It has been argued that the approximate number system (ANS) constitutes a problem for the grounded approach to cognition because it implies that some conceptual tasks are performed by non-perceptual systems. The ANS is considered non-perceptual mainly because it processes stimuli from different modalities. Jones (2015) has recently argued that this system has many features (such as being modular) which are characteristic of sensory systems. Additionally, he affirms that traditional sensory systems also process inputs from different modalities. This suggests that (...) the ANS is a perceptual system and therefore it is not problematic for the grounded view. In this paper, I defend the amodal approach to the ANS against these two arguments. In the first place, perceptual systems do not possess the properties attributed to the ANS and therefore these properties do not imply that the ANS is perceptual. In the second place, I will propose that a sensory system only needs to be dedicated to process modality-specific information, which is consistent with responding to inputs from different modalities. I argue that the cross-modal responses exhibited by traditional sensory systems are consistent with modality-specific information whereas some responses exhibited by the ANS are not. (shrink)

It has been argued that neural data are an especially sensitive kind of personal information that could be used to undermine the control we should have over access to our mental states, and therefore need a stronger legal protection than other kinds of personal data. The Morningside Group, a global consortium of interdisciplinary experts advocating for the ethical use of neurotechnology, suggests achieving this by treating legally ND as a body organ. Although the proposal is currently shaping ND-related policies, it (...) is not clear what its conceptual and legal basis is. Treating legally something as something else requires some kind of analogical reasoning, which is not provided by the authors of the proposal. In this paper, I will try to fill this gap by addressing ontological issues related to neurocognitive processes. The substantial differences between ND and body organs or organic tissue cast doubt on the idea that the former should be covered by bodily integrity. Crucially, ND are not constituted by organic material. Nevertheless, I argue that the ND of a subject s are analogous to neurocognitive properties of her brain. I claim that s’ ND are a ‘medium independent’ property that can be characterized as natural semantic personal information about her brain and that s’ brain not only instantiates this property but also has an exclusive ontological relationship with it: This information constitutes a domain that is unique to her neurocognitive architecture. (shrink)

In the present article, we attempt to elucidate the conceptual rela- tionship between censorship and emotional development. We employ a framework from emotion regulation studies in order to clarify how censorship works and to ex- plain why it cannot affect emotional development in the same way as the remaining types of emotional regulation. Nevertheless, we argue that, by focusing on Plato’s ac- count of censorship, and specifically of its sociocultural function, one can find that it is not a useless device (...) for emotional development. Censorship affects relevant variables in the dynamics of contraposed emotional processes that compete for dominance. (shrink)

Experiments in cognitive neuroscience build a setup whose set of controlled stimuli and rules elicits a cognitive process in a participant. This setup requires researchers to decide the value of quite a few parameters along several dimensions. We call ‘’contextual factors’’ the parameters often assumed not to change the cognitive process elicited and are free to vary across the experiment’s repetitions. Against this assumption, empirical evidence shows that many of these contextual factors can significantly influence cognitive performance. Nevertheless, it is (...) not entirely clear what it means for a cognitive phenomenon to be context-sensitive and how to identify context-sensitivity experimentally. We claim that a phenomenon can be context-sensitive either because it is only triggered within a specific context or because different contexts change its manifestation conditions. Assessing which of these forms of context-sensitivity is present in a given phenomenon requires a criterion for individuating it across contextual variations. We argue that some inter-level experiments that, within the mechanistic approach to explanation, are required to identify relations of constitutive relevance between a phenomenon and a mechanism, are also necessary for individuating the phenomenon across its contextual variations. We articulate a criterion according to which behavioral variations across contexts indicate different phenomena if and only if the mechanistic activities, components and/or organizational properties recruited in each context are different. We support this approach by showing how it is applied in paradigmatic studies addressing cognitive performance differences resulting from contextual variations of task features, such as stimulus type and response modality. Finally, we address the challenge that a form of context-sensitivity possessed by the so-called ‘multifunctional mechanisms’ is incompatible with our proposal because it entails that the same mechanism can be recruited in different contexts to produce different phenomena. We examine key cases of multifunctionality and argue that they are consistent with our proposal because a single mechanism can have different components, activities and/or organizational properties in different contexts. Thus, these modifications may not affect the identity of a mechanism, and they could explain how it produced different phenomena in those contexts. (shrink)

