The purpose of the commentary is not to contradict HIT but rather to question whether its increase in predictive power outweighs the decrease in parsimony. For the refutable aspects of HIT, a simpler model for naming appears to achieve as much. Both models better fit the facts concerning naming performance than describe category-specificity.

The question of whether colour categorisation is determined by nontrivial constraints (i.e., universal neurophysiological properties of visual neurons) is an empirical issue concerning the organisation of the internal colour space. Rosch has provided psychological evidence that categories are organised around focal colours and that the organisation is universal; this commentary reconsiders that evidence.

Goldstein reported multiple cases of failure to categorise colours in patients that he termed amnesic or anomic aphasics. These patients have a particular difficulty in producing perceptual categories in the absence of other aphasic impairments. We hold that neuropsychological evidence supports the view that the task of colour categorisation is logically impossible without labels.

Evidence from aphasia is considered that leads to a distinction between abstract and concrete thought processes and hence for a distinction between rules and similarity. It is argued that perceptual classification is inherently a rule-following procedure and these rules are unable to be followed when a patient has difficulty with name comprehension and retrieval.

Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Color is the outcome of a workshop, held in Leuven, Belgium, in May 2000.

The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely (...) they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias. (shrink)

Our focus here is on whether, when influenced by implicit biases, those behavioural dispositions should be understood as being a part of that person’s character: whether they are part of the agent that can be morally evaluated.[4] We frame this issue in terms of control. If a state, process, or behaviour is not something that the agent can, in the relevant sense, control, then it is not something that counts as part of her character. A number of theorists have argued (...) that individuals do not have control, in the relevant sense, over the operation of implicit bias. We will argue that this claim is mistaken. We articulate and develop a notion of control that individuals have with respect to implicit bias, and argue that this kind of control can ground character-based evaluation of such behavioural dispositions. (shrink)

It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, are morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering (...) of the wrong-doer, and the aim to bring this about, can (contra recent arguments from Hanna 2008) be morally justified. -/- It has been suggested that by reflecting on the role of the retributive emotions in interpersonal relationships, and the alleged legitimacy of the aim for the suffering of the wrong-doer within them, support can be garnered for retributive practices of punishment by the state (Duff 1986 and 2001, Bennett 2002 and 2003). The conclusion of the second line of argument in the paper is that whilst the retributive responses can permissibly aim at suffering, the way in which this is so in interpersonal relationships cannot provide support for retributive state punishment. (shrink)

Jules Janssens a construit une œuvre importante, qui, pour de nombreux chercheurs, a ouvert des perspectives de recherches nouvelles et fécondes. Ses travaux ont fait date. Ils portent principalement sur la philosophie d'Avicenne, ses sources, ses rapports avec la pensée musulmane, son influence sur la théologie ash'arite (al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) et sa réception dans le monde latin. Pour lui rendre hommage, quatorze collègues et amis de renommée internationale se sont réunis pour poursuivre ses réflexions sur ces thèmes. L'ouvrage (...) qui en est issu offre un état des lieux de la recherche contemporaine sur Avicenne et sa postérité arabo-latine. (shrink)

This volume contains the new version of Jules Vuillemin's Five Studies on Aristotle, which first appeared in 1967. Topics include: the types of analogy in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas; the economy of the Categories and their logical articulation; the legitimacy of the refutations by the regression towards the infinite; the Aristotelian concept of knowledge as relationship; the structure of the proofs for the existence of the Prime mover. French text.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...) agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities. (shrink)

