The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, if these (...) boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

Measurement is a process aimed at acquiring and codifying information about properties of empirical entities. In this paper we provide an interpretation of such a process comparing it with what is nowadays considered the standard measurement theory, i.e., representational theory of measurement. It is maintained here that this theory has its own merits but it is incomplete and too abstract, its main weakness being the scant attention reserved to the empirical side of measurement, i.e., to measurement systems and to the (...) ways in which the interactions of such systems with the entities under measurement provide a structure to an empirical domain. In particular it is claimed that (1) it is on the ground of the interaction with a measurement system that a partition can be induced on the domain of entities under measurement and that relations among such entities can be established, and that (2) it is the usage of measurement systems that guarantees a degree of objectivity and intersubjectivity to measurement results. As modeled in this paper, measurement systems link the abstract theory of measuring, as developed in representational terms, and the practice of measuring, as coded in standard documents such as the International Vocabulary of Metrology. (shrink)

The common account of the analog vs digital distinction is based on features of physical systems, being related to the usage of continuous vs discrete supports respectively. It is proposed here to alternatively characterize the concepts of analog and digital as related to coding systems, of which a formal definition is given, by suggesting that the distinction refers to the strategy adopted to define the coding function: extensional in digital systems, isomorphic intensional in analog systems. This thesis is supported by (...) examples, in particular of analog systems exploiting discrete supports, and is discussed to explain why digital coding is currently so widespread in technological and social practice. (shrink)

Non-bivalent semantics of the future tense assert that propositions regarding future contingents are neither true nor false. One of the most relevant non-bivalent semantics is supervaluationism :264–281, 1970; Thomason, in: Gabbay, Guenthner Handbook of philosophical logic, Springer, Berlin, 1984), which preserves important logical principles. Recently, non-bivalent semantics are under attack from some pragmatics arguments: these semantics would be incompatible with our practices of asserting future contingents and with the probability we ascribe to such assertions :251–271, 2014; Cariani and Santorio in (...) Mind 127:129–165, 2018). The aim of this paper is to defend supervaluationism against this kind of criticism. We argue that, if probability is interpreted as the subjective belief in a proposition and if a semantic contextualism is adopted, supervaluationism makes correct predictions concerning the norms that govern our practices of asserting future contingents. Obviously, other arguments can be proposed against supervaluationism, but they must be of a different kind, such as metaphysical arguments. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is argued on two different grounds that sentences in natural languages can be seen as systems. First, beyond their linear order, sentences exhibit a syntactic hierarchical structure. Therefore, they are structured entities. Although this structure is usually interpreted as independent of meaning, many semanticists believe that syntactic structure indicates the order in which the meanings of the parts are combined. Second, although the principle of compositionality—which states that the meaning of a sentence is a function of (...) the meanings of the parts of that sentence—is valid in general for natural languages, this principle has been shown to have many exceptions, where interpretation does not proceed bottom-up but top-down, from the meaning of the whole to the meaning of the parts. For this reason, a radical version of the principle of compositionality is untenable; if the whole depends on its parts and the parts on the whole, then the sentence is a system that cannot be dissected into separate parts without losing something essential. (shrink)

This book deals with an old conundrum: if God knows what we will choose tomorrow, how can we be free to choose otherwise? If all our choices are already written, is our freedom simply an illusion? This book provides a precise analysis of this dilemma using the tools of modern ontology and the logic of time. With a focus on three intertwined concepts - God's nature, the formal structure of time, and the metaphysics of time, including the relationship between temporal (...) entities and a timeless God - the chapters analyse various solutions to the problem of foreknowledge and freedom, revealing the advantages and drawbacks of each. Building on this analysis, the authors advance constructive solutions, showing under what conditions an entity can be omniscient in the presence of free agents, and whether an eternal entity can know the tensed futures of the world. The metaphysics of time, its topology and the semantics of future tensed sentences are shown to be invaluable topics in dealing with this issue. Combining investigations into the metaphysics of time with the discipline of temporal Logic this monograph brings about important advancements in the philosophical understanding of an ancient and fascinating problem. The answer, if any, is hidden in the folds of time, in the elusive nature of this feature of reality and in the infinite branching of our lives. (shrink)

