought in general and how Toegye's philosophy in particular can be relevant in modern interreligious dialogues (p. 149).Consisting of ten chapters, where each chapter could serve as an individual article, Chung takes the reader through the core concepts of Toegye and his development of a form of self-cultivation different from the Chinese Neo-Confucian idea of self-cultivation. This together created a holistic religious worldview with a strong spiritual dimension, which manifests through selfcultivation practices. The first two chapters introduce Toegye and the historical context of 16th-century Joseon-dynasty Korea (1392–1910); his understanding of the Neo-Confucian tradition as the true learning; and his rejection of Daoism and Buddhism. With the reader introduced to the immediate historical context and Neo-Confucian discourse of the time, the following three chapters cover Toegye's religious and moral understanding of the relationship between the Heavenly Principle (C. tianli, K. cheolli) and human nature (C. renxing, K. inseong). Furthermore, Chung covers the moral-spiritual implications that the Four-Seven Debate had on Toegye's later practical self-cultivation for becoming a sage. In short, the debate concerns the relation between the "four sprouts" of human characteristics as first described by Mengzi (ca. 371–289 BCE) and the seven human emotions mentioned in various classical texts. Toegye believed in the doctrine that the "experience of Heaven was within oneself" (p. 47). Therefore, [End Page 1] to become a sage, one would have to commit to the active practice of an inner feeling of reverence (C. jing, K. gyeong) daily.Chapter six dives into the spiritual practice of self-reflection and mind cultivation (C. xinxue, K. simhak), which was an ongoing process that would lead the practitioner closer to sagehood. The seventh chapter focuses on how this spiritual dimension of Toegye's doctrine is relevant to broader discussions of ecology today. With a strong love for nature, Toegye incorporated the idea of nature within his spiritual self-cultivation, which Chung elaborates on. It was important for the human being to be in harmony with Heaven, earth, and all myriad things. This meant respecting and spending time in nature also played a part in the daily practice of spiritual self-cultivation. Moving on, in chapters eight and nine, Chung presents a comparative study on the philosophical and theological question of how to transcend evil, as well as the matter of interreligious dialogue. By way of a textual-interpretive approach, Chung compares Toegye's thought with Christian contra Buddhist theological ideas and how these findings can help develop an interreligious approach. In chapter nine, Chung suggests that the idea of self-transcendence through self-cultivation can be the ultimate reality. In this chapter, Chung wants to break with the tendency in interreligious dialogue where many scholars rely heavily on Christian theological terms. Chung introduces Neo-Confucian concepts and terms, especially the terms used by Toegye. The last and concluding chapter... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and History, Customs and EthicsHui-Chieh Loy (bio)Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom. By Tao Jiang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China is a serious tour de force of a study. In many ways, I am reminded of Angus Graham's Disputers of the Tao and Benjamin Schwartz' The World of Thought in Ancient (...) China—but updated. A signal difference is that it is more constrained in its coverage of figures, texts, and especially in having the topical focus upon moral-political philosophy. At the same time and within the chosen (narrower) confines, it often examines its subject in greater detail and draws on more recent discussions.One neat thing that Jiang does is to deliberately weave in explicit discussions of how each subsequent thinker or text incorporated or criticized ideas associated with earlier thinkers. (I formulated it this way since there isn't enough historical evidence about who-actually-read-what in the ancient world, citation practices being what they were.) In this regard, I am especially heartened to read, for example, the sections on "Traces of Mohist Elements in the Laozi" (3.3.2), and "Mohist Elements in Han Feizi's Thought" (7.3.3).By no means should the desultory remarks below be counted as a full review or assessment (impressionistically, this is the sort of book I will recommend that my grad students read—there, I've said it). Think of them as humble shards of pottery thrown in the hope for some jade in response. To make my task more focused, I will comment on the Sinology versus Philosophy distinction, and Jiang's treatment of the Mohists.I. Philosophy and History of PhilosophyAn important part of Jiang's Introduction is devoted to discussing the situation of Chinese Philosophy as a field in the Western Academy, caught between Sinology on the one hand and academic Philosophy on the other. Due to the different scholarly objectives and norms in the two disciplines, scholars working on Chinese Philosophy often find themselves caught [End Page 420] between two distinct audiences who demand different things. Jiang's aim is to propose an "interpretive model to distinguish two sets of scholarly objects operative in Sinology and philosophy. These objects are related and at times overlap, but they are also often irreducibly distinct, i.e., original text versus inherited text, historical author versus textual author, and authorial intent versus textual intent, with the former in the pairs belonging to Sinologists and the latter to philosophers" (p. 7). In general, I am highly sympathetic to the distinctions Jiang draws. But I do wonder if we need to step back and start from a wider context involving what is potentially a deeper divide.Now, it is entirely a caricature but the joke around the water cooler is that philosophers—especially those of a more "analytic" bent—often exude the attitude that they are not in the business of reading old books. Their project is one focused on issues and problems and puzzles that are ultimately about the natural and human world, rather than about texts and their interpretation, or even the historical thinkers themselves. To give some obvious examples, the intellectual questions they see themselves as answering are the likes of:• Can we know that God exists, if God exists at all?• What is the nature of moral claims? Do they admit of truth and falsity?• How is causation related to possibility?• Is a logic that dispenses with the law of non-contradiction viable?• What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge?• Is abortion morally justifiable?Sometimes the questions they ask even infringe on the results and insights from nearby fields, for instance linguistics and the natural and empirical sciences:• What is time?• Can a presentist conception of time be made consistent with contemporary physics?• What is the nature of consciousness? How is it related to physical neural states or informational computational processes?• Can computers be sentient?• How is morality related to the passions?• In what sense is a political order that does justice to diversity of moral beliefs... (shrink)

Abstract:Miki Kiyoshi's Philosophical Anthropology was written probably between 1933 and 1937, shortly after Philosophy of History (1931–1932) and prior to Philosophy of Technology (1942). Resonating with these major texts, this unfinished work represents Miki's interest in Kantian Anthropologie as well as his own views of the human. This study examines singularity, contingency, and poiesis as key ideas for understanding Miki's anthropology. Singularity of an event is defined by the binary of the present ex ante facto (before-the-fact) and ex post facto (...) (after-the-fact). Contingency of an event is defined by not having a sufficient ground within itself. An important thesis of Miki's anthropology is that an action is an event, singular and contingent by these definitions; it is poiesis (not praxis) irreducible to one's historical agency. This idea of singularity, with the self-contradictory binary of action-intuition ex ante facto and ex post facto, has ethical significance for debates on human cloning and global crisis today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of GaṅgeśaStephen Phillips (bio)More or less happy with the reviews, I would like mainly, in response, to identify advances made in the study of Gaṅgeśa. Anand Vaidya articulates a clearer overview of Gaṅgeśa's theory of knowledge; Eberhard Guhe shows a better way to render the notion of vyāpti, "pervasion," which is central in the theory of (...) inference as a knowledge source; and Michael Williams, too, shows need for improvement on that score as well as for elaboration of matters taken up by classical commentators that are given short shrift in my running comments. For example, whereas long discussions are provoked by Gaṅgeśa's definition of "knowledge," pramā, major points in the purvapakṣa in the section on proving the existence of an īśvara, a "Lord," seem, as Williams says, "threadbare."Vaidya, following Burge (2003), introduces a distinction between entitlement and justification: entitlement is the kind of unreflective epistemic warrant delivered by Gaṅgeśa's pramāṇa, "knowledge sources," working automatically in our everyday lives, whereas justification requires self-conscious certification, prāmāṇya-jñapti. Thereby splitting the horns of a dilemma posed by internalist accounts of knowledge in opposition to externalist ones, Burge and Vaidya are able to incorporate the most [End Page 519] attractive features of each approach. The entitlement/justification distinction cashes out, I may add, to Vaidya's elucidation, Nyāya's deeply held doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇya, "certification by another," against the view of "intrinsic certification," svataḥ-prāmāṇya, of Prabhākara and others. As Williams notes, Prābhākara positions, for which Gaṅgeśa sometimes shows sympathy, may have led him to presume that an anubhava—"awareness" or "presentational experience" in my translation, "fresh news" in Matilal's snappy rendering—is an episode of knowledge, pramā, "unless one knows otherwise," bādhakam vinā.On reflection, one sees that such a presentation (it could be perceptual, inferential, analogical, or testimonial) has been produced by a pramāṇa, or, in abnormal cases, not, and so by a "pramāṇa-pretender," a pramāṇaābhāsa, as in seeing a mirage. Again, an anubhava is not just any old cognition or "thought" (pace Das 2021, p. 162); it is defined as nonrecollective. Unlike a deliverance of a genuine pramāṇa, some instances may, on examination, prove to be a-pramā, "non-knowledge," but are, nevertheless, at the animal level, sufficient to provoke and guide action that would not be unhesitating were there doubt in any way. A thirsty Maya, in Vaidya's example, would naturally move in the direction of the water she "sees." But she would hesitate were she to learn from her friend about the unreliability of water-perception in the current circumstances. At the reflective level, where she is unsure whether the anubhava she apperceives is pramā or apramā, her action, including speech (implying assertability), is altered.So far so good in Vaidya's reconstruction. But Gaṅgeśa does not himself pronounce on the question of whether, after learning about the defeater, Maya would still be entitled to her perceptual belief that there is water in the distance. In the volumes under review, I assumed that she would not be "justified" and indeed that she would no longer have the belief (if we may speak about "beliefs"). The defeater grasped at the reflective level would mean not only that she could not certify the perceptual deliverance but also that there would be no knowledge. Clearly, she can't certify it, and thus, as Vaidya reasons, loses the right to assert. But maybe he's correct that, according to Gaṅgeśa's sensibilities, she does not lose the perceptual knowledge. She would remain entitled to her belief.Personally, I think this is wrong, but Vaidya's understanding does have the merit of explaining why some later Naiyāyikas apparently took absurd positions on epistemic luck (Bhattacharya 1996, p. ix). I think that Maya would lose her entitlement, too, but what if, after being informed of the unreliability of water-perception... (shrink)

Among the many strengths of Tao Jiang's magnum opus, Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China, his analysis of the fa tradition (or the fa school, fajia 法家, often misleadingly dubbed Legalists)1 stands out as a major achievement. This achievement is immediately observable from the depth and seriousness with which the fa tradition is covered. Two out of the book's seven chapters (nine if we count Introduction and Conclusion) deal with fa thinkers: chapter 4 is dedicated to Shen Buhai 申不害 (...) (d. 337 b.c.e.), Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338 b.c.e.), and Shen Dao 慎到 (fourth century b.c.e.?); chapter 7 deals with Han Fei 韓非 (d. 233 b.c.e.). These chapters account for 112 pages out of the book's 476 (excluding... Read More. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism by Swami MedhanandaAnantanand Rambachan (bio)Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism. By Swami Medhananda. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xv + 412. Hardcover $99.00, isbn 978-0-197624-46-3.As a young man, Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, addressed a direct question to the teachers he encountered in his quest for religious certainty. "Have you seen God?" asked Vivekananda. The first affirmative reply to his question (...) came in 1882 when he met Ramakrishna (1836-1886), who eventually became his teacher and mentor:"Do you believe in God, Sir?" asked Vivekananda."Yes," replied Ramakrishna."Can you prove it Sir?""Yes.""How?""Because I see him just as I see you here, only in a much intenser sense."(p. 144)Ramakrishna's unhesitating reply had a deep impact on the young Vivekananda. "For the first time," said Vivekananda, "I found a man who dared to say that he saw God, that religion was a reality to be felt, to be sensed in an infinitely more intense way than we can sense the world" (p. 144).This pivotal encounter with Ramakrishna and his claim about the perception of God found more systematic expression in Vivekananda's arguments for supersensuous perception as the only ultimately authoritative source of knowledge about the nature of God and other matters that are not accessible through our ordinary ways of knowing. Medhananda's book, Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism, is a wide-ranging discussion of many facets of Vivekananda's interpretations of the tradition of Advaita Vedānta and religion in general. These include the decisive influence of Ramakrishna on Vivekananda, Vivekananda's departure from Śaṅkara, and his understanding of the possibilities and limits of reason, the nature of faith and the hard problem of consciousness. The single theme, implicitly and explicitly, present throughout his discussion, is the reality and epistemic significance of mystical experience: "For Vivekananda, we can achieve 'objective certitude' of God's existence…through a self-authenticating realization of God that guarantees its own veridicality" (p. 285). [End Page 1] Medhananda ends his work calling for greater recognition of the importance of spiritual experience for our understanding of the nature of consciousness (p. 371). One comes away from his work thinking that the edifice of Vivekananda's philosophy stands or fall on his arguments for supersensuous perception as the highest authority for religious claims. Medhanananda is critical of appeals by Vivekananda to scripture unless such appeals are buttressed by affirming the supremacy of supersensuous experience (p. 341). Medhananda regards references to scripture alone as dogmatic. In those Advaita traditions, however, that regard scripture as a source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), arguments for scripture are not asserted without appeals to reason and the evidence of other sources of valid knowledge (Rambachan 1991). In other words, appeals to scripture are not always dogmatically irrational.At the end of The Limits of Scripture: Vivekananda's Reinterpretation of the Vedas, I invited those who are the direct heirs of Vivekananda's legacy and those movements who have come under his influence "to provide a consistent and coherent account of the synthesis that he attempted" (p. 137). I regard Medhananda's work as a significant contribution to this much-needed task. His work on Vivekananda is an exercise in apologetics, understood as the effort to defend and clarify religious teachings through systematic argument, and is one of the most detailed, scholarly, and vigorous contemporary expositions of Vivekananda's thought. As a work in apologetics, however, readers will not find any significant criticism of Vivekananda's thought. The single significant one I found is his observation that there is a patronizing element in Vivekananda's situating of dualistic traditions on a lower salvific level than non-dualism (pp. 88-90).I am heartened by the fact that Medhananda acknowledges important differences between Vivekananda and Śaṅkara on several significant issues. As a scholar-monk of the Ramakrishna Order, Medhananda's position is unusual on this issue, and he must diverge from prominent members of his Order in this regard. At the heart of this difference is Śaṅkara's insistence on the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Time of Novelty: Logic, Emotion, and Intellectual Life in Early Modern India, 1500-1700 C.E. by Samuel WrightAnusha Rao (bio)A Time of Novelty: Logic, Emotion, and Intellectual Life in Early Modern India, 1500-1700 C.E. By Samuel Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xxi + 278. Paper $99.00, isbn 978-0-197568-16-3Samuel Wright's A Time of Novelty examines the discipline of Nyāya, or Sanskrit logic, between 1500 and 1700 CE (...) and argues that novelty, both as an intellectual and affective category, was the structuring principle through which Nyāya intellectuals built a philosophical community in early modernity. Wright uses a set of essays and commentaries by Nyāya philosophers on a range of topics to reflect on how intellectual life in this period was shaped by critical inquiry, emotion, and manuscript culture.The book studies a very fruitful, if contentious, period within the history of Sanskrit intellectual disciplines. Sheldon Pollock's "Sanskrit Knowledge Systems on the Eve of Colonialism" (SKSEC project) was the first to draw attention to this period as early modernity in India. Pollock has pointed to both parallels with and differences from modernity in Europe. Since then, scholarly attention has been directed to how periodizing techniques were used by Nyāya intellectuals, and to the relationship that these "new" Nyāya intellectuals had with the tradition. While Wright is in general agreement with the aims of the SKSEC project, he argues against focusing exclusively on intellectual historical change without understanding the values and sentiments that underwrite intellection. For this reason, the book undertakes the challenging task of linking a set of understudied Nyāya arguments with philosophy of emotions to understand affective novelty. This offers interesting insights into the emotional concerns behind Nyāya intellection in a way that earlier scholarship has been unable to, but it has the disadvantage of imposing frameworks alien to Nyāya philosophers onto their arguments--such as Wright's arguments about how space is produced in chapter 3.The book is organized into six chapters, each of which deals with an important topic within Nyāya arguments in early modern India. While the first four chapters, titled "Doubt," "Objectivity," "Happiness," and "Dying," directly deal with these contentious issues and debates around them by Nyāya thinkers, in the last two chapters, "Space" and "Time," Wright does not take up specific arguments from primary texts, but focuses on how we can best understand the space that Nyāya intellectuals inhabited and how novelty can be conceptualised in time. [End Page 1]In the first chapter on doubt, Wright zooms in on arguments about how doubting cognitions emerge, focusing particularly on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and how commentators present his novel position on the issue. Earlier Nyāya intellectuals argued that speech and other indirect forms of perception could not generate doubting cognitions. Instead, they advanced a theory of apperceptive doubt, where doubt arises in a subsequent, remembering cognition. Raghunātha, on the other hand, argues that doubting cognitions can arise directly from speech, and he substantially changes the definition of doubt, a change which is noted and carefully explained by his commentators. Beginning with the theory of doubt allows Wright to then examine how the new definition of doubt leads to structural changes in the crafting of Nyāya debates, particularly in genres such as the short essay (vāda), where the topic of contention is stated in the newly developed format. Wright also links this debate with the notion of trust. Careful attention to how the debate is framed by commentators also underscores the emotional underpinnings of the argument--the "old" view is not to be trusted, since it does not stand up to reasoning (p. 60). Doubting cognitions are not ignored in Nyāya, but become the beginning point of debates and discussions, demonstrating that Nyāya philosophers in early modern India were fashioning a community that engaged peers through new ways of understanding and caring about critical inquiry.The second chapter focuses on arguments around objectivity and deals at greater length with the periodizing techniques used by Nyāya thinkers in the early modern period. This... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humaneness and Justice in the Analects:On Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early ChinaHagop Sarkissian (bio)IntroductionOne of the central themes of Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China is the contestation of the values of partialist humaneness and impartialist justice across diverse thinkers and texts throughout the classical period. His departure point is the Analects, which displays a keen awareness of the difficulties in balancing these (...) opposing values. Jiang's analysis of this dynamic is skillful, filled with Sinological detail and philosophical analysis.Here, I hope to add to Jiang's discussion, focusing on two broad points. First, I suggest two different interpretations of Jiang's analysis of ren 仁 as preference for kin in the Analects, and argue that one of these interpretations is more successful than the other. Second, I argue that aligning humaneness with partiality on the one hand, and justice with impartiality on the other, may obscure some of the Analect's views on these topics, even while illuminating others. In particular, I try to argue that justice cannot be understood as consisting of impartiality alone.Humaneness and JusticeJiang provides "thin or baseline definitions" of the key values of humaneness and justice so as to "schematize … competing normative values operative in the moral-political project during the classical period while … leaving room for variations on these broad underlying values among different inherited texts and the thinkers they are attributed to" (p. 35). They are as follows:[H]umaneness is understood in this book as the … natural inclination to be partial toward those who are close to us, especially our family/kin members; justice is defined here as … our exercise of impartial judgment on the merits of persons and states of affairs, especially in lieu of articulated and publicized standards and codes, irrespective of their relations to us. In other words, humaneness is partialist in nature, whereas justice is impartialist. Humaneness is understood in relational terms, whereas justice is non-relational by contrast. More importantly, precisely because of the relational nature of humaneness, [End Page 429] agent and recipient cannot be switched or substituted, whereas in justice agent and recipient are switchable and substitutable.This framework is fruitful, allowing