: In this paper, I investigate Leibniz's conception of final causation. I focus especially on the role that Leibnizian final causes play in intentional action, and I argue that for Leibniz, final causes are a species of efficient causation. It is the intentional nature of final causation that distinguishes it from mechanical efficient causation. I conclude by highlighting some of the implications of Leibniz's conception of final causation for his views on human freedom, and on the unconscious activity of substances.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT LEIBNIZ’S NOTION OF HARMONY plays a crucial role in his philosophical system. Leibniz drew on this concept of harmony in motivating, and explaining, numerous areas of his thought: everything from Leibnizian mathematics and metaphysics to ethics and social philosophy, incorporates the notion of harmony as a central descriptive and explanatory concept. While there has been much discussion of some the applications of harmony in Leibniz’s system– especially the mind-body harmony, and the so-called universal harmony of (...) simple perceiving substances–little attention has been paid to Leibniz’s very concept of harmony. Yet it seems important for understanding Leibniz’s holistic philosophy that we grasp this concept, for he employed the term “harmony” when describing so many features of the created world: there is a harmony between geometry and physics, between efficient and final causation, between nature and grace, to mention just a few. (shrink)

Boyle prefaced his Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things with the claim that there are three dangerous consequences for failing to engage in the pursuit of final causes. Boyle was sincere in this claim, for there is a systematic line of reasoning in his texts that incorporates all three consequences and establishes conceptual connections between his science, his theology, and his value theory. I argue in this paper that Boyle's teleological outlook led him to believe that the natural (...) philosopher is morally obligated to continue his investigations of nature on the grounds that a deeper understanding of the teleological order necessarily motivates divine worship. Moreover, Boyle saw a conceptual connection between a teleological study of nature and revealed theology, a connection that reveals that a study of teleological nature can lead to the highest form of happiness. I conclude with a summary, and some remarks about the sincerity and weaknesses of Boyle's reasoning. (shrink)

Throughout his early writings, Leibniz was concerned with developing an acceptable account of God's relationship to the created world. In some of these early writings, he endorsed the idea that this relationship was similar to the human soul's relationship to the body. Though he eventually came to reject this idea, theanima mundi thesis remained the topic of several essays and correspondences during his career, culminating in the correspondence with Clarke. At first glance,Leibniz's discussions of this thesis may seem less important (...) in comparison to others, since it might seem like a topic which is far removed from what are regarded as his most important philosophical doctrines. I hope to show in what follows that such a view is mistaken. The large amount of attention Leibniz paid to this thesis is a sure indication of its importance to him. Further, as we shall see, his discussions of this thesis tum on some of his most interesting metaphysical topics, including the development of his thinking about the actual infinite, the structure of organic wholes, and the relationship between God and the created universe. In what follows, I examine these discussions chronologically, from the De Summa Rerum (1675-6), to the correspondence with Clarke (1715-6). (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to underscore the novelty of Leibniz’s teleology from a historical perspective. I believe this perspective helps deliver a better understanding of the finer details of Leibniz’s employment of final causes. I argue in this paper that Leibniz was taking a stance on three central teleological issues that derive from Aristotle, issues that seem to have occupied nearly every advocate of final causes from Aristotle to Leibniz. I discuss the three Aristotelian issues, and how major (...) thinkers treated them in the medieval period. I argue that Leibniz rejected all of the mainstream Aristotelian teleological views on these issues. I conclude that Leibniz broke with longstanding threads of teleological thinking in ways that were often extreme. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the topic of free will in Leibniz with particular attention to Leibniz's concept of volition, and its analogue in his physics – his concept of force. I argue against recent commentators that Leibniz was a causal determinist, and thus a compatibilist, and I suggest that logical consistency required him to adopt compatibilism given some of the concepts at work in his physics. I conclude by pointing out that the pressures to adopt causal determinism in Leibniz's (...) system are perhaps more severe than those facing the contemporary libertarian, pressures that stem from empirical considerations about the behavior of bodies in the physical world, and the “well‐founding” of those bodies in simple substances. (shrink)

A traditional and widespread belief among theists is that God administers punishment for sins and/or immoral actions. In this paper, Iargue that there is good reason to believe that the infliction of any suffering on humans by God (i.e., a perfectly just being) is morally unjustified. This is important not only because it conflicts with a deeply entrenched religious belief, but also because, as I show, a number of recent argumentative strategies employed by theistic philosophers require that divine punishment be (...) morally justifiable. I conclude, then, that the arguments put forth by these theistic philosophers do not succeed. (shrink)

