his monograph examines the metaphysical commitments of the new mechanistic philosophy, a way of thinking that has returned to center stage. It challenges a variant of reductionism with regard to higher-level phenomena, which has crystallized as a default position among these so-called New Mechanists. Furthermore, it opposes those philosophers who reject the possibility of interlevel causation. Contemporary philosophers believe that the explanation of scientific phenomena requires the discovery of relevant mechanisms. As a result, new mechanists are, in the main, concerned (...) solely with epistemological questions. But, the author argues, their most central claims rely on metaphysical assumptions. Thus, they must also take into account metaphysics, a system of thought concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world around it. This branch of philosophy does indeed matter to the empirical sciences. The chapters investigate the nature of mechanisms, their components, and the ways in which they can bring about different phenomena. In addition, the author develops a novel account of causation in terms of activities. The analysis provides the basis for many further research projects on mechanisms and their relations to, for example, the mind-body problem, realization, multiple realization, natural kinds, causation, laws of nature, counterfactuals, and scientific levels. (shrink)

Constitutive mechanistic explanations are said to refer to mechanisms that constitute the phenomenon-to-be-explained. The most prominent approach of how to understand this constitution relation is Carl Craver’s mutual manipulability approach to constitutive relevance. Recently, the mutual manipulability approach has come under attack (Leuridan 2012; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015; Harinen 2014; Casini and Baumgartner 2016). Roughly, it is argued that this approach is inconsistent because it is spelled out in terms of interventionism (which is an approach to causation), whereas (...) constitutive relevance is said to be a non-causal relation. In this paper, I will discuss a strategy of how to resolve this inconsistency, so-called fat-handedness approaches (Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Casini and Baumgartner 2016; Romero 2015). I will argue that these approaches are problematic. I will present a novel suggestion of how to consistently define constitutive relevance in terms of interventionism. My approach is based on a causal interpretation of mutual manipulability, where manipulability is interpreted as a causal relation between the mechanism’s components and temporal parts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the unconscious mind back to center stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? I suggest a new strategy for answering this question, which rests on the idea that categorizing unconscious phenomena as “mental” should be scientifically useful relative to the explanatory research goals. I argue that this is the case if by categorizing an unconscious phenomenon as “mental” one picks out explanatorily relevant similarities (...) to a corresponding paradigmatically mental conscious phenomenon. Explanatory relevance is spelled out in terms of mechanistic norms. (shrink)

Many authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability account (MM). In this paper I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that should not count as verifying EC. This challenge can (...) be met by adding a necessary condition: cognitive constituents satisfy MM and they are what I call behavior unspecific. (shrink)

The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena. After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis (...) of this notion, we will clarify what distinguishes constitutive mechanistic explanations from etiological ones. 1 Introduction 2 Criteria of Adequacy 2.1 Descriptive adequacy 2.2 Constitutive–etiological distinction 2.3 Constitution 3 The Ontological Nature of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena 3.1 Phenomena as input–output relations 3.2 Phenomena as end states 3.3 Phenomena as dispositions 3.4 Phenomena as behaviours 4 Phenomena as Object-Involving Occurrents 4.1 What object-involving occurrents are and why we need them 4.2 The object in the phenomenon 4.3 The adequacy of option 5 Conclusion. (shrink)

According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic level