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  1. (1 other version)The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilities.Robert Kane - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):57-80.
  2. (1 other version)Autonomy and manipulated freedom.Tomis Kapitan - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):81-104.
    In recent years, compatibilism has been the target of two powerful challenges. According to the consequence argument, if everything we do and think is a consequence of factors beyond our control (past events and the laws of nature), and the consequences of what is beyond our control are themselves beyond our control, then no one has control over what they do or think and no one is responsible for anything. Hence, determinism rules out responsibility. A different challenge--here called the manipulation (...)
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  3. (1 other version)Alternative possibilities and causal histories.Derk Pereboom - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):119-138.
  4. (1 other version)Transfer principles and moral responsibility.Eleonore Stump & John Martin Fischer - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):47-56.
  5. (1 other version)Libertarian compatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):139-166.
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  6. (1 other version)Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further look.David Widerker - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):181-202.
  7. (1 other version)Free will and agency at its best.Gideon Yaffe - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):203-230.
  8. (1 other version)Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):231-248.
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