L'une des applications de la de Leibniz aboutit à la thèse que toutes les substances créées forment une hiérarchie continue selon leur degré de perfection. Des critiques ont soutenu que cette thèse est contradictoire à l'affirmation de Leibniz que les êtres rationnels, étant des images de la divinité et constituant ainsi une classe distincte d'êtres créés, sont plus près de la perfection que tous les autres. L'objection est que cette affirmation crée une lacune entre les êtres rationnels et les êtres (...) nonrationnels qu'aucune ordonnance continue en fonction de degré de perfection ne saurait combler. Dans la présente étude, je pose que la métaphysique de Leibniz satisfait les deux exigences: d'une part, l'exigence que tous les êtres peuvent être rangés en ligne continue selon leur degré de perfection, et d'autre part, l'exigence que les êtres rationnels constituent une classe à part parmi les êtres créés. (shrink)

While it is well known that Leibniz and Berkeley adopted versions of phenomenalism, it is less well known that both thinkers also believed that knowledge of phenomenal nature, via the mechanical philosophy, is a necessary condition for human happiness. Yet an examination of their respective accounts of happiness reveals weighty differences, and these differences are rooted in their respective phenomenalisms. The upshot is the somewhat surprising conclusion that adhering to a certain type of phenomenalism can place restrictions on one’s account (...) of human happiness, for Berkeley could not, by the very logic of his phenomenalism, embrace Leibniz’s views on human happiness, nor could Leibniz embrace Berkeley’s. This is significant not only for understanding the systems of Leibniz and Berkeley, but it also illuminates any view that grounds the science of happiness in knowledge of a “material” world that is in some sense mind-dependent. (shrink)

Introduction: The empiricists and their context -- Empiricism and the empiricists -- The intellectual background to the early modern empiricists -- Martin Luther and the Reformation -- Aristotelian cosmology and the scientific revolution -- Aristotelian/scholastic hylomorphism and the rise of mechanism -- The Royal Society of London -- Francis Bacon (1561-1626) -- The natural realm : the idols of the mind -- Idols of the tribe -- Idols of the cave -- Idols of the marketplace -- Idols of the theatre (...) -- Knowledge and experience : induction introduced -- Aristotelian/scholastic syllogisms : deductions dismissed -- Baconian empiricism : induction introduced -- Conclusion: Bacon the empiricist -- Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) -- The natural realm : Hobbes's materialistic mechanism -- The importance of motion -- Sensation and the mind -- Knowledge and experience : definitions and the euclidean method -- Two kinds of knowledge and proper ratiocination -- The method of analysis and the method of synthesis -- Conclusion: Hobbes, the empiricist -- Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) -- The natural realm : Gassendi's atomism -- The basic principles of Gassendi's atomism -- Atomistic sensation -- Knowledge and experience : the middle way to knowledge -- The sceptics are partly correct -- Knowledge regained? -- Conclusion: Gassendi. the empiricist -- Robert Boyle (1627-1691) -- The natural realm : Boyle's mechanism (corpuscularianism) -- The basic principles of Boyle's mechanism (or corpscularianism) -- Sensation and the mind -- Knowledge and experience : mechanism and the cautious experimenter -- The excellency of mechanism -- Experimentation and the status of mechanism -- Conclusion: Boyle, the empiricist -- John Locke (1632-1704) -- The natural realm : Locke's mechanism -- Against innatism -- Ideas and the tabula rasa -- Primary and secondary qualities, and our confused idea of substance -- Locke on power -- Knowledge and experience : Locke's epistemology -- Indirect realism, or the representational theory of perception -- The certainty of knowledge -- The origin of knowledge -- The extent of knowledge -- Conclusion: Locke, the empiricist -- Isaac Newton (1642-1727) -- The natural realm : Newton's principia -- A world of forces : universal gravitation -- What kind of quality is gravity? -- Mechanism and action at a distance -- Knowledge and experience : rules for the study of natural philosophy -- The four rules -- Whither natural philosophy -- Conclusion: Newton, the empiricist -- George Berkeley (1685-1753) -- The natural realm : Berkeley's idealism -- The world contains only souls and ideas -- Esse est percipi : two arguments for idealism/immaterialism -- Against the primary/secondary quality distinction -- Knowledge and experience : Berkeley's common sense epistemology -- Against the representational theory of perception -- Defeating the skeptic, and returning to common sense -- Mechanism, newtonianism, and instrumentalism : Berkeley on the new science -- Responses to popular objections -- Conclusion: Berkeley, the empiricist -- David Hume (1711-1776) -- The natural realm : Hume's psychological approach -- Ideas and impressions -- The principles of association -- Knowledge and experience : Hume's semi-scepticism -- Relations of ideas vs. matters of fact -- From matters of fact to cause and effect : Hume's first question -- Knowledge of cause and effect : Hume's second question -- The problem of induction : Hume's third question -- Hume's positive account of causation : induction regained -- Conclusion: Hume, the empiricist -- Empiricism and the empiricists : summary and conclusion. (shrink)

Albert Casullo (2000, 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against naturalism applies equally to moderate rationalist accounts of a priori justification. They conclude that dilemma arguments are, therefore, insufficient for establishing an advantage for moderate rationalism over naturalized epistemology. I argue that both Casullo's and Oakley's criticisms depend on an illicit assumption, namely, that dilemma (...) arguments presuppose a meta-justificatory demand that naturalists provide non-circular support for their basic sources of evidence. I argue that this assumption is not necessary for the force of dilemma arguments, and I construct a version that avoids this misreading. I conclude that, although there remain strategies for responding to dilemma arguments, they constitute a challenge naturalists must take seriously. (shrink)

In last year’s Review Gregory Brown took issue with Laurence Carlin’s interpretation of Leibniz’s argument as to why there could be no world soul. Carlin’s contention, in Brown’s words, is that Leibniz denies a soul to the world but not to bodies on the grounds that “while both the world and [an] aggregate of limited spatial extent are infinite in multitude, the former, but not the latter, is infinite in respect of magnitude and hence cannot be considered (...) a whole”. Brown casts doubt on this interpretation—or rather, he begins by questioning its adequacy as an interpretation of a central passage, only to concede its essential correctness as an interpretation of Leibniz’s position, and to turn his attack on the latter itself. In this note I shall argue that Brown underestimates the subtlety of Leibniz’s views on the infinite, and that Carlin is basically correct in his suggestion that the infinite magnitude of the world is what precludes it from having even the phenomenal unity that a body does. (shrink)

One of the many problems that would have t o be solved by a satisfactory theory of empirical knowledge, perhaps the most central is a general structural problem which I shall call the epistemic regress problem: the problem of how to avoid an in- finite and presumably vicious regress of justification in ones account of the justifica- tion of empirical beliefs. Foundationalist theories of empirical knowledge, as we shall see further below, attempt t o avoid the regress by locating a (...) class of empirical beliefs whose justification does not depend on that of other empirical beliefs. Extemalist theories, the topic of the present paper, represent one species of foundationalism. (shrink)

Deleuze & Guattari, Politics and Education mobilizes Deleuzian-Guattarian philosophy as a revolutionary alternative to the lingering forms of transcendence, identity politics, and nihilism endemic to Western thought. Operationalizing Deleuze and Guattari's challenge to contemporary philosophy, this book presents their view as a revolutionary alternative to the lingering forms of transcendence, identity politics, and nihilism endemic to the current state of Western formal education. This book offers an experimental approach to theorizing, creating an entirely new way for educational theorists to approach (...) their work as the task of revolutionizing life itself. Examining new conceptual resources for grappling with and mapping a sustainable political alternative to the cliche's that saturate contemporary educational theory, this collection of essays works toward extracting a genuine image of education and learning that exists in sharp contrast to both the neo-liberal educational project and the critical pedagogical tradition. (shrink)

Introduction: there is no justice in Heidegger or for Marx -- Interpretations of Heidegger and Marx -- The history of Marx and Heidegger -- The history and negation of metaphysics -- Logic and dialectic -- Metaphysics of the human state -- The situation of Germany -- The ideology of Germany -- Nazism, liberalism, humanism -- The Jewish question -- Speaking of the essence of man -- Production-previously this was called God -- The end of humanism -- Between men and gods (...) -- Conclusion. (shrink)

A bold, insightful book that rejects the myth of America the Unphilosophical, arguing that America today towers as the most philosophical culture in the history of the world, an unprecedented marketplace of truth and argument that far surpasses ancient Greece or any other place one can name.Publisher's description.