Jiang to draw connections across texts and thinkers, highlighting aspects of the debates that too often remain hidden from view. His detailed analyses of concepts such as xiao (filial piety), jianai (impartial care), fa (objective standards), tian (Heaven), and shu (conscientious perspective taking) show how they relate to these overarching values. The schematization works, and the book repays careful reading.There are also points, however, where the alignment of humaneness with partiality on the one hand, and justice with impartiality on the other, can lead those familiar with these texts to wonder whether the presentation has, as a result, oversimplified some complex issues. I discuss two of these in what follows.Ren and PartialityJiang claims that the concept of ren in the Analects has two components or elements to it. As he puts it,[T]he way ren is articulated by Confucius, it contains both a partialist element favoring one's family and an impartialist element when dealing with others. … To put it in terms of the central terminologies employed in this book, ren in the Analects is a comprehensive category that contains the elements of both humaneness and justice.Jiang 2021, p. 53)Jiang's analysis of ren in terms of impartiality is compelling, so I will focus on the other half of the analysis—specifically, the claim that the concept of ren itself is partialistic (or, more accurately, has a notable partialist element). This claim may surprise some readers. For example, ren has often been contrasted with the partialistic xiao (filial piety) as the more impartial, public-facing virtue in Confucianism. Indeed, this contrast has been the focus of a strenuous and strident debate in Confucian ethics in modern times (see, e.g., Guo 2007; Guo 2004; Liu 2003), and has a pedigree going at least as far back as the Hou Hanshu (Chan 2004). However, such debates span multiple texts and thinkers in the Confucian tradition. We can still ask the more pointed... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Vaiśeṣikasūtra – A Translation by Ionut Moise and Ganesh U. ThiteNils Seiler (bio)Vaiśeṣikasūtra – A Translation. By Ionut Moise and Ganesh U. Thite. London: Routledge, 2021. Pp. viii + 294. Paper $48.95, isbn 978-1-032005-90-4.Vaiśeṣikasūtra – A Translation by Ionut Moise and Ganesh U. Thite serves as an introduction to Vaiśeṣika thought and an introduction to the seventh-century commentary (vṛtti) on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra by Candrānanda. Their book is primarily (...) intended for non-specialists. As Moise notes, "The aim of this edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtra is, therefore, to introduce students of Western philosophy to some of the categories of Indian philosophy, and by way of this to demonstrate the necessity of conceptual correlation between Indian philosophy (particularly Vaiśeṣika) and the perennial and insoluble questions of today's World philosophy" (p. 6). Besides ShashiPrabha Kumar's Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy: On Knowing and What is to Be Known (2013) and the brief summaries included in surveys such as Raffaele Torella's The Philosophical Traditions of India: An Appraisal (2011), there is very little secondary literature in English that offers a general introduction to Vaiśeṣika thought, especially for non-specialists. Moise and Thite's work attempts to help fill this gap, but their work would have benefited from a longer, more descriptive introduction to Vaiśeṣika (à la Kumar and Torella). Primary literature in English on Vaiśeṣika is not much better. For example, as Moise and Thite note, only excerpts of Candrānanda's commentary have been translated into English. Thus, unlike Halbfass (1992), Nozawa (1993), and Thakur (2003) (p. ix), Moise and Thite offer the first complete translation of the earliest extant commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra.The book is divided into three main parts: chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to Vaiśeṣika philosophy and a summary of Candrānanda's commentary, chapter 2 outlines the current state of manuscripts of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti, and chapter 3 contains a transliteration and translation of the Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti. The authors also include three appendices, two of which situate Vaiśeṣika philosophy within world philosophy and within its own commentarial tradition, and one of which outlines the extant manuscripts of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti.Moise uses chapter 1 to familiarize his philosophical audience with the tradition of Vaiśeṣika. He does this by drawing attention to the history of Greek and Indian thought, highlighting similarities between these traditions, and emphasizing the importance of naturalism, metaphysics, and ontology in both [End Page 1] traditions. Although it may seem an idiosyncratic way to introduce Indian philosophy, Moise uses the Greek tradition to build a foundation from which those unfamiliar with Indian thought may find a way into the tradition of Vaiśeṣika. This approach is more than pedagogical. Moise argues that his "preliminary survey on the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy [sic] is important because of their conspicuous resemblance with the problems raised by the early Vedic and Upaniṣadic seers" (p. 2). The similarity between Greek and Vedic thought is essentially metaphysical, according to Moise. But there are also meaningful differences between the questions Greek and Indian thinkers pose and the answers they provide and attending to these differences can be philosophically fruitful. As Moise argues, "by matching unrelated systems of thought (Indian, Greek, analytic, and so forth), our knowledge rebuilds and reconstructs while the ontic definitions of the world gain more clarity than has ever been possible" (p. 6).According to Moise, Vaiśeṣika philosophy can challenge our metaphysical and ontological notions. Specifically, he argues that Vaiśeṣika ontology provides an alternative to the problematic dualism of matter and form in Aristotelian thought, as well as to the notions of essence and existence in the Medieval Scholastics (p. 4). Moise argues that disparate philosophical traditions can problematize and influence our understanding of philosophy: "In short, Indian philosophies begin, change, and challenge the scope of ontology" and... (shrink)

Abstract:Unlike previous comparisons between Nāgārjuna and the later Wittgenstein, this article denies that either philosophy intends to replace ontological pluralism with holism (see, e.g., Streng 1967, Hudson 1973, Gudmunsen 1974 and 1977, Waldo 1975 and 1978, and Katz 1981). Instead, employing a "therapeutic" reading of the Philosophical Investigations associated with the later Gordon Baker, it is proposed that Nāgārjuna and the later Wittgenstein claim that an ontology consisting of discrete particulars is pictorially indeterminate, visible under either aspect of parts or (...) a whole. What Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein share is an understanding of contrary positions like pluralism and holism as interchangeable Gestalten rather than matters of fact. As a result, I argue that Nāgārjuna's philosophy may be understood in terms of a broader non-dualism employed as a skill-in-means (upāyakauśalya). Akin to Wittgenstein's notion of an "object of comparison" (PI §131), Nāgārjuna's chief insight amounts to a useful perspective rather than a philosophical thesis. (shrink)

Abstract:Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970–1040) holds three conflicting positions: luminosity (prakāśa) is the ultimately real nature of consciousness; luminosity and appearances (ākāras) are identical; and appearances are false (alīka) because they are targeted by the neither-one-nor-many argument. But why is luminosity not false, too, given its identity with appearances? In response to this worry, Ratnākaraśānti develops a notion of identity (tādātmya) that lets him claim that, although luminosity and appearance are composed of the same stuff, they are not identical in every respect. (...) On the basis of this, he limits the scope of the neither-one-nor-many argument such that it targets appearances but not luminosity. Other philosophers (and possibly Ratnākaraśānti himself) then further limit the argument's scope, showing that it also does not target experiences of pleasure (sukha) and, crucially for their buddhology, the innate bliss (sahajānanda) that characterizes the experience of buddhahood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Considering CertificationAnand Jayprakash Vaidya (bio)Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology: A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi. Volume 1, Perception. Volume 2, Inference. Translated by Stephen Phillips. London: Bloomsbury.I. IntroductionStephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology is a masterful translation and commentary on the books originally written by Gaṅgeśa, the fourteenth-century father of the Navya-Nyāya tradition of Indian philosophy. Jewel is one of (...) the most highly regarded works in Indian epistemology, one that rivals the work of Immanuel Kant in terms of its depth and significance. While J. N. Mohanty (1966) and B. K. Matilal (1968) translated portions of Gaṅgeśa's Jewel, only Phillips (2020) offers a complete translation—one that will serve as the foundation for any future study of Gaṅgeśa. In what follows, I will not be focusing on issues of translation or interpretation pertaining to the text. Rather, I will be engaging Phillips' account of Gaṅgeśa (hereafter Phillips) with the aim of bringing Gaṅgeśa's Jewel into contact with a debate in contemporary epistemology. I believe Gaṅgeśa's distinction between perceptual knowledge and certification has a lot to offer contemporary epistemology.The point of departure for my engagement with Phillips is the debate over internalism and externalism about knowledge.1 One account of the debate is that there is a disagreement over whether the KK principle is true. The KK principle states that when x knows that p, x knows that x knows that p. Internalists hold that knowledge is a wholly internal affair, and thus they accept the KK principle. More specifically, awareness internalists hold that x knows that p only when x is also aware of x's knowledge basis for p. By contrast, access internalists hold a weaker claim: x knows that p only when x can become aware, by reflection, of x's knowledge basis for p. Externalists typically deny some version of the KK principle. On one version of externalism, knowledge is justified true belief + some anti luck condition, and to have a justified true belief is for the belief to be formed on the basis of a reliable belief-forming process whether or not the subject knows anything about the workings of the belief-forming process. Externalists hold [End Page 486] that x can know that p, without having any reflective access to the knowledge basis for p.2 However, some analytic philosophers object to the internalismexternalism debate. In a now classic set of essays, Tyler Burge (1993, 2003) moves around the internalism-externalism debate by drawing a distinction between two types of warrant: entitlement and justification—where entitlement plays an externalist role, and justification plays an internalist role.The internalism-externalism distinction does not exist in Indian epistemology. In Indian epistemology, there is a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic validity. This distinction only superficially resembles the internalism-externalism contrast found in the analytic tradition.3 Just as Indian epistemologists did not draw the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, they also did not draw the distinction between justification being a wholly internal affair versus justification being a wholly external affair.Can the absence of the internalism-externalism debate in classical Indian epistemology be used to draw an alternative map of epistemic relations, one that competes with Burge's distinction between entitlement and justification? Stephen Phillips' (2012) work on Nyāya epistemology in combination with his translation and commentary on Jewel allows for an opportunity to explore this question. In section II, I present Burge's account of the dual warrants of entitlement and justification. In section III, I present Phillips' account of perceptual knowledge and certified knowledge. In section IV, I use both theories to analyze a case of perceptual knowledge. In section V, I turn to a comparative analysis of Burge's and Phillips' views, to open up the issue for further debate and discussion.II. Tyler Burge on Entitlement and JustificationIn his 1993 and 2003 articles Burge offers an alternative way of seeing the internalism-externalism debate about justification. In his 1993 work he distinguishes between justification... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Review of Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology:A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇiMichael Williams (bio)Stephen Phillips presents a translation and commentary on Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's Tattvacintāmaṇi, which is widely regarded as the foundational text of the Navya-Nyāya tradition. The importance of Gaṅgeśa's work to subsequent philosophy in India can hardly be overstated. In the centuries after his death, countless commentaries and dissertations were written (...) on the Tattvacintāmaṇi by Nyāya scholars in Mithila and Bengal. Recent [End Page 510] scholarship (David and Duquette 2021) has highlighted how the work of the Navya-Naiyāyikas came to influence intellectuals from all over the Indian subcontinent. The theories of Gaṅgeśa and his followers shaped discussions in diverse scientific fields, including Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, grammatical science, and literary theory.Despite its pervasive impact on Indian thought, Navya-Nyāya has frequently been portrayed in a negative light by scholars. The Indologist Arthur Berriedale Keith (1921, p. 35) described the commentaries on Gaṅgeśa's work as "a vast mass of perverted ingenuity worthy of the most flourishing days of mediaeval scholasticism." Meanwhile, Swami Vivekananda bemoaned the "never ending Avacchinnas and Avacchedakas" of Navya-Nyāya prose.1Jonardon Ganeri (2011) has discussed how these negative stereotypes reach back to the political agenda of the British colonial government in India during the nineteenth century, and his work highlights the vitality and diversity of the discussion of metaphysics in the Bengali tradition of Navya-Nyāya. Nevertheless, there is no denying that much Navya-Nyāya work is extremely difficult to discuss and translate comprehensibly. Many scholars still think of Navya-Nyāya works as untranslatable, at least in the sense that their meaning could not be effectively communicated to a modern audience who are not already deeply familiar with the tradition. This would be tragic, given the potential of Navya-Nyāya philosophy to contribute to the growing cross-cultural conversation in philosophy.Phillips is the first scholar to translate the entire Tattvacintāmaṇi into another language. His work attempts to communicate the foundational text of the Navya-Nyāya tradition to a broad audience. In his introduction, Phillips says that his work aims to speak to analytic philosophers, Sanskritists, and "specialists whose interests span issues in contemporary philosophy and Gaṅgeśa's achievements" (2020, vol. 1, p. 1). Phillips worked with the late Ramanuja Tatacharya to read the Tattvacintāmaṇi's chapters on perception and inference. Tatacharya was recognized as one of the leading experts on Navya-Nyāya philosophy in the world during his lifetime, and Phillips' translation distils many of his insights into the text.Phillips' goal is to translate the Tattvacintāmaṇi into lucid English. He eschews what he terms the "error of literalism" (2020, 1:xvi), instead using idiomatic translations that draw on concepts from contemporary analytic philosophy. Unlike Daniel Ingalls (1951) and Cornelius Goekoop (1967), Phillips uses formalization in Property Predicate Logic comparatively rarely, deploying it selectively in contexts such as the discussion of the nature of pervasion (the Vyāptivāda) and the discussion of the "inferential undercutter" (the Upādhivāda), for instance. The introduction to the work is extremely clear and explains the translation using terms of modern analytic philosophy. Phillips presents a perspicuous introduction to the theory of inference, [End Page 511] which is necessary to understanding Gaṅgeśa's work, which constantly employs inferential arguments.Phillips' introductions to the individual chapters of the text are also very illuminating, and often contain original insights into the philosophy of the Tattvacintāmaṇi. For instance, his introduction to the Īśvaravāda argues, contra John Vattanky ([1989] 2011), that Gaṅgeśa himself was not entirely persuaded of the strength of the proofs for the existence of god (īśvara) that he puts forward in that chapter. Phillips argues that Gaṅgeśa may actually have sympathized to some extent with the Mīmāṃsā views he ultimately critiques there, detecting on Gaṅgeśa's part a "sympathy for certain atheistic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toleration and Justice in the Laozi:Engaging with Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early ChinaAi Yuan (bio)IntroductionThis review article engages with Tao Jiang's ground-breaking monograph on the Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China with particular focus on the articulation of toleration and justice in the Laozi (otherwise called the Daodejing).1 Jiang discusses a naturalistic turn and the re-alignment of values in the Laozi, resulting in a naturalization (...) of justice (impartiality) by rejecting artificial humaneness and rigid hierarchical moral-political structures. In this Laozian just world, there is no room for human intervention and rigid top-down enforcement of values, thus leaving justice to naturalized Heaven or Dao as the ultimate source of the cosmos.Based on Jiang's interpretative context, I show that there is a twofold justification for the "paradoxical" and "elusive"2 value of political toleration.3 A negative expression of toleration focuses on non-interference with choices, and non-enforcement of values toward those whom one reasonably disagrees with and regards as morally wrong. Such an attitude of toleration results in practical advantages such as avoiding entrenchment in bloodshed, abandonment, and deprivation.A positive expression of toleration operating in the Laozian ideal world requires equal protection of people as capable knowers, including those to whom we object. Such protection includes their ways of expression and an unbiased recognition of them as equally capable knowers so that they are heard without bias and prejudice. Such a kind of toleration is revealed as a constituent component of justice since it enables equal contribution toward the shaping of society without discrimination. In other words, toleration is seen as naturalized justice in a Laozian world within which no one is "being wronged with the capacity as a knower"—a kind of epistemic justice articulated by Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007).4 [End Page 466]This article discusses how Jiang's political reconstruction of Laozian philosophy contains the seeds for a discussion of toleration, a value associated with distributive justice and against epistemic injustice. First, it introduces Jiang's arguments on a naturalization of justice and impartiality as Heavenly attributes in the Laozi. Second, it articulates the value of tolerance in the Laozi. Finally, I compare Laozian toleration with Confucian toleration using youwei- wuwei metaethical criticism.Moral-Political Philosophy in the LaoziJiang's interpretative framework about the origins of distributive justice in the Laozi starts with a discussion of the cosmogonic-mystical worldviews that signal "a new understanding of the nature of the cosmos, as well as a broad reorientation in the Heaven-human relationship in the mid-Warring States period" (p. 192). Differing from the interests in the origins of human culture or civilization in the Ru and Mo traditions, Jiang agrees with Franklin Perkins and identifies a "cosmogonic turn" in the late fourth century b.c. that reveals a demotion of anthropomorphic Heaven. By paring Heaven with earth and accordingly decentering human beings in the intellectual discourse, the Laozi directs equal values to the ten thousand things, with humans as just one among them (Perkins 2016, quoted in Jiang 2021, p. 196).5 Laozi's philosophy thus stands out by rejecting Heaven as caring for human affairs while taking Dao as the ultimate origin of the cosmos, as claimed in chapter 5 of the received text: "Heaven and earth are not humane; they treat ten-thousand things in the world as straw dogs; the sage is not humane; he treats people as straw dogs" (p. 199).With Jiang's reading of a naturalistic heaven, we see a re-alignment between cosmos and the human since sage-rulers follow the Heaven-Dao. The Laozian Dao is "self-so-ing" (ziran 自然), "accommodating" (rong 容), and "impartial" (gong 公), and thus marks a sharp contrast to Confucian familial bias resulting in "actively intervening in human affairs on behalf of the (certain) humans by appointing them to carry out its mission" (p. 200). With the sage emulating the ultimate Dao, the Laozi replaces the Confucian anthropocentric Heaven, which focuses on partiality (qin 親) and humaneness (ren 仁).This Laozian understanding of the cosmos also grounds its philosophical departure from Mohism despite both having a political... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Answer to Catherine König-Pralong, Eun-Jeung Lee, and Jyoti MohanSelusi Ambrogio (bio)I want to start my reply by expressing my deep gratitude to the three reviewers who devoted their energy and time to reading and commenting on my book. Their wise comments and criticisms helped in shaping my upcoming research plans, as well as in refining my understanding of this historiographical topic. The eventual readers of this research will certainly (...) benefit from their arguments. I will reply to each review separately, one after the other. Also I could never thank the editors of Philosophy East and West enough for the honor they bestowed on me in hosting this debate.Mapping the ExclusionCatherine König-Pralong provides an extremely knowledgeable and refined review of the book in three sections. The first section is a theoretical evaluation and discussion of the outputs of the monograph through the lens of Reinhard Koselleck's theory of the "temporalization of history" (Verzeitlichung [End Page 230] der Geschichte)1 and her unequalled expertise on the imaginary maps of civilizations. I completely agree with her statement that "from the doxography of the seventeenth century to Brucker's eclecticism, philosophical historiography seemed to be much less attached to historical accuracy than to delimiting regions and identifying peoples and their minds—in a word, to territorializing." The territorialization of philosophy into maps that presented first the lost seeds of divine wisdom (perennialism) and afterwards the exclusive regions of rationality (eclecticism) shows more the Western necessity for a self-definition rather than an effective understanding of the thought of other civilizations. As Metha perfectly expresses it, "Long ago 'Asia' and the 'Orient' became almost existential categories in the European mind."2 It is in this context of 'spatialization of identities' that philosophy became one of the leading characteristics—when not the leading one—of European identity. As the reviewer lucidly remarks, this happened at the expense of philosophy itself. Practical philosophy was put under the superior control of theoretical and logical faculties. It is true that this process was achieved in German pragmatism and Kantian historiography, but this was already evident in Heumann and Brucker's historiographical productions.In her dense analysis, König-Pralong provides bibliographical suggestions that could be integrated within the monograph. I have to admit that, unluckily, I've never come across the