It is shown, first, that Georgius Benignus [Juraj Dragišić, ca 1445-1520] at the end of the 15th century almost fully disposed with the theory of the fourth syllogistic figure. Prantl's view on Benignus' logic is critically examined. Besides, Benignus' doctrines on the supposition of terms and logical consequences are examined with respect to his two versions of logic (1488/1489 and 1519) and to the main influences (e.g., Strodus, Paulus Venetus, Ferebrich, Paulus Pergolensis). A reduction of the rules of consequences of (...) Benignus' logic 1488/1489 to the rules of logic 1519 is reconstructed. Benignus rejects the reasoning ex impossible quodlibet and e quolibet necessarium in what he defines as material consequences. (shrink)

The article considers the idea of astronomy as useful theoretical science as it was promoted by Federik Grisogono, Croatian renaissance philosopher, astrologist and physician in his work Astronomical Mirror. U ntill the Renaissance, theoretical science in principle could not be useful since this followed from the very aristotelian-platonic notion of theoretical science whose assignment was only to consider what is eternal and unchangeable. Theoretical science in any case could not be “useful science”. Grisogono considers possibility of a theoretical science – (...) mathematics – being the highest theoretical and at the same time useful science. For us, of course, astrology is none of this. However, by means of his groundbreaking notion of theoretical science, Grisogono worked towards suspending the traditional notion of the theoretical science, as well as towards opening of new possibilities of establishing the modern idea of science. (shrink)

The article considers the idea of astronomy as useful theoretical science as it was promoted by Federik Grisogono, Croatian renaissance philosopher, astrologist and physician in his work Astronomical Mirror. U ntill the Renaissance, theoretical science in principle could not be useful since this followed from the very aristotelian-platonic notion of theoretical science whose assignment was only to consider what is eternal and unchangeable. Theoretical science in any case could not be “useful science”. Grisogono considers possibility of a theoretical science – (...) mathematics – being the highest theoretical and at the same time useful science. For us, of course, astrology is none of this. However, by means of his groundbreaking notion of theoretical science, Grisogono worked towards suspending the traditional notion of the theoretical science, as well as towards opening of new possibilities of establishing the modern idea of science. (shrink)

The article considers the idea of astronomy as useful theoretical science as it was promoted by Federik Grisogono, Croatian renaissance philosopher, astrologist and physician in his work Astronomical Mirror. U ntill the Renaissance, theoretical science in principle could not be useful since this followed from the very aristotelian-platonic notion of theoretical science whose assignment was only to consider what is eternal and unchangeable. Theoretical science in any case could not be “useful science”. Grisogono considers possibility of a theoretical science – (...) mathematics – being the highest theoretical and at the same time useful science. For us, of course, astrology is none of this. However, by means of his groundbreaking notion of theoretical science, Grisogono worked towards suspending the traditional notion of the theoretical science, as well as towards opening of new possibilities of establishing the modern idea of science.Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit der Idee der Astrologie als nützlicher theoretischer Wissenschaft, wie sie der kroatische Renaissance-Philosoph, Astrologe und Arzt Federik Grisogono in seinem Werk Der astronomische Spiegel vertrat. Bis zur Renaissance vermochte die theoretische Wissenschaft grundsätzlich keine nützliche Wissenschaft zu sein, was aus dem aristotelisch-platonischen Begriff der theoretischen Wissenschaft selbst hervorging, deren Aufgabe es war, nur das Ewige und Unveränderliche zu betrachten. Grisogono erörtert die Möglichkeit, dass eine theoretische Wissenschaft – die Mathematik – sowohl die höchste theoretische als auch zugleich eine nützliche Wissenschaft ist. Obgleich die Astrologie dies für uns heute keinesfalls darstellt, hatte Grisogono mit dem grundlegenden Begriff der nützlichen theoretischen Wissenschaft Anteil an der Aufhebung des traditionellen Begriffes der theoretischen W issenschaft und somit auch an der Wegbereitung für die Konstituierung der neuzeitlichen Idee der Wissenschaft.U članku se razmatra ideja o astronomiji kao korisnoj teorijskoj znanosti koju je u djelu Astronomsko zrcalo zastupao Federik Grisogono, hrvatski renesansni filozof, astrolog i liječnik. Do renesanse teorijska znanost načelno nije mogla biti korisna znanost jer je to proizlazilo iz samog aristotelovsko-platoničkog pojma teorijske znanosti čiji je zadatak bio da tek motri ono vječno i nepromjenljivo. Teorijska znanost ni na koji način nije mogla biti “korisna znanost”. Grisogono sagledava mogućnost da teorijska znanost – matematika – bude i najviša teorijska i istodobno korisna znanost. Astrologija to, dakako, za nas nije. No Grisogono je svojim temeljnim shvaćanjem korisne teorijske znanosti radio na dokidanju tradicionalnog pojma teorijske znanosti, pa tako i na otvaranju mogućnosti za konstituiranje novovjekovne ideje znanosti. (shrink)

