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  1. ‘Discrimination Preferred’: How Ordinary Verbal Bigotry Harms.Bianca Cepollaro & Laura Caponetto - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):189-195.
    ABSTRACT A widespread thesis in contemporary philosophy of language is that certain speech constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm. McGowan develops a prescriptive account of harm constitution, according to which harm-constituting speech enacts norms that prescribe harm. Ordinary verbal bigotry, she claims, is harmful in this sense. We submit that the norms enacted by ordinary racist utterances are not prescriptive. In our view, ordinary verbal bigotry enacts ‘non-neutrally’ permissive norms rendering harmful behaviours locally permitted—and indeed preferred over non-harmful options. We (...)
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  2. Sometimes, It Is Just Words: Norm-Setting as Negotiation.Lawrence Lengbeyer - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):196-202.
    ABSTRACT McGowan’s notion of norm ‘enactment’ is the linchpin of her practical project, designed to provide an objective standard that circumvents the need to assess actual subjective uptake of discriminatory norms proposed by racist utterances in public spaces. However, the essential role of uptake to potential norm-imposing utterances—and responses like dismissing, countermanding, and ignoring—cannot be waved away. Contributions to conversations, and even more so to other social interactions, do not exert the normative compulsion upon participants that McGowan’s theory needs. People’s (...)
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  3. Hateful Speech and Hostile Environments.Ishani Maitra - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):150-159.
    ABSTRACT This paper examines Mary Kate McGowan’s account of oppressive speech. McGowan argues that ordinary hateful speech can oppress by enacting discriminatory norms, and further, that this enactment sometimes renders the speech regulable under current United States law. In response, the paper raises two sets of questions. First, it asks about the contents of the norms enacted by a given hateful utterance, and specifically, about what determines those contents. Second, the paper also questions McGowan’s emphasis on the distinction between causing (...)
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  4. Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application.Mary Kate McGowan - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):129-149.
    ABSTRACT This paper argues for a hidden way in which speech constitutes harm by enacting harmful norms. The paper then explores the potential legal consequences of uncovering such instances of harm constitution. In particular, the paper argues that some public racist speech constitutes harm and is thus harmful enough to warrant legal remedy. Such utterances are actionable, it is contended, because they enact discriminatory norms in public spaces.
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  5. Response to Critics.Mary Kate McGowan - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):211-220.
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  6. What a ‘Boo’ Can Do: Adam Goodes, Discrimination, and Norm (R)Evolution.Louise Richardson-Self - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):203-210.
    ABSTRACT In this commentary I evaluate what McGowan’s project would conclude with respect to the treatment of professional Australian Football League player Adam Goodes, who was incessantly ‘booed’ by crowds for the final two years of his career. Analysing Goodes’ case in light of McGowan’s argument leads me to two observations. First, McGowan’s norm-enactment approach is incredibly useful because it explains how words like ‘boo’ can constitute actionable discrimination. Second, however, I wonder if a narrow focus on whether such speech (...)
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  7. Just Words? Hate Speech, Harm, and the Justifiability of Legal Regulation.Sam Shpall & Sarah Sorial - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):117-128.
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  8. The Conversational Character of Oppression.Robert Mark Simpson - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):160-169.
    McGowan argues that everyday verbal bigotry makes a key contribution to the harms of discriminatory inequality, via a mechanism that she calls sneaky norm enactment. Part of her account involves showing that the characteristic of conversational interaction that facilitates sneaky norm enactment is in fact a generic one, which obtains in a wide range of activities, namely, the property of having conventions of appropriateness. I argue that her account will be better-able to show that everyday verbal bigotry is a key (...)
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  9. Commentary on Mary Kate McGowan’s ‘Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application’.Jeremy Waldron - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):170-178.
    ABSTRACT This essay considers Mary Kate McGowan's contention that no account of hate speech is adequate if it does not explain how such speech constitutes harm to those targeted by it. ‘Constitutes’ is suppose dot mean something different than ‘causes.’ McGowan's suggestion that the speech enacts a norm offers an interesting dimension to our understanding of the harm of hate speech. But I argue that it is important to distinguish carefully between ‘norm-enactment’ and ‘norm-application’ in this model. Failure to attend (...)
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  10. Does Public Racist Speech Constitute Hostile Discrimination? Comments on McGowan.Caroline West - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (2):179-188.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm: An Overview and an Application’, Mary Kate McGowan argues that some racist speech in public places should be made unlawful in the United States for the same reason that sexist behaviour in the workplace is already legally actionable—namely, to protect individuals from a hostile discriminatory environment. While McGowan may be correct that some public racist speech may constitute an act of discrimination in some morally significant sense, I present several reasons for (...)
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  11. Evidence and Faith.Helen De Cruz - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):1-3.
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  12. The Doxastic Norms of Faith: Reply to Commentators.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):104-115.
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  13. True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality About Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defence of Evidentialism.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):4-28.
    ABSTRACT Is it good to form positive beliefs about those you have faith in, such as God or a religious community? Doxastic partialists say that it is. Some hold that it is good, from the viewpoint of faith, to form positive beliefs about the object of your faith even when your evidence favours negative ones. Others try to maintain respect for evidence by appealing to a highly permissive epistemology. I argue against both forms of doxastic partiality, on the grounds that (...)
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  14. Evidence Through a Glass, Darkly.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):56-61.
    ABSTRACT Dormandy’s ‘True Faith’ presents two views on the proper epistemological stance towards faith: doxastic-partialism and evidentialism. Here, I argue for a third option that cuts across the evidentialism/partialism distinction. I first analyze the Pascalian conception of faith, arguing that Pascal begins with the cognitive attitude of acceptance rather than belief. Next, I discuss Dormandy’s case for evidentialism, and contend that some evidence—the kind gained through transformative experiences—presents a difficulty for her argument. Finally, I offer my proposed view—Partialist Evidentialism—and argue (...)
