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  1. Online Extremism, AI, and (Human) Content Moderation.Michael Randall Barnes - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3/4).
    This paper has 3 main goals: (1) to clarify the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI)—along with algorithms more broadly—in online radicalization that results in ‘real world violence’; (2) to argue that technological solutions (like better AI) are inadequate proposals for this problem given both technical and social reasons; and (3) to demonstrate that platform companies’ (e.g., Meta, Google) statements of preference for technological solutions functions as a type of propaganda that serves to erase the work of the thousands of human (...)
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  2.  10
    The Bias Dilemma.Oisín Deery & Katherine Bailey - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Addressing biases in natural-language processing (NLP) systems presents an underappreciated ethical dilemma, which we think underlies recent debates about bias in NLP models. In brief, even if we could eliminate bias from language models or their outputs, we would thereby often withhold descriptively or ethically useful information, despite avoiding perpetuating or amplifying bias. Yet if we do not debias, we can perpetuate or amplify bias, even if we retain relevant descriptively or ethically useful information. Understanding this dilemma provides for a (...)
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  3.  7
    Siri, Stereotypes, and the Mechanics of Sexism.Alexis Elder - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Feminized AIs designed for in-home verbal assistance are often subjected to gendered verbal abuse by their users. I survey a variety of features contributing to this phenomenon—from financial incentives for businesses to build products likely to provoke gendered abuse, to the impact of such behavior on household members—and identify a potential worry for attempts to criticize the phenomenon; while critics may be tempted to argue that engaging in gendered abuse of AI increases the chances that one will direct this abuse (...)
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  4.  4
    Est-ce que Vous Compute?Arianna Falbo & Travis LaCroix - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Cultural code-switching concerns how we adjust our overall behaviours, manners of speaking, and appearance in response to a perceived change in our social environment. We defend the need to investigate cultural code-switching capacities in artificial intelligence systems. We explore a series of ethical and epistemic issues that arise when bringing cultural code-switching to bear on artificial intelligence. Building upon Dotson’s (2014) analysis of testimonial smothering, we discuss how emerging technologies in AI can give rise to epistemic oppression, and specifically, a (...)
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  5.  7
    Feminism, Social Justice, and Artificial Intelligence.Carla Fehr - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Introduction to the special issue by editor Carla Fehr.
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  6.  1
    Don’t Just "Google It".Tempest M. Henning - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    This paper examines the argumentative retort “Just Google it” in response to cases of epistemic exploitation. Critical assessments of the reply often examine the phrase from an argumentation theory standpoint, which views it as at best rude and at worst a violation of argumentative norms. However, these critiques ignore one of the functions of the term—to avoid epistemic exportation. The response may be a useful tool for Black individuals to offload some epistemic burdens concerning racial arguments, but due to racially (...)
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  7.  51
    Ameliorating Algorithmic Bias, or Why Explainable AI Needs Feminist Philosophy.Linus Ta-Lun Huang, Hsiang-Yun Chen, Ying-Tung Lin, Tsung-Ren Huang & Tzu-Wei Hung - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly adopted to make decisions in domains such as business, education, health care, and criminal justice. However, such algorithmic decision systems can have prevalent biases against marginalized social groups and undermine social justice. Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is a recent development aiming to make an AI system’s decision processes less opaque and to expose its problematic biases. This paper argues against technical XAI, according to which the detection and interpretation of algorithmic bias can be handled (...)
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  8.  6
    Algorithmic Racial Discrimination.Alysha Kassam & Patricia Marino - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    This paper contributes to debates over algorithmic discrimination with particular attention to structural theories of racism and the problem of “proxy discrimination”—discriminatory effects that arise even when an algorithm has no information about socially sensitive characteristics such as race. Structural theories emphasize the ways that unequal power structures contribute to the subordination of marginalized groups: these theories thus understand racism in ways that go beyond individual choices and bad intentions. Our question is, how should a structural understanding of racism and (...)
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  9.  24
    Artificial Knowing Otherwise.Os Keyes & Kathleen Creel - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    While feminist critiques of AI are increasingly common in the scholarly literature, they are by no means new. Alison Adam’s Artificial Knowing (1998) brought a feminist social and epistemological stance to the analysis of AI, critiquing the symbolic AI systems of her day and proposing constructive alternatives. In this paper, we seek to revisit and renew Adam’s arguments and methodology, exploring their resonances with current feminist concerns and their relevance to contemporary machine learning. Like Adam, we ask how new AI (...)
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  10. Artificial Intelligence in a Structurally Unjust Society.Ting-An Lin & Po-Hsuan Cameron Chen - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3/4):Article 3.
    Increasing concerns have been raised regarding artificial intelligence (AI) bias, and in response, efforts have been made to pursue AI fairness. In this paper, we argue that the idea of structural injustice serves as a helpful framework for clarifying the ethical concerns surrounding AI bias—including the nature of its moral problem and the responsibility for addressing it—and reconceptualizing the approach to pursuing AI fairness. Using AI in healthcare as a case study, we argue that AI bias is a form of (...)
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  11.  4
    Algorithmic Microaggressions.Emma McClure & Benjamin Wald - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    We argue that machine learning algorithms can inflict microaggressions on members of marginalized groups and that recognizing these harms as instances of microaggressions is key to effectively addressing the problem. The concept of microaggression is also illuminated by being studied in algorithmic contexts. We contribute to the microaggression literature by expanding the category of environmental microaggressions and highlighting the unique issues of moral responsibility that arise when we focus on this category. We theorize two kinds of algorithmic microaggression, stereotyping and (...)
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  12.  5
    Uncomfortably Close to Human.Shelley M. Park - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Social robots are marketed as human tools promising us a better life. This marketing strategy commodifies not only the labor of care but the caregiver as well, conjuring a fantasy of technoliberal futurism that echoes a colonial past. Against techno-utopian fantasies of a good life as one involving engineered domestic help, I draw here on the techno-dystopian television show Humans (stylized HUMⱯNS) to suggest that we should find our desires for such help unsettling. At the core of my argument is (...)
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  13.  17
    A Perfect Storm for Epistemic Injustice.Heather Stewart, Emily Cichocki & Carolyn McLeod - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3).
    Over the past decade, feminist philosophers have gone a long way toward identifying and explaining the phenomenon that has come to be known as epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice is injustice occurring within the domain of knowledge (e.g., knowledge production and transmission), which typically impacts structurally marginalized social groups. In this paper, we argue that, as they currently work, algorithms on social media exacerbate the problem of epistemic injustice and related problems of social distrust. In other words, we argue that algorithms (...)
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  14.  42
    A Phenomenological Approach to Sexual Consent.Ellie Anderson - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (2).
    Rather than as a giving of permission to someone to transgress one’s bodily boundaries, I argue for defining sexual consent as feeling-with one’s sexual partner. Dominant approaches to consent within feminist philosophy have failed to capture the intercorporeal character of erotic consciousness by treating it as a form of giving permission, as is evident in the debate between attitudinal and performative theories of consent. Building on the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ann Cahill, Linda Martín Alcoff, and others, I argue that (...)
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  15.  56
    Why You Ought to Defer: Moral Deference and Marginalized Experience.Savannah Pearlman & Williams Elizabeth - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (2).
    In this paper we argue that moral deference is prima facie obligatory in cases in which the testifier is a member of a marginalized social group that the receiver is not and testifies about their marginalized experience. We distinguish between two types of deference: epistemic deference, which refers to believing p in virtue of trusting the testifier, and actional deference, which involves acting appropriately in response to the testimony given. The prima facie duty we propose applies to both epistemic and (...)
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  16. Gender as a Self-Conferred Identity.Michael Rea - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (2).
    This paper develops and defends the view that gender is an identity that we confer upon ourselves. The claim that gender is a self-conferred identity is not novel; but its metaphysics is obscure at best. What exactly is an identity, and how do we manage to confer identities upon ourselves? Furthermore, how does the claim that gender is a self-conferred identity comport with the widely accepted notion that gender is also a social identity, and that social identities are (at least (...)
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  17.  12
    Epistemic Agency and the Value of Knowledge and Belief.Aron Edidin - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    “Credit-worthiness” accounts of the value of knowledge focus on the exercise of agency as the source of value in question. This focus is shared by an approach suggested by Sally Haslanger to the value of belief. The standard examples and counterexamples from the “value of knowledge” literature treat the relevant sort of agency in fundamentally individualistic terms. But recent work on relational autonomy recommends that we think of agency as fundamentally socially embedded. This reorientation not only disarms a standard objection (...)
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  18.  93
    Normative competence, autonomy, and oppression.Ji-Young Lee - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    Natalie Stoljar posits that those who have internalized oppressive norms lack normative competence, which requires true beliefs and critical reflection. A lack of normative competence makes agents nonautonomous, according to Stoljar. This framework is thereby meant to address what she calls the “feminist intuition”—the intuition that oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. On my view, however, Stoljar’s normative competence account of autonomy is subject to a worrying problem. Her account misattributes nonautonomy to those who perpetrate the oppression, making those who (...)
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  19.  10
    Blaming from Inside the Birdcage.Amy McKiernan - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    This article notices a trend in work done by philosophers who build on P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes; it looks as though philosophers supplement Strawson with a more robust ethical program in order to address questions concerning the moral appropriateness of the reactive attitudes. I argue feminist care ethics can serve as a promising moral supplement to Strawson. Then, I diagnose a problem in Strawson— namely, the assumption that members of moral communities will express all three kinds (...)
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  20.  2
    Normative competence, autonomy, and oppression.J. Y. Lee - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1).
    Natalie Stoljar posits that purely procedural theories of autonomy are unable to explain the ‘feminist intuition’, which is the idea that the internalization of false and oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. She claims instead that an account based on ‘normative competence’ – which requires true beliefs and critical reflection – can explain why oppressive norms should be excluded as legitimate decision-making inputs. On my view, however, the normative competence approach is subject to a worrying problem. While Stoljar's view successfully (...)
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  21.  14
    Est-ce que Vous Compute? Code-Switching, Cultural Identity, and AI.Arianna Falbo & Travis LaCroix - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (8).
    Cultural code-switching concerns how we adjust our overall behaviours, manners of speaking, and appearance in response to a perceived change in our social environment. We defend the need to investigate cultural code-switching capacities in artificial intelligence systems. We explore a series of ethical and epistemic issues that arise when bringing cultural code-switching to bear on artificial intelligence. Building upon Dotson’s (2014) analysis of testimonial smothering, we discuss how emerging technologies in AI can give rise to epistemic oppression, and specifically, a (...)
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