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  1.  12
    Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring.Dale Dorsey - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):465-484.
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  2.  11
    The Criminal Is Political: Policing Politics in Real Existing Liberalism.Koshka Duff - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):485-502.
    The familiar irony of ‘real existing socialism’ is that it never was. Socialist ideals were used to legitimize regimes that fell far short of realizing those ideals – indeed, that violently repressed anyone who tried to realize them. This paper suggests that the derogatory concept of ‘the criminal’ may be allowing liberal ideals to operate in contemporary political philosophy and real politics in a worryingly similar manner. By depoliticizing deep dissent from the prevailing order of property, this concept can obscure (...)
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  3.  5
    Derrida's Rethinking of Professorial Authority.Samir Haddad - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):430-445.
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  4.  15
    Social Mereology.Katherine Hawley - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):395-411.
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  5.  7
    Autism, Metacognition, and the Deep Self.Nathan Stout - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):446-464.
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  6.  5
    Must Adaptive Preferences Be Prudentially Bad for Us?Rosa Terlazzo - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):412-429.
    In this paper, I argue for the counter-intuitive conclusion that the same adaptive preference can be both prudentially good and prudentially bad for its holder: that is, it can be prudentially objectionable from one temporal perspective, but prudentially unobjectionable from another. Given the possibility of transformative experiences, there is an important sense in which even worrisome adaptive preferences can be prudentially good for us. That is, if transformative experiences lead us to develop adaptive preferences, then their objects can become prudentially (...)
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  7.  9
    On Intellectualism in the Theory of Action.Robert Audi - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):284-300.
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  8.  2
    The Measure of Pleasure: A Note on the Protagoras.Richard Davies - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):301-315.
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  9.  7
    Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):372-393.
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  10. ‘I'm Not Envious, I'm Just Jealous!’: On the Difference Between Envy and Jealousy.Sara Protasi - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):316-333.
    I argue for the view that envy and jealousy are distinct emotions, whose crucial difference is that envy involves a perception of lack while jealousy involves a perception of loss. I start by noting the common practice of using ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ almost interchangeably, and I contrast it with the empirical evidence that shows that envy and jealousy are distinct, albeit similar and often co-occurring, emotions. I then argue in favor of a specific way of understanding their distinction: the view (...)
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  11.  16
    Personal Ideals as Metaphors.Nick Riggle - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):265-283.
    What is it to have and act on a personal ideal? Someone who aspires to be a philosopher might imaginatively think “I am a philosopher” by way of motivating herself to think hard about a philosophical question. But doing so seems to require her to act on an inaccurate self-description, given that she isn’t yet what she regards herself as being. J. David Velleman develops the thought that action-by-ideal involves a kind of fictional self-conception. My aim is to expand our (...)
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  12.  2
    A Mistake in the Commodification Debate.Luke Semrau - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):354-371.
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  13. Humans Should Not Colonize Mars.Ian Stoner - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):334-353.
    This article offers two arguments for the conclusion that we should refuse on moral grounds to establish a human presence on the surface of Mars. The first argument appeals to a principle constraining the use of invasive or destructive techniques of scientific investigation. The second appeals to a principle governing appropriate human behavior in wilderness. These arguments are prefaced by two preliminary sections. The first preliminary section argues that authors working in space ethics have good reason to shift their focus (...)
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  14.  11
    A Normative Theory of Disagreement.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):189-208.
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  15.  25
    On the Limits of the Method of Phenomenal Contrast.Martina Fürst - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):168-188.
    The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate about cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain (...)
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  16.  12
    The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism.Dan Lowe & Joseph Stenberg - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):247-263.
    It is widely held that the Experience Machine is the basis of a serious objection to Hedonistic theories of welfare. It is also widely held that Desire Satisfactionist theories of welfare can readily avoid problems stemming from the Experience Machine. But in this paper, we argue that if the Experience Machine poses a serious problem for Hedonism, it also poses a serious problem for Desire Satisfactionism. We raise two objections to Desire Satisfactionism, each of which relies on the Experience Machine. (...)
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  17. Analytical Critiques of Whitehead's Metaphysics.Leemon McHenry & George W. Shields - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):483-503.
    Analytic philosophers have criticized A. N. Whitehead’s metaphysics for being obscure, yet several such philosophers have espoused positions in metaphysics and philosophy of mind that were advanced by Whitehead in the 1920s. In this paper, we evaluate the merits and demerits of these criticisms by Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, Karl Popper and others and then demonstrate the affinities and contrasts in the positions advanced by Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel and Whitehead regarding so-called “analytic panexperientialism.”.
     
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  18.  54
    The Transcendental Argument of the Novel.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):148-167.
    Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unexceptional that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if (...)
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  19.  11
    Humean Laws in an unHumean World.Samuel Kimpton-nye - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):129-147.
    I argue that an unHumean ontology of irreducibly dispositional properties might be fruitfully combined with what has typically been thought of as a Humean account of laws, namely, the best-system account, made popular by David Lewis (e.g., 1983, 1986, 1994). In this paper I provide the details of what I argue is the most defensible account of Humean laws in an unHumean world. This package of views has the benefits of upholding scientific realism while doing without any suspect metaphysical entities (...)
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  20. The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.
    The moral of Buridan's Ass is that it can sometimes be rational to perform one action rather than another even though one lacks stronger reason to do so. Yet it is also commonly believed that it cannot ever be rational to believe one proposition rather than another if one lacks stronger reason to do so. This asymmetry has been taken to indicate a deep difference between epistemic and practical rationality. According to the view articulated here, the asymmetry should instead be (...)
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  21.  8
    Enduring Questions and the Ethics of Memory Blunting.Joseph Vukov - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):227-246.
    Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival (...)
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  22. Imaginative Vividness.Kind Amy - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3:32-50.
    How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not (...)
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  23. Finding the Good in Grief: What Augustine Knew but Meursault Couldn't.Michael Cholbi - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3:91-105.
    Meursault, the protagonist of Camus' The Stranger, is unable to grieve, a fact that ultimately leads to his condemnation and execution. Given the emotional distresses involved in grief, should we envy Camus or pity him? I defend the latter conclusion. As St. Augustine seemed to dimly recognize, the pains of grief are integral to the process of bereavement, a process that both motivates and provides a distinctive opportunity to attain the good of self-knowledge.
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  24.  15
    Aristotle on Accidental Causation.Huismann Tyler - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3:1-15.
    I offer a new analysis of Aristotle's concept of an accidental cause. Using passages from Metaphysics Δ and Ε, as well as Physics II, I argue that accidental causes are causally inert. After defending this reading against some objections, I draw some conclusions about Aristotle's basic understanding of causation.
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