Recognition and Freedom offers up-to-date discussions of Axel Honneth’s political thought by ten experts in the field. It also includes an interview with Honneth and an essay by him on education and democracy, previously unpublished in English.

Habermas’ ‘ethics of citizenship’ raises a number of relevant concerns about the dangers of a secularistic exclusion of religious contributions to public deliberation, on the one hand, and the dangers of religious conflict and sectarianism in politics, on the other. Agreeing largely with these concerns, the paper identities four problems with Habermas’ approach, and attempts to overcome them: the full exclusion of religious reasons from parliamentary debate; the full inclusion of religious reasons in the informal public sphere; the philosophical distinction (...) between secular and religious reasons; and the sociological distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ religions. The result is a revised version of the ethics of citizenship, which I call moderate inclusivism. Most notably, moderate inclusivism implies a replacement of Habermas’ ‘institutional translation proviso’ with a more flexible ‘conversational translation proviso’. (shrink)

The paper discusses Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of deliberative democracy, focusing on the question of religious reasons in political discourse. Whereas Rawls as well as Habermas defend a fully inclusivist position on the use of religious reasons in the ‘background culture’ or ‘informal public sphere’, we defend a moderately inclusivist position. Moderate inclusivism welcomes religiously inspired contributions to public debate, but it also makes normative demands on public argumentation beyond the ‘public forum’ or ‘formal public sphere’. In particular, moderate inclusivism (...) implies what we call a ‘conversational translation proviso’ according to which citizens have a duty to supplement religious with proper political arguments if – but only if – they are asked to do so by their co-discussants. This position, we argue, is more in line with the deeper intuitions behind Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative model than is the fully inclusivist alternative. _Keywords_: conversational translation proviso, deliberative democracy, ethics of citizenship, Habermas, moderate inclusivism, public reason, Rawls. (shrink)

Este artículo elabora la crítica habermasiana del trabajo del antropólogo Talal Asad. Basándome flexiblemente en Habermas, defiendo que la crítica de Asad al secularismo y a la democracia liberal adolece de «esencialismo» (de un binarismo reduccionista entre los «musulmanes» y los «occidentales») y de «autorreferencia» (una dependencia implícita de las ideas noramtivas que se rechazan explícitamente). Finalmente, defiendo el enfoque habermasiano sobre el caso del Islam en Europa frente al enfoque asadiano.