On Surface and Place is a rich and poetic exploration of surfaces which foregrounds their significance in our understanding and experience of place. Adopting weaving as its overarching metaphor, it departs from Gottfried Semper's discussion of correspondences between architecture and textiles, and emerges from the reading of photographs, a swatch of Harris Tweed and curtain wall façade juxtaposed. In juxtaposing the fabric of the city with the weave of Harris Tweed the book charts an original course across a range of (...) connected ideas and questions, combining many different themes, writers and disciplines. It presents integrated and innovative rethinkings on a number of fundamental relationships, including correlations between body and building, word and image, and between the rural and the metropolitan, and the hand-crafted and the mass-reproduced. In doing so, it seeks to foreground the very interrelationship of surface and place, as it makes a claim for the relational nature of the world in which we live. (shrink)

Research to improve the health of pregnant and fetal patients presents ethical challenges to clinical investigators, institutional review boards, funding agencies, and data safety and monitoring boards. The Common Rule sets out requirements that such research must satisfy but no ethical framework to guide their application. We provide such an ethical framework, based on the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient. We offer criteria for innovation and for Phase I and II and then for Phase III clinical trials (...) to improve the health of pregnant patients and of fetal patients and also criteria to responsibly manage the transition from investigation to clinical practice. Basing ethical criteria for research involving pregnant women on the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient insulates the proposed ethical framework and therefore research on pregnant women from the divisive and politicized concepts and discourses of personhood, fetal rights, and unborn child. (shrink)

The Minos is one of thirty-five dialogues that ancient editors and commentators regarded as one of the authentic works of Plato. Although it is now regarded as spurious, in both the classical and modern eras, the Minos was treated as a suitable problematic introduction to Plato's Laws. The co-authors (Houlgate and Hathaway) believe that it is still an excellent introduction to the Laws. It has philosophical significance whether or not it is authentic. It is the philosophical significance that is discussed (...) in this article. (shrink)

In this paper I present a novel account of achievement and I argue that, all other things being equal, the presence of this particular type of achievement in a person’s life makes that life more meaningful. In arguing for this conclusion, I explore the connections between m-achievements and a person’s self-conception and especially the idea that m-achievements provide a reason for the revision of one’s self-conception.

Against the “universal consent of the people” and “the crowd of philosophers”, Pascal proves the existence of the void, thus re-establishing the truth where only the force and falsity of opinions had prevailed. Nature “has no repugnance for the void”, it “makes no effort to avoid it” but “admits it without difficulty or resistance”. Pascal defines the void as neither matter nor nothingness. Can this definition be found in Philosophy, in the Anthropology of the Pensées? We would like to show (...) the importance of the notion of the capacity of empty nature, which is decisive when it comes to describing the condition of man, troubled by a desire for truth and happiness that he cannot satisfy. Nature is thus, for him, what is “most contrary” to him, depriving him of what is rightfully his. The void has a cardinal function in Physics, but also in Philosophy. (shrink)

C. Thi Nguyen's (2020) recent account of echo chambers as social epistemic structures that actively exclude outsiders’ voices has sparked debate on the connection between echo chambers and epistemic injustice (Santos 2021; Catala 2021; Elzinga 2021).In this paper I am mainly concerned with the connection between echo chambers and testimonial injustice, understood as an instance whereby a speaker receives less epistemic credibility than they deserve, due to a prejudice in the hearer (Fricker 2007). In her reconstruction of the types of (...) testimonial injustice, Catala implicitly equates incidental testimonial injustice as resulting from epistemic prejudice and systematic testimonial injustice as resulting from identity prejudice. As I will argue, there as certain cases that fall in between these interpretations, namely instances of incidental testimonial injustice, whereby the impact on the speaker is localized, but where the credibility deficit nevertheless results from identity prejudice. One example of how this can manifest is the structural distrust against health-care experts in anti-vaccination echo-chambers, wherein said experts’ testimony is dismissed due to unwarranted assumptions regarding their motives qua their social type. To understand the importance and severity of the testimonial injustices in echo chambers, we need to look beyond the specific harms that are done to the targeted speakers and the immediate loss of knowledge, but also take into account the consequences for fairness in public deliberation—the latter being a fundamental condition for procedural democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

