Les contours de la notion d'animalité ont évolué. lls suggèrent des questions épistémologiques, quant à la place de l'animal par rapport aux autres êtres vivants ou à l'homme, des questions morales sur la manière dont il faut traiter les animaux, voire des questions métaphysiques, puisque l'humanité ne peut exister sans animalité. The outlines of the concept of animality evolved. They suggest epistemological questions as regards the seat of animals with reference to other living beings or to man, moral questions about (...) how to treat animals, nay metaphysical questions since humanity cannot exist but with animality. (shrink)

Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre l'Univers, l'animal, la machine et la ville? A priori pas grand-chose si l'on prend en considération les différences d'échelle ou encore le fait que l'on cherche à rapprocher deux concepts "naturels", l'Univers et l'animal, à deux types de "constructions" humaines, la machine et la ville. Le propos de cet ouvrage est précisément de démontrer le contraire : des constatations identiques ou analogues peuvent s'appliquer à chacun d'eux. Notre appréhension de ces différentes entités a progressé de (...) façon considérable au cours du temps et notoirement au cours des dernières années. Les quatre termes deviennent de plus en plus complexes en même temps que nos analyses deviennent plus performantes. Chacun d'eux est constitué de structures emboîtées : ils sont en mosaïques, ensembles faits d'éléments distincts qui se juxtaposent, mais qui sont toujours plus que la simple somme de leurs éléments. Ils évoluent au cours du temps, et cette évolution est darwinienne : ils s'adaptent, cherchent l'équilibre, et seules subsistent les structures les plus robustes. Et ce qui est le plus réussi, le plus adapté, est aussi bien souvent ce que nous trouvons le plus beau... Mettre en parallèle les regards d'un astrophysicien, d'un biologiste, d'un architecte et d'un roboticien permet à chacune de ses disciplines d'apporter un éclairage nouveau sur les trois autres : un bel exercice de dialogue. (shrink)

La conception épistémologique dualiste de Raymond Ruyer, où l'information n'est signifiante que par l'exercice d'une conscience relevant d'une autre dimension, a permis à l'auteur d'échapper à un dogme erroné dans ce domaine : celui qui voulait identifier information, ordre et néguentropie. Même si les conceptions philosophiques des scientifiques d'aujourd'hui, généralement matérialistes et monistes, sont différentes, leurs conséquences rejoignent les positions épistémologiques de Ruyer où information, structure, forme ou évolution des espèces ne peuvent être conçues selon un réductionnisme simpliste. Raymond Ruyer's (...) dualistic epistemological conception, in which information is significant only by the exercise of a consciousness that belongs to another dimension, allowed the author to escape an erroneous dogma: the temptation to conflate information, order and neguentropy. Even if the philosophical conceptions of contemporary scientists, most often materialistic and monistic, are different, their consequences coincide with the epistemological positions of Ruyer's, in which information, structure, form or the evolution of species cannot be conceived in the terms of a simplistic reductionism. (shrink)

The present thesis, compatible with Darwinian theory, endeavours to provide original answers to the question of why the evolution of species leads to beings more complex than those existing before. It is based on the repetition of two main principles alleged to play a role in evolution towards complexity, i.e. "juxtaposition" and "integration". Juxtaposition is the addition of identical entities. Integration is the modification, or specialisation, of these entities, leading to entities on a higher level, which use the previous entities (...) as units. Several concrete examples of the process are given, at the genetic level (introns), at the anatomical level and at the social level. Structures where integration at one level leaves the units at a lower level in a state of relative autonomy can be describedusing the metaphor of the "mosaic", and the description can also be applied to the human brain and functioning of thought, where essential functions such as language or memory have a mosaic structure. (shrink)

Deux livres récents, ceux de Pierre Jouventin et de Kevin Laland, conduisent à réexaminer, chez Darwin et au-delà, les liens entre la sélection naturelle et l’évolution culturelle.