U članku se analizira Petrićeva usporedba Aristotelove podjele na supralunarni i sublunarni svijet s morskim bićem koje Petrić naziva Marinus Glaucus. Tu usporedbu, s bićem koje je dijelom riba, a dijelom kamen, rabi Petrić kako bi eksplicirao neprirodnost, monstruoznost spomenute Aristotelove podjele. Postavlja se pitanje što je ili tko je Marinus Glaucus. U članku se izlaže da Petrićev Marinus Glaucus najvjerojatnije u sebi ujedinjava i svojstva grčko-rimskog morskog polubožanstva koje se zove Glauko i osobine jedne vrste otrovnih riba koje se (...) u nekim europskim jezicima zovu kamene ribe, a svojstvena im je mimikrija, prilagodba okolišu u kojem žive, kamenu.Im Aufsatz wird der Petrić´s Vergleich der Aristotelischen Aufteilung in die sublunare und supralunare Welt, mit einem Wesen, das er als Marinus Glaucus bezeichnet, analisiert. Diesen Vergleich mit dem Wesen, das er als halb Fisch, halb Stein bestimmt, unternimmt Petrić um die Widernatürlichkeit, ja Monstruosität der genannten Aristotelischen Aufteilung darzulegen. Es wird die Frage gestellt, was, oder, wer ist Marinus Glaucus. Es wird vermutet, dass Petrić’s Marinus Glaucus zwei verschiedene Beschaffenheiten in sich birgt: die einer griechisch-römischen Halbgottheit namens Glauco und die einer Art giftigen Mittelmeerfische, die in einigen europäischen Sprachen Steinfische heißen und die eine Mimikry auszeichnet, die Fähigkeit sich der Welt in der sie leben, dem steinigen Meerboden, anzugleichen. (shrink)

The paper aims to present Spinoza’s understanding of the ontological status of finite beings, which was heavily influenced by mathematics, i.e. geometry. Spinoza stratified finite beings into two fairly incompatible layers: the one subjectively conceived, while the other is the objective level. The first level is related to the essence of being that is caused by God through immanent causality: here, we speak of entailment on the logical and epistemological level, and not the level of reality. Unlike essence, existence represents (...) the second level of being: existence is caused by the real finite being through transeunt cause. The first level, by its ontological status, is very close to mathematical entities, therefore the qualification that Spinoza ‘geometrized reality under a species of the essences’. Namely, he geometrized the segment under the scope of ontology, i.e. the essences of finite modes. The final part of the paper is dedicated to one of the main reasons why Spinoza failed to provide a satisfactory solution to this ontological problem, which is not the only such problem of his system. This would be that Spinoza paid too much attention on ethics, to the detriment of metaphysics, i.e. ontology as general metaphysics. For Spinoza, ontology is subjected to epistemology and ethics, therefore the name ‘functional metaphysics’. (shrink)

