Year:

  1. A Kantian Theory of the Sensory Processing Subtype of ASD [Autism Spectrum Disorder].Susan V. H. Castro - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 6 (1):1-15.
    Immanuel Kant’s theory of imagination is a surprisingly fruitful nexus of explanation for the prima facie disparate characteristics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), especially the sub-spectrum best characterized by the Sensory Integration (SI) and Intense World (IW) theories of ASD. According to the psychological theories that underpin these approaches to autism, upstream effects of sensory processing atypicalities explain a cascade of downstream effects that have been characterized in the diagnostic triad, e.g., poor sensory integration contributes to weak central coherence, which (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Feeling Good: Integrating the Psychology and Epistemology of Moral Intuition and Emotion.Hossein Dabbagh - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (5):1-30.
    Is the epistemology of moral intuitions compatible with admitting a role for emotion? I argue in this paper that moral intuitions and emotions can be partners without creating an epistemic threat. I start off by offering some empirical findings to weaken Singer’s (and Greene’s and Haidt’s) debunking argument against moral intuition, which treat emotions as a distorting factor. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake. Moral intuitions and (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  8
    On the Self-Knowledge Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology.M. A. Parks - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 1 (6):91-102.
    The present paper will be primarily concerned with criticizing the defense of cognitive phenomenology presented by David Pitt’s (2011) self knowledge argument, focusing on his response to Joseph Levine (2011). In this essay, I argue that Pitt’s self-knowledge argument appears to presuppose that a person makes voluntary judgments about their beliefs on the basis of recognition of distinctive phenomenal states, the way we recognize what we see, hear, or smell. However, many of those who reject the existence of cognitive phenomenology (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues