One of the standard ways of proving the consistency of additional hypotheses with the basic axioms of an axiom system is by the construction of what may be described as ‘inner models.’ By starting with a domain of individuals assumed to satisfy the basic axioms an inner model is constructed whose domain of individuals is a certain subset of the original individual domain. If such an inner model can be constructed which satisfies not only the basic axioms but also the (...) particular additional hypothesis under consideration, then this affords a proof that if the basic axiom system is consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to this system the new hypothesis. This method has been applied to axiom systems for set theory by many authors, including v. Neumann, Mostowski, and more recently Gödel, who has shown by this method that if the basic axioms of a certain axiomatic system of set theory are consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to these axioms a strong form of the axiom of choice and the generalised continuum hypothesis. Having been shown in this striking way the power of this method it is natural to inquire whether it has any limitations or whether by the construction of a sufficiently ingenious inner model one might hope to decide other outstanding consistency questions, such as the consistency of the negations of the axiom of choice and continuum hypothesis. In this and two following papers we prove some general theorems concerning inner models for a certain axiomatic system of set theory which lead to the result that as far as a fairly large family of inner models are concerned this method of proving consistency has been exhausted, that no essentially new consistency results can be obtained by the use of this kind of model. (shrink)

In this paper we continue the study of inner models of the type studied inInner models for set theory—Part I.The present paper is concerned exclusively with a particular kind of model, the ‘super-complete models’ defined in section 2.4 of I. The condition of 2.4 and the completeness condition 1.42 imply that such a model is uniquely determined when its universal class Vmis given. Writing condition and the completeness conditions 1.41, 1.42 in terms of Vm, we may state the definition in (...) the form:3.1. Dfn.A classVmis said to determine a super-complete model if the model whose basic notions are defined by,satisfies axiomsA, B, C.N. B. This definition is not necessarily metamathematical in nature. If desired, it could be written out quite formally as the definition of a notion ‘SCM’ thus:whereψ is the propositional function expressing in terms ofUthe fact that the model determined byUaccording to 3.1 satisfies the relativization of axioms A, B, C. E.g. corresponding to axiom A1m, i.e.,,ψ contains the equivalent term. All the relativized axioms can be similarly expressed in this way by first writing out the relativized form and then replacing ‘ϕ bywhich is in turn replaced by, and similarly replacing ‘ϕ’ by ‘ϕ’ by ‘), andThusψ is obtained in primitive notation. (shrink)

In this third and last paper on inner models we consider some of the inherent limitations of the method of using inner models of the type defined in 1.2 for the proof of consistency results for the particular system of set theory under consideration. Roughly speaking this limitation may be described by saying that practically no further consistency results can be obtained by the construction of models satisfying the conditions of theorem 1.5, i.e., conditions 1.31, 1.32, 1.33, 1.51, viz.:This applies (...) in particular to the ‘complete models’ defined in 1.4. Before going on to a precise statement of these limitations we shall consider now the theorem on which they depend. This is concerned with a particular type of complete model examples of which we call “proper complete models”; they are those complete models which are essentially interior to the universe, those whose classes are sets of the universe constituting a class thereof, i.e., those for which the following proposition is true:The main theorem of this paper is that the statement that there are no models of this kind can be expressed formally in the same way as the axioms A, B, C and furthermore it can be proved that if the axiom system A, B, C is consistent then so is the system consisting of axioms A, B, C, plus this new hypothesis that there exist no proper complete models. When combined with the axiom ‘V = L’ introduced by Gödel in this new hypothesis yields a system in which any normal complete model which exists has for its universal class V, the universal class of the original system. (shrink)

Mints has given a deductive calculus, a set of proof rules, for pure Prolog such that the goal X = A1,..., An succeeds in Prolog iff X is derivable in this calculus and X fails in Prolog iff ()X is derivable in this calculus. We summarise Mints' results and give appropriate modifications of his calculus to deal with use of negated goals in Prolog, SLD- resolution, SLDNF-resolution, extensions of SLDNF-resolution allowing negation as failure to be applied to nonground negative literals.