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion (...) for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate. (shrink)

One of the most prominent ethical concerns regarding emerging neurotechnologies is mental privacy. This is the idea that we should have control over access to our neural data and to the information about our mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. A key issue is whether this information needs more stringent protection than other kinds of personal information. I will articulate and support the view, underlying recent regulatory frameworks, that mental privacy requires a special treatment because (...) of its relation to relevant aspects of personal identity. It has been suggested that this approach could be supported by the idea that mental privacy constitutes a fundamental psychological dimension of privacy. The connection between this psychological view of privacy and identity can be traced back to Irwin Altman’s idea that privacy is an interpersonal boundary regulation process. However, it is not clear whether this notion of privacy can be associated with a conception of identity that is relevant in contemporary neuroethics. I will suggest that the narrative and relational approach to identity, a prominent view in recent ethical discussions of neurotechnology, lines up with key aspects of Altman’s proposal. I suggest that if mental privacy is an essential component of identity, the latter could be affected by technological mind-reading. (shrink)

Although it has been argued that mechanistic explanation is compatible with abstraction, there are still doubts about whether mechanism can account for the explanatory power of significant abstract models in computational neuroscience. Chirimuuta has recently claimed that models describing canonical neural computations must be evaluated using a non-mechanistic framework. I defend two claims regarding these models. First, I argue that their prevailing neurocognitive interpretation is mechanistic. Additionally, a criterion recently proposed by Levy and Bechtel to legitimize mechanistic abstract models, and (...) also a criterion proposed by Chirimuuta herself aimed to distinguish between causal and non-causal explanation, can be employed to show why these models are explanatory only under this interpretation. Second, I argue that mechanism is able to account for the special epistemic achievement implied by CNC models. Canonical neural components contribute to an integrated understanding of different cognitive functions. They make it possible for us to explain these functions by describing different mechanisms constituted by common basic components arranged in different ways. (shrink)

Pritchard sostiene que la condición de habilidad y la condición de seguridad le imponen demandas independientes al conocimiento, i.e., que la satisfacción de una no implica la satisfacción de la otra y que, por lo tanto, ninguna de ellas es suficiente por sí misma para ofrecer una caracterización adecuada de esta noción. Argumento, por el contrario, que no hay buenas razones para pensar que la condición de seguridad es insuficiente. Empleando algunos conceptos de Greco y Pritchard y Kallestrup para caracterizar (...) a las habilidades cognitivas y el caso del mentiroso consistente de Lackey, argumento que TEMP, el caso clave de Pritchard para mostrar que puede haber seguridad sin habilidad, no funciona porque el proceso cognitivo relevante constituye una realización legítima, aunque anómala, de una habilidad. Pritchard maintains that the ability and the safety conditions impose independent demands on knowledge, i.e., that satisfying only one of them is not sufficient to acquire knowledge. I argue that there are no good reasons to suppose that the safety condition is not sufficient. I claim that TEMP, the key case proposed by Pritchard to show that there can be safety without ability, fails because therelevant cognitive process constitutes a legitimate, although anomalous, realization of a cognitive ability. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar la relevancia de la teoría informacional del conocimiento para el problema de la suerte epistémica. Argumento que el clásico enfoque de Dretske es equivalente a la condición de seguridad de Pritchard. Sin embargo, considero que esta manera de eludir la suerte epistémica exige lidiar con el llamado "problema de la generalidad". Argumento que una respuesta a este problema requiere una noción de seguridad diferente y propongo un enfoque informacional equivalente a esta versión (...) del requisito. Concluyo que este enfoque es preferible a la condición de seguridad propuesta porque desvela relaciones conceptuales entre los elementos que constituyen el conocimiento.The aim of this paper is to determine the relevance of an informational theory of knowledge to address recently discussed epistemic problems. I argue that Dretske's classical approach is equivalent to the safety condition proposed by Pritchard to avoid epistemic luck. However, I claim that Pritchard's condition has to be modified to avoid the so-called "generality problem" for reliabilism. I propose an alternative version of the requirement to deal with these problems and provide an equivalent informational condition. I conclude that this informational version is preferable since it reveals conceptual relationships between the constituents of knowledge. (shrink)

