This chapter discusses the roles of Anakin Skywalker in central story of the Star Wars saga, and that of Achilles in the ancient Greek epic poem The Iliad. When Anakin discovers that his mother has died violently at the hands of Tusken Raiders, his anger is transmuted into blind, hate‐filled rage and he goes on a killing spree in revenge. Like Anakin, Achilles' anger is turned into blind, hate‐filled rage when the person he loves most, Patroclus, is killed by Hector, (...) the prince of the Trojans. Like Anakin, Achilles barely managed to reemerge from the greatest danger and the greatest temptation he ever faced: nihilism. Anakin and Achilles found that going down the dark path of nihilism can cost them dearly. Like Achilles, Anakin barely makes it back from his journey into nihilism. (shrink)

There are many philosophical questions surrounding the notion of lying. Is it ever morally acceptable to lie? Can we acquire knowledge from people who might be lying to us? More fundamental, however, is the question of what, exactly, constitutes the concept of lying. According to one traditional definition, lying requires intending to deceive (Augustine. (1952). Lying (M. Muldowney, Trans.). In R. Deferrari (Ed.), Treatises on various subjects (pp. 53?120). New York, NY: Catholic University of America). More recently, Thomas Carson (2006. (...) The definition of lying. Nous, 40, 284?306) has suggested that lying requires warranting the truth of what you do not believe. This paper examines these two prominent definitions and some cases that seem to pose problems for them. Importantly, theorists working on this topic fundamentally disagree about whether these problem cases are genuine instances of lying and, thus, serve as counterexamples to the definitions on offer. To settle these disputes, we elicited judgments about the proposed counterexamples from ordinary language users unfettered by theoretical bias. The data suggest that everyday speakers of English count bald-faced lies and proviso lies as lies. Thus, we claim that a new definition is needed to capture common usage. Finally, we offer some suggestions for further research on this topic and about the moral implications of our investigation into the concept of lying. (shrink)

For Socrates, philosophy is not like Christian conversion from error to truth, but rather it is like the pagan process whereby a young man is initiated into cult mysteries by a more experienced man - the mystagogos - who prepares him and leads him to the sacred precinct. In Greek cult religion, the mystagogos prepared the initiate for the esoteric mysteries revealed by the hierophant. Socrates treats traditional wisdom with scepticism, and this makes him appear ridiculous or dangerous in the (...) eyes of cultural conservatives. Nevertheless, his scepticism is not radical: custom is not something on which we must turn our backs if we are to pursue the truth. Socrates assumes an epistemology and employs a method by which he induces his companions to begin the critical and self-critical process of philosophical inquiry, not ignoring conventional wisdom, but thinking through and reinterpreting it as they make constructive progress towards the truth. He provides conclusive and convincing arguments in support of controversial answers to some of the most important moral questions he poses. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to postphenomenology, an emerging school of thought in the philosophy of technology and science and technology studies, which addresses the relationships users develop with the devices they use.

Don Adams - Plato's Lysis - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 321-322 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Don Adams Central Connecticut State University Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe. Plato's Lysis. Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 366. Cloth, $60.00. Part I of this book is a running commentary on Plato's Lysis. Part II is an explanation and (...) defense of the authors' theory that the dialogue "provides a systematic and coherent, if incomplete, account of a special theory about, and special explanation of, human desire and action." The authors include their own translation of the dialogue that is quite good. This book is an important contribution to Plato scholarship and will.. (shrink)

The empirical study of grace, a relational virtue, is in its beginning stages. The purpose of this study was to provide rich, context-based, qualitative data to describe Mainline Protestants’ (a) experiences of, and (b) beliefs about, divine grace. Interviews were conducted with 28 community adults who were affiliated with Mainline Protestant Churches. Results indicated that Mainline Protestant Christians have varying beliefs about divine grace and how it is related to both the present moment and the afterlife. Divine grace was often (...) defined as, or associated with, other relational virtues (e.g., forgiveness and love), and participants occasionally defined grace as a gift. In addition, divine grace was also reported to be difficult to accept at times for a variety of reasons, but the effects of divine grace have direct associations with participants’ overall well-being. Divine grace was also associated with beliefs about heaven or the afterlife, yet participants had varying beliefs about how grace is applied to non-Christians. Limitations and future directions for research are discussed in light of the present empirical literature on divine grace. (shrink)

Don Adams - Plato's Lysis - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 321-322 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Don Adams Central Connecticut State University Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe. Plato's Lysis. Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 366. Cloth, $60.00. Part I of this book is a running commentary on Plato's Lysis. Part II is an explanation and (...) defense of the authors' theory that the dialogue "provides a systematic and coherent, if incomplete, account of a special theory about, and special explanation of, human desire and action." The authors include their own translation of the dialogue that is quite good. This book is an important contribution to Plato scholarship and will.. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Apeiron Jahrgang: 47 Heft: 1 Seiten: 48-80.

