This article aims to defend Locke against Quine’s charge, made in his famous “two dogmas” paper, that Locke’s theory of knowledge is badly flawed, not only for assuming the dogmas, but also for adopting an “in-tolerably restrictive” version of the dogma of reductionism. It is shown here that, in his analysis of the epistemological status of scientific laws, Locke has effectively transcended the narrow idea-empiricism which un-derlies this version of reductionism. First, in order to escape idealism, he introduced the notion (...) of “sensitive knowledge of the particular existence of finite beings without us,” broadening thus his initial definition of knowledge in terms of the “perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas” — a definition compatible with Quine’s interpretation. Sec-ondly, after showing that we can have virtually no a priori knowledge of universal truths about substances, Locke extended the notion of “sensi-tive knowledge” to the particular propositions of “coexistence” in sub-stances, appealing to the notion of “probability” for treating their induc-tive generalizations and, in particular, the phenomenological laws of sci-ence. Finally, acknowledging the essential presence of hypothetical, non-phenomenological laws in science, he anticipated much of the contempo-rary views on their role and nature, including, remarkably, a mild ver-sion of the epistemological holism championed by Quine. (shrink)

Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio (...) Geral inserido no final da segunda edição do livro, Newton diz que foi capaz de "explicar" vários fenômenos de movimento por meio da força de gravidade - que ele mostrou ser um tipo de força centrípeta -, embora não tivesse ainda conseguido explicar a causa dessa força. Uma interpretação plausível dessas últimas afirmações é que Newton acreditava que pôde inferir, a partir dos fenômenos, a existência da força de gravidade, enquanto agente causal real de certos movimentos, mas que ainda não havia tido sucesso em descobrir a causa dessa causa. O objetivo principal do presente artigo não é aprofundar a análise histórica das declarações de Newton, mas examinar como essa questão se insere no debate mais geral sobre o estatuto epistemológico das hipóteses científicas que transcendem a experiência imediata. Segundo a posição defendida, entre muitos outros, por John Locke, tais hipóteses devem ser interpretadas como tentativas legítimas de descrever aspectos inobserváveis da realidade. Em contraste com isso, no caso específico das hipóteses sobre forças - de gravitação ou quaisquer outras -, George Berkeley argumentou vigorosamente a favor de sua interpretação como meros artifícios teóricos úteis às "demonstrações matemáticas" na ciência da mecânica. Ao longo da análise das vantagens e desvantagens filosóficas dessas posições opostas, indica-se aqui que, embora a interpretação realista pareça fazer mais justiça ao desenvolvimento real da física após os Princípios matemáticos, a interpretação instrumentalista de Berkeley tem o mérito filosófico inegável de representar uma adesão mais firme ao empirismo, que é, de um modo ou de outro, valorizado por ambas as partes envolvidas na disputa sobre a natureza da gravitação. Newton's defence, in the Principia, of the existence of a universal force of gravity immediately gave rise to a wave of philosophical doubts and objections. His own remarks on the nature of gravitation are not easily amenable of a consistent, uniform interpretation. This paper begins by reviewing briefly these remarks. Its primary objective is, however, to examine how this important scientific issue contributed to demarcate two main epistemological positions on the status of scientific hypotheses transcending immediate experience. In Newton's time, two exponents of these positions were, respectively, Locke and Berkeley. Intriguingly, Newton fuelled both the Berkeleyan, instrumentalist interpretation, and the Lockean, realist interpretation. On the one hand, immediately after offering the definitions of "quantities of centripetal forces" (Definitions 6-8), he warned that he was treating these forces "mathematically", without pronouncing on its physical status. This remark lends support to Berkeley's anti-realist interpretation of forces, as Berkeley himself was keen to point out. But in the General Scholium, at the end of the book, Newton declared that he could "explain" certain important phenomena of motion by the force of gravity, although he had not yet been able to explain the cause of this force, adding, famously, that he would "feign no hypotheses" about this issue. A natural, realist interpretation of this statement is that Newton believed that he could infer, from the phenomena, the existence of gravity, as a real, causal physical agent, but that he had not yet succeeded in discovering the cause of this cause. In discussing the shortcomings and advantages of these opposing views, we indicate that although the realist interpretation appears to do more justice to the actual development of physics after the Principia, Berkeley's interpretation has the philosophical merit of representing a firmer adherence to empiricism, a position valued, in one way or another, by all parties involved in the dispute on the nature of gravitation. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p49 The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based (...) on the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account. (shrink)