The paper outlines the historical development of question about ambiguous and mysterious human nature, in particular considering the reasons and conditions for the founding of modern philosophical anthropology. Subsequently, it brings an overview of the conceptual beginnings and directions of anthropological research in Croatia. The focus is on the following questions: When did the investigations begin in the field of philosophical anthropology, in what kind of thinking environments were they shaped and what scientific achievements were reached? The presentation brings to (...) light the cognition that philosophical anthropology in Croatia got its first contours and valuable contributions to the very beginning of the contemporary renewal of this discipline, shortly after its phenomenological and scientific revivals in the ventures of Scheler and Plessner. The development of this research branch is, according to Hans Lankʼs model, divided into four main conceptual orientations. The anthropology from above shows the creative contributions of Stjepan Zimmermann, Vilim Keilbach, Rajmund Kupareo, Miljenko Belić, Ante Kusić, Josip Ćurić, Hrvoje Lasić and Ivan Koprek. The anthropology from below is illustrated by the reference to the research by Vera Ehrlich-Stein, Rudi Supek, the Institute of Anthropology, Pavao Rudan and Darko Polšek. For the anthropology from culture, the philosophical achievements of Pavao Vuk-Pavlović, Vladimir Filipović, Vjekoslav Mikecin, Esad Ćimić, Nikola Skledar, Branka Brujić, Milan Galović and Mihaela Girardi-Karšulin were delineated. Under the anthropology from history, the works of Predrag Vranicki, Milan Kangrga, Vanja Sutlić, Gaja Petrović, Hotimir Burger, Mislava Kukoč and Raul Raunić are outlined. The conclusion summarises four insights. 1. Philosophical anthropology is an under-researched and not enough appreciated field, which represents one of the most fertile currents of thought in the 20th century. 2. Creative contributions are presented in all four major orientations. 3. In the context of anthropological research, lively dialogue and a fruitful meeting of different worldviews were realised. 4. The beginnings of the development of the discipline should be moved earlier in history than previously considered, from the 1950s and 1960s to the early 1930s. The last insight points to the need for further exploration of the perceived, and so far largely neglected, continuity of anthropological themes and related ideas in the history of recent philosophy in Croatia. (shrink)

In this paper, a special type of polysemantic words, that is, words with multiple meanings for the same part of speech, are analyzed under the name of neutrosophic words. These words represent the most dif cult cases for the disambiguation algorithms as they represent the most ambiguous natural language utterances. For approximate their meanings, we developed a semantic representation framework made by means of concepts from neutrosophic theory and entropy measure in which we incorporate sense related data. We show the (...) advantages of the proposed framework in a sentiment classification task. (shrink)

Lorenzo Girardi brings together themes of Europe, phenomenology and politics to reveal the relevance of Edmund Husserl and Jan Patočka’s works for contemporary political issues. Addressing the concept of crisis in Europe, this book presents an agonistic conception of liberal democracy based on Patočka’s phenomenological concept of problematicity.

During the last decade there has been burgeoning research concerning the ways in which we should think of and apply the concept of responsibility for Artificial Intelligence. Despite this conceptual richness, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what Responsible AI entails on both conceptual and practical levels. The aim of this paper is to connect the ethical dimension of responsibility in Responsible AI with Aristotelian virtue ethics, where notions of context and dianoetic virtues play a grounding role for (...) the concept of moral responsibility. The paper starts by highlighting the important difficulties in assigning responsibility to either technologies themselves or to their developers. Top-down and bottom-up approaches to moral responsibility are then contrasted, as we explore how they could inform debates about Responsible AI. We highlight the limits of the former ethical approaches and build the case for classical Aristotelian virtue ethics. We show that two building blocks of Aristotle’s ethics, dianoetic virtues and the context of actions, although largely ignored in the literature, can shed light on how we could think of moral responsibility for both AI and humans. We end by exploring the practical implications of this particular understanding of moral responsibility along the triadic dimensions of ethics by design, ethics in design and ethics for designers. (shrink)