Many scholars find Socratic irony so obvious in the Euthydemus that they don’t bother to cite any textual support when they claim that Socrates does not sincerely mean something he says, e.g., when he praises Euthydemus and his brother. What these scholars overlook is the role of agapē in shaping Socrates’s view of other intellectuals. If we take his agapē into account, it is easy to see that while there is some irony in the Euthydemus, none of it is Socratic.

Because the moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is egoistic while modern consequentialism is impartialistic, it might at first appear that the former cannot, while the latter can, provide a common value on the basis of which inter-personal conflicts may be settled morally. On the contrary, in this paper I intend to argue not only that Aquinas' theory does provide just such a common value, but that it is more true to say of modern consequentialism than of Thomism that it (...) gives in to the partiality of different interests and fails to provide a robust common value on the basis of which disagreements may be settled morally. This is so primarily because the egoism of Aquinas represents a fundamental commitment to personal moral development which is absent from modern teleological theories. (shrink)

When modern ethical contractualists defend their view against “teleology,” they typically have in mind utilitarian or consequentialist theories according to which valuable states of affairs are to be promoted. But if we look to older teleological theories e.g. that found in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas we will find a kind of teleology that can be incorporated beneficially into contractualist ethics. In this paper I argue that Scanlon would be well served, on grounds to which he appeals, to make (...) a teleological modification to his theory of what we owe to each other. Drawing not only on Aristotle and Aquinas, but also on the thought and life of Martin Luther King, I argue that Scanlon's contractualism can and should be modified to incorporate the ancient and medieval teleological emphasis on personal fruition and legitimate self-assertion. (shrink)

Dans l’Apologiede Platon, Socrate affirme quephthonosetdiabolēont conduit Aristophane à devenir l’un de ses accusateurs. Soit Socrate commet une grossière exagération, car clairement Aristophane ne faisait que plaisanter, soit nous avons tort de penser que l’humour d’Aristophane n’est rien d’autre que de la plaisanterie. Dans cet article, je défends la seconde position. Je soutiens qu’Aristophane est un type spécifique de conservateur social et que Socrate était le genre de social-libéral qui dérangeait Aristophane. Je conclus queLes Nuéesn’est pas un texte innocent, mais (...) est, comme Socrate le prétendait, motivé parphthonosetdiabolē. (shrink)

This essay argues that the critically neglected work of the American mid-twentieth-century writer Jane Bowles is a rare attempt at realism in modern fiction that takes as its metaphysical premise the reality referred to in Spinoza’s pronouncement, “By reality and perfection I understand the same.” Bowles’ innately allegorical fiction is an effort to reveal the perfect reality of the world by prophetically creating the future rather than mimetically preserving the present and recovering the past, expressing a world that is existentially (...) founded rather than representationally endured. The realism of perfection her prophetic creations strive to apprehend serves as a necessary reproof of the all too actual world reflected in merely mimetic fiction. (shrink)

This essay contends that reality is a creative evolutionary process by which the virtual is transformed into the actual and argues that our critical conception of realism in literature needs to be altered to reflect this purposive and progressive living reality in contrast to the static and dead actuality assumed by the conventional notion of realism as mimesis. Realist fiction writers who are profound creators have strategically employed metaphysically dipolar and ethically earnest literary genres in tandem with mimetic realism, resulting (...) in complexly interactive alternative and prophetic realisms that function as catalytic agents for progressive change in our world. (shrink)

Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...) property of being an A. In this respect, its logical form is the same as that of relative frequencies. For instance, we might talk about the probability of a human baby being female. That probability is about human babies in general — not about individuals. If we examine a baby and determine conclusively that she is female, then the definite probability of her being female is 1, but that does not alter the indefinite probability of human babies in general being female. Most objective approaches to probability tie probabilities to relative frequencies in some way, and the resulting probabilities have the same logical form as the relative frequencies. That is, they are indefinite probabilities. The simplest theories identify indefinite probabilities with relative frequencies.3 It is often objected that such “finite frequency theories” are inadequate because our probability judgments often diverge from relative frequencies. For example, we can talk about a coin being fair (and so the indefinite probability of a flip landing heads is 0.5) even when it is flipped only once and then destroyed (in which case the relative frequency is either 1 or 0). For understanding such indefinite probabilities, it has been suggested that we need a notion of probability that talks about possible instances of properties as well as actual instances.. (shrink)