This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument (...) is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based on (...) the claim that in microphysics the demand for explanation leads to a demand for the so-called hidden-variable theories, which “runs contrary to at least one major school of thought in twentieth-century physics”. It is shown here that this argument does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to scientific realism, not even when a series of important theoretical and experimental results against hidden-variable theories — and not merely a conflict with a certain school of thought—is taken into account. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p229 Tanto no Tratado da Natureza Humana como na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano , Hume mostra-se convencido de que “não há acaso no mundo”, e que “aquilo que o vulgo chama de acaso não passa de uma causa secreta e escondida”. Essa tese desempenha papel crucial em sua análise do livre-arbítrio e, conseguintemente, da responsabilidade moral; é também um elemento importante em sua discussão sobre os milagres. No entanto, o próprio Hume ofereceu, no Tratado , um argumento convincente para (...) mostrar que o princípio de causalidade, segundo o qual tudo o que começa a existir tem uma causa, não pode ser conhecido a priori , por intuição ou demonstração. Logo, essa “opinião tem necessariamente de provir da observação e experiência”. O presente trabalho examina essa tese, mostrando, inicialmente, qual era a proposta de Hume para fundar na experiência o princípio de causalidade, e depois qual, de fato, teria sido o mais robusto fundamento para esse princípio: a mecânica newtoniana. Explica-se, por fim, como esse fundamento empírico indireto e o próprio argumento de Hume foram solapados pela física quântica, no século XX. (shrink)

Both in the Treatise of Human Nature and in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume defends that “there is no chance in the world”, and that “what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and conceal’d cause”. This view plays a crucial role in Hume’s influential analysis of free will and moral responsibility. It functions also as a central presupposition in his discussion of miracles. However, Hume himself argued convincingly that the “maxim of causality”, according to which “whatever (...) begins to exist, must have a cause of existence” cannot be established a priori, by either intuition or demonstration. He concludes, then, that such “opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience”. In the present article I analyse this latter statement, showing, first, what was Hume detailed proposal for funding the principle of causality on experience. Given the apparent weakness of this proposal, I then speculate on what kind of firmer empirical foundation could, instead, have been given, in Hume’s time, to the principle of causality, namely, the indirect support offered by Newtonian mechanics. Finally, I show how this theoretical link between experience and the principle, and also Hume’s straightforward, inductive argument, were undermined by the inception of quantum physics, at the beginning of the 20th century. (shrink)

In his influential criticism of scientific realism, Bas van Fraassen assumes that this doctrine is incompatible with empiricism, according to which the sole ultimate basis of knowledge is experience. This claim has been generally accepted in the contemporary literature in philosophy of science. Thus, the very distinction between scientific realism and empiricism is often forgotten, the term 'empiricism' being now widely used to designate a range of anti-realist positions, such as van Fraassen's "construct ive empiricism". In this paper it is (...) argued, first, that empiricism, in the traditional and proper sense of the word, is a thesis about the problem of the foundations of knowledge, and should therefore be clearly distinguished from anti-realism, which concerns the issue of the extension of knowledge. It is then conceded that the main arguments for scientific realism do indeed require that extra-empirical characteristics of scientific theories, such as simplicity and explanatory power, should be ascribed epistemic weight. Although this point lends support to van Fraassen's claim, it is indicated here that his constructive empiricism is threatened by the same kind of epistemological objections which he raises against his opponents. Like some other scientific anti-realists, van Fraassen avowedly embraces realism concerning ordinary material objects; but it is not clear that this form of anti-realism remains tenable when explanatory power, simplicity, etc. are regarded as merely pragmatic, non-epistemic virtues. (shrink)

The central aim of this article is to discuss Russell's analysis of the notion of cause. In his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in 1912, Russell put forward several theses on causality in general, and specially on its role in science. He claimed that although vague references to causal laws are often found in the beginnings of science, "in the advanced sciences” the word 'cause' never occurs". Furthermore, Russell maintained that even in philosophy the word 'cause' is "so inextricably (...) bound up with misleading associations" that it would be desirable to promote its "complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary". These positions are rendered particular/y strong by Russell's explicit adhesion to the regular sequence view of causation, which he attributed to Hume. Essentially the same opinions were repeated in a series of lectures delivered in Boston two years later. After a systematic exposition of the main theses advanced by Russell on these two occasions, we trace their origin to his general conception of science. Then we examine the substantial changes that Russell's views on causality underwent several decades later. We remark that these changes seem to be intimately associated with the adoption of a new epistemological position concerning the nature of our knowledge of the external world, involving some clear elements of realism and naturalism. (shrink)