The adaptive BCI known as ‘closed-loop deep brain stimulation’ (clDBS) is a device that stimulates the brain in order to prevent pathological neural activity and automatically adjusts stimulation levels based on computational algorithms that detect or predict those pathological processes. One of the prominent ethical concerns raised by clDBS is that, by inhibiting or modulating the undesirable neural states of a cognitive agent automatically, the device potentially undermines her autonomy. It has been argued that clDBS is not a threat because (...) autonomy is fundamentally relational, i.e., it essentially depends on external (e.g., social or cultural) factors. If the relational approach to autonomy includes human-computer interaction, then the mechanisms of clDBS, even if external to the brain and exerting some degree of control over the individual, may support her autonomy. However, DBS applications are substantially different from one another, each involving a specific neurological or psychiatric condition, neural target, mechanism and symptom(s), and therefore at least some of them may not fit into the relational analysis. I examine different clDBS applications for treatment resistant depression and claim that while internal capsule/ventral striatum (VC/VS) clDBS is a case of relational autonomy, subgenual cingulate gyrus (Cg25) clDBS is not. Autonomy (relational or otherwise) requires some degree of self-regulation of our motivational states, which is supported by VC/VS DBS but is absent in Cg25 DBS. In Cg25 DBS the device itself directly influences motivational states, thus substituting or overriding (instead of supporting) the auto-regulatory cognitive processes required for autonomous action. (shrink)

Although the study of emotion regulation constitutes a thriving research field, there is still an ongoing debate about the very notion of emotion regulation. According to a popular approach, regulation is a second-order process which is different from (and modifies) emotion. This view has been challenged by the fact that emotion regulates itself through different feedback loops. Emotional feedback suggests that regulation may be a form of control (as defined in control theory). In this paper, I argue that none of (...) these characterizations captures all the intended applications of the notion and propose instead to identify regulation with modulation. In neuroscience, modulation is the process of changing the shape of an input-output relation. This is a notion that can be applied to the different regulatory strategies proposed in the literature and which is compatible both with second-order and feedback regulation. (shrink)

RESUMEN D. Pritchard ha sostenido que el conocimiento requiere la satisfacción de una condición de habilidad y una anti-suerte que no guardan relación de implicación entre sí. Se sostiene que la satisfacción de una condición anti-suerte implica cumplir con la condición de habilidad, primero, porque, las características centrales del caso de D. Pritchard en contra de esta implicación son compartidas con casos en los que hay habilidad; y segundo, el caso de A. Goldman del dios benevolente es más efectivo que (...) TEMP, pero involucra un tipo de seguridad diferente a la requerida para el conocimiento. Por último, se muestra que la respuesta de D. Pritchard al problema de la generalidad bloquea la implicación de seguridad a habilidad. Se propone un contraejemplo, adaptando un caso tomado de la epistemología del testimonio. ABSTRACT D. Pritchard holds that knowledge requires the satisfaction of an ability condition and an anti-luck condition that bear no relation of implication to each other. The article argues that the satisfaction of the anti-luck condition implies satisfying the ability condition for two reasons: first, that the main characteristics of Pritchard's case against this implication are shared by cases in which there is ability; and, second, that although A. Goldman's benevolent demon case is more effective than TEMP, it involves a different type of certainty than that required for knowledge. Finally, the article shows that Pritchard's response to the generality problem blocks the implication between certainty and ability, and proposes a counterexample that draws on the epistemology of testimony. (shrink)