Nous, êtres humains, sommes issus d'une longue évolution, minérale et cosmique d'abord, biologique et terrestre ensuite. Pour certains, nous aurions définitivement rompu avec un héritage ancestral qui faisait de nous des bêtes. Nous seuls serions capables du sens du bien et du sens du beau. Nous seuls serions doués de morale. Il existerait ainsi un fossé infranchissable entre le grand philosophe Emmanuel Kant et nos cousins les chimpanzés! Ou bien, au contraire, faut-il considérer que la morale et l'esthétique chez l'homme (...) plongent leurs racines dans le terreau de la «nature»? Les animaux ne sont-ils pas eux aussi capables de dévouement pour leurs proches? Nos cousins les primates ne peuvent-ils pas éprouver eux aussi des sentiments en face d'une belle chimpanzé? Bref, la découverte des «cultures animales» n'amène-t-elle pas à concevoir davantage de continuité entre l'homme et l'animal? (shrink)

Chez les animaux, le système nerveux permet de simuler les actions et les contraintes de l’environnement. Le cerveau humain dépasse cette simulation du monde physique. « Humien par construction », puisqu’il sépare ses activités dans deux hémisphères cérébraux, il peut aussi simuler « à vide » des langages complexes, des êtres mathématiques, des images et des « mondes » imaginaires, des artifices et des tricheries.The central nervous system in animals can simulate actions and obey environmental constraints, but in humans the (...) brain goes beyond basic simulation of the physical world. It is « Humean » by its very construct, with activities divided and allocated to one of the two halves of the brain. And it can simulate operations, doing a « dry run » to simulate complex languages, mathematical entities, images or imaginary realms, to simulate artifice or deception. (shrink)

Comment fonder l’altérité et ses conséquences morales ? Sur le plan neurobiologique, les animaux évolués et l’homme sont très proches. Berthoz et Petit offrent une approche phénoménologique de l’intersubjectivité fondée sur les kinesthèses de Husserl. Nous montrons que cette position n’est pas contradictoire avec la neurobiologie et qu’elle appelle, sur le plan moral, à inclure les animaux dans l’altérité. D’autant que, comme le montre Burgat, la question de l’animal peut être considérée comme l’un des enjeux essentiels de la phénoménologie.How to (...) found otherness and its moral consequences ? On the neurobiological level evolved animals and man are quite close. Berthoz and Petit offer a phenomenological approach of the intersubjectivity founded on the « kinestheses » of Husserl. We show that such a point of view is in no way contradictory with neurobiology calling forth that we should, on the moral level, include animals within otherness. All the more so since, as Burgat shows it, the question at stake of animals may be considered as one of the main stakes of phenomenology. (shrink)

L’évolution du vivant, ontogénétique comme phylogénétique, repose sur de nombreux mouvements par oppositions et dépassements successifs. Ces mouvements peuvent être observés aussi bien dans la vie organique que dans la vie mentale et rapprochés de thèses philosophiques comme la dialectique dagognétienne, mais aussi de l’intégration spencérienne. Au niveau organique s’exerce une opposition entre les principes darwiniens de la sélection naturelle et des principes d’association (que j’ai appelés « complexité en mosaïque ») qui agissent en sens opposé. Au niveau mental, cette (...) opposition aboutit à des contradictions entre la prédation et l’entraide entre les individus. (shrink)

Par le canal de l’informatique, le concept de « simulation » et la pratique qu’il désigne sont devenus des composantes essentielles des sciences contemporaines, qu’il s’agisse des sciences physiques, des sciences biologiques ou des sciences de la cognition. Toutefois, en raison de ce vaste spectre d’emplois, le mot « simulation » n’échappe pas aux dérives sémantiques qui affectent..

Comment penser et décrire l'animal aujourd'hui? Faut-il insister sur l'identité homme-animal, au point de supprimer toute différence? Doit-on maintenir un propre de l'homme, et si oui, lequel? Comment éviter les travers de l'anthropocentrisme? Que faire - et ne pas faire - aux animaux, et au nom de quoi? Georges Chapouthier et Florence Burgat travaillent depuis longtemps ces questions, d'une manière qui déplace nos (pré)conceptions...

The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...) possession: this tie is a consequence of what, by definition, it is to possess (i.e., to understand) one’s concepts. A corollary of the overall account is that the a priori disciplines (logic, mathematics, philosophy) can be largely autonomous from the empirical sciences. (shrink)

Idealist philosopher Georg Hegel defied the traditional epistemological distinction of objective from subjective and developed his own dialectical alternative. Remarkable for its breadth and profundity, this work combines aspects of psychology, logic, moral philosophy, and history to form a comprehensive view that encompasses all forms of civilization. Its three divisions consist of the subjective mind (dealing with anthropology and psychology), the objective mind (concerning philosophical issues of law and morals), and the absolute mind (covering fine arts, religion, and philosophy). Wide-ranging (...) in its influence, this survey of the evolution of consciousness is essential reading for all students of philosophy and history. (shrink)

TRANSLATORS PREFACE THE PRESENT TRANSLATION OF GEORG SIMMEL'S Schopen- hauer und Nietzsche: Ein Vortragszyklus (1907), ...

"This book is a sorely needed corrective. Animal Spirits is an important--maybe even a decisive--contribution at a difficult juncture in macroeconomic theory.

Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff (...) x thinks m(p). Such deviant relations satisfy the commonly discussed functionalist psychological principles. Finally, a more complicated system of deviant relations is constructed, one satisfying sophisticated principles dealing with the self-conscious rational mind. (shrink)

Physics underlies all complexity, including our own existence: how is this possible? How can our own lives emerge from interactions of electrons, protons, and neutrons? This book considers the interaction of physical and non-physical causation in complex systems such as living beings, and in particular in the human brain, relating this to the emergence of higher levels of complexity with real causal powers. In particular it explores the idea of top-down causation, which is the key effect allowing the emergence of (...) true complexity and also enables the causal efficacy of non-physical entities, including the value of money, social conventions, and ethical choices. (shrink)

The description for this book, Desert, will be forthcoming.

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is the superstar of Irish Philosophy. He entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1700 and became a fellow in 1707. In 1724 he resigned his Fellowship to become Dean of Derry, and in 1734 he was made Bishop of Cloyne. He settled in Oxford in 1752 and died the following year. The work of George Berkeley is marked by its diversity and range. His writings take in such topics as mathematics, psychology, politics, health, economics, deism and education, as (...) well as that with which he is most associated - philosophy. Whatever topic he dealt with, his grasp of the subject matter was always impressive and his criticisms of his contemporaries often acute. Among the most noteable of the British Empiricists, he took his starting point from Locke's new 'way of ideas', but he rejected abstract ideas and the possibility of real existence outside perception. It is for this doctrine that he is most known - that there is no such thing as matter, and that things are collections of ideas which can exist only in our minds and only for so long as they are perceived. This philosophy, summed up in his phrase 'to be is to be perceived', he termed 'immaterialism'. A.C. Fraser's collection includes a series of what were previously unpublished notes by Berkeley on all the main topics of his philosophy. This, the 1901 edition, was the first complete edition of his works. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential states (...) as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology — that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states — brings our views of subjective mental states into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another. (shrink)

Georges Sorel's Study on Vico is a revelatory document of the depths and stakes of French social thought at the end of the 19th century. What brought Sorel to the 18th century Neapolitan theorist of history? Acute awareness of the limitations of Marxist thought in his day, a profound concern with the material underpinnings of language, law, and culture, and the imperative to understand the possibilities of revolutionary change. We find here a different Sorel, one who speaks in surprising (...) ways to the 21st century. The translation is accompanied by an introduction and by a set of notes which situate the text both in Sorel's overall intellectual trajectory and in the fin de siècle debates from which it emerged. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Many epistemologists have been interested in justification because of its presumed close relationship to knowledge. This relationship is intended to be ...