This paper addresses the status of the act of sharing a message in a social network. Scholars do not agree on what kind of act sharing is and what kind of communicative and illocutionary act is performed when a post is shared. We defend the view that sharing is an act similar to photocopying and distributing a document. Such an act is a basic act that can be used for communicative aims in certain contexts but that is not necessarily communicative. (...) One can repost for several reasons—to manifest agreement or derision, to inform, to please the author, to show activity on social networks, to have an economic return—and only some of them are communicative. However, even when reposters do not perform a communicative act, they are not relieved of every responsibility; in fact, the responsibilities of reposters are like those of the persons who copy and distribute something. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. The first is to offer a precise definition of soft fact. Without such definition it is impossible to assess the Ockhamist solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in an accurate way. The second purpose is to identify the costs of such a solution, distinguishing them from some of the other costs usually ascribed to Ockhamism, which Ockhamism does not actually need to pay. In particular, it is argued that Ockhamism is (...) committed to the view that a true future exists and to a form of backward causation. (shrink)

In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantinga’s well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantinga’s view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom and the concept of transworld depravity. Then, we will sketch our own version of the Free-Will Defence, which maintains that moral evil depends on the misuse of human freedom. However, (...) our argument does not hinge on problematic metaphysical assumptions, but depends only on a certain definition of a free act and a particular interpretation of divine omniscience. (shrink)

In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this change (...) of truth value, a multiple frame structure is introduced in which every frame presents a privileged time, with its past and the possible alternative futures, which are still open. God atemporally knows all the frames and the truth values of propositions with respect to each one. Since divine knowledge of what an agent decides in a certain temporal frame depends on the agent’s act itself, divine knowledge does not conflict with the agent’s free will. (shrink)

In this article, we take into consideration two semantics of the future tense: linearism, according to which future-tense sentences are interpreted on a single history, and universalism, according to which they are evaluated by universally quantifying on the plurality of future histories that radiate from the present instant. Specifically, we focus on a objection advanced against universalism: if universalism were correct semantics of will, negated future-tense sentences of natural language should have two readings, depending on the scope of negation with (...) respect to the universal quantifier on histories. However, since natural language does not show this difference, one may conclude that there is no universal quantifier in the interpretation of these sentences. We show that this conclusion is premature. First, will has clear scope interactions with indefinite nouns phrases, contrary to what linearism predicts. Second, it is possible to extend the treatment of vague predicates as partial predicates to will: Since partial predicates have no scope interactions with negation, this can account for the scopelessness of will. The partiality of truth conditions is not restricted to will but also pertains to counterfactuals and generics and probably is part of a general tendency to maximize contraries. (shrink)

The timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages. Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of time are taken on board. It is shown that on static conception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for, but human freedom is threatened, while (...) a dynamic conception has no problems with human freedom, but, on this view, some truths seem not to be knowable by a timeless God. We propose Fragmentalism as a metaphysics of time in which the divine timeless knowledge of temporal events and human freedom can be reconciled. -/- . (shrink)

In addressing the problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter problems regarding the metaphysics and structure of time. Some models of temporal logic developed for completely independent reasons have proved especially appropriate for representing the temporal structure of the world as Molinism conceives it. In particular, some models of the Thin Red Line ) seem to imply that conditionals of freedom are true or false, as Molinists maintain. Noting the resemblance between Molinism and (...) \ models, Restall Molinism: the contemporary debate, pp 227–239, 2011) has advanced some criticisms of Molinism that have also been leveled against \ models. In particular, Restall believes that the implication \ is not true in \ models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implication is not true, this is a problem for them. We will show that Restall’s criticism is wide of the mark. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that in many open future models ) the implication \ is invalid. Secondly, while it is possible to account for this implication, some modifications are required in respect of the branching time semantics. In proposing one such modification, we show that this new semantics can be adopted by advocates of the \ and, as a consequence, by Molinists as well. We conclude that the principle stated by Restall is either a problem for many open future models or can be accounted for by these models and so is not a problem for Molinists either. (shrink)

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, if these (...) boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

The timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages. Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of time are taken on board. It is shown that on static conception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for, but human freedom is threatened, while (...) a dynamic conception has no problems with human freedom, but, on this view, some truths seem not to be knowable by a timeless God. We propose Fragmentalism as a metaphysics of time in which the divine timeless knowledge of temporal events and human freedom can be reconciled. (shrink)