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  15.  49
    Pascalian Faith.Alexander Jech - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):73-79.
    Katherine Dormandy aims both to classify possible modes of relating faith to epistemic norms in terms of three broad viewpoints: evidentialism, epistemological partialism, and anti-epistemological partialism. I advance two related claims: first, her categorization flattens the epistemological terrain by treating epistemic norms that operate at different levels as if they operated on the same level and thereby distorts the views she categorizes under Anti-Epistemological Partiality; and second, when rightly described, the noetic conflict involved in this view can be understood as (...)
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  16. Kierkegaard’s Defence of Faith as Second-Order Partialism and Critique of Impartialism.Andrew Komasinski - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):80-85.
    ABSTRACT While Katherine Dormandy claims Kierkegaard is an anti-epistemological partialist, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling provides a second-order partialism that takes evidence and reason seriously but sees these considerations as exceeded for a self who stands in relationship with the absolute.
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  17. On the Harmony Between Epistemology and Pistology.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):29-35.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I seek to retain many of Dormany's central claims about the excellent-making features of faith, without accepting her direct application of evidentialism to faith. In order to achieve that goal, I argue that we have to distinguish between the non-conflicting norms of epistemology and pistology. We also have to distinguish the often conflicting norms of epistemic and practical rationality.
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  18.  43
    Evidence Thresholds and the Partiality of Relational Faith.Finlay Malcolm - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):86-91.
    ABSTRACT This commentary shows how Dormandy’s ‘Partiality Norm of Belief for Faith’ can be made compatible with ‘Evidentialism about Faith’. Dormandy takes partiality to involve disrespect toward evidence—where evidence we are partial toward is given undue weight. I propose an alternative where partiality is to require more or less evidence for believing a proposition given the benefits or harms of holding the belief. Rather than disrespecting evidence, this partiality is simply to have variable ‘evidence thresholds’ that are partly set by (...)
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  19. The Partiality of Faith.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):36-45.
    ABSTRACT Katherine Dormandy argues that there is no partiality in virtuous faith. Partiality biases and leads to noetic entrenchment. In response, I contend there is an important sense in which virtuous faith is partial towards its object. Namely, it disposes one to perceive the object as more trustworthy and to rely on this partialist evidence in forming beliefs, even when the impartialist evidence points in the other direction. There are, after all, situations in which impartialist evidence is apt to mislead (...)
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  20. Faith: How to Be Partial While Respecting the Evidence.Taylor-Grey Miller & Derek Haderlie - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):67-72.
    In her paper, “True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defense of Evidentialism,” Katherine Dormandy argues against the view that there is a partiality norm on faith. Dormandy establishes this by showing that partiality views can’t give the right responses to encounters with stubborn counter evidence. Either they (anti-epistemic-partiality views) recommend flouting the evidence altogether in order hold on to positive beliefs about the object of faith or they (epistemic-partiality views) lower the epistemic (...)
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  21.  11
    Evidentialism, Stubborn Counterevidence and Horrendous Evils.Daryl Ooi - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):92-97.
    Dormandy argues that stubborn counterevidence provides a reason for Evidentialists to form negative beliefs about God. Focusing on ‘horrendous evils’ as a kind of stubborn counterevidence, I discuss two possible interpretations of Dormandy’s account (a stronger and a weaker view). Against the stronger view, I consider the case of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist, that is, an evidentialist who possesses a defeater belief against horrendous evils. I argue that it would be improbable that she would form negative beliefs about God on (...)
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  22.  61
    How to Make Norms Clash.Eva Schmidt - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):46-55.
    In this comment on Katherine Dormandy's paper «True Faith», I point out that the clash she describes between epistemic norms and faith-based norms of belief needs to be supplemented with a clear understanding of the pertinent norms of belief. I argue that conceiving of them as evaluative fails to explain the clash, and that understanding them as prescriptive is no better. I suggest an understanding of these norms along the lines of Ross’s (1930) prima facie duties, and show how this (...)
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  23. Open Faith and Jealous God: Some Remarks on Faith and Evidentialism.Sylwia Wilczewska - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):98-103.
    ABSTRACT In response to Katherine Dormandy’s argument for the superiority of the kind of faith which respects the evidence against retaining faith, I argue that the necessity of deciding which way of weighting evidence for and against retaining faith is preferable leads to Pascal’s wager for evidentialists: the choice between closed and open faith based on the calculation of epistemic and non-epistemic losses and gains, disclosing the tension between the kind of faith grounded in God’s reality and the kind which (...)
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  24.  8
    Rationality and Kinds of Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):386-392.
    ABSTRACT In his ‘Rationality versus Normativity’, John Broome argues against the view that rationality is reducible to normativity. Broome’s argument rests on the claim that while rationality supervenes on the mind, normativity does not. In this commentary, I argue that Broome's arguments succeed only against views on which reasons and normativity are univocal. Once we admit of multiple kinds of normative reasons, some fact-given and others non-factive, a version of the reasons-responsiveness view emerges that is untouched by Broome's arguments. On (...)
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  25. The Importance of Being Erroneous.Nils Kürbis - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):155-166.
    This is a commentary on MM McCabe's "First Chop your logos... Socrates and the sophists on language, logic, and development". In her paper MM analyses Plato's Euthydemos, in which Plato tackles the problem of falsity in a way that takes into account the speaker and complements the Sophist's discussion of what is said. The dialogue looks as if it is merely a demonstration of the silly consequences of eristic combat. And so it is. But a main point of MM's paper (...)
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