Jeg diskuterer i denne artikel en række principielle spørgsmål angående det der kaldes «religionens genkomst» i det moderne demokrati. Mit hovedeksempel er den såkaldte «Muhammed-krise», som stadigvæk debatte­res med stor intensitet i nationale og internationale sammenhænge. De tre hovedspørg­smål lyder: Hvilken plads kan religiøse synspunkter og ytringer gøre krav på i den demokratiske offentlighed? Kan vi indholdsmæssigt fastsætte grænsen for religiøs blasfemi ved lov eller står den til løbende demokratisk debat? I hvilken grad kan reli­giøse minoritetsgrupper kræve anerkendelse fra – (...) og beskyttelse mod – majoritetskultu­ren i moderne, liberale demokratier? Til det første spørgsmål svarer jeg med Jürgen Habermas at religiøse grupper bør forsøge at oversætte deres holdninger til ikke-religiøse argumenter, samtidig med at denne oversættelse af forskellige årsager ikke kan fremtvin­ges retsligt eller afkræves som betingelse for demokratisk deltagelse. Mht. til det andet spørgsmål argumenterer jeg – igen med Habermas – for, at den konkrete anvendelse af abstrakte retsprincipper som ytringsfrihed og religionsfrihed kræver åben, demokratisk debat med bred deltagelse for athave legitimitet. Resultatet af denne debat kan godtvære et strengt syn på, hvad der tæller som blasfemisk, men muligheden for at kritisere dette syn – eller for generel religionskritik – kan ikke undertrykkesuden at gå kompromis med det liberale demokratis grundprincipper. Som svar på det tredje spørgsmål, og som et kritisk supplement til Habermas, fremfører jeg med Axel Honneth, at samfundsmæssig integration ikke skabes af demokratiske debatter alene. Der kræves også en vis før-dis­kursiv atmosfære af solidaritet: Religiøse minoritetsgrupper kan ganske vist ikke kræve juridisk beskyttelse af religiøse følelser, men de kan påpege «asymmetriske anerkendel­sesforhold», f.eks. ensidigt negative fremstillinger i medierne, som forringer deres mulighed for at bidrage til samfundet som anerkendte og anerkendende medborgere. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to illuminate the ethically difficult situations experienced by care providers working in a nursing home. Individual interviews using a narrative approach were conducted. A phenomenological-hermeneutic method developed for researching life experience was applied in the analysis. The findings showed that care providers experience ethical challenges in their everyday work. The informants in this study found the balance between the ideal, autonomy and dignity to be a daily problem. They defined the culture they work in (...) as not supportive. They also thought they were not being seen and heard in situations where they disagree with the basic values of the organization. The results are discussed in terms of Habermas’s understanding of modern society. Care settings for elderly people obviously present ethical challenges, particularly in the case of those suffering from dementia. The care provider participants in this study expressed frustration and feelings of powerlessness. It is possible to understand their experiences in terms of Habermas’s theory of modern society and the concept of the system’s colonization of the life world. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPatric Baert suggests that ‘encountering difference’, as we might when immersing ourselves in new cultural settings, allows us to redescribe and reconceptualise ourselves, our culture and our surroundings. By so doing, individuals can learn to see themselves, their own culture and their own presuppositions from a different point of view. They can then contrast their interpretations with alternative forms of life; and this is a requirement both for learning about themselves and coming to understand others. There is evidence that such (...) learning can reduce animosity towards others and encourage reciprocity. In this paper, I discuss the possibility that such an approach could also be useful if applied to the more-than-human world, as an antidote to nature’s exploitation by humans. I therefore argue that we need to ‘encounter difference’ with nature’s forms, which will allow us to learn from it. The meaning and implications of such ‘encountering difference’ will be developed in relation to Bhaskar’s philosophy of metaReality. (shrink)

Frode Jakobsen søger i "Nietzsches kamp med den kristelige moral" at forstå den tyske filosof Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Det gør Jakobsen blandt andet med udgangspunkt i Nietzsches person, oplevelser, psyke, som han kombinerer med hans værker for at sammenfatte udviklingen i Nietzsches moralske tænken. Frode Jakobsen (1907-1997), dansk politiker, modstandsleder og forfatter. Medstifter af foreningen Dansk Studiering, som i 1943 blev omdannet til en illegal organisation, der spillede en stor rolle i modstandsbevægelsen under anden verdenskrig. I 1945 (...) blev han valgt for Socialdemokratiet, hvor han var MF indtil 1973. Jakobsen har desuden udgivet en række bøger, der fortæller om hans erindringer og erfaringer fra sine mange år i politik. (shrink)

Can art, religion, or philosophy afford ineffable insights? If so, what are they? The idea of ineffability has puzzled philosophers from Laozi to Wittgenstein. In Ineffability and its Metaphysics: The Unspeakable in Art, Religion and Philosophy, Silvia Jonas examines different ways of thinking about what ineffable insights might involve metaphysically, and shows which of these are in fact incoherent. Jonas discusses the concepts of ineffable properties and objects, ineffable propositions, ineffable content, and ineffable knowledge, examining the metaphysical pitfalls (...) involved in these concepts. Ultimately, she defends the idea that ineffable insights as found in aesthetic, religious, and philosophical contexts are best understood in terms of self-acquaintance, a particular kind of non-propositional knowledge. Ineffability as a philosophical topic is as old as the history of philosophy itself, but contributions to the exploration of ineffability have been sparse. The theory developed by Jonas makes the concept tangible and usable in many different philosophical contexts. (shrink)

This article advocates evangelical environmental care by grounding an ethic of nature at the centre of evangelical theology, namely, in Christ and his resurrection. As Paul points out in 1 Corinthians 15, the continuity between our earthly bodies and our resurrected bodies entails that we should take care of our bodies. Drawing on Romans 8, I argue that the same line of reasoning applies to nature: the continuity between creation and the new creation entails that we should take care of (...) nature. Finally, I consider some objections to my argument regarding its possible eschatological consequences. (shrink)