two outstanding essays by Wimmer and Rüdiger on Chinese philosophy as a problem of historiography in the eighteenth century, both published in 2017.3 On the contrary, I eagerly read the reviewer's book La colonie philosophique, which was published in March 2019. However, at that time, my monograph was already in the hands of the editor, undergoing the process of double-blind peer review and editing, and hence my argumentation could not benefit from her discussion on temporalization versus historicization and the mapping of civilizations. To quote a sentence from her brilliant book: "L'histoire de la philosophie des Lumières programme en effet une rationalisation de l'histoire et une temporalisation de la philosophie."4 This sentence is a perfect explanation of the "de-territorialization" of India and China from the land of historicity and rationality, namely philosophy. For Brucker, India and China did not possess reliable historical sources, showed childish theoretical capacities, and presented oppressive norms that were not based on moral principles and reasoning.The reviewer agrees with the fact that, at the time of Brucker, we can already find reasons for the exclusion of Asian philosophies, but she contests the thesis that the character of this exclusion was already completely displayed. She suggests that Brucker's Historia critica is mostly a destructive history, showing human mistakes, and that the real targets were Neoplatonism and mystical syncretism, not Asian thought. She writes that "Brucker excluded non-European thoughts from philosophy, but not from the history of philosophy." In my view, Brucker did not insert "barbarian" [End Page 231] and "exotic" civilizations in the history of philosophy, but rather in a critical history—that is, historia critica—of human mistakes. He clearly states that nothing philosophical could be detected in these lands and that his own use of the term "philosophy" about them is... (shrink)

From the Qur'an, Surah Maryam: -/- (21) So she conceived him, and went in seclusion with him to a remote place. (22) And the pains of childbirth drove her to the trunk of a palm tree: she cried (in her anguish): "Ah! would that I had died before this! Would that I had been a thing forgotten and out of sight!" (23) But (a voice) cried to her from beneath the (palm tree): "Grieve not! for thy Lord hath provided a (...) rivulet beneath thee;" (24) "And shake towards thyself the trunk of the palm tree: it will let fall fresh ripe dates upon thee." (25) "So eat and drink and cool (thine) eye. And if thou dost see any man say 'I have vowed a fast to (Allah) Most Gracious, and this day will I enter into no talk with any human being.'" -/- This Surah depicts a human being in unbearable pain. What makes the pain tolerable is the sympathy that God shows for Mary. Hearing her inner voice, understanding her suffering and her grief, God is moved to provide her with practical and substantive support to help her bear her agony. For me this story portrays a God who is active in the world, hears the supplications of humanity, and has empathy with the needy, the oppressed, and those who are suffering. -/- Yet I am concerned that our theological traditions in the Islamic world (as also in Christendom) have developed through the centuries such that God is now seen, by overwhelming theological consensus, as an immutable being, a being outside time who has determined our providence from the standpoint of eternity, who has foreknowledge of every free action of his creations and has designed all according to His plan for past and future events; who knows in advance even the timings and contents of our petitionary prayers and has decided already whether to answer them. (shrink)

Abstract:One of the models that Leibniz considered for his characteristica universalis was the Chinese script, which, after many oscillations, he ended up conceiving as a rational language. In order to explain what "rationality" means in this context, the role of symbolicity and metaphoricity in the characteristica is discussed here. Furthermore, it is argued that Leibniz' idea of a constitutive role of signs for thought led him to produce a concept of writing based not on representation but on expression, in which (...) written signs are structurally connected to the ideas they express. Taking inspiration from Rita Widmaier's metaphorological reading of Leibniz and in Kwan Tze-wan's philosophical theory of the Chinese script, it is shown how the procedures involved in the formation of sinographs shed light on the principles of the characteristica, and how, despite Leibniz' inaccurate understanding of Chinese writing as ideographic, his philosophy can still inspire contemporary research on this script. (shrink)

Abstract:Analyzed here are the virtue-theoretic and feminist arguments for moral anger as appropriate in response to injustice. A Buddhist response is offered to these accounts and it is argued that Buddhist ethics neither obligates nor forbids anger on moral grounds, but instead characterizes anger as an affliction of the mind that should be overcome for the sake of the agent's own well-being. It is argued that compassion can offer some of the same moral benefits we expect from moral anger without (...) compromising well-being, and this leaves open the possibility that there are other similarly non-destructive and morally efficacious attitudes toward injustice. (shrink)

Abstract:This article conducts a close textual analysis of "A Painting of a Rice Cake (Gabyō)," a key fascicle in the Shōbōgenzō that reveals the significance of artistic creation as a metaphor for realizational practice. By analyzing the multiple meanings of "gabyō," it is shown that artistic creation can clarify the nonduality of practice and enlightenment in Dōgen's thought, inasmuch as enlightenment is a constant practice as if making an evanescent and cocreative painting of enlightenment with the entire world as Buddha-nature. (...) For Dōgen, enlightenment involves a deeply personal attunement to and a concrete actualization of the dharma that is not reducible to the purely theoretical understanding of Buddhist texts, and the metaphor of "painting rice cakes" demonstrates the importance of expressive activities in manifesting one's understanding of the dharma. (shrink)

Abstract:The most important themes of Wang Lü's painting theory are the "true self" and the "true thing." One reason this topic has not received sufficient attention is that the original text was altered. This article aims to correct and reinterpret the text. After textual research and interpretation, Wang Lü's paintings and painting theory have been reevaluated. This article also responds to some difficult topics such as the relationship between "form" (ᔶ) and "meaning" (ᛣ) and between "following" (ᕲ) and "not following" (...) (䘩) the rules in Chinese painting theory. (shrink)

Abstract:The problem of evil is of significant concern to theologians and to philosophers of religion. Despite the extensive discussion this problem has received in various Anglo-American philosophical circles, relatively liĴ le aĴ ention has been paid to the theodical insights specifically of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (ca. ninth–tenth centuries ѐ.ђ.). Here, it is sought to address this lacuna by highlighting certain theological insights within the Bhāgavatapurāṇa that offer explanations for the existence of suffering. These insights are also drawn upon in order to (...) formulate a response to the evidential problem of evil. Although this is not an aĴ empt to construct a comprehensive theodicy with these textual materials, it is highlighted how the Bhāgavatapurāṇa can address certain dimensions of the evidential problem for evil, and some pathways are noted for further inquiry into the theodical insights of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. (shrink)

Abstract:Investigated here is how Pyŏn Kye-ryang, one of the most distinguished Neo-Confucian scholar-bureaucrats of fifteenth-century Korea, achieved the balance between ritual-based moral universalism, as pertaining to the hierarchical order between China and Korea, and the Korean monarch's Heaven-given responsibility for the well-being of his people under staggering political pressure for the consolidation of the new Korean Neo-Confucian dynasty called Chosŏn (1392–1910). Contrary to the prevailing view of Pyŏn as an advocate of Chosŏn's political independence and national identity, Pyŏn Kye-ryang is (...) presented here as a distinctively Neo-Confucian political realist who enabled Chosŏn's consolidating rulers to carry out the mandate of Heaven as the new state's socioeconomic and political circumstances would require, without having it violate the ritual propriety it owes as a Ming foreign vassal state. Special attention is paid to how Pyŏn developed his Neo-Confucian political realism through the creative reinterpretation of the Confucian theory of "the expedient.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion by Selusi AmbrogioCatherine König-Pralong (bio)Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion. By Selusi Ambrogio. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. How Modern Historians of Philosophy Drew Their World MapsIn his latest book, Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception (...) and the Exclusion, Selusi Ambrogio presents an extensive survey of how Indian and Chinese traditions were conceived of and staged in modern European historiography. This study, which surpasses in detail and scope other works devoted to the same topic,1 reconstructs 150 years of philosophical historiography. Otto van Heurn's Barbaricae philosophiae antiquitatum libri duo (published in 1600) included for the first time contemporary and ancient Indian thinkers in the philosophical doxography; at the other end of the time span considered, Jacob Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae (1744) sanctioned the exclusion of Chinese and Indian thinkers by means of a detailed criticism of their pseudo-philosophies. Moreover, Ambrogio makes the choice to focus on the history of philosophy, unlike Étiemble, for example,2 who was interested in philosophy in a broad sense—academic and non-academic—as well as in travel accounts, the writings of the Jesuits, and those of their opponents, among other sources. According to Ambrogio, the histories of philosophy were more representative of "the common European understanding of these civilizations," since they "were not openly written for controversialist aims" (p. 2). Even though one may wonder whether defining philosophy ("what philosophy is and its role"—ibid.) and legitimizing its scholarly practice is a less political or less polemical undertaking than pamphlets, letters, and philosophical essays,3 it is probably true that philosophical historiography produced an effect of objectification or an appearance of neutrality.The author's main thesis is that the exclusion of all non-Greeks or non-Europeans from the history of philosophy does not date from the nineteenth century and Hegel, as is generally thought, but precisely from the moment when Indian and Chinese "civilizations" were considered by historians of philosophy and included in the philosophical historiography: from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards (p. 3). Applying a segregationist model, modern historians of philosophy developed a dialectic of [End Page 203] identification—the author speaks of "reception"—and exclusion. They defined the European philosophical mind by demarcating it from other ways of thinking, which they situated in place and time on a civilizational world map. Encompassing the world from Europe produced in return processes of definition and situation. Philosophy was established in a territory and identified with a "culture" or "mind" that began to think itself in relation to the rest of the world under the name of Europe.4I will discuss Ambrogio's remarkable work in three moments. First, I will develop some particularly interesting conclusions drawn from the study; namely, they address periodization, the production of cultural categories, and the valorization of theory. I will then discuss the main thesis as well as some problematic issues, before concluding on the subject of a world absent from Ambrogio's book, the Near and Middle East.I. Logic of Time and Cultural TerritorializationAmbrogio's book is composed of three parts that address three successive historiographical models. First, the "perennialist universalism" (p. 57)—represented by, among others, Otto van Heurn, Thomas Burnet, Isaac Vossius, François Bernier, Georg Horn, and François de la Mothe le Vayer—included ancient India and then China in the "prisca theologia"; on the other hand, it described contemporary Indian and Chinese thinkers as "barbarian" philosophers. In this constellation, Buddhism began to function as the negative part of Oriental thought. According to the Jesuits, it had polluted and corrupted the original Chinese wisdom, often identified with Confucianism.The second model constructed an "Atheistic Asia," which was used either as a positive anthropological image (for example in Pierre Bayle), or as a negative foil for Lutheran philosophy and theology (for example in Johann Franz Buddeus). In the pages he dedicates to these endeavors, Ambrogio often moves away from philosophical doxography, represented by André-Fran... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cross-Cultural Encounters and ExclusionEun-Jeung Lee (bio)There are only a handful of comprehensive studies about the role that knowledge of non-European civilizations and ideas played in the formation of early modern and Enlightenment European thought. Any in-depth treatment of how European thinkers understood China and India between 1600 and 1744 is therefore a more than welcome addition to existing research in this area. During this period, new information about Chinese (...) Confucian culture reached Europe through reports and writings of Jesuit missionaries. It was also during this time that Chinese and Indian ideas started to be excluded from the category of world philosophy.Early modern European thinkers who came into contact with reports about non-European cultures, such as China and India, embraced, rejected, or criticized the transmitted ideas in relation to their own system of thinking. In that sense, European thinkers were not much different from those East Asian scholars who in the seventeenth century first encountered translated Western books and books on the West written in classical Chinese, for [End Page 215] example the Korean literati of the Chosŏn dynasty. These scholars, in a fashion strikingly similar to how their contemporary European thinkers dealt with Chinese Confucian culture, accepted, rejected, or criticized Western knowledge based on their own canon of thought.1 This process can be said to be a ubiquitous response to such cross-cultural encounters. Today, it is generally accepted that it is through such reactions that we can understand the spiritual and social conditions of a society.2 The way European thinkers discussed Chinese or Indian thought throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries allows important insights into Western thought at the time, but not so much that of China or India.The eventual exclusion of Chinese and Indian thought from "world philosophy" in the eighteenth century, scholars agree, had its roots in the belief of the superiority of European civilization. "Histories of world philosophy" became mainstream in the latter half of the eighteenth century, forming the global standard for a very long time due to the effects of European imperialism and European intellectual hegemony. Current debates on the decolonization of philosophy recognize the importance of how to approach depictions of the history of philosophy from a practical and global perspective.3 A critical and systematic study of the process of exclusion of non-European cultures from histories of philosophy compiled in Europe are therefore crucial to such discussions. Selusi Ambrogio's study forms an important contribution to this area of inquiry.Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy spans the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when the arrival of information about the history and culture of China in Jesuit treatises and reports came as a great shock to European philosophers. Especially Chinese history and its ancient tradition of written culture, much older than Christian historiography, became the focus of interest in European intellectual circles. It is no coincidence that Descartes, widely considered the founder of modern philosophy, in his Discours de la méthode mentions China as a prime reason for the existence of a new uncertainty in European philosophy.4In his book, Ambrogio systematically shows how the philosophical dispute over the evaluation of Chinese philosophy was embedded within a paradigm shift from the older Philosophia perennis to the newer Philosophia sectaria and eclectica. This shift not only shaped the scientification of the history of philosophy in the eighteenth century, but also redefined European conceptions of time and history. In the debates about the correct paradigm for the history of philosophy, Confucian philosophy, as transmitted by the Jesuits, played a key role due to the long tradition of its canonical texts.Ambrogio summarizes how histories of philosophy written in Europe first included China but subsequently began a process of exclusion of Chinese thought. He does this by placing a special focus on the tension between theology and philosophy before the time of Hegel. In the first chapter, [End Page 216] Ambrogio shows how the Chinese were seen "as contemporaries" but, at the same time, "as ancient barbaric peoples inserted within the biblical history of philosophy" (p. 56). The second chapter deals with discussions that define... (shrink)

Abstract:This is a discussion of how the Cārvākas viewed the relationship between the mind and the body. Whereas they have traditionally been interpreted as Emergentists, the aim here is to show that we can do better by reading them as being Mysterians.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Omissions and Chronological ComplexitiesJyoti Mohan (bio)The stated purpose of Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion by Selusi Ambrogio is "to examine the European understanding of China and India within the histories of philosophy from 1600 to 1744."1 Specifically, Ambrogio sets out to investigate the antecedents of the "othering" of non-Western philosophies. How far back did the notion go, that (...) non-Western philosophies were inferior? While Ambrogio often extends his argument to non-Western philosophies in general, in this monograph he examines only what he defines as "orientalist" philosophies—the philosophies of India and China. Since Ambrogio is investigating the histories of philosophy written in Europe, this choice makes sense: India and China were the two philosophical giants that most European philosophers needed to include in their works in order to claim to be universalist. No philosopher who wrote about world philosophies—and by extension no historian of philosophy—could ignore India and China, whether it was to dismiss the philosophies emanating from these geographic regions as inferior, or to extol them as proof that Europe was not the birthplace of "original thought."Ambrogio has chosen a time span from 1600 to 1744 c.e. to represent "the year 1600 … [,] the publication of Barbaricae philosophae antiquitatum by Otto van Heurn[,] and 1744[,] the year of the publication of the last book of the Historia critica by Jakob Brucker."2 Within the limits of this time [End Page 220] span, Ambrogio examines the work of several scholars who included Indian and Chinese philosophies in their "world histories of philosophies" and delineates three major historiographical trends. His rationale for ending his study with Brucker's work is that after this eighteenth-century opus, "Asians were usually excluded from the histories of philosophy."3 This time span seems puzzling to me. I know that most, if not all, of the authors Ambrogio cites had successors in their individual traditions well into the nineteenth century, if not the twentieth. While many histories of philosophy focused solely on the Western and classical traditions (as they did during the period under review by Ambrogio as well), the work of historians and scholars on Orientalist philosophies continued to multiply. To the extent that Ambrogio diligently studies his sources and constructs his argument, his work is commendable, but as a historian my questions for Ambrogio have to do with the underlying rationale for the time span he has chosen, and, by that extension, by the choices of his sources. Below I collect evidence that Asians continue to be included in the histories of philosophy past 1744, and in so doing suggest that this fact has an impact on his historiographical model.For instance, I would like to understand why, in his choice of sources, he has omitted all colonial works, especially since he engages with the argument that descriptions and understandings of Indian and Chinese philosophies were meditated through lenses of proselytization and of conquest. Granted, he is beginning with historians of philosophy, but as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries progressed, historians also diversified their writings—as Ambrogio acknowledges—into histories of religion for instance. The connections between, and descriptions of, non-Western religions and philosophies were so muddled that it is impossible to separate them, save by attending to the titles of individual authors' works as being about religion or philosophy, respectively.The contents of such works are so closely related, at least in the Indian context, that contemporary historians, especially of the colonial period and of Indology, do not quibble over whether these works are about religion or philosophy. For instance, Paul Masson-Oursel wrote in 1923 that the development of Indian philosophy was integral to and proceeded alongside the development of religion.4 Systems of philosophical thought in India operated within larger systems of religious practice. Based on this model, Masson-Oursel describes the development of Indian philosophy as proceeding from the needs of religion. So, for example, he theorized that the mix of an Indo-Iranian religion and a pastoral, fire-worshipping people with an older indigenous Dravidian culture of agriculture, Goddess worship, and belief in amulets, spells, talismans, and other... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen PhillipsSwami Narasimhananda (bio)God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion. Translated, with Introduction and Explanatory Notes, by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2021. Pp. xx + 91. Paperback $19.00, isbn 978-1-62466-957-6.The scarcity of accessible English translations of Sanskrit texts (...) that retain the philosophical rigor of the original has been a great challenge in Indian philosophy. God and the World's Arrangement, a translation with introduction and explanatory notes by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips, is an example of how this scarcity could be addressed without straying away from present-day idioms and context. This book discusses the perspectives on God and the arrangement of the world according to Nyāya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhist philosophies. This book is divided into two parts, followed by two appendices, and a bibliography. Each part has study questions at the end and there is an impressive reading list. The first part is a translation and analysis of Śaṅkara's theistic argument in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra 2.2.1–10. The translators also include the subcommentary by Vācaspati Miśra. The second part contains the translation and analysis of Vācaspati Miśra's theistic argument in his commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra 4.1.19–21. All translations are followed by explanations that elaborate the contexts of the arguments. The translations in this book are elegant and use modern English idioms.The seeds of this book were sown by a guest lecture by Nirmalya Guha to a philosophy course at the University of Texas at Austin. The other two authors joined hands with Guha and worked on texts from Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhist schools of thought. Scholars around the world are now interested in having a pan-global view of philosophy. However, such an understanding requires an informed engagement with the various contexts and mores of thought. This deceptively slim volume addresses this problem by succinctly providing the required background context and clarifying many commonly held misconceptions about Indian philosophy, particularly Advaita Vedānta. For a long time, there have not been many serious readings of Advaita Vedānta texts. This book comes as a relief and explains the basic concepts of Advaita Vedānta with readings from relevant portions of texts like the Brahma-sūtra. This book is a step to fill the gap [End Page 1] of texts that properly voice the perspectives of scholars from within the traditions following Advaita Vedānta.It is heartening to read a contemporary text that acknowledges the unbiased masterly exegetical work of Vācaspati Miśra that earned him the epithet sarva-tantra-svatantra, "one who is equally proficient in all the disciplines of knowledge." The translators and editors of this book have a noble goal of "coupling Vācaspati's works on Vedānta and on Nyāya" to make "it possible for a wide swath of his work to be pondered, little of which is currently accessible despite Vācaspati's importance for the whole of classical Indian philosophical thought" (p. xi). The editors lose no time in clarifying the approach of the texts explained in the book from Vedānta and Nyāya philosophies. They explain in some detail one of the means of knowledge, pramāṇa s, used by the Indian philosophies that adhere to the Vedās, the means of anumāṇa or inference. An interesting aspect of this book is the contemporary examples that the translators give, like those of a politician and automobile manufacturers. For instance, the translators explain different ways in which arguments given through an example can fail. The translators explain the error of an example not having the property to be proved in this manner:Yet another type of failure occurs when the property to be proved is not actually present in the example. Should one argue that "People who purchase Japanese vehicles... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A New Culture of Energy: Beyond East and West by Luce IrigarayOliver Thorne (bio)A New Culture of Energy: Beyond East and West. By Luce Irigaray, translated by Stephen Seeley, Stephen Pluháček and Antonia Pont. New York: Columbia University Press, 2022. Pp. v + 121. Paperback $25.00, isbn 978-0-231177-13-9.A New Culture of Energy: Beyond East and West, Luce Irigaray's most recent contribution to the traditions and discourses of Eastern (...) and Western cultures, will not disappoint those who have followed her work through its many phases of development. The scope of Luce Irigaray's lifework is impressive. It ranges from a philosophical and psychoanalytic critique of Western patriarchal culture to the establishing of another subject, "woman," to a feminine culture of between-women with their own symbol, language, and values, to her ethics of sexuate difference--a world which recognizes that at least two different sexuate subjects exist--to finally, her most mature work, which is for the most part a timely engagement with what she calls the vegetal and nature, our most pressing shared ethical concern today.At the heart of Luce Irigaray's work is the ultimate philosophical question: "What does it mean to be a human being?" (p. 5). And how are we to fulfil our humanity, "in relation to myself as well as in relation to nature, to the world, to the other or others, and to a possible transcendence relative to human existence?" (p. 5). Her open and never-ending pursuit of meaning places her firmly in that existential philosophical tradition of which she is probably the last living exponent. The search for meaning is at the heart of her journey between and beyond traditions. Her search for mediations and bridges between cultures digs down into mythology to find insights into the relational nature of human beings. It is her idea that human beings cannot be thought of as objects, either analytically or in isolation which gives her style such depth and warmth.The main thesis of A New Culture of Energy develops out of Luce Irigaray's practice of Yoga within a European context, following the teachings of T.K.V. Desikachar (and several senior teachers) for over forty years. This practice helped her to develop her own position and unique way of interpreting and critiquing what she came to see as the Western tradition of philosophy. During this time, Luce Irigaray described herself as living between traditions--Between East and West (2002) being her first publication which focused on the East-West discourse. The essays in this text further develop--through autobiography, textual [End Page 1] interpretation, and analysis--a unique self-reflection on her own experience and writings, especially how her own philosophy has been influenced by yogic practice and techniques of breathing.Her fundamental thought of sexuate difference (originally sexual difference) is not prominent in this work, with only passing references to it. Justice cannot be done here to her thought of sexuate difference, but a brief note may help the reader who is not familiar with her work. Luce Irigaray claims that traditionally the European subject has always been a masculine-male subject, even though this subject presented as neutral. One of the aims of her early work was to critique this subject and their culture, which reduced women to an object dominated by men. Following on from this critique, Luce Irigaray wanted to develop a female-feminine subject position which was different to the neutral or the male-masculine subject. This was in some sense, but not limited to, a development of the work of Simone de Beauvoir's woman as other. Finally, her ethics of sexuate difference becomes possible as a culture between two subjects, that is, two subjects who are irreducibly different, each with their own symbol, language, embodiment, ways of perceiving and culture: one masculine-male, the other feminine-female.There are several dimensions to this process which she fleshes out throughout her works. The main criticism of sexuate difference is its essentialism, which Luce Irigaray denies. Her main response is the need to see the living-relational web of human beings, and not an interpretation based... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. ChalmersAnand Jayprakash Vaidya (bio)Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. By David J. Chalmers. New York, NY: W.W Norton & Company, 2022. Pp. xi + 520. Hardcover $22.49, isbn 978-0-393635-80-5.It isn't uncommon to think that virtual worlds, the worlds we engage with in video games, for example, are not real or at least less real than (...) the ordinary world. After all, they are worlds that are created by us, and thus are less real than the world we didn't create, mind-independent reality. However, in Reality+, David Chalmers argues for the thesis that virtual reality is genuine reality.Reality+ is the twenty-first century equivalent of Bertrand Russell's twentieth century The Problems of Philosophy, published 110 years prior. Like Russell, Chalmers' goal is to explain the basic problems of philosophy to a wide audience.The book's twenty-four chapters are organized into seven different parts: virtual worlds, knowledge, reality, real virtual reality, mind, value, and foundations. Each section has about three to four chapters. Having taught the book in an upper-division philosophy of mind course, I would say that the first nine chapters should be read together to get a good sense of the whole project, because they give shape and structure to Chalmers' basic arguments and positions. The following fifteen self-explanatory, self-contained, chapters, are independently engaging, and can be taught separately, as standalone works of philosophy.Chalmers engages in what he terms technophilosophy, which is the combination of (1) asking philosophical questions about technology and (2) using technology to help answer traditional questions of philosophy. He claims that he draws inspiration for the project from Patricia Churchland's 1986 Neurophilosophy, where she does the equivalent of (1) and (2) with neuroscience. Reality+ delivers clear arguments, referencing historical and contemporary philosophical work, while frequently drawing from science fiction, including several outstanding Rick and Morty -style illustrations. The use of science fiction helps to connect students to abstract ideas, while the robustly constructed arguments serve to instruct students on how to go about critically examining the ideas. My students found the book accessible and engaging. I imagine the book [End Page 1] will become even more relevant to successive classes, as the issues Chalmers discusses grow more dominant in the future.Chapter 1, "Is this the real life?", begins by discussing Indian and Chinese philosophy in relation to Greek philosophy with respect to theme of illusion/dreams vs. reality. In all three traditions, one finds discussion of the nature of reality and whether we can know it. Chalmers thinks that each of these traditions helps to formulate the basic questions of his book: the knowledge question, the reality question, and the value question.The knowledge question: can we know whether or not we are living in a virtual world? In part 2, Chalmers argues that we cannot know that we are not living in a virtual world. He does so by defending his own version of Nick Bostrom's simulation argument (2003), which very roughly goes as follows: (1) If there is nothing (technological or otherwise) that would serve to block the creation of a perfect simulation of a humanlike being into existence (what he calls a sim blocker), then most humanlike beings are simulations. (2) if most humanlike beings are simulations, we are probably simulations. So, (3) if there are no sim blockers, we are probably sims.The reality question: are virtual worlds real? He argues that virtual worlds are genuinely real by examining a variety of definitions of what makes something real in chapter 6. I will examine this argument in more detail in the following section.The value question: can you lead a good life in a virtual world? He argues that one can, in parts 5 and 6. He says: "In principle, life in virtual reality can have the same sort of value as life in nonvirtual reality. To be sure, life in virtual reality can be good or bad" (p. 311).As successful as Reality+ is, philosophical counterpoints arose in my mind. In the next section, I present... (shrink)

