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  1.  5
    Embodied Self-Referentiality.Giovanna Colombetti - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):51-52.
    Glas's rich article makes several useful points about both anxiety and enactivism, and about how enactivism can help to conceptualize anxiety in a suitably complex way. I agree that we need to characterize anxiety as an embedded, context-sensitive and temporally evolving phenomenon with layered symptoms. As Glas points out, the enactive approach has useful conceptual tools for doing so, because of its incorporation of the theoretical apparatus of dynamical systems theory. I am sympathetic with most of what Glas says about (...)
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  2.  10
    An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry.Sanneke de Haan - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):3-25.
    Psychiatry is enormously complex. One of its main difficulties is how to connect the wide diversity of factors that may cause or contribute to the problems at hand, factors ranging from traumatic experiences, dysfunctional neurotransmitters, existential worries, economic deprivation, and social exclusion, to genetic bad luck. Interventions are also diverse, with options including chemical or electrical treatment, therapies aimed at behavior change and those promoting insight. Much is still unknown: what are the causal pathways, which interventions work best for which (...)
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  3.  3
    Enactivism as a New Framework for Psychiatry.Sanneke de Haan - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):1-2.
    How we think about the mind affects how we think about mental disorders: about what they are, how they develop and how we should best treat them. How we think about the mind and its relation to both body and world will typically be implicit though. One commonly assumed 'mind-world topology' regards the mind as internal and the world as external, and gives the mind the task of properly representing the outer world. This leads to a division of labor in (...)
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  4.  7
    Why Schizophrenia Is so Relevant to Enaction and to Clinical Ethics: Naturalizing the Transcendental and the Risk of Stigmatizing.Daria Dibitonto - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):107-109.
    The mutual interest between embodied cognitive sciences, in particular enactivism, and phenomenological psychopathology has significantly increased in the last 15 years. Gipps's article contributes to this field of research by defining ego boundaries in an enactivist framework to explain how the distinction self-other emerges and is maintained in ordinary healthy conditions, and how it is weakened and impaired in cases of schizophrenia. Gipps's first tenet is: The ego-boundary is enacted equiprimordially with experience, that is, it...
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  5.  3
    De Haan on Sense-Making and Psychopathology.Caitrin Donovan & Dominic Murphy - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):29-30.
    De Haan has provided a novel and distinctly enactivist solution to the problem of integrating the physiological, experiential, social and existential. We admire her articulation of her fourth "existential" dimension. Not only does it represent a real attempt to bridge, as she says, enactivism's explanatory gap, it is also a potentially useful construct for conceptualizing the way that self-reflexivity seems to go astray in much psychopathology. We think that pinpointing this phenomenon is something that phenomenological accounts excel at. We have, (...)
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  6.  7
    Delusion, Reality, and Intersubjectivity: A Phenomenological and Enactive Analysis.Thomas Fuchs - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):61-79.
    Normal convictions are formed in a context of social living and common knowledge. Immediate experience of reality survives only if it can fit into the frame of what is socially valid or can be critically tested. … Each single experience can always be corrected but the total context of experience is something stable and can hardly be corrected at all. The source for incorrigibility therefore is not to be found in any single phenomenon by itself but in the human situation (...)
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  7.  3
    On Excentricity and Explanation: Reply To Sass's and Walter's Comments.Thomas Fuchs - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):89-90.
    In his commentary, Louis Sass points out some aspects of excentricity that are important to keep in mind when applying the notion to schizophrenia.First, it is true that the failure of the excentric position may not be equated with the naïve egocentricity of Piaget's young child—it is not a "regression" to an earlier developmental stage. On the contrary, paranoid delusion is only possible because the patients had already acquired the excentric position before, for this is what leads them to see (...)
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  8.  11
    Enactivism, Causality, and Therapy.Shaun Gallagher - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):27-28.
    In 1937, John Dewey delivered a lecture to the College of Physicians in Saint Louis. His clear message was that in the practice of medicine it does not suffice for physicians to treat just the body, or to look to just the body for the mechanism of disease. Emphasizing the relational nature of organism-environment, he argued that the physician must treat the whole patient and must therefore consider the environment of the patient. It makes no sense, he suggested, to provide (...)
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  9.  2
    Disturbance of Ego-Boundary Enaction in Schizophrenia.Richard G. T. Gipps - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):91-106.
    Today the concept of 'schizophrenia' is often presented in psychiatric texts as a construct, a construct bringing together a diverse and, allegedly, independently assailable range of signs and symptoms. According to such a diagnostic scheme two patients may both be allowed to count as suffering from schizophrenia despite sharing hardly a single symptom. The validity of the concept has accordingly been contested by psychologists for its apparent lack of unity. In the absence of clear independent evidence of a unitary physiological (...)
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  10. When Ego-Boundaries Break.Richard G. T. Gipps - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):111-113.
    In her commentary, Dibitonto helpfully compares my understanding of schizophrenic ego disturbance with that of Blankenburg. His patient Anne described her true schizophrenic difficulty as obtaining in some sense 'before' those experiential disturbances she can articulate. Ordinary conversational modes misleadingly invite her and us to attempt describing her difficulties in terms which presuppose the intactness of, rather than capture the underlying disturbance to, her self-hood. They fail to locate the disturbance deep enough, fail to grasp how it arises 'before' what (...)
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  11.  1
    On Stories Within and Stories Behind Symptoms: Response to Colombetti and Stein.Gerrit Glas - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):57-58.
    I thank Giovanna Colombetti and Dan Stein for their careful reading and thoughtful comments.Colombetti is right when she suggests that in enactivism there are no 'mere physiological states.' She criticizes the following quotation: "If there is no self-referentiality, even after attempts at clarification, the putative emotion is just a physiological state or a sensation." My formulation, she says, echoes traditional, disembodied cognitivist accounts of emotion, according to which bodily arousal and bodily sensation, without accompanying intentional evaluations and judgments, are mere (...)
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  12.  3
    An Enactive Approach to Anxiety and Anxiety Disorders.Gerrit Glas - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):35-50.
    Enactive approaches to emotion are rare and to anxiety and anxiety disorder even more. This article aims to show how an enactive paradigm might be helpful in solving some problems in the clinical and scientific understanding of anxiety and anxiety disorder. I begin by pointing at a number of relevant clinical features of anxiety and anxiety disorder and by sketching how and why anxiety theories have difficulties with doing justice to these features. I specifically focus on two themes: a) how (...)
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  13.  3
    Delusion, Reality, and Excentricity: Comment on Thomas Fuchs.Louis A. Sass - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):81-83.
    In "Delusion, Reality, and Intersubjectivity," Thomas Fuchs offers a superb presentation of an enactive/phenomenological approach to schizophrenic delusions—an approach that is clearly superior to the poor-reality-testing formula that has dominated thinking about delusion in psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and cognitive-behavioral theory. As he convincingly argues, two key tendencies go a long way toward accounting for the distinctive features of delusion in schizophrenia: 1) withdrawal from practical, sensori-motoric interaction with the physical environment; and 2) failure to experience reality in intersubjective terms—as a realm (...)
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  14.  4
    Cognitive Embodiment and Anxiety Disorders.Dan J. Stein - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):53-55.
    Glas's article is one of several in an interesting special issue focused on applying concepts from enactivism to psychiatry; his focuses on anxiety in particular. Given ongoing developments in work on enactivism, and ongoing debates about how to progress psychiatry, this application is timely. Here, I make three general points about the application of enactivism to psychiatry; I exemplify these with occasional comments on social anxiety disorder.First, as de Haan notes in her introduction, the term enactivism encompasses a number of (...)
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  15.  5
    Description Is Not Enough: The Real Challenge of Enactivism for Psychiatry.Henrik Walter - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1):85-87.
    In his article, "Delusion, Reality, and Inter-subjectivity," Thomas Fuchs gives an "enactivist" account of how primary delusions in early schizophrenia evolve. First, subjects experience the "loss of familiar, commonsensical meanings"—known as delusional mood. Consecutively they experience new "revelatory significances," in perception as well as in social interaction, with all experiences becoming radically "subjectivized." Out of these "uncanny, spurious and made" experiences delusions develop. Suddenly the formerly uncanny experiences make sense. This new subjective reality, however, is "rigid." Subjects are no longer (...)
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