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  1. The Priority of Gifted Forgiveness: A Response to Fricker.Lucy Allais - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):261-273.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I respond to Fricker’s paradigm-based account of forgiveness, which aims to integrate two seemingly different versions of responses to wrongdoing—conditional forgiveness and unconditional forgiveness —into one explanatory order, as well as, she argues, showing the second to be derivative and parasitic on the basic functioning of the first, and more contingent. My aim is to endorse and draw on Fricker’s paradigm-based strategy and the way it enables us to present a unified account, to endorse her view (...)
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  2.  7
    Forgiveness—An Ordered Pluralism.Miranda Fricker - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):241-260.
    ABSTRACT There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? (...)
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  3.  1
    The Practices of Forgiving: Replies.Miranda Fricker - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):336-345.
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  4. Guest Editor’s Introduction.Katrina Hutchison & Catriona Mackenzie - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):239-240.
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  5.  1
    Permission, Blame, and Forgiveness.Per-Erik Milam - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):324-329.
    ABSTRACT I contend that Miranda Fricker’s ambitious new pluralist account of forgiveness is too inclusive and counts as forgiveness practices that are psychologically and normatively quite different. I raise three worries: First, her account of proleptic Gifted Forgiveness as temporally displaced Moral Justice Forgiveness seems to allow for Preemptive Forgiveness. Second, proleptic Gifted Forgiveness seems to resemble communicative blame more than forgiveness. Finally, an alternative account of forgiveness—explained in terms of reasons to forswear blame—seems capable of meeting Fricker’s desiderata for (...)
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  6. Attitudes and Practices.Glen Pettigrove - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):288-304.
    ABSTRACT The philosophical literature on forgiveness has ignored a distinction that has a profound bearing on when we should forgive, namely, the distinction between attitudes and practices. Most of the literature focuses on the attitudes called for in the aftermath of wrongdoing. And it attempts to derive the ethics of forgiving directly from the ethical profile of those attitudes. However, attitudes underdetermine what one ought to do. I argue that assessing what we should do also requires us to consider practices. (...)
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  7. On Ordered Pluralism.Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):305-11.
    This paper examines Miranda Fricker’s method of paradigm-based explanation and in particular its promise of yielding an ordered pluralism. Fricker’s starting point is a schism between two conceptions of forgiveness, Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness. In the light of a hypothesis about the basic point of forgiveness, she reveals the unity underlying the initially baffling plurality and brings order into it, presenting a paradigmatic form of forgiveness as explanatorily basic and other forms as derivative. The resulting picture, she claims, (...)
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  8. Messy Forgiveness: A Reply to Fricker.Luke Russell - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):274-287.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism’, Miranda Fricker aims to show that two seemingly incompatible conceptions of forgiveness are unified insofar as they ascribe the same moral function to forgiveness. Both Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness, she maintains, remove redundant blame feeling. In reply, I contend that Fricker’s two targets do not actually share the same function. Gifted Forgiveness of unrepentant wrongdoers often removes blame feeling that is anything but redundant. Fricker’s argument depends on the mistaken assumption that resentment (...)
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  9.  2
    Expanding Moral Understanding.Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):318-323.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism,’ Fricker argues that the function of forgiveness is to liberate the forgiver from redundant blame-feeling. Blame is rendered redundant when it no longer serves its purpose, so to understand the function of forgiveness, we must understand the function of blame. For Fricker, the paradigmatic function of Communicative Blame is to align the moral understandings of wrongdoers and their victims, which is accomplished by wrongdoers coming to feel remorse. In this paper, I argue that Fricker (...)
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  10. Stories of Forgiveness.Andrea C. Westlund - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):312-317.
    ABSTRACT Miranda Fricker argues that paradigm-based explanations take a more direct and transparent route to the same destination as State of Nature storytelling, offering hypotheses about the basic purpose of a practice while dispensing with distracting narrative elements. I argue that narratives of forgiveness are not simply dispensable; they but offer a form of emotional and evaluative understanding to which there is no more direct route.
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  11.  58
    Legein to What End?Merrick Anderson - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):176-182.
    In the 5th century a number of sophists challenged the orthodox understanding of morality and claimed that practicing injustice was the best and most profitable way for an individual to live. Although a number of responses to sophistic immoralism were made, one argument, in fact coming from a pair of sophists, has not received the attention it deserves. According to the argument I call Immortal Repute, self-interested individuals should reject immorality and cultivate virtue instead, for only a virtuous agent can (...)
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  12.  1
    Some Aspects of Aspect: Reflections on M.M. McCabe’s ‘First Chop Your Logos: Socrates and the Sophists on Language, Logic and Development’.Nicholas Denyer - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):151-154.
    ABSTRACT McCabe is right on one thing and wrong on another. She is right to draw our attention to the different aspects that a verb might have—and not only because attention to aspect helps us understand what is going on in Plato’s Euthydemus. Getting straight on aspect promises benefits for our philosophy of action, and for our metaphysics more generally, comparable to those of getting straight about modality and about excuses. The same is true of getting straight on the active, (...)
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  13.  1
    Fine-Grained and Coarse-Grained Knowledge in Euthydemus 293b7–D1.Matthew Duncombe - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):198-205.
    ABSTRACT McCabe [2021: 137–40] identifies a crucial ambiguity in the terms ‘learns’ and ‘knows’. Such terms can be read as either ‘perfective’ or ‘imperfective’. This is an aspect difference. The former indicates a settled state, the latter a directed process. McCabe uses this insight to show how Socrates can rebut the sophists’ view of meaning, render compelling Socrates’ self-refutation arguments, and explain the Socratic connections between learning, knowledge, and how one should live. In the final section of the Euthydemus, Euthydemus (...)
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  14. Says Who? Modes of Speaking in the Euthydemus.Fiona Leigh - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):123-130.
    Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 123-130.
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  15. Isocrates’ Pragmatic Reflective Life at Euthydemus 304d–306e.Tony Leyh - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):206-213.
    ABSTRACT This article explores the role of Isocrates in Plato’s Euthydemus, with special attention given to M.M. McCabe’s defense of Socratic philosophy against the sophistic challenges of Euthydemus and Dionysodoros. I defend two main theses: Isocratean philosophy refutes what McCabe calls ‘chopped logos’ and Isocratean philosophy, like its Socratic rival, is committed to reflection and to the consistency of logoi but, unlike its Socratic rival, it is committed to them for strictly pragmatic reasons. As support for these theses, I argue (...)
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  16. First Chop Your Logos … : Socrates and the Sophists on Language, Logic and Development.Mary Margaret McCabe - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):131-150.
    ABSTRACT At the centre of Plato’s Euthydemus lie a series of arguments in which Socrates’ interlocutors, the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus propose a radical account of truth according to which there is no such thing as falsehood, and no such thing as disagreement. This account of truth is not directly refutable; but in response Socrates offers a revised account of ‘saying’ focussed on the different aspects of the verb to give a rich account of saying, of truth and of knowledge. (...)
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  17.  2
    Who’s Who and What’s What? A Response to Commentators on ‘First Chop Your Logos … ’.Mary Margaret McCabe - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):214-238.
    Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 214-238.
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  18.  1
    Eristic Combat at Euthydemus 285e–286b.Ravi Sharma & Russell E. Jones - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):167-175.
    ABSTRACT M.M. McCabe argues that in Plato’s Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus hold a view she calls ‘chopped logos’. Chopped logos implies that nothing said is false, or opposed to any other statement, or entailed by any other statement. We focus on a key piece of evidence for chopped logos, the argument concluding that there is no such thing as contradiction, and defend a competing interpretation. The argument in question, and the eristic exchanges as a whole, are simply examples of a (...)
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  19.  2
    ‘Learning’ and Learning at Euthydemus 275d–278d.Christine J. Thomas - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):191-197.
    ABSTRACT Early in Plato’s Euthydemus, sophistical arguments threaten the intelligibility of the process of learning. According to M. M. McCabe, Socrates resists the sophists’ arguments by resisting their problematic replacement model of change. The replacement model proposes that one item is simply replaced with a nonidentical item. Socrates is said to endorse a rival metaphysics of temporally extended, teleologically structured activities. The rival model allows an enduring subject to survive ‘aspect changes’ by occupying distinct stages in a continuous, unified process. (...)
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  20.  4
    Teleology and Sophistic Endeavour in the Euthydemus.Daniel Vázquez & Saloni de Souza - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (2):183-190.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, we build upon M.M. McCabe's [2021] characterisation of two accounts of logos and Socratic endeavour in Plato's Euthydemus. We argue that the brothers, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are engaged in and committed to an endeavour which has features in common with Socrates’. It has an aim, rules, and is subject to failure. It is also a unified activity in which structure, process and continuity are important. However, the brothers’ only aim is impressing their audience and they seem (...)
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  21. Embodiment and Oppression: Reflections on Haslanger.Erin Beeghly - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1):35-47.
    In ‘Cognition as a Social Skill’, Sally Haslanger enhances her theory of oppression with new concepts: ‘mindshaping,’ ‘doxa,’ ‘heterodoxy,’ and ‘hidden transcripts.’ This essay examines these new c...
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