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us (...) to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework. (shrink)

In this paper, we have analyzed a number of solutions to the antinomy between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If we assume that God is temporal, then a sort of backwards causation of past divine beliefs by future human acts must be acknowledged. Since this solution runs into difficulties, we consider the prospects of the view according to which God is outside time. A timeless and omniscient God seems to imply a B-theory of time and, at least at first glance, (...) seems to jeopardize human freedom. Therefore, we have examined what happens when a non-standard A-theory of time like Fragmentalism is assumed. We demonstrate that in this case the prospects of a timeless view of God are much better: both human freedom and divine knowledge of the results of human choices are preserved if this metaphysics of time is adopted. The costs of this solution are, however, very high. From the logical point of view, it rejects bivalence; from the metaphysical point of view, the world is regarded as fragmentary and incoherent. However, if one is ready to accept these costs, this solution is one of the most successful in the search for a solution to the centuries-old problem of the conciliation between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. (shrink)

The species concept is one of the central concepts in biological science. Although modern systematics speculates about the existence of a complex hierarchy of nested taxa, biological species are considered particularly important for the active role they play in evolution. However, neither theoretical biologists nor philosophers of biology have come to an agreement about what a species is. In this chapter, we address two questions pertaining to biological species: (1) are they individuals or universals? and (2) are they bona fide (...) or fiat entities? In section The Species-as-Individuals View, we illustrate the reasons that have led many scholars to support the view that species are individuals. In the next two sections, we show that the relational concepts of species – on which the species-as-individuals view is based – provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for species membership. This seriously undermines the species-as-individuals view. In the section A Conceptualist Model for the Metaphysics of Species, we advance the proposal that species are fiat concepts (and thus, universal entities partially dependent on the human mind) carved in a multi-dimensional space representing the properties that the biological organisms possess. The final section concludes. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. The first is to offer a precise definition of soft fact. Without such definition it is impossible to assess the Ockhamist solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in an accurate way. The second purpose is to identify the costs of such a solution, distinguishing them from some of the other costs usually ascribed to Ockhamism, which Ockhamism does not actually need to pay. In particular, it is argued that Ockhamism is (...) committed to the view that a true future exists and to a form of backward causation. (shrink)

Supervaluationism is one of the most discussed approaches to the semantics of future tense sentences in a branching time. In this paper, we consider the criticism advanced by Malpass against Supervaluationism. This criticism relies on the fact that supervaluationists must accept as supertrue disjunctions whose disjuncts are not only supertrue—which supervaluationists are ready to acknowledge—but also not satisfiable. In order to show this, Malpass proposes a formula, F F 1, which shows the existence of a satisfiable disjunction with unsatisfiable disjuncts (...) in supervaluationist models. In reply, we show that formula F F 1 cannot be expressed within a model (whether Ockhamist or supervaluationist) because it quantifies on models. It can be correctly characterised only within a meta-model that has the resources to quantify on various models. However, once that is done, F F 1 is, for the advocates of Supervaluationism, no more demanding than other disjunctions because it just generalises at the meta-theoretical level what supervaluationists already acknowledge at the theoretical level. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to examine the relationships between four solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom—theological determinism, Molinism, simple foreknowledge and open theism—and divine providence and theodicy. Some of these solutions—theological determinism and Molinism, in particular—highlight God’s government of the world. Some others—simple foreknowledge and open theism—highlight human autonomy and freedom. In general, the more libertarian human freedom is highlighted, the less God’s government of the history of the world seems possible. However, the task of (...) theodicy becomes easier because humans are fully responsible for the evil they do. Conversely, the more God’s government is highlighted, the more human freedom seems to be restricted. Moreover, God seems to be directly or indirectly responsible for evil in the world. Because of the trade–off between control and freedom, each solution finds itself at ease with some problems, while on other fronts, it must adopt a defensive position. As we will see, no solution can solve all problems; thus, the pros and cons of each solution should be weighed carefully. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy of religion has witnessed a significant increase in interest in the ontological presuppositions of the various theological doctrines. This special issue collects new essays on various divine attributes.