A new strategy for moving forward in the characterization of the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) is proposed. According to Dehaene, Changeux and colleagues, broadcasting is the main function of the GNW. However, the dynamic network properties described by recent graph-theoretic GNW models are consistent with many large-scale communication processes that are different from broadcasting. We propose to apply a different graph-theoretic approach, originally developed for optimizing information dissemination in communication networks, which can be used to identify the pattern of frequency (...) and phase-specific directed functional connections that the GNW would exhibit only if it were a broadcasting network. (shrink)

Pritchard propone revitalizar el proyecto analítico para la noción de conocimiento: ofrecer una caracterización informativa y no circular de la misma. Cree que la clave es entender que las dos intuiciones centrales a esta noción imponen demandas independientes. Sostengo, por el contrario, la suficiencia de la condición anti-suerte. No solo respondo al argumento de Pritchard sino que desarrollo una línea alternativa inadvertida por él, pero implicada por supuestos suyos sobre la condición anti-suerte. Sostengo que una concepción evidencial de la seguridad (...) la hace dependiente de una condición de habilidad. Fortalezco la defensa de la epistemología anti-suerte minando dicha concepción. (shrink)

An argument recently proposed by Chirimuuta seems to motivate the rejection of the claims that every neurocognitive phenomenon can have a mechanistic explanation and that every neurocognitive explanation is mechanistic. In this paper, I focus on efficient coding models involving the so-called “canonical neural computations” and argue that although they imply some form of pluralism, they are compatible with two mechanistic generalizations: all neurocognitive explanations are mechanistic; and all neurocognitive phenomena that have an explanation have a purely mechanistic explanation.

James Gross ha desarrollado una propuesta muy difundida según la cual la regulación emocional es un procesoreflexivo o de segundo orden que es diferente de las emociones. A su vez, Gross considera que esta propuesta esindependiente de qué teoría sobre las emociones uno adopte. En este trabajo discutoesta presunta independencia. En particular, sostengo queel enfoque evolutivo de Tooby y Cosmidestiene dos implicaciones respecto de la relación entre emoción y regulación emocional: los procesos comúnmente considerados como regulativos son, de acuerdo con (...) esta propuesta, parte de la emoción misma y la regulación emocional se lleva a cabo horizontalmente, es decir, entre emociones que se encuentran en el mismo nivel. (shrink)

Barsalou has recently argued against the strategy of identifying amodal neural representations by using their cross-modal responses (i.e., their responses to stimuli from different modalities). I agree that there are indeed modal structures that satisfy this “cross-modal response” criterion (CM), such as distributed and conjunctive modal representations. However, I argue that we can distinguish between modal and amodal structures by looking into differences in their cross-modal responses. A component of a distributed cell assembly can be considered unimodal because its responses (...) to stimuli from a given modality are stable, whereas its responses to stimuli from any other modality are not (i.e., these are lost within a short time, plausibly as a result of cell assembly dynamics). In turn, conjunctive modal representations, such as superior colliculus cells in charge of sensory integration, are multimodal because they have a stable response to stimuli from different modalities. Finally, some prefrontal cells constitute amodal representations because they exhibit what has been called ‘adaptive coding’. This implies that their responses to stimuli from any given modality can be lost when the context and task conditions are modified. We cannot assign them a modality because they have no stable relation with any input type. (shrink)