Politics is full of people who don’t care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account (...) of bullshit (Section 1), I discuss the incentives driving three different groups of agents to bullshit: politicians, the media, and voters (Section 2). I then examine several existing proposals to combat bullshit in politics, arguing that each will fail because they ignore the relevant underlying incentives (Section 3). I conclude somewhat pessimistically that a certain amount of bullshit in politics is inevitable (Section 4). (shrink)

Organizations have neither a right to the vote nor a weighty right to life. We need not enfranchise Goldman Sachs. We should feel few scruples in dissolving Standard Oil. But they are not without rights altogether. We can owe it to them to keep our promises. We can owe them debts of gratitude. Thus, we can owe some things to organizations. But we cannot owe them everything we can owe to people. They seem to have a peculiar, fragmented moral status. (...) What explains this? Individualistic views explain this in terms of individualistic notions alone. Such notions don’t invoke any distinctive features of organizations. They just invoke the features of individual members of organizations. Collectivistic views, instead, explain this in terms of collective notions alone. Such notions don’t invoke the features of individual members of organizations. They just invoke the features of those organizations. We argue that neither approach works. Instead, one needs to synthesize the two approaches. Some individual interests, we think, are distinctively collective. We, as individuals, have a distinctive interest in playing a part in successful collective action. From this, so we argue, flows the apparently peculiar, fragmented moral status of organizations. (shrink)

When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are (...) supported by our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not. (shrink)

_How not to be a hypocrite: _the indispensable guide to school choice that morally perplexed parents have been waiting for. Many of us believe in social justice and equality of opportunity - but we also want the best for our kids. How can we square our political principles with our special concern for our own children? This marvellous book takes us through the moral minefield that is school choice today. Does a commitment to social justice mean you have to send (...) your children to the local comprehensive - regardless of its academic results? Is it hypocritical to disapprove of private schools and yet send your child to one? Some parents feel guilty but shouldn't. Others should feel guilty but don't. Read _How Not to be a Hypocrite_, then answer the questionnaire, and work out where you stand on this crucial issue. (shrink)

A widely held picture in political science emphasizes the cognitive shortcomings of us citizens. We’re ignorant. We don’t know much about politics. We’re irrational. We bend the evidence to show our side in the best possible light. And we’re malleable. We let political elites determine our political opinions. This paper is about why these shortcomings matter to democratic values. Some think that democracy’s value consists entirely in its connection to equality. But the import of these shortcomings, I argue, cannot be (...) explained in purely egalitarian terms. To explain it, we must instead think of democracy’s value partly in terms of collective autonomy. Our ignorance and irrationality undermine the epistemic conditions for realizing this kind of autonomy. They stop us knowing the outcomes of our political choices. Our irrationality and malleability undermine the independence conditions for realizing such autonomy. They mean our political choices are subject to problematic kinds of interpersonal influence. Thus, at root, the import of the widely held picture is that, if accurate, it closes off this critical aspect of democracy’s value. (shrink)

_How not to be a hypocrite: _the indispensable guide to school choice that morally perplexed parents have been waiting for. Many of us believe in social justice and equality of opportunity - but we also want the best for our kids. How can we square our political principles with our special concern for our own children? This marvellous book takes us through the moral minefield that is school choice today. Does a commitment to social justice mean you have to send (...) your children to the local comprehensive - regardless of its academic results? Is it hypocritical to disapprove of private schools and yet send your child to one? Some parents feel guilty but shouldn't. Others should feel guilty but don't. Read _How Not to be a Hypocrite_, then answer the questionnaire, and work out where you stand on this crucial issue. (shrink)

Phenomenal intentionality is a singular form of intentionality. Science shows it is internally-determined. So standard externalist models for reducing intentionality don't apply to it.

Although much has been written on the dead-donor rule in the last twenty-five years, scant attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be formulated in terms of either a Don’t Kill rule or a Death Requirement, the former being historically rooted in absolutist ethics and the latter in a prudential policy aimed at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that the moral core of (...) the rule is the Don’t Kill rule, not the Death Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform their practices to their ethics—unlike today’s critics of the DDR, who rethink their ethics in a question-begging fashion to accommodate their practices. A better discussion of the ethics of killing is needed to move the debate forward. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the plausibility of the criticism against the thesis that external factors causally influence cognition and that they are, consequently, partly constitutive of cognition. The discussion should not be taken as implicitly proposing that the opposite theory is true, although the works of Adams and Aizawa suggest that they are defending internalism. This can be attributed to the fact that systems are, by definition, bounded; one must make assumptions about systems in developing cognitive models. This chapter defends (...) the position that metaphysical considerations should play no role in deciding how to model cognition. It further explains how there is no basis for a general fact of the matter about determining what is and what is not a cognitive system. (shrink)