Abstract:This article aims to help Anglophone scholars recover a neglected Zhuangist dialogue for philosophical engagement. The discussion between "Knowlittle" and "Great Unbiased Harmony" in Zhuangzi 25 preserves an extensive, relatively technical analysis of "dao" and its infinite referent that throws interesting light on many other treatments of this topic in the surrounding literature. Apparently taking exception to the practice of using "dao" as a label for something different in kind from ordinary things, whoever wrote this dialogue maintains that dao includes (...) those things—and hence is just as available for understanding and description as they are. While its place in the historical development of "Daoist" conversations remains an open question for future research, this dialogue's fascinating claims and arguments in and of themselves reward attention. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature ed. by Rafael K. StepienVesna A. Wallace (bio)Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature. Edited by Rafael K. Stepien. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2020. Pp. xi + 381. Paperback $26.95, isbn 978-1-4383-8070-1.The editor of the Buddhist Literature as Philosophy and Buddhist Philosophy as Literature should be commended for bringing together an excellent collection (...) of essays and producing the first comprehensive volume that offers a coherent study of the relationship between Buddhist literature and philosophy. This book is an ambitious and praiseworthy project, which covers a wide range of Buddhist literary genres produced in India, Tibet, and East Asia over two millennia. As a whole, the volume invites the reader to reexamine a centuries-long binary division between the categories of literature and philosophy, which have been often approached in academic studies as mutually exclusive. It does so by demonstrating that in the context of Buddhism, philosophy and literature continuously converge, diminishing the overarching binary and broadening their scopes. Most contributions to this volume demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy as presented and enacted in Buddhist literature is not limited to what some would consider a "pure philosophy." The volume is divided into the two, mutually mirroring sections, with each section containing six chapters. Chapters forming the section one, "Buddhist Literature as Philosophy," aim at broadening our perspective about literary forms, such as tales, novels, hymns, and court poetry, which have not been usually explored as the means of articulating Buddhist philosophical views. Chapters grouped in the section "Buddhist Philosophy as Literature" focus on Buddhist literary theories as philosophy of language and introduce the Buddhist biographical and autobiographical genres characterized by practical philosophy to further challenge our preconceptions of what it is that constitutes literature and philosophy. While some contributors endeavor to demonstrate the presence of rational, analytical reasoning in unexpected literary forms, other contributors problematize a strict distinction between literature and philosophy as inapplicable to Buddhism, which is undeniably cross-disciplinary.The first two chapters in section one, authored by Amber Carpenter and Sarah Shaw respectively, draw examples from jātaka stories to show us how Buddhist ethical lessons work in the narrative tales of the Buddha's former births. These two chapters also draw our attention to an accessible and engaging, [End Page 1] narrative manner that presents the Bodhisattva's philosophical exercises to the audience, a manner that stands in contrast to the a priori reasoning characteristic of philosophical treatises. In the first chapter, titled "Transformative Vision: Coming to See the Buddha's Reality," Carpenter analyzes two jātaka stories--"Bodhi the Wandering Ascetic" and "The Man Without an Heir"--taken from Āryaśūra's Jātakamālā. In the first story, a renunciant Bodhi, while repudiating the king's ministers who are intent on disqualifying him as a king's advisor on morality, makes metaphysical claims regarding the nature of reality, causation, and the universe, and provides the reasons and arguments. According to Shaw, by offering an insight into the Buddhist worldview and morality, jātaka tales have a transformative power not only with regard to ethics but also in transforming the reader's vision of reality. In the chapter "Jātakas and the Abhidhamma: Practical Compassion and Kusala Citta," Shaw suggests that a reason why jātaka stories are rarely discussed seriously in the way that they were intended is their literary format based in narrative and mundane situations. Analyzing the concepts of momentariness and kusala citta ("virtuous consciousness") in these stories, Shaw shows that by communicating the technical and insight-based Buddhist doctrinal elements, jātaka tales significantly contribute to Buddhist practical ethics. The Pāli Javanahaṃsa-jātaka, a tale about the friendship between a goose and a king, introduces the reader to some of the most complex Buddhist ideas such as impermanence, momentariness, and mental states, expounded in the Abhidhamma in extraction. Through her analysis of the Kurudhamma-jātaka and Mahosaddha-jātaka, Shaw further shows the integration of narrative literature and Buddhist philosophical tenets, of Buddhist tales and the Abhidhamma, of the relationship between the intention and consciousness... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hylomorphism, Change, and God's Mutability:A Rejoinder to Ebrahim AzadeganAmirhossein Zadyousefi (bio)In "A Long Way to God's Mutability: A Response to Ebrahim Azadegan"1 I tried to challenge what Azadegan says in his "On the Incompatibility of God's Knowledge of Particulars and the Doctrine of Divine Immutability: Towards a Reform in Islamic Theology."2 Then, in his "Necessary Existence, Immutability, and God's Knowledge of Particulars: A Reply to Amirhossein Zadyousefi,"3 Azadegan replies (...) to my response. In my response to Azadegan, I discussed many points, and Azadegan did not deal with all of them in his reply. So, in this short rejoinder, I will deal with what Azadegan has said about some of my criticisms. Before proceeding, I should say that in my response to Azadegan I remained neutral on whether God is mutable or not. All I have done there is to show that Azadegan's path to God's mutability by adopting Sadra's knowledge-by-presence theory is not as easy as it initially seems. Also, I have tried to show that Avicenna does not adopt the dogma of God's immutability. Rather, he has some reasons for adopting this view. I understand that one might challenge Avicenna's reasons for God's immutability. But, as I insisted in my first response to Azadegan, we should be careful not to conflate having a dogma with having a bad reason.In his reply to my response, Azadegan states that "according to Zadyousefi, Avicenna believes in an incompatibility between God's necessary existence and the denial of divine immutability." Then, he presents the following argument that he calls "Argument from God's Necessary Existence to His Immutability": [End Page 196]A1:1. God is a necessary existent.2. A necessary being possesses his attributes necessarily (the principle of 'Necessity of a necessary Being's Attributes').3. If God has a certain knowledge-set, then He has it necessarily.4. A necessary existent exists in all possible worlds and at all times.5. In all possible worlds God has a certain fixed knowledge-set.6. So what God knows at w1 (in a possible world w1 or in time t1 in the actual world) is the same as what God knows at w2 (or t2).7. Therefore, God is immutable."4But I have not argued by virtue of the above argument that according to Avicenna God's being a necessary existent is inconsistent with God's mutability. Instead, I have presented the following argument to show that:A2:Avicenna, following Aristotle, explains change via matter. That is, if something undergoes change or can undergo change, then it is composed of matter and form and hence it is material. Now, since every material being is constituted by a matter-form compound, every material being is dependent on its constituents (matter and form) and therefore is a contingent being. For a contingent being, according to Avicenna, is a being that is dependent on something else. So, every material being would be contingent. Therefore, God's mutability entails God's being material, which in turn entails God's being contingent. So, God's being a necessary existent is incompatible with God's mutability.As we can see, this argument is completely different from A1. I suspect Azadegan's A1 is a misinterpretation of an objection that I raised against him. In his initial paper, following Ghazālī, Azadegan states that, according to Avicenna, God's knowledge of particulars is in tension with God's eternality. In my response, I argued that this is not the case. According to Avicenna, God's knowledge of changing particulars, based on some certain mechanism for knowing the occurrence of a change among particulars (i.e., knowledge of change through indexical propositions), is in tension with God's being a necessary existent. I stated this inconsistency as follows:A3:8. God is omniscient.9. Therefore, for any change C among particulars, God knows the occurrence of C.10. For any knower S, if S knows the occurrence of C, then S's set of knowledge changes (based on indexical propositions). [End Page 197]11. If S's set of knowledge changes... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Long Way to God's Mutability:A Response to Ebrahim AzadeganAmirhossein Zadyousefi (bio)I. IntroductionIn his "On the Incompatibility of God's Knowledge of Particulars and the Doctrine of Divine Immutability: Towards a Reform in Islamic Theology" (2020, 2022) Ebrahim Azadegan tries to make room for what he calls a reform in Islamic theology. Affirming that God's knowledge of particulars is inconsistent with God's immutability, Azadegan puts forward a theory of God's (...) knowledge of particulars, inspired from Sadrā's philosophy, which allows one to (1) explain God's knowledge of particulars and (2) hold that God is mutable. That is, Azadegan, accusing Avicenna of having the dogma of God's immutability, abandons God's immutability in favor of God's knowledge of particulars and thinks that a God who knows particulars but is mutable is more perfect than a God who does not know particulars but is immutable. In the present response, I shall show that Azadegan's project is not as easy as he thinks, and I will criticize it. Let us have a short look at Azadegan's project.II. Azadegan's ProjectAzadegan's 2020 essay consists of three parts. In the following, I will present a brief summary of each.In the first part, Azadegan tries to delineate the main contours of a debate in Islamic intellectual tradition over God's knowledge of particulars—a debate chiefly between Ghazālī and Avicenna—and shows how God's knowledge of particulars is in tension with God's immutability. He summarizes this debate in the following argument:1. God is omniscient.2. Every omniscient being knows all past, present, and future particular states of the world and of individuals.3. Particular states of the world and of individuals change.4. Every sort of knowledge will change with the change of its object.5. [Therefore] God's knowledge of occurrent particulars changes. [End Page 166]6. Knowledge is an intrinsic property of every individual, including God.7. [Therefore] God's intrinsic property regarding His knowledge of particulars changes.8. God's intrinsic properties are His essential properties.9. [Therefore] God's essential properties change.10. [Therefore] God is not immutable.1Then he states that God's knowledge of particulars, in both Avicenna's and Ghazālī's views, is inconsistent with God's immutability.2 That is, if one holds that God knows particulars (premise 2), according to the argument above, one has to accept that God is not immutable (premise 10). According to Azadegan, Avicenna denies God's knowledge of particulars, that is, premise 2 of the argument above, in order to avoid its conclusion (premise 10).3 But, Azadegan is well aware that only temporal knowledge of changing particulars entails a change in God's essence. So, he mentions that by introducing knowledge in a universal way Avicenna tries to save premise 2 of the preceding argument while denying its fifth premise.4But Azadegan thinks that Avicenna's appeal to knowing in a universal way does not help him, and this way of knowing particulars "cannot in the end accommodate God's knowledge of occurrent particulars and the phenomenal states of other minds"5 and "the contents of our senses and particular mental states."6 "God does not" even "know what time it is"7 and "what particular qualitative or phenomenal properties any particular individual has been experiencing when he or she has felt a pain or some other sensation."8 Azadegan states that Avicenna warmly welcomes such a result because Avicenna thinks that God's lack of knowledge of changing particulars partly constitutes God's perfectness.9 But he disagrees with Avicenna and, following Ghazālī, holds that such a God is perfect only in name. Following Ghazālī, Azadegan makes a connection between God's perfectness, God's immutability, and God's knowledge of particulars and holds that a God who knows particulars but is mutable is more perfect than a God who does not know particulars but is immutable.10 He believes that the conception of God introduced by Avicenna (a God who lacks knowledge of changing particulars) does not correspond to the God introduced by... (shrink)