View year:

  1.  33
    (1 other version)Against judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.Donald E. Bello Hutt - 2017 - Revus 31.
    Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and answer affirmatively. I criticise both (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  30
    How can we explain pre-conventions?Sebastián Figueroa Rubio - 2017 - Revus.
    In this comment to Celano’s “Pre-Conventions. A Fragment of the Background”, the author introduces the following question: What kind of explanation fits better with behaviours that could be categorised as pre-conventions? Some possible answers to the question are explored, as well as some possible implications for Celano’s proposal.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  36
    On pre-conventions as ‘normative facts’.Luís Duarte D’Almeida - 2017 - Revus.
    In his essay “Pre-Conventions: A Fragment of the Background”, Bruno Celano seems to endorse three claims about what he calls ‘pre-conventions’: that such ‘entities’ exist; that they are neither rules nor de facto regularities; and that their ‘character’ is at once factual and normative: that pre-conventions are “literally, ‘normative facts’.” I suggest that and are not particularly striking claims, and that Celano’s case for is unpersuasive.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues