We address the following issues raised by the commentators of our target article and book: the problem of multiple perspectives; how to define group selection; distinguishing between the concepts of altruism and organism; genetic versus cultural group selection; the dark side of group selection; the relationship between psychological and evolutionary altruism; the question of whether the psychological questions can be answered; psychological experiments. We thank the contributors for their commentaries, which provide a diverse agenda for future study of evolution and (...) morality. Our response will follow the organization of our book, distinguishing between evolutionary issues that concern fitness effects and psychological issues that concern motives. (shrink)

The hypothesis of group selection fell victim to a seemingly devastating critique in 1960s evolutionary biology. In Unto Others, we argue to the contrary, that group selection is a conceptually coherent and empirically well documented cause of evolution. We suggest, in addition, that it has been especially important in human evolution. In the second part of Unto Others, we consider the issue of psychological egoism and altruism -- do human beings have ultimate motives concerning the well-being of others? We argue (...) that previous psychological and philosophical work on this question has been inconclusive. We propose an evolutionary argument for the claim that human beings have altruistic ultimate motives. (shrink)

Changes and additions in the new edition reflect the ways in which the subject has broadened and deepened on several fronts; more than half of the-chapters are ...

I discuss two versions of the doomsday argument. According to "Gott's Line", the fact that the human race has existed for 200,000 years licences the prediction that it will last between 5100 and 7.8 million more years. According to "Leslie's Wedge", the fact that I currently exist is evidence that increases the plausibility of the hypothesis that the human race will come to an end sooner rather than later. Both arguments rest on substantive assumptions about the sampling process that underlies (...) our observations. These sampling assumptions have testable consequences, and so the sampling assumptions themselves must be regarded as empirical claims. The result of testing some of these consequences is that both doomsday arguments are empirically disconfirmed. (shrink)

In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant.

Elliott Sober''s selection for/selection of distinction has been widely used to clarify the idea that some properties of organisms are side-effects of selection processes. It has also been used, however, to choose between different descriptions of an evolutionary product when assigning biological functions to that product. We suggest that there is a characteristic error in these uses of the distinction. Complementary descriptions of function are misrepresented as mutually excluding one another. This error arises from a failure to appreciate that (...) selection processes can be described at several different theoretical levels. (shrink)

“Absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence” is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (“Is E evidence about H ?”) and quantitative questions (“How much evidence does E provide about H ?”) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides evidence that those species have (...) a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects. (shrink)

How could the fundamental mental operations which facilitate scientific theorizing be the product of natural selection, since it appears that such theoretical methods were neither used nor useful "in the cave"-i.e., in the sequence of environments in which selection took place? And if these wired-in information processing techniques were not selected for, how can we view rationality as an adaptation? It will be the purpose of this paper to address such questions as these, and in the process to sketch some (...) of the considerations that an evolutionary account of rationality may involve. By describing the broad framework within which the evolution of rationality may eventually be understood, I hope to undermine the idea that evolutionary theory is somehow incapable of dealing with this characteristic and requires supplementation by some novel principle. A more modest ambition of the paper is to try to provoke those who think that there are special problems involved in this evolutionary inquiry to say what these problems are. (shrink)

The propensity interpretation of fitness draws on the propensity interpretation of probability, but advocates of the former have not attended sufficiently to problems with the latter. The causal power of C to bring about E is not well-represented by the conditional probability Pr. Since the viability fitness of trait T is the conditional probability Pr, the viability fitness of the trait does not represent the degree to which having the trait causally promotes surviving. The same point holds for fertility fitness. (...) This failure of trait fitness to capture causal role can also be seen in the fact that coextensive traits must have the same fitness values even if one of them promotes survival and the other is neutral or deleterious. Although the fitness of a trait does not represent the trait’s causal power to promote survival and reproduction, variation in fitness in a population causally promotes change in trait frequencies; in this sense, fitness variation is a population-level propensity. (shrink)

In their book What Darwin Got Wrong , Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini construct an a priori philosophical argument and an empirical biological argument. The biological argument aims to show that natural selection is much less important in the evolutionary process than many biologists maintain. The a priori argument begins with the claim that there cannot be selection for one but not the other of two traits that are perfectly correlated in a population; it concludes that there cannot be an (...) evolutionary theory of adaptation. This article focuses mainly on the a priori argument. *Received March 2010; revised July 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: ersober@wisc.edu. (shrink)

Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light (...) on the theoretical virtues of parsimoniousness, unification, and non ad hocness, on the dispute about Bayesianism, and on empiricism and scientific realism. * Both of us gratefully acknowledge support from the Graduate School at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and NSF grant DIR-8822278 (M.F.) and NSF grant SBE-9212294 (E.S.). Special thanks go to A. W. F. Edwards.William Harper. Martin Leckey. Brian Skyrms, and especially Peter Turney for helpful comments on an earlier draft. (shrink)

A statement of the form ‘C caused E’ obeys the requirement of proportionality precisely when C says no more than what is necessary to bring about E. The thesis that causal statements must obey this requirement might be given a semantic or a pragmatic justification. We use the idea that causal claims are contrastive to criticize both.

Philosophers have explored objective interpretations of probability mainly by considering empirical probability statements. Because of this focus, it is widely believed that the logical interpretation and the actual-frequency interpretation are unsatisfactory and the hypothetical-frequency interpretation is not much better. Probabilistic assertions in pure mathematics present a new challenge. Mathematicians prove theorems in number theory that assign probabilities. The most natural interpretation of these probabilities is that they describe actual frequencies in finite sets and limits of actual frequencies in infinite sets. (...) This interpretation vindicates part of what the logical interpretation of probability aimed to establish. (shrink)

Sober argues that the units of selection problem in evolutionary biology is to be understood and solved by applying the general analysis of what it means for C to cause E in a population. The account he utilizes is the unanimity account, according to which C causes E in a population when C raises the probability of E in each causal context. I argue that he does not succeed here, both because the unanimity account is not well grounded in (...) the general case, and because there are important differences between cases of population causation which do involve selection and those which do not. (shrink)

We argue elsewhere that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant . Let H be some hypothesis, O some observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then O screens-off E from H: Pr = Pr. This thesis, hereafter “SOT” , is defended by appeal to a representative case. The case concerns smoking and lung cancer. McCain and Poston grant that SOT holds in cases, like our case concerning smoking and lung cancer, that involve frequency (...) data. However, McCain and Poston contend that there is a wider sense of evidential relevance—wider than the sense at play in SOT—on which explanatoriness is evidentially relevant even in cases involving frequency data. This is their main point, but they also contend that SOT does not hold in certain cases not involving frequency data. We reply to each of these points and conclude with some general remarks on screening-off as a test of evidential relevance. (shrink)

In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga constructs two arguments against evolutionary naturalism, which he construes as a conjunction E&N .The hypothesis E says that “human cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention (p.220).”1 With respect to proposition N , Plantinga (p. 270) says “it isn’t easy to say precisely what naturalism is,” but then adds that “crucial to metaphysical naturalism, of course, is the view that there is (...) no such person as the God of traditional theism.” Plantinga tries to cast doubt on the conjunction E&N in two ways.His “preliminary argument” aims to show that the conjunction is probably false, given the fact (R) that our psychological mechanisms for forming beliefs about the world are generally reliable.His “main argument” aims to show that the conjunction E&N is self-defeating — if you believe E&N , then you should stop believing that conjunction.Plantinga further develops the main argument in his unpublished paper “Naturalism Defeated” (Plantinga 1994).We will try to show that both arguments contain serious errors. (shrink)

We argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr = Pr. We defended this screening-off thesis by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called (...) “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”. (shrink)

The probability that the fitter of two alleles will increase in frequency in a population goes up as the product of N (the effective population size) and s (the selection coefficient) increases. Discovering the distribution of values for this product across different alleles in different populations is a very important biological task. However, biologists often use the product Ns to define a different concept; they say that drift “dominates” selection or that drift is “stronger than” selection when Ns is much (...) smaller than some threshold quantity (e.g., ½) and that the reverse is true when Ns is much larger than that threshold. We argue that the question of whether drift dominates selection for a single allele in a single population makes no sense. Selection and drift are causes of evolution, but there is no fact of the matter as to which cause is stronger in the evolution of any given allele. (shrink)

In their 2010 book, Biology’s First Law, D. McShea and R. Brandon present a principle that they call ‘‘ZFEL,’’ the zero force evolutionary law. ZFEL says (roughly) that when there are no evolutionary forces acting on a population, the population’s complexity (i.e., how diverse its member organisms are) will increase. Here we develop criticisms of ZFEL and describe a different law of evolution; it says that diversity and complexity do not change when there are no evolutionary causes.