The concept of soft facts is crucial for the Ockhamistic analysis of the divine knowledge of future contingents; moreover, this notion is important in itself because it concerns the structure of the facts that depend—in some sense—on other future facts. However, the debate on soft facts is often flawed by the unaware use of two different notions of soft facts. The facts of the first kind are supervenient on temporal facts: By bringing about a temporal fact, the agent can bring (...) about these facts. However, on the one hand, the determination of the existence of these facts does not affect the past; on the other hand, assimilating divine knowledge into this kind of facts does not help the Ockhamist. The authors will argue that, to vindicate Ockhamism, another definition of “soft fact” is necessary, which turns out to be much more demanding from a metaphysical point of view. (shrink)

Review of Patrick Todd's book, The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False, Oxford University Press, 2021.

In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalized as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum degrees of (...) belief in different possibilities, we should be more confident in larger groups of possibilities. It is thus shown that, in the type of situation considered (in so-called ‘classical ignorance’, i.e. “behind a thin veil of ignorance”), it is epistemically rational for advocates of suspending judgment to endorse this comparative confidence; while on the other hand it is shown that, even in classical ignorance, no stronger belief—such as a precise uniform probability distribution—is warranted. (shrink)

This article investigates the agency of the architecture of the Temple of Apollo at Claros and its cognitive impact on the ritual of divination. In the comparison with Delphi, Claros represents a peculiar example of how architecture evolved to suit and shape at the same time the ritual it was hosting. The paper starts with the analysis of the exteriors of the building, highlighting the choice of the Doric style dictated by the desire of being associated to Delphi. A further (...) analysis of the internal layout gives the author a chance of describing the cognitive inputs that the peculiar structure sent to the ancient mind. Specifically, the paper studies how the narrow tunnels made of black marble that turned seven times and the underground cave like adyton created a situation of sensory confusion in the mind of the seekers and the oracle that found themselves prone to detect agencies in the surrounding space and specifically to identify the agent with Apollo. (shrink)

It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment “propagates” from (...) the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism, scientific realism, and peer disagreement. (shrink)

El término nuestroamericano —utilizado por Horacio Cerutti— tiene sus fundamentos en el concepto "Nuestra América". Este hilo conductor de pensamiento tiene como hecho ineludible el hacerse cargo de la realidad en que se vive y del lugar en donde se está, hecho expresado en un permanente interés en la identidad cultural y nacional, como también por una lectura crítica y explicativa del desarrollo de las ideas. En el caso de Chile, a nuestro juicio, la memoria filosófica nuestroamericana ha tendido a (...) ser borrada, olvidada, siendo obnubilada por un fuerte eurocentrismo, lo que ha dado como resultado un escaso número de filósofos preocupados por "lo latinoamericano". Así, este trabajo indaga sobre los orígenes de la vertiente latinoamericanista en la filosofía chilena en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. A modo de conclusión, proponemos que no es sino hasta los años ochenta cuando, desde el Círculo de Filosofía de la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, se genera un punto de inflexión con la tradición filosófica chilena, dando origen de forma más nítida a la vertiente nuestroamericana que, antes de esto, solo habría tenido pequeñas huellas dispersas. (shrink)

El presente artículo interroga de la naturaleza semiótica de la educación inclusiva y sus problemas de regulación ontológicos, visuales y epistémicos. Este problema comienza a evidenciarse cuando, buena parte, de la consciencia heurística de la educación especial se toma literalmente como la lengua natural de un espacio intelectual en blanco pero altamente generador en la transformación del conocimiento pedagógico. Tal transferencia, devino en la cristalización de un modelo semiótico universal que alcanza su efectividad a través de la castración de la (...) identidad semiológica de lo inclusivo, lo que afianza un sistema de edipización de sus signos y, con ello, coloca de manifestando un sistema de desviación sobre sus propiedades ontológicas implícitas. Producto de esta operación, es que, sus diferentes tipos de agenciamientos de enunciación son objeto de confusión y tervigersación, especialmente, sobre sus unidades semiológicas auténticas. Estamos en presencia de una operación estratégicamente intencionada que contribuye a castrar la pregunta por los signos de lo inclusivo y, por consiguiente, a instalar un sistema de edipización sobre su objeto. El método empleado es el de revisión documental crítica. El trabajo concluye que, al imponer el rostro de la educación especial como parte del corazón de la educación inclusiva se omite la intención de colocar en conexión sus dos tipos de representaciones, las que, también pueden ser interpretadas como formaciones particulares del poder, por medio de las cuales, se designa un modo particular de funcionamiento que es afianzado a través de un sistema de descodificación generalizada de sus signos y flujos semióticos. (shrink)