How do we evaluate the power and utility of language when it has been made to articulate falsehoods in certain totalitarian regimes or has been charged with vulgarity and imprecision in a mass-consumer democracy? How will language react to the increasingly urgent claims of more exact speech such as mathematics and symbolic notation? These are some of the questions Steiner addresses in this elegantly written book, first published in 1967 to international acclaim.

Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “the good [that] men do separately is small compared with what they may do collectively” (Isaacson 2004). The ability to join with others in groups to accomplish goals collectively that would hopelessly overwhelm the time, energy, and resources of individuals is indeed one of the greatest assets of our species. In the history of humankind, groups have been among the greatest workers, builders, producers, protectors, entertainers, explorers, discoverers, planners, problem-solvers, and decision-makers. During the late 19th (...) and early 20th century, many social scientists employed the notorious “group mind” idiom to express the sensible idea that groups can function as the seats of cognition, intelligence, and agency in their own right (Allport 1968; Wilson 2004). In their quest to stress (rightly) that group phenomena are something “over and above” the sum of individual contributions, a fondness for vitalist metaphors led them to believe (wrongly) that genuine group cognition must be the result of tapping into individualistically inaccessible, “holistic” forces. Today, inspired in part by historically unparalleled forms of mass collaboration enabled by the internet, it has once again become popular to speak of collective intelligence, group agency, or even the emergence of a “global brain” (cf. the wiki-edited MIT Handbook of Collective Intelligence). -/- In this chapter, I review some contemporary developments of the idea of group cognition, defined broadly as the collaborative performance of cognitive tasks such as remembering, problem-solving, decision-making, or verbal creativity for the purpose of producing a group-level outcome. My discussion serves a two-fold purpose. First, by discussing how the idea of group cognition can be operationalized, I seek to show that we can retain some central theoretical insights of the “group mind” thesis without succumbing to its eccentric metaphysical overtones. Second, by providing a useful array of generalizable taxonomic resources, I hope to foster greater degrees of mutual awareness among insufficiently integrated areas of research on group performance. (shrink)

This edited volume draws upon Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to examine the conscious and unconscious forces underlying race as a social formation, conceptualizing race, racial identity, and racism in ways that go beyond traditional modes of psychoanalytic thought Featuring contributions from Lacanian scholars from diverse geographical and disciplinary contexts, chapters span a wide breadth of topics including white nationalism and contemporary debates over confederate monuments; emergent theories of race rooted in Afropessimism and postcolonialism; Latinx and other racialized groups; apartheid and American (...) slavery; and applications of Lacan's concepts of the lamella, drive and sexuation to processes of racialization. The collection both reorients readers' understandings of race through its deployment of Lacanian theory and redefines the Lacanian subject through its theorizing of subjectivity in relation to race, racism and racial identification. Lacan and Race will be a definitive text for psychoanalytic theorists and contemporary scholars of race and appeal to readers across the fields of psychology, cultural studies, humanities, politics, and sociology. (shrink)

The systems perspective, as applied to biology, involves regarding organisms as systems consisting of biological molecules in motion; its goal is to determine which interacting molecules make up the organism and how their interactions change over time. I argue here that Nicanor Austriaco’s attempt at reformulating Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism in terms of the systems perspective fails because it looks to systems biology to answer questions that only natural philosophy can answer. These questions include whether an organism is collection of parts having (...) accidental unity or is a substance, what constitutes an emergent property, and what role the final cause plays in understanding organisms. In addition, insufficient attention is paid to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tenet that the soul can only be united to a suitably disposed body, namely, one with organs. Nothing is offered to show that this tenet can be accorded with a perspective that views organisms as networks of interacting molecules. (shrink)