Carl Hempel argued that probabilistic hypotheses are limited in what they can explain. He contended that a hypothesis cannot explain why E is true if the hypothesis says that E has a probability less than 0.5. Wesley Salmon and Richard Jeffrey argued to the contrary, contending that P can explain why E is true even when P says that E’s probability is very low. This debate concerned noncontrastive explananda. Here, a view of contrastive causal explanation is described and defended. It (...) provides a new limit on what probabilistic hypotheses can explain; the limitation is that P cannot explain why E is true rather than A if P assign E a probability that is less than or equal to the probability that P assigns to A. The view entails that a true deterministic theory and a true probabilistic theory that apply to the same explanandum partition are such that the deterministic theory explains all the true contrastive propositions constructable from that partition, whereas the probabilistic theory often fails to do so. (shrink)

Carl Hempel (1965) argued that probabilistic hypotheses are limited in what they can explain. He contended that a hypothesis cannot explain why E is true if the hypothesis says that E has a probability less than 0.5. Wesley Salmon (1971, 1984, 1990, 1998) and Richard Jeffrey (1969) argued to the contrary, contending that P can explain why E is true even when P says that E’s probability is very low. This debate concerned noncontrastive explananda. Here, a view of contrastive causal (...) explanation is described and defended. It provides a new limit on what probabilistic hypotheses can explain; the limitation is that P cannot explain why E is true rather than A if P assign E a probability that is less than or equal to the probability that P assigns to A. The view entails that a true deterministic theory and a true probabilistic theory that apply to the same explanandum partition are such that the deterministic theory explains all the true contrastive propositions constructable from that partition, whereas the probabilistic theory often fails to do so. (shrink)

If selection at the group level is to be considered more than a mere possibility, it is important to find phenomena that are best explained at this level of selection. I argue that human religious phenomena provide evidence for the selection of a “pious gene” at the group level, which results in a human tendency to believe in a transcendental reality that encourages behavioral conformity to collective as opposed to individual interest.

In the Edwardian period, the essays, novels, and criticism of G.K. Chesterton gave voice to a unique but emblematic form of patriotic anti-imperialism. The article places his views in the context of the Liberal Little Englander reaction to the Boer War, and offers two comparative case studies. The first focuses on Chesterton's inheritance of the late-Victorian anti-imperialist rhetoric of William Morris; the second assesses his fraught relationship with internationalism, as represented in the writings of Morris's political collaborator, E.B. Bax. Chesterton's (...) radical populist patriotism, it turns out, had more in common with contemporary socialist ideologies than the currently prevailing view of its parochialism would allow. (shrink)

A primeira tese de Sober é que não podemos agir livremente, a não ser que o Argumento da Causalidade ou o Argumento da Inevitabilidade tenham alguma falha. O Argumento da Causalidade é o seguinte: nossos estados mentais causam movimentos corporais; mas nossos estados mentais são causados por fatores do mundo físico. Nossa personalidade pode ser reconduzida à nossa experiência e à nossa genética. E tanto a experiência quanto a genética foram causados por itens do mundo físico. Assim, o meio (...) ambiente e os genes são os causadores de nossas crenças e desejos. E estes, por sua vez, causam o nosso comportamento. Como, em última instância, não escolhemos nem os nossos genes e nem o meio ambiente no qual adquirimos as nossas experiências, também não escolhemos o nosso comportamento: ele é causado por fatores além do nosso controle; isso nos faz não ser livres. E o Argumento da Inevitabilidade é exposto por Sober assim: se uma ação foi praticada livremente, então deve ter sido possível ao agente agir de outra forma. Mas, dado que as causas de nossas ações são as nossas crenças e desejos, não poderíamos ter agido diferentemente de como elas nos determinam a agir. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In (...) their “Epiphenomenalism: The Dos and the Don’ts,” Larry Shapiro and Elliott Sober employ a novel empirical approach to challenge the piggyback principle. Their empirical approach pulls from the experiments of August Weismann regarding the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Through an examination of Weismann’s experiments, Shapiro and Sober extract lessons in reasoning about the epiphenomenalism of a property. And according to these empirically drawn lessons, the piggyback principle is a don’t. My primary aim in this paper is to defend the piggyback principle against Shapiro and Sober’s empirical approach. (shrink)