La philosophie cartésienne se décline en un refrain tranquille : « je pense, donc je suis », la méthode, le doute, le triomphe de la raison, Dieu lui-même soumis à la logique de l’entendement et toutes les passions domestiquées. Ce refrain semble même être devenu celui de la nation française toute entière : y a-t-il un autre philosophe auquel il soit fait aussi couramment référence? Mais ce « cartésianisme » que la tradition a retenu n’est justement pas cartésien. A rebours (...) de nos a priori sur Descartes, Laurence Devillairs souligne le caractère inclassable de sa philosophie : Descartes revendique le droit de la raison à s’exercer librement mais il se définit aussi comme « philosophe chrétien » ; il déclare l’homme capable de connaître l’essence même de Dieu mais en affirme l’irréductible incompréhensibilité ; il rétablit les droits de l’âme contre toute confusion avec le corporel mais fait de l’homme l’union intime d’un corps et d’un esprit. Ainsi se fait jour le portrait d’un maître à penser sans réel disciple, critique de la philosophie de l’École, désireux de voir le cartésianisme enseigné au titre de philosophie officielle, premier philosophe de la modernité et meilleur théologien de son siècle. Descartes n’a d’autre école que la sienne. (shrink)

This is a review of Laurence Houlgate's "Family and State: the Philosophy of Family Law. It takes a look at the moral theory from which Houlgate begins and raises questions about is correctness and appropriateness, but it finds more to agree with with respect to his middle-level principles. It considers his definition of "family" in the context of contemporary political controversy over such definitions. It looks at his consequentialist justification for the family, agrees with it, and suggests additional supplementary (...) arguments, primarily from Brigitte and Peter Berger, to give additional support for Houlgate's argument. It looks at his justification for family law and agrees with his principle of optimum communal benefit. It seeks to place Houlgate's views within the context of contemporary political debate about being "pro-family" or "anti-family". It then goes on to look briefly at some of the specific issues of family law that Houlgate considers, taking time to raise a few questions about some of them, and concludes by dealing in a more extensive way with the question of what the extent and limits of state interference in the family should be, agreeing with Houlgate's basic position, but considering further its application to specific issues. (shrink)

Comment concilier le relatif et l’universel? C’est à cette délicate tâche que s’était attelée il y a déjà quelques années Madame Delmas-Marty, spécialement dans le domaine des droits de l’homme. Le présent ouvrage envisage une difficulté supplémentaire en croisant les interrogations sur le pluralisme juridique avec la question de l’effectivité du droit économique. La prise en compte des pluralismes, notamment du pluralisme juridique, contribue-t-elle à une meilleure effectivité du droit économique? Ou bien, au contraire, le pluralisme juridique est-il un facteur (...) d’ineffectivité du droit économique? Dans cette recherche, les auteurs se sont attachés au pluralisme aussi bien dans la production du droit économique que dans le règlement des différends. C’est ainsi que le lecteur est appelé à cheminer dans la diversité des formes nouvelles qu’empruntent les régulations juridiques pour partir à la recherche des multiples intérêts que peut prendre en charge le droit économique, qu’ils soient individuels, collectifs ou même futurs. Le voyage se poursuit, là encore dans les mondes aussi bien des formes que de la substance. L'ouvrage, après avoir cherché à cerner la notion d’effectivité au regard de notions voisines comme l’efficacité ou l’efficience, s’interroge in fine sur l’éventualité des voies d’un dépassement de la notion de pluralisme juridique. (shrink)

The object of this article is to clarify the relationship between morality and family law in a variety of legal situations. This will give the reader a better grasp of the kind of case to be included in the traditionalist claim that the idea of legal intervention in the family is a coherent notion. Once this is sorted, we will be in a position to discuss and clarify the radical thesis that "the personal is political.".

What does it mean to be an expert? What sort of authority do experts really have? And what role should they play in today's society? Addressing why ever larger segments of society are skeptical of what experts say, Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction reviews contemporary philosophical debates and introduces what an account of expertise needs to accomplish in order to be believed. Drawing on research from philosophers and sociologists, chapters explore widely held accounts of expertise and uncover their limitations, outlining a (...) set of conceptual criteria a successful account of expertise should meet. By providing suggestions for how a philosophy of expertise can inform practical disciplines such as politics, religion, and applied ethics, this timely introduction to a topic of pressing importance reveals what philosophical thinking about expertise can contribute to growing concerns about experts in the 21st century. (shrink)

One of the most important abilities we have as humans is the ability to think about number. In this chapter, we examine the question of whether there is an essential connection between language and number. We provide a careful examination of two prominent theories according to which concepts of the positive integers are dependent on language. The first of these claims that language creates the positive integers on the basis of an innate capacity to represent real numbers. The second claims (...) that language’s function is to integrate contents from modules that humans share with other animals. We argue that neither model is successful. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics.