The ideal, my friend, is the lifebuoy. Let's say one is taking a swim, floundering around, trying as hard as possible not to sink. One might try to swim in a safe direction despite contrary currents; the essential thing is to use a classic stroke according to recognized swimming principles...Some eccentrics who try to swim faster in order to get there, come what may, splash all over everybody and always end by drowning, involving I don't know how many other poor (...) souls who might have been able to continue splashing around tranquilly enough- in the soup. (Jean Anouilh). (shrink)

What is the relationship between prophetic vision and vision in terms for a hoped-for future? How might vision for a church or person best be defined today?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:It's Not Always Just a RashAdam BossertI looked at the emergency department track board and saw a patient waiting for a provider who was "roomed" in a hallway stretcher with a chief complaint of a rash. I briefly considered his ultimate disposition, "He's probably fine. He can't be that sick if he was triaged as safe for the hallway." I was tired and close to the end of an (...) overnight shift and thought he would be a quick turnaround, likely discharged, since rashes are typically benign. I walked over to his stretcher after a quick chart biopsy that highlighted his mildly increased heart [End Page 24] rate on arrival as well as his history of polysubstance use and homelessness."Hey doc, I don't feel so good.""I'm sorry to hear that. What's specifically bothering you?""I am itching all over with these bumps. My skin is red, and I also think I'm withdrawing since I have body aches and chills."The interview continued.I discovered his last heroin use was approximately eight hours prior to arrival. I thought he was an ideal candidate for buprenorphine since he was actively withdrawing. I was recently licensed to prescribe this medication and excited to use my license for the first time. He declined the suggestion, however, preferring methadone instead. Buprenorphine can precipitate withdrawal if not given long enough after opioid use or if an incorrect dose is given; thus, many patients are hesitant to take it. He also stated he was predominantly here for his rash and did not want rehabilitation placement. I ordered our initiation methadone dose as well as a screening COVID-19 test and a urine drug screen test, which are both needed for rehabilitation placement in case he changed his mind.His rash was highly suspicious for scabies. He was covered with red bumps that spared only his face, some in linear distributions, and was actively scratching his arms and legs during the interview. I prefer oral ivermectin over topical permethrin for the homeless population simply for ease of administration, lower cost, and increased compliance. He received ivermectin for his scabies and knew he could return to the emergency department for a repeat dose if he was unable to fill a prescription.What happened next is, in my experience, an all-too-common scenario.The patient told me that the methadone is "doing nothing." I explained he could no longer take buprenorphine since he already received methadone, which only made him more frustrated. Unfortunately, I am restricted with the amount of methadone I can give in the emergency department, largely due to the drug's long half-life, and thus I was unable to give him more, let alone attempt titrating to his tolerance.Opioid withdrawal is not a life-threatening diagnosis; these patients are not typically admitted to the hospital. The management consists of initiating either methadone or buprenorphine, symptomatic treatment and then outpatient referral or rehabilitation placement. I explained the options to him, and he requested to be discharged since he was deferring rehabilitation. He was discharged. I was able to treat his rash but his chronic illness, opioid use disorder, was not controlled.I discharge a patient in opioid withdrawal or who has opioid use disorder almost every day, and I think most emergency medicine physicians would echo that statement. The disposition is not wrong from the perspective of the individual physician, but it feels like the system has failed these patients when I think of the frequency that they return and their baffling risk of overdose. The latter can be reduced by giving patients Narcan, the drug to reverse opioid overdose, upon discharge but this is just placing a bandage over the problem and not all emergency departments can fund this risk-reduction tool.I saw my patient's COVID-19 result return as I wrapped up my shift. It was positive. And, of course, he was in our department's hallway the whole time, only intermittently using his mask. I suddenly realized that while yes, he was withdrawing, he also may have had a symptomatic COVID-19 infection! I quickly reopened his chart, only to... (shrink)

According to a typical skeptical hypothesis, the evidence of your senses has been massively deceptive. Venerable skeptical hypotheses include the hypotheses that you have been deceived by a powerful evil demon, that you are now having an incredibly detailed dream, and that you are a brain in a vat. It is obviously reasonable for you now to be confident that neither of the above hypotheses is true. Epistemologists have proposed many stories to explain why that is reasonable. One theory is (...) that those hypotheses are inherently much less plausible than the hypothesis that your senses are basically reliable. Another theory is that you currently don’t believe any of those hypotheses, and that you need no justification to continue in that disbelief, given that your current beliefs cohere properly. A third theory is that —given that your senses are working properly—your sensory experiences themselves justify you in believing propositions such as the proposition that you have hands. Neo is given very good evidence that some skeptical hypothesis is true. He rightly becomes doubtful that his senses are or have been trustworthy. In fact, he becomes confident of a particular hypothesis: that AI’s created the Matrix, etc. But this is just one of many types of hypotheses that might account for his experiences. These types include. (shrink)