In earlier work ( Cleland [2001] , [2002]), I sketched an account of the structure and justification of ‘prototypical’ historical natural science that distinguishes it from ‘classical’ experimental science. This article expands upon this work, focusing upon the close connection between explanation and justification in the historical natural sciences. I argue that confirmation and disconfirmation in these fields depends primarily upon the explanatory (versus predictive or retrodictive) success or failure of hypotheses vis-à-vis empirical evidence. The account of historical explanation that (...) I develop is a version of common cause explanation. Common cause explanation has long been vindicated by appealing to the principle of the common cause. Many philosophers of science (e.g., Sober and Tucker) find this principle problematic, however, because they believe that it is either purely methodological or strictly metaphysical. I defend a third possibility: the principle of the common cause derives its justification from a physically pervasive time asymmetry of causation (a.k.a. the asymmetry of overdetermination). I argue that explicating the principle of the common cause in terms of the asymmetry of overdetermination illuminates some otherwise puzzling features of the practices of historical natural scientists. (shrink)

In introducing the papers of the symposiasts, I distinguish between statistical, physical, and evidential probability. The axioms of the probability calculus and so Bayes’s theorem can be expressed in terms of any of these kinds of probability. Sober questions the general utility of the theorem. Howson, Dawid, and Earman agree that it applies to the fields they discuss--statistics, assessment of guilt by juries, and miracles. Dawid and Earman consider that prior probabilities need to be supplied by empirical evidence, while (...) Howson considers that there are no objective constraints on prior probabilities. I argue that simplicity is a crucial determinant of prior probability. Miller discussed how Bayes’s theorem can be interpreted so as to apply to physical probability. (shrink)

An author writing overt, confessed, and unrepentant metaphysics is, in these days, very rare and very reassuring, as evidence that the true spirit of philosophy is still alive and is being resuscitated. Professor Sprigge gives short shrift to the current opponents of metaphysics, and marshals sober and trenchant arguments, to my mind unanswerable, against them in his Preamble. He boldly claims to be seeking the literal truth about things as they really are, thus once and for all disposing of (...) the prevalent relativism, agnosticism, and skeptical nihilism in so many professional philosophical circles today. (shrink)

Kneller's main concern is that, "If we are to understand the problems, policies, and concepts of education, we must first examine carefully the language of educational discourse." This book is a sober and readable review of several problems in modern philosophy, in which are revealed some of the strategies used by the giants of language philosophy to analyze difficult philosophical propositions and paradoxes. Each chapter of historical exposition is paralleled with a chapter of applications to problems in educational philosophy. (...) The early part of the book is a review of John Dewey's central theses, plus a few words on research methodology in general, both of which are related to the conduct of classroom lessons; the second part of the book, which Kneller calls "Formal Analysis," is an exceedingly competent precis of work in the philosophy of science, especially Wittgenstein's and Carnap's, followed by a series of important caveats to educational researchers, reminding them of some of the serious problems of inference and generalization in the behavioral sciences; the third section, featuring Ryle, Austin, and Strawson, is called "Informal Analysis," and is principally a discussion of "ordinary language" philosophy, with applications to the familiar clichés and slogans of school administrators and politicians. Kneller favors this last group, since he feels that informal analysis is more "practical and humane," and his feelings are supported by some current conflicts between hard and soft educational research. The basic exhortation of this book, though, is that people who talk and think about education should be more philosophically competent about it, even if their philosophical blunders have not yet affected their ability to teach and make policy. He maintains that educational philosophy will not add anything new to the educational universe, but rather, clarify what is already there.—E. H. W. (shrink)

There are no changes of note between this re-issue of Field's book and the previous edition. The book first appeared in 1930 and still remains a solid introduction to the background of Plato's philosophy. The first part gives a sober and balanced account of Plato's life and the form and chronology of the dialogues. The second and third parts detail the moral, political, literary, and philosophical setting of Plato's thought. Three appendices are added. The first defends the authenticity of (...) all but the first and second epistles; the second defends the general accuracy of Aristotle's account of the Platonic forms; the third is a lengthy and valuable summary, with texts, of the history of "Socrates and Plato in Post-Aristotelian Tradition." Field's particular virtue is the consistency with which he separates fact from conjecture in the account of Plato and his work. He is not himself above conjecturing in order to fill in some of the gaps in our knowledge, but his conjectures are clearly indicated and moderate in character.--E. A. R. (shrink)