Both in the Introduction to the Treatise of Human Nature and in the, Hume expressly declared that his goal was to contribute to the development of a “science of man” methodologically akin to the natural sciences, and capable of emulating their “accuracy” and explanatory success. He regarded these sciences as starting from careful observation of phenomena, and proceeding to the establish-ment of “principles” of increasing generality. Although rejecting as vain any hope of discovering “the ultimate principles” of any science, he (...) did not make clear what exactly he thought the principles actually involved in natural philosophy are. This article aims to shed some light on this issue through a survey and examination of the principles of Hume’s “science of man”, and of the most representative examples of principles of natural philosophy considered by Hume. (shrink)

Die jüngst publizierten "Schwarzen Hefte" Heideggers und auch der Neufund des Heftes von 1945/46 machen deutlich: Heidegger entwickelt hier eine Theorie der Globalisierung. Diese führt er nicht auf eine jüdische Weltverschwörung zurück -- da wäre nur eine "Machenschaft" auf eine andere reduziert -- sondern auf die abendländische Kulturgeschichte selbst. Insbesondere der neuzeitliche Siegeszug des "rechnenden Denkens" habe eine Geschichte des Herrschaftsdenkens und des Expansionismus in Gang gesetzt. Darin sieht Heidegger ab 1934 das Dritte Reich wie auch den Bolschewismus und den (...) Kolonialismus Englands und der USA involviert. Heidegger setzt dem entfesselten Herrschaftsdenken auch nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg -- ihrer "Vernutzung der Erde" und "Verrechnung der Welt" -- die Lehre vom "andren Anfang" der Geschichte entgegen: eine Kulturpraxis der Schonung und Nachhaltigkeit. (shrink)

This article suggests developing the concept of spiritual ecology into that of balanced spiritual ecosystems. Philosophies, theologies, education systems, political parties, and gender-based and ethnic identity politics need to be critiqued both from within and without so that they can finally contribute to the creation, maintenance and flourishing of balanced spiritual ecosystems.Contribution: Spiritual ecology is a concept on which converge different worldviews. This article recommends using balanced spiritual ecosystems, instead. The new concept could provoke further reflection on how our -ontologies (...) and communities co-exist and whether they do it organically and spiritually. This article befits HTS’s interest in ‘theology and nature’. (shrink)

Vision is the main entrance for environmental input to the human brain. Even if vision is our most used sensory modality, its importance is not limited to environmental exploration. Rather it has strong links to motor competences, further extending to cognitive and social aspects of human life. These multifaceted relationships are particularly important in developmental age and become dramatically evident in presence of complex deficits originating from visual aberrancies. The present review summarizes the available neuropsychological evidence on the development of (...) visual competences, with a particular focus on the associated visuo-motor integration skills in health and disease. With the aim of supporting future research and interventional settings, the goal of the present review is to constitute a solid base to help the translation of neuropsychological hypotheses into straightforward empirical investigations and rehabilitation/training protocols. This approach will further increase the impact, ameliorate the acceptance, and ease the use and implementation of lab-derived intervention protocols in real-life situations. (shrink)

Does Wittgenstein have a coherent philosophy of mathematics? Here, I will be concerned with showing that the answer is positive. However, given that his life-long philosophical perspective on mathematics tends to be misleading, I focus on the specific problem posed by Paul Benacerraf in ‘Mathematical Truth’, that is: the puzzle about how to reconcile the metaphysics with the epistemology for mathematics. My aim is to show that there is an adequate anti-platonistic solution to that puzzle in the mature writings of (...) the Austrian philosopher. (shrink)