My aim in this essay is largely defensive. I aim to discuss some problems for moral error theory and to offer plausible solutions. A full positive defense of moral error theory would require substantial investigations of rival metaethical views, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will, however, try to motivate moral error theory and to clarify its commitments. Moral error theorists typically accept two claims – one conceptual and one ontological – about moral facts. The conceptual (...) claim is that moral facts are or entail facts about categorical reasons (and correspondingly that moral claims are or entail claims about categorical reasons); the ontological claim is that there are no categorical reasons – and consequently no moral facts – in reality. I accept this version of moral error theory and I try to unpack what it amounts to in Section 2.1 In the course of doing so I consider two preliminary objections: that moral error theory is (probably) false because its implications are intuitively unacceptable (what I call the Moorean objection) and that the general motivation for moral error theory is self-undermining in that it rests on a hidden appeal to norms. The above characterization seems to entail the standard formulation of moral error theory, according to which first-order moral claims are uniformly false. Critics have argued that the standard formulation is incoherent since – by the law of excluded middle – the negation of a false claim is true. Hence if ‘Torture is wrong’ is false, ‘Torture is not wrong’ is true. Contrary to what moral error theorists contend, then, moral error theory seems to carry first-order moral implications that by the theory’s own lights are uniformly false. In Section 3 I suggest a formulation that is consistent with the standard formulation of moral error theory, free of first-order moral implications, and subject to no logical difficulties. In Section 4 I consider and rebut Stephen Finlay’s recent attack on moral error theory. According to Finlay the conceptual claim is false because all moral claims – and indeed all normative claims – are, or should be understood as, relativized to some moral standard or system of ends. Moral error theorists thus attribute to ordinary speakers an error that simply isn’t there. I argue that Finlay’s view has some very implausible implications and that it does not avoid commitment to various forms of error theory. This becomes especially clear when we focus on fundamental moral claims. In Section 5 I consider the worry that error theorists’ rejection of categorical reasons proves too much; in particular, the worry that error theorists’ qualms about categorical reasons apply equally to claims about hypothetical reasons, that is, claims to the effect that there is reason to take the means to one’s ends. In my view error theorists such as Mackie and Joyce have failed to pay due consideration to this problem. What the challenge establishes, I submit, is that error theorists cannot just take for granted that hypothetical reasons are metaphysically unproblematic; they must offer an account of hypothetical reasons that shows that they are. I argue that the only plausible account available to error theorists is one according to which claims about hypothetical reasons reduce to non-normative claims about relations between means and ends. (shrink)

Die Demut wird gegenwärtig entweder als ein verstaubtes Erbe des Christentums wahrgenommen oder vermehrt als ein säkulares „Modewort“ verstanden, das als mahnender Aufruf für die Rückgewinnung eines verlorenen Maßes zum Einsatz kommt. Jonas Puchta unternimmt den Versuch, unter Berücksichtigung der christlichen Tradition und ihrer Kritiker die Demut auf Grundlage einschlägiger Erfahrungen des Menschseins auf den Begriff zu bringen.

Background Nurse leaders increasingly need effective tools that facilitate the prioritisation of ethics and help staff navigate ethical challenges and prevent moral distress. This study examined experiences with a new digital tool for ethical reflection, tailored to improve the capabilities of both leaders and employees in the context of municipal long-term care. Aim The aim was to explore the experiences of nurse leaders and nurses in using Digital Ethical Reflection as a tool for ethics work in home nursing care. Research (...) design The study employed a qualitative design, incorporating individual and focus group interviews for data collection. Qualitative content analysis was used to analyse the data. Participants and research context The participants comprised six nurse leaders and 13 nurses, representing six home care zones across two Norwegian municipalities. Ethical considerations The study involved informed, voluntary participation and was approved by the Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research. Findings Four themes were developed: a constant walk on the edge between engagement and discouragement and lost in translation describe the process, while tuning in to the ethical dimension and navigating ethical uncertainties illuminate the experienced significance of Digital Ethical Reflection. Conclusion Success with Digital Ethical Reflection in home nursing care depends on clear leadership planning, nurses’ understanding of the tool’s purpose, and active use of digital registrations. Support from ethically interested nurses enhances overall engagement. Further research is needed to explore the potential of Digital Ethical Reflection as an additional tool in long-term care ethics work. (shrink)