In this work, the first of two volumes, Harris attempts to explicitate the world-view implicit in modern science. The second volume, adumbrated at the conclusion of this study, will develop a philosophical synthesis consistent with this world-view. The survey of science, which occupies the bulk of the book, is a masterful tour de force which stresses the striving of every level of reality toward completion on a higher level. His interpretation of physics is generally competent, but tends to rely too (...) heavily on Eddington and on speculative interpretations of general relativity and of the Pauli principle. His evolutionary biology is a sober critical redevelopment of views similar to those which Teilhard de Chardin sketched in glowing prose. In interpreting the findings of neurophysiology and psychology he utilizes Gestalt theory and Piaget's idea of developmental stages. His general conclusion is that mind and thought, the ultimate terms of evolutionary development, must be immanent in every preceding stage, not as consciousness but as rationality. Accordingly, the philosophy modern science requires must be a synthesis, along Hegelian lines, of monism and pluralism, of process and holism. Any philosophy which rests on atomic facts or atomic propositions is, in Harris's opinion, radically incapable of supplying such a synthesis.—E. M. M. (shrink)

Starting from the problem of the Theaetetus, i.e., the problem of distinguishing knowledge from true opinion, Chisholm proceeds in a sober and meticulous fashion to detail and suggest avenues of approach to the gamut of traditional and contemporary epistemological problems. A theory of degrees of certainty from the directly and indirectly evident through the reasonable to the acceptable is developed in line with Chisholm's empiricist and perception-centered approach to epistemology. The notion of the directly evident, or the "given," as (...) it has been styled, is cautiously but firmly defended, as is Chisholm's version of "Brentano's Thesis." Other individual chapters are given over to the analytic/synthetic distinction, truth, and the status of appearances. Since it is in Prentice-Hall's Foundations of Philosophy Series and is designed for use in undergraduate courses, the book could have used a more extensive and systematically presented bibliography than what can be culled from the footnotes—especially since Chisholm is in continual but formally unacknowledged dialogue with other contemporary analytical philosophers.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In this work, the first of two volumes, Harris attempts to explicitate the world-view implicit in modern science. The second volume, adumbrated at the conclusion of this study, will develop a philosophical synthesis consistent with this world-view. The survey of science, which occupies the bulk of the book, is a masterful tour de force which stresses the striving of every level of reality toward completion on a higher level. His interpretation of physics is generally competent, but tends to rely too (...) heavily on Eddington and on speculative interpretations of general relativity and of the Pauli principle. His evolutionary biology is a sober critical redevelopment of views similar to those which Teilhard de Chardin sketched in glowing prose. In interpreting the findings of neurophysiology and psychology he utilizes Gestalt theory and Piaget's idea of developmental stages. His general conclusion is that mind and thought, the ultimate terms of evolutionary development, must be immanent in every preceding stage, not as consciousness but as rationality. Accordingly, the philosophy modern science requires must be a synthesis, along Hegelian lines, of monism and pluralism, of process and holism. Any philosophy which rests on atomic facts or atomic propositions is, in Harris's opinion, radically incapable of supplying such a synthesis.—E. M. M. (shrink)

An author writing overt, confessed, and unrepentant metaphysics is, in these days, very rare and very reassuring, as evidence that the true spirit of philosophy is still alive and is being resuscitated. Professor Sprigge gives short shrift to the current opponents of metaphysics, and marshals sober and trenchant arguments, to my mind unanswerable, against them in his Preamble. He boldly claims to be seeking the literal truth about things as they really are, thus once and for all disposing of (...) the prevalent relativism, agnosticism, and skeptical nihilism in so many professional philosophical circles today. (shrink)

Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H|O&E) = P(H|O). In this paper I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between (...) them. (shrink)

The relationship between q-spaces (c.f. [9]) and quantum spaces (c.f. [5]) is studied, proving that both models coincide in the case of Spec A, the spectrum of a non-commutative C*-algebra A. It is shown that a sober T 1 quantum space is a classical topological space. This difficulty is circumvented through a new definition of point in a quantale. With this new definition, it is proved that Lid A has enough points. A notion of orthogonality in quantum spaces is (...) introduced, which permits us to express the usual topological properties of separation. The notion of stalks of sheaves over quantales is introduced, and some results in categorial model theory are obtained. (shrink)

Misunderstandings often develop when scientists from different backgrounds use the same words when they mean different things by them. Theorists must therefore choose and define their terms carefully. In addition, proponents of “new” theories need to demonstrate empirically that theirs are more powerful than the existing theories they wish to supplant. Wilson & Sober have not yet done this.