Die Entwicklung der Rationalität ist eine Erfolgsgeschichte. Denn die Rationalität war und ist der Motor der abendländischen Kultur und der Grund dafür, dass sie in der Neuzeit allen anderen Weltkulturen machtpolitisch überlegen ist. Zwischen dem 8. und 6. Jahrhundert v. Chr. formierte sich das logische Denken gleich auf mehreren Feldern: Durch die Erfindung der philosophischen Wissenschaft, die Geometrisierung des Raumes und der Schlachtordnung, die Berechnung der Zeit, durch die Geldwirtschaft und die neuen Organisationsformen des Politischen wurde Rationalität zum Synonym für (...) Fortschritt. Auch die Begriffe Freiheit und Demokratie gehören in diesen Zusammenhang. Silvio Vietta zeichnet diese Erfolgsgeschichte nach, beschreibt aber auch ihre Gefahren und Kurzschlüsse. In der Konsequenz entwickelt er eine : ndere9 aisthetisch rückgebundene und reflexive Rationalität, die uns aus den gegenwärtigen Krisen herausführen könnte. (shrink)

La dicotomia tra sapere e sapienza, presente fin dai primordi nella speculazione, ritorna prepotentemente alla ribalta nell’attuale contesto, assumendo spesso una connotazione fortemente interdisciplinare. I contributi accolti nel volume rappresentano, nella loro eterogeneità (che spazia dall’ambito filosofico a quello giuridico, a quello sociologico e a quello del linguaggio espressivo) un momento di riflessione odierna sulla dicotomia sopra indicata, in cui l’approccio sincronico si alterna a quello diacronico e in cui alla prospettiva analitico-ricognitiva si accompagna quella ermenuetico-interpretativa.

Este texto reflete sobre o memoricídio, consequente à presunção racial branca, como vestígio de operações para o genocídio dos corpos e das mentes negras a partir da Peleja de Inácio da Catingueira contra Romano. Sob o jogo discursivo da humilhação, já se encontrava a vontade brutal de destruição de qualquer traço, perspectiva, visão remanescente de saberes e culturas africanas ou descendentes, fossem de cunho material, simbólico, reflexivo, imagético, expressivo, na língua, no corpo. No embate, Inácio, negro, escravizado, já rebaixado sob (...) a égide do sistema escravocrata, embate-se contra a tentativa presunçosa de aniquilamento perpetrada por seu oponente. (shrink)

Werte sind kollektive Leitvorstellungen fur das Denken und Handeln. Unser menschliches Denken und Handeln wird von Werten bestimmt und gesteuert. Die Werte selbst sind Ergebnisse der jeweiligen Kulturgeschichte. Das Buch stellt zentrale Werte der europaischen Kulturgeschichte vor. Es sind vor allem drei Werte-Familien, die Europas Kulturgeschichte gepragt haben und nach wie vor pragen: Erstens die europaische Rationalitatskultur mit dem Leitwert des eigenstandigen Denkens, der Suche nach Wahrheit, Kritik und Kritikfahigkeit, Demokratie und Toleranz, Freiheit, Individualitat, Bildung, aber auch Rechtssicherheit, Wehrhaftigkeit, Technizitat, (...) Macht und Wohlstand. Die zweite Werte-Familie umfasst religiose Werte wie die Offenheit fur die religiose Erfahrung selbst sowie genuin christliche Werte wie Nachstenliebe, soziale Fursorge, Empathie, Solidaritat, Friedfertigkeit, Schutz der Schopfung, also Nachhaltigkeit. Die dritte Gruppe umfasst patriotische Werte wie Muttersprache, Heimat, Vaterland und den historisch eher spaten Wert der Nation. Menschen, politische Gruppen sowie historische Epochen werden gepragt durch die fur sie bedeutsamen Werte. Werte stehen somit im Konflikt miteinander und uberlagern sich auch. Politische Einstellungen und ganze Epochen konnen daher nach ihren Werte-Dominanzen unterschieden werden. In Zeiten des Werte-Zerfalls pladiert der Autor abschliessend fur eine Balance der Werte und einen europaischen Werte-Patriotismus. (shrink)

The pandemic period has placed the organizations in a state of great tension. It has generated a situation of confusion, lack of rules, and production-related criticalities that have called into question the very existence of many productive realities. This article aims to highlight the dimensions of care and ethics put in place by HR managers in COVID-19. The objective that animated the authors have focused on the HRM level of medium and large companies in Italy to highlight the protective actions (...) toward people and the organization in the period COVID 19, highlighting what were the ethical values and actions of care put in place. In this article, we wanted to give voice to managers who had management tasks in their organizations by asking them to tell us how they dealt with the challenges imposed by the emergency. In the research, we start from a way of understanding workplaces understood as a “process of ongoing social relationship” within which the HR function is dedicated to the care of the quality of relationships. HR managers have to manage a complex role of mediating between the interests of people and employers by trying to find good mediations. (shrink)