Il y a un mot de passe pour entrer dans ce livre. Un mot de passe facile à retenir. C'est le mot AMOUR. L'auteur ne le révèle qu'à la toute fin, mais dès les premières pages, on le devine. On a tôt fait de découvrir un homme en amour avec «son» Plateau, où il habite depuis plus de trente ans. Cet amour bien réel en cache un autre plus profond, l'amour de la langue française. Quelques essais bien sentis en témoignent (...) éloquemment. C'est ainsi qu'à travers récits et essais, dans une langue belle et empreinte d'humour, Jules Tessier nous invite à partager des souvenirs où il sera question de pièces de théâtre, de personnages méconnus mais hauts en couleur, de conseils pour augmenter sa longévité, d'invitations au voyage et même de péchés et de vertus! «Un dénominateur commun relie tous ces chapitres, que ce soit le point de vue d'un observateur ou d'un actant: un vif intérêt, peut-être même une passion pour les thèmes abordés.» Au cours de sa carrière universitaire, Jules Tessier s'est intéressé notamment aux manifestations de la vie française sur le continent, tant sur le plan de la langue que sur celui de la littérature. Il est à l'origine du périodique Francophonies d'Amérique qu'il a dirigé pendant dix ans, à partir de sa fondation en 1991, et vingt-cinq ans plus tard, cette revue est toujours aussi nécessaire et dynamique. Mot de passe est le quatrième d'une série de titres consacrés à des essais et inaugurée par Sur la terre comme un ciel (Fides, 2010). (shrink)

[I] Les conséquences immédiates et le syllogisme. -- [II] La proposition et le syllogisme. -- {III] L'observation de Platner. -- [IV] Note sur le "Philèbe" [de Platon].

L'histoire de la métaphysique, pense Martin Heidegger, est une histoire de l'oubli de l'Etre. La technique moderne opère dans le vide de l'Etre, dans la pénurie de l'Etre et éloignée de l'Etre. La technique moderne est un mode de dévoilement dans ce sens qu'elle provoque la nature. Dès lors, l'essence de la technique, pense Heidegger, n'est rien de technique, elle est l'arraisonnement.

Research programs in empirical psychology from the past two decades have revealed implicit biases. Although implicit processes are pervasive, unavoidable, and often useful aspects of our cognitions, they may also lead us into error. The most problematic forms of implicit cognition are those which target social groups, encoding stereotypes or reflecting prejudicial evaluative hierarchies. Despite intentions to the contrary, implicit biases can influence our behaviours and judgements, contributing to patterns of discriminatory behaviour. These patterns of discrimination are obviously wrong and (...) unjust. But in remedying such wrongs, one question to be addressed concerns responsibility for implicit bias. Unlike some paradigmatic forms of wrongdoing, such discrimination is often unintentional, unendorsed, and perpetrated without awareness; and the harms are particularly damaging because they are cumulative and collectively perpetrated. So, what are we to make of questions of responsibility? In this article, we outline some of the main lines of recent philosophical thought, which address questions of responsibility for implicit bias. We focus on (a) the kind of responsibility at issue; (b) revisionist versus nonrevisionist conceptions of responsibility as applied to implicit bias; and (c) individual, institutional, and collective responsibility for implicit bias. (shrink)

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...) blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are liable to blame could be constructive. (shrink)

Begehren, Sexualität, Intimität und Affektivität sind feinmaschig in die spätkapitalistische Matrix des Sozialen eingewebt. Die Studie untersucht die politische Ökonomie des Begehrens nach 1968. Sie unternimmt einen Streifzug quer durch die Philosophiegeschichte – von Platon über die Psychoanalyse zum Poststrukturalismus. Dabei geht sie von der Annahme aus, dass Ökonomie einen konstitutiven Faktor darstellt, wenn man Begehren begreifen will. Umgekehrt lassen sich sozioökonomische Strukturen nicht ohne die Rolle des Begehrens verstehen. Begehren wirkt sozialmobilisierend, indem es normative Ordnungen sowohl errichten und aufrechterhalten (...) als auch überschreiten kann. Neben paradigmatischen Positionen von Platon, Georg W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche und Sigmund Freud werden begehrensökonomische Thesen von Gilles Deleuze und Félix Guattari und der im Paris von Mai ’68 aufkommenden Philosophie des Begehrens betrachtet. (shrink)