This paper presents a bivalent extensional semantics for positive free logic without resorting to the philosophically questionable device of using models endowed with a separate domain of "non-existing" objects. The models here introduced have only one (possibly empty) domain, and a partial reference function for the singular terms (that might be undefined at some arguments). Such an approach provides a solution to an open problem put forward by Lambert, and can be viewed as supplying a version of parametrized truth non (...) unlike the notion of "truth at world" found in modal logic. A model theory is developed, establishing compactness, interpolation (implying a strong form of Beth definability), and completeness (with respect to a particular axiomatization). (shrink)

INTRODUZIONE 2 1. POVERA E NUDA VAI, FILOSOFIA… 19 1.1 TRA SCIAMANI E CALCOLATORI 20 1.2 AUTOCASTRAZIONI E DINTORNI 25 1.2.1 Debes, ergo potes 26 1.2.1.1 Scienze della natura e scienze dello spirito 27 1.2.1.2 Orizzonti di responsabilità 32 1.2.1.3 Ritrovare la saggezza 36 1.2.2 Potes, ergo debes 37 1.2.2.1 Disintegrando la frammentazione 40 1.2.2.2 Disarticolando lo smembramento 51 1.2.2.3 Oltrepassando l’autosuperamento 58 1.3 IL (MIO) PUNTO DI VISTA 62 2. GLOBALIZZAZIONE E UNIVERSALISMO 70 2.1 PENSARE LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE 73 2.1.1 (...) Una civiltà universale? 73 2.1.1.1 Quale cultura? 74 2.1.1.2 Singolare e plurale 78 2.1.2 Scontro delle civiltà? 85 2.2 CERCANDO UN’ETICA GLOBALE 89 2.2.1 Il minimalismo morale 92 2.2.1.1 Un confronto con il liberalismo neo-contrattualista 96 2.2.1.2 La quercia, la ghianda e la foresta 100 2.2.2 L’etica mondiale 102 2.3 RIFLESSIONI CRITICHE 107 3. RELATIVISMO 112 3.1 LE RAGIONI DEL RELATIVISMO 114 3.1.1 Ragioni della politica 116 3.1.1.1 Multiculturalismo e neutralità etica 116 3.1.1.2 Antifondazionalismo e democrazia 121 3.1.2 Ragioni dell’antropologia 125 3.1.3 Ragioni dell’ermeneutica 130 3.1.4 Ragioni dell’epistemologia 135 3.1.5 Ragioni dell’etica 143 3.1.5.1 Nel regno della necessità 145 3.1.5.2 In regime di cieca obbedienza 146 3.1.5.3 Il piacere e l’interesse 151 3.1.5.4 Intuizioni, emozioni, prescrizioni 153 3.1.5.5 Accordo, consenso e permesso 159 3.1.5.6 Etica della ragione 166 3.2 LA RAGIONE PRATICA 170 3.2.1 Oltre l’ansia cartesiana 171 3.2.2 Autenticità e ragionamento 176 3.2.3 Ragioni della diversità e ragioni del riconoscimento 181 4. FIGURE DI RAZIONALITÀ PRATICA 185 4.1 UTILITARISMO 186 4.1.1 Cosa è «migliore»? 187 4.1.1.1 Piacere, felicità, bene 188 4.1.1.2 L’atto e la regola 191 4.1.2 Conta solo il risultato? 194 4.2 CONTESTUALISMO 197 4.2.1 Recupero della phrónesis 198 4.2.2 Recupero della prâxis 204 4.2.3 Recupero dell’éthos 208 4.3 ETICA DEL DISCORSO 217 4.3.1 Dalle pretese di validità del discorso al principio di un’etica universale 218 4.3.2 Universalità e formalismo 224 4.3.3 Limiti dell’etica del discorso 226 4.4 ETICA DELLA RELAZIONE 231 4.4.1 Relazione versus rappresentazione 232 4.4.2 L’umanità dell’altro uomo 236 4.5 UN BILANCIO 241 ALCUNE PROSPETTIVE. POSTILLA 245 . (shrink)