Table of Contents1) Summary of System and Method for Capturing and Sequestering Carbon.2) Rapid Site Selection and Performance Monitoring for Marine Reserves3) Economic Growth and Environmental Protection4) Energy Based System for Appraising the Non-Use Ecosystem Values5) Structural Adjustment, Deforestation, and Population Growth6) Theories of Intergenerational Equity7) Environmental Ethics From Theory to Praxis8) The United States and Biological Diversity9) Public-Private Conservation: An Urban Case Study10) Regime Shift and Diminished Biodiversity in Tree Species Composition in a New York City Forest: A 68 (...) Year Study11) Towards a New Environmental Tort Damages Regime12) Intergeneration Equity and Family Structure: Exploring the Social Impact of Intestate Inheritance Laws in Louisiana and Puerto Rico13) Fearless Blogosphering FDA and Food Labeling: 10/09/09 Human Bio-Response to Acidification: 10/06/09 Environmental Law Issues Facing NY City: 9/16/09 Facing Tough Energy Decisions in NY State: 7/28/09 List of Most Charismatic Endangered Species: 7/26/09 What Should The New US Health Care System Look Like? 7/24/09 Copenhagen Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD): 7/24/09 Copenhagen: Most Favored Technology Transfer Nation Status: 7/24/09 Traversing the International Climate Change Negotiations Impasse: 7/9/09 Whither the Smart National Grid? 6/29/09 Sustainable Psychoactive Substances: 6/21/09 Waxman-Markey (ACESA) a Fake, says Dr. James Hansen: 6/12/09 Carbon Price Market Failure and the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES)Draft: 4/30/09 Chicken Little Re-Plucked: 4/27/09 Waxman-Markey and REDD Blog Discussion: 4/27/09 Lomborg: Don't Waste Time Cutting Emissions: 4/25/09 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Discuss: 4/18/09 How Much Carbon Dioxide Per Person, Per Nation? 4/6/09 How to Adjust for National Population Changes in an International Carbon Cap System? 4/6/09 Whither Kyoto and CDM? 3/28/09 Of Defecits and Prosperity: 3/22/09 F.D.A. Approves Drug From Gene-Altered Goats: 3/20/09 Carbon Dioxide Statistics: How Many Cars Off the Roads? 3/1/09 What is a fair way of distributing the right to emit carbon among nations? 2/28/09 Should We Be Focusing on the Fossil Fuel Producers? 2/28/09 Are Environmentalists Trying to Keep the Developing World Poor? 2/25/09 "When Population Growth and Resource Availability Collide": 2/13/09 Lithium Recycling and Sea Water Extraction: 2/3/09 Baseline Electricity Generation for NY City: 1/26/09 Environmental Economic Stimulus: 1/24/09 Crichton, Lomborg, and the Environmental Skeptics: 11/14/08 Reparations for the Invasion of Eurasian Germs: 11/2/08How Should We Fight Charco Terrorism? 7/6/08. (shrink)

Geach and Thomson have argued that nothing is just plain good, because ‘good’ is, logically, an attributive adjective. The upshot, according to Geach and Thomson, is that consequentialism is unacceptable, since its very formulation requires a predicative use of ‘good’. Reactions to the argument have, for the most part, been uniform. Authors have converged on two challenging objections . First, although the logical tests that Geach and Thomson invoke clearly illustrate that ‘good’, as commonly used, is an attributive, they don’t (...) show that ‘good’ lacks an intelligible predicative interpretation. Second, even if the English word ‘good’ fails to express the property of goodness, we can just stipulate that ‘good*’ expresses goodness and thus formulate consequentialism accordingly. The second objection is one way of voicing skepticism about the method of drawing substantive philosophical conclusions from considerations about ordinary language. In this essay, we present an argument, inspired by Geach and Thomson, which isn’t susceptible to the same objections but which supports the same conclusion. The significance of our argument for ethics is obvious; it challenges the intelligibility of standard consequentialism, and even certain forms of non-consequentialism. One might be inclined to think that a more sophisticated consequentialism, which relies on ‘good {possible world/state of affairs/outcome}’ instead of just ‘good’, evades the criticism. But we explain why the criticism can’t be so easily evaded. (shrink)