Kant’s early work The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures is typically considered a narrow, technical work still embedded in the tradition of Wolffian logic. I argue instead that it needs to be considered in light of Kant’s developing theory of cognition and his corresponding criticism of the Wolffian single faculty theory. Whereas the mature Kant criticizes the rationalists for misrepresenting the nature of sensibility, the urgent task facing him at this stage seems to have been a proper determination (...) of the nature of the understanding. On the Wolffian framework, the latter is defined in a merely nominal manner, in terms of a generic cognitive task: the distinct representation of the possible. On Kant’s view, however, distinctness entails a capacity to relate representations, which only happens in the act of judgment. Thus, the stated aim of the False Subtlety notwithstanding, the work attempts to reorganize the logical operations around the capacity to judge. In turn, by defining the higher faculty of cognition in terms of an act of relating representations, Kant wants to show that this faculty cannot stem from a power of representation that we share with non-rational animals and must instead rest on a different fundamental power, which at the time he alternatively calls “inner sense” or “consciousness”. (shrink)

Deep learning AI systems have proven a wide capacity to take over human-related activities such as car driving, medical diagnosing, or elderly care, often displaying behaviour with unpredictable consequences, including negative ones. This has raised the question whether highly autonomous AI may qualify as morally responsible agents. In this article, we develop a set of four conditions that an entity needs to meet in order to be ascribed moral responsibility, by drawing on Aristotelian ethics and contemporary philosophical research. We encode (...) these conditions and generate a flowchart that we call the Moral Responsibility Test. This test can be used as a tool both to evaluate whether an entity is a morally responsible agent and to inform human moral decision-making over the influencing variables of the context of action. We apply the test to the case of Artificial Moral Advisors and conclude that this form of AI cannot qualify as morally responsible agents. We further discuss the implications for the use of AMAs as moral enhancement and show that using AMAs to offload human responsibility is inadequate. We argue instead that AMAs could morally enhance users if they are interpreted as enablers for moral knowledge of the contextual variables surrounding human moral decision-making, with the implication that such a use might actually enlarge human moral responsibility. (shrink)

The book aims to provide both theoretical perspectives and practical approaches for teachers interested in transforming the future. Through the approaches of theoretical background but also through the studies of practical application nature, the book can serve as bibliographic support for early education programs.

So-called predatory journals threaten to diminish the quality of papers and of scientific research. This paper defines what constitutes a predatory journal, and provides a short literature overview. The aim of the research is to explore researchers’ and librarians’ awareness of predatory journals, using the example of Croatia, an EU country. Several institutions control the quality of Croatian scientific journals, so there are no predatory journals in Croatia. However, Croatian scientists publish their papers in foreign journals and thus have to (...) be aware of all the threats of predatory journals. An online questionnaire was sent to researchers and librarians in order to find out if they understand what predatory journals are, if the researchers publish in those journals, and if the librarians educate their users about those journals. Results show that almost 90% of researchers are not sure what constitutes a predatory journal. Almost 50% of librarians are familiar with the term, but only less than 10% of librarians provide education on the topic. Raising awareness about predatory journals among scientists could prevent negative consequences such as the loss of scientific integrity and the risk of minimizing the visibility of research results. Libraries should play an important role in providing user education. (shrink)

This article examines the difference between two concepts of critical importance to the philosophical frameworks of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze–pleasure and desire–through the troubling and troubled figure of suicide. My contention is that, in the work of both thinkers, suicide makes legible an affirmative impulsion and a mode or tekhnē (in both senses of the term: practice and art) of encountering an unforeseeable virtuality (the Outside). Of aesthetic and ethical significance, this mode is experimental and dangerous, a frequency of (...) passion, situated between pleasure and desire. Souci de soi (the care of the self) and a line of flight, I suggest, coincide in suicide, “an art that it takes a lifetime to learn.”. (shrink)

This book investigates the link Kant discerned between our experience of beauty and our experience of the moral law. By examining Kant's relation to Greek philosophy, to Plato and Pythagoras, as found in Kant's own writings, the author sheds new light on one the most intriguing and mysterious doctrines of Kant's third Critique.