The essays in Politics, Nature, and Piety take up the central question of political philosophy: What is the good life, and what place do nature, politics, and piety have in that life? 'The unity of the essays,' Alex Priou writes in his introduction, 'lies in the various tensions explored: between ancients and moderns, religion and philosophy, magnanimity and prudence, justice and friendship, and, most fundamentally, spiritedness and the intellect.' Laurence Berns proves an excellent guide for beginning one's study of (...) the great books of political philosophy, from Plato to the present." --Publisher's description. (shrink)

Chaque fois que les hommes parlent du temps, ils le connotent d'une valorisation typiquement humaine : "Prendre du bon temps", "perdre son temps", "la fuite du temps". Cette expérience immédiate, affective et bouleversante favorise un discours quasi simpliste ou nostalgique sur ce temps considéré comme ce qui enferme le tragique ou le pathétique de la condition humaine, vouée à la finitude. Le paradoxe réside donc, en ce fait qu'il paraît complexe de dire l'essence du temps, d'autant que souvent chacun en (...) est réduit à n'en faire qu'une description mesurable, chronologique ou phénoménologique. Toutefois cette conception d'un temps essentiellement linéaire ne semble pas rendre compte de l'aspect cyclique ou rythmé de certaines manifestations (notamment naturelles), ni même des résurgences du passé par l'intermédiaire de la mémoire, ou encore des projets et des anticipations envisagés en prévention d'un "à-venir". L'embarras réside, spécifiquement, dans cette aporie à donner une consistance au temps typiquement humain face à la perfection ontologique d'une éternité : Ontologie qu'il importe de situer en l'homme par opposition à une entité extérieure rendue visible par l'instrument de mesure, mais qui ne peut coïncider avec l'intériorisation du temps intuitionné au coeur de l'être en plein étance. Ontologie à distinguer notamment d'un Etre suprême qui échappe à toute temporalité et présuppose son immuabilité et dont l'homme, dans son statut d'être livré au temps, est coupé. Au regard de cette complexité, nous pouvons réitérer la question : Qu'est-ce que le temps et comment le penser? Comment égrener une philosophie du temps comparable à la saisie de l'écoulement de grains de sable dans un sablier et palper au coeur même de la vie, dans son efflorescence la puissance de l'instant? L'ouvrage de Laurence Vanin fournit un ensemble d'éléments susceptibles d'orienter le lecteur vers des réponses... (shrink)

A ética do discurso justifica o conteúdo de uma moralidade que salienta a simetria entre os sujeitos e a solidariedade entre todos. Para Habermas “a solidariedade é a outra face da justiça” (1999, p. 42), ou seja, são duas faces da mesma moeda. Esta é uma afirmação chave em relação ao conteúdo cognitivo do âmbito moral. A validade das normas pressupõe uma fundamentação normativa estruturada linguisticamente, de forma a vincular a justiça com a solidariedade. A ênfase está em uma razão (...) prática capaz de fundamentar princípios igualitários e universalistas da moral e do direito (2009, p. 63). A legitimação do estado de direito deve preservar sua neutralidade ideológica, alicerçada em uma moral racional, isto é, laica (ou secular). Com isso, as exigências normativas devem ser aceitas por todos em uma sociedade pluralista, formada por cidadãos de diferentes credos e, inclusive, por não crentes (HABERMAS, 2009, p. 69). (shrink)

In response to widespread voter ignorance, Jason Brennan argues for a voting ethics that can be summarized as one negative duty: do not vote badly. The implication that abstaining is always permissible entails no incentive for citizens to become competent voters or to vote once competent. Following the Condorcet Jury Theorem, this can lead to suboptimal outcomes, suggesting that voter turnout should concern instrumentalist epistemic accounts of democratic legitimacy. This could be addressed by adding two positive voting duties: to make (...) an effort to become a competent voter; and, once competent, to vote. (shrink)

This book offers a unique synthesis of past and current work on the structure, meaning, and use of negation and negative expressions, a topic that has engaged thinkers from Aristotle and the Buddha to Freud and Chomsky. Horn's masterful study melds a review of scholarship in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics with original research, providing a full picture of negation in natural language and thought; this new edition adds a comprehensive preface and bibliography, surveying research since the book's original publication.