Causal approaches to explanation often assume that a model explains by describing features that make a difference regarding the phenomenon. Chirimuuta claims that this idea can be also used to understand non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. She argues that mathematical principles that figure in efficient coding explanations are non-causal difference-makers. Although these principles cannot be causally altered, efficient coding models can be used to show how would the phenomenon change if the principles were modified in counterpossible situations. The problem is (...) that efficient coding models also involve difference-makers that, prima facie, cannot be characterized as non-causal in this sense. Mathematical principles always involve variables which have counterfactual relations between them. However, we cannot simply assume that these difference-makers are causal. They can also be found in paradigmatic non-causal explanations and therefore they must be characterized as non-causal in some sense. I argue that, despite appearances, Chirimuuta's view can be applied to these cases. The mentioned counterfactual relations presuppose the counterpossible conditionals that describe the modification of a relevant mathematical principle. If these conditionals are the hallmark of non-causal relations, then Chirimuuta’s criterion has the desired implication that variables in mathematical principles are non-causal difference-makers. (shrink)

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty – often framed as “neurorights” in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines (...) on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions. (shrink)

As neuroethics continues to grow as an established discipline, it has been charged with not being sufficiently sensitive to the way in which the identification, conceptualization, and management of the ethical issues raised by neuroscience and its applications are shaped by local systems of knowledge and structures. Recently there have been calls for explicit recognition of the role played by local cultural contexts and for the development of cross‐cultural methodologies that can facilitate meaningful cultural engagement. In this article, we attempt (...) to fill this perceived gap by providing a culturally situated analysis of the practice of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) in Argentina. ECT was introduced as a psychiatric treatment in Argentina in the 1930s but it is largely underutilized. While the use of ECT remains low in several countries, what makes the Argentinian case interesting is that the executive branch of government has taken a stance regarding both the scientific and moral appropriateness of ECT, recommending its prohibition. Here, we begin with a recent controversy over the use of ECT in Argentina and explain the legal recommendation to ban its application. Next, we offer an overview of some of the salient aspect of the international and local discussions on ECT. We argue that the governmental recommendation to ban the procedure should be rethought. While acknowledging the role that contexts and local conditions play in shaping the identification and assessment of the relevant ethical issues, we caution against using contextual and cultural considerations to avoid a necessary ethical debate on controversial issues. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a natureza do cosmopolitismo leibniziano e os fundamentos sobre os quais ele repousa. Procura-se resolver a aparente contradição entre, por um lado, a defesa de um cosmopolitismo científico e teológico-moral e, por outro, um certo “realismo” político, orientado pelo conhecimento preciso das relações internacionais, com a consideração dos interesses particulares dos Estados e a preocupação de preservar o “equilíbrio da Europa”. O artigo busca mostrar como esse cosmopolitismo não implica uma rejeição, por princípio, da (...) guerra nem a adesão ao projeto do abade de Saint-Pierre de instaurar uma paz perpétua. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Desiderata for an Account of Genre Existing Accounts of Genre An Account of Genre Conclusion Notes References.

While scientific inquiry crucially relies on the extraction of patterns from data, we still have a far from perfect understanding of the metaphysics of patterns—and, in particular, of what makes a pattern real. In this paper we derive a criterion of real-patternhood from the notion of conditional Kolmogorov complexity. The resulting account belongs to the philosophical tradition, initiated by Dennett :27–51, 1991), that links real-patternhood to data compressibility, but is simpler and formally more perspicuous than other proposals previously defended in (...) the literature. It also successfully enforces a non-redundancy principle, suggested by Ladyman and Ross, that aims to exclude from real-patternhood those patterns that can be ignored without loss of information about the target dataset, and which their own account fails to enforce. (shrink)

The paper introduces a special issue of the journal Philosophical Problems in Science (ZFN) on the topic of the nature and norms of scientific explanation.

La théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains / par Abel Rey,... Date de l'édition originale: 1907 Le présent ouvrage s'inscrit dans une politique de conservation patrimoniale des ouvrages de la littérature Française mise en place avec la BNF. HACHETTE LIVRE et la BNF proposent ainsi un catalogue de titres indisponibles, la BNF ayant numérisé ces oeuvres et HACHETTE LIVRE les imprimant à la demande. Certains de ces ouvrages reflètent des courants de pensée caractéristiques de leur époque, mais (...) qui seraient aujourd'hui jugés condamnables. Ils n'en appartiennent pas moins à l'histoire des idées en France et sont susceptibles de présenter un intérêt scientifique ou historique. Le sens de notre démarche éditoriale consiste ainsi à permettre l'accès à ces oeuvres sans pour autant que nous en cautionnions en aucune façon le contenu. Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.fr. (shrink)

In this incisive study of the biological and cultural origins of the human self, the author challenges readers to re-think ideas about the self and consciousness as being exclusive to humans. In their place, he expounds a metatheoretical approach to the self as a purposeful system of extended cognition common to animal life: the invisible medium maintaining mind, body and environment as an integrated 'field of being'. Supported by recent research in evolutionary and developmental studies together with related discoveries in (...) animal behavior and the neurosciences, the author examines the factors that have shaped the evolution of the animal self across widely different species and times, through to the modern, technologically enmeshed human self; the differences between which, he contends, are relations of degree rather than absolute differences. We are, he concludes, instinctive and 'fuzzy' individuals clinging to fragile identities in an artificial and volatile world of humanity's own making, but which we now struggle to control. However, the reasons for humanity’s failure to respond effectively to the climate emergency, he argues, lie not only with the powerful sectors of modern society which continue to exploit fossil fuels, but also the conservative nature of the human self and its deeply rooted resistance to changing familiar modes of life. (shrink)

A study of what Descartes calls émotions in his Passions of the Soul suggests that, rather than just a theory of passions—as Descartes himself explicitly claims to be proposing—he was in practice putting forward a more comprehensive theory of passions-émotions, a unified theory which would be closer to what today should properly be called Descartes’ theory of emotions. I try here to make explicit the grounds of this unity by showing that émotions both fit within the functional account Descartes attributes (...) to what he calls passions; and complement the intentionality of passions by expanding it to new objects. In order to show this I offer also a tentative distinction, functionally and intentionally, between passions and émotions in general, on one hand, and, on the other, between the two apparent types of émotions Descartes refers to in the treatise—interior or internal [intérieure] and intellectual [intellectuelle] émotions. (shrink)

Abstract:I defend that the distinctive object of our aesthetic evaluation of films is the full emotional experience, taken as a unified whole, that we go through as we watch a film and that I call the viewer's film emotional life. The aesthetic value itself—the positive quality we perceive in the experience of having had a certain film emotional life—is in the significance we experience in that film emotional life insofar as it contributes to the discovery and the exploration of the (...) viewer's human and individual emotional nature. I finally suggest that the explanation of the positive felt quality of such experience is in the progress it represents regarding our resourcefulness as emotional subjects toward the realization of our individual ideal of life. (shrink)

Excerpt from L'E nerge tique Et le Me canisme: Au Point de Vue des Conditions de la Connaissance 1. - Les physiciens contemporains s'accordent tous a reconnaitre la valeur objective complete des resultats purement experimentaux. Ceux-ci constituent veritablement la science de la physique, et, sauf dans des cas exceptionnels, momentanes, dans la science en train de se faire, il n'y a, a leur sujet, aucune divergence. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find (...) more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

This book argues that the primary function of human thinking in language is to make judgments, which are logical-normative connections of concepts. Robert Abele points out that this presupposes cognitive conditions that cannot be accounted for by empirical-linguistic analyses of language content or social conditions alone. Judgments rather assume both reason and a unified subject, and this requires recognition of a Kantian-type of transcendental dimension to them. Judgments are related to perception in that both are syntheses, defined as the unity (...) of representations according to a rule/form. Perceptual syntheses are simultaneously pre-linguistic and proto-rational, and the understanding makes these syntheses conceptually and thus self-consciously explicit. Abele concludes with a transcendental critique of postmodernism and what its deflationary view of ontological categories—such as the unified and reasoning subject—has done to political thinking. He presents an alternative that calls for a return to normativity and a recognition of reason, objectivity, and the universality of principles. (shrink)