In this article, we address why our management of the economy, community and business has led to global warming and we discuss the importance of worldviews, ontology, epistemology and axiology in the search for alternative paths of development. We do this by focusing on the concept of Circular Economy. Circular Economy is often presented as a solution to the problems of a globalized economy in the form of over-exploitation of resources, climate change and pollution of the environment. Within the mainstream (...) economics paradigm, the aim is how to increase the effectiveness of resource extraction and utilization in order to maintain growth. We contrast this with the paradigm of Ecological Economics where the goal of the economy is to achieve and secure a higher quality of life. Circular Economy often side steps the deep ontological and epistemological questions we need to answer if we are to address the complex and interrelated environmental, economic and social problems we face today. This can be a limiting factor in the search for creative and long-term solutions. However, within the Circular Economy discourse, we find strands that critically engage with the foundations of mainstream Economics and so, innovative solutions for the society of the future are a possibility. We argue that to bring about a lasting solution to the interconnected social, economic and environmental problems, Circular Economy must engage with the ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations of mainstream economics. To further this argument, we apply Imre Lakatos’ ‘research program’ model to philosophy of science as our framework of analysis and draw lessons for business and communities. (shrink)

In his Guide to the Lakes (1810, 1835), the English Romantic poet William Wordsworth used the word 'nature' in two senses. Sometimes it denoted a holistic ideal, in the manner of metaphysicians, and sometimes a concrete landscape of discrete things, in the manner of natural scientists. The Guide to the Lakes thus marks a watershed in Western philosophy of nature. Although chronologically the ideal preceded the concrete landscape, conceptually the concrete landscape precedes the ideal, much as in Nietzsche's 'fiction of (...) causation'. (shrink)

This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go beyond the common ground and consider competing accounts of the reason relation. Robust and quietist versions of non-naturalism (...) are considered in section 11.3 and naturalism is considered in section 11.4. Section 11.5 summarizes and gives a brief comparative assessment of the accounts considered. (shrink)

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts or moral truths. It is the ontological component of moral error theory, which is the best-known and most comprehensive metaethical theory that involves moral nihilism. My main aim is to discuss some consequences of endorsing moral error theory or believing to some degree that moral error theory is true. In §2, I consider the implications for ordinary moral thought and discourse and the epistemological consequences for moral theorizing. In §3, (...) I consider a recent challenge, according to which moral judgments do not have the epistemic profile that moral error theory alleges. I shall argue in §3–5 that the challenge can be met and that there is evidence that moral error theory is in fact correct about the epistemic profile of moral judgments. (shrink)

Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather (...) than etiology. Proponents of the challenge argue that cognitively penetrated visual experiences can fail to provide the usual justification because they have improper etiologies. However, extant arguments for the challenge’s key claims are subject to formidable objections. In this paper, I present the challenge’s key claims, raise objections to previous attempts to establish them, and then offer a novel argument in support of the challenge. My argument relies on an analogy between cognitively penetrated visual and emotional experiences. I argue that some emotional experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their improper etiologies and conclude that analogous cognitively penetrated visual experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their etiologies, as well. (shrink)

Critical thinking is considered to be a central epistemic aim of education. The claim may be about skills, but also about the state of justified belief. In opposition to this latter view, Alvin Goldman claimed that justification is only a means to true belief and that the only fundamental epistemic aim of education is true belief. Harvey Siegel’s response defended the view that justified belief is in fact a fundamental epistemic aim of education. In a recent article, Alessia Marabini and (...) Luca Moretti analyse Siegel’s arguments, reject all of them, and provide two new ones. I defend one of Siegel’s arguments against their objection, raise some doubts about one of their own arguments, and give an additional argument against Goldman’s view. (shrink)

This paper revisits Richard Price’s Review of the Principal Questions in Morals. Price was a defender of rationalism about ethics and he anticipated many views and arguments that became influential as the metaethical and ethical debates evolved over the later centuries. The paper explores and assesses Price’s arguments in favour of rationalism and against sentimentalism, with a view to how they bear on the modern metaethical debate.

Error theories have been proposed and defended in several different areas of philosophy. In addition to ethics, there are error theories about numbers, color, free will, and personal identity. Moral error theories differ in scope. Theories at one end of the spectrum take normative judgments in general—of which moral judgments are a subclass—to be uniformly false, whereas theories at the other end of the spectrum take only a subclass of moral judgments—example those concerning duty and obligation, but not those concerning (...) virtue and vice—to be uniformly false. Moral error theorists typically join forces with non-naturalist realists, against naturalism and non-cognitivism. Facts that are normative in the reason-implying sense are irreducibly normative, and they are very different. Many non-naturalist realists and error theorists maintain that it is impossible to give a plausible naturalistic account of moral facts, precisely because they are irreducibly normative; moral naturalism therefore falls prey to the "normativity objection". (shrink)

erster Teilband. Grundlegung -- zweiter Teilband. Tragweite und Aktualität einer Zukunftsethik.

Recognizing yourself in literature cannot only help you to get a clearer grasp of what you already think and feel. It can also deeply unsettle your vision of yourself. This article examines a hitherto neglected mechanism to this effect: learning by way of seeing yourself in others’ blindness. I show that In Search of Lost Time epitomizes this phenomenon. Confronting characters oblivious to their old age makes the protagonist realize that he, too, has aged without noticing it, and invites readers (...) to analogous insights. The paper contributes to the discussion on how you can learn from literature and adds a twist to Proust’s claim that the purpose of literature is that readers recognize themselves in it. (shrink)

The book develops the metaphysics of meaning along the lines set up by Paul Grice, defining the three central notions of what is meant, said and implicated. The Gricean notion of what is said is threatened by semantic underdetermination: If the sentence underdetermines the thought it is used to express, what is said cannot be the proposition expressed by the sentence and meant by the speaker. This leads to a number of questions: How far does semantic underdetermination reach? Do we (...) have to extend or restrict the Gricean notion? Is what is said semantic or pragmatic? Keeping these metaphysical questions separate from the epistemological question of how the hearer understands what is meant, which is best explained by generalizing the Gricean theory of implicature derivation and combining it with a game-theoretic model, the book provides an original defense of a Gricean view in the ongoing debate about semantics and pragmatics. (shrink)

Clearing up the confusion about religion, re-visioning the core elements of spiritual traditions, and transcending the fault line of secular-versus-religious.

This paper concerns how extant theorists of predictive coding conceptualize and explain possible instances of cognitive penetration. §I offers brief clarification of the predictive coding framework and relevant mechanisms, and a brief characterization of cognitive penetration and some challenges that come with defining it. §II develops more precise ways that the predictive coding framework can explain, and of course thereby allow for, genuine top-down causal effects on perceptual experience, of the kind discussed in the context of cognitive penetration. §III develops (...) these insights further with an eye towards tracking one extant criterion for cognitive penetration, namely, that the relevant cognitive effects on perception must be sufficiently direct. Throughout these discussions, we extend the analyses of the predictive coding models, as we know them. So one open question that surfaces is how much of the extended analyses are genuinely just part of the predictive coding models, or something that must be added to them in order to generate these additional explanatory benefits. In §IV, we analyze and criticize a claim made by some theorists of predictive coding, namely, that (interesting) instances of cognitive penetration tend to occur in perceptual circumstances involving substantial noise or uncertainty. It is here that our analysis is most critical. We argue that, when applied, the claim fails to explain (or perhaps even be consistent with) a large range of important and uncontroversially interesting possible cases of cognitive penetration. We conclude with a general speculation about how the recent work on the predictive mind may influence the current dialectic concerning top-down effects on perception. (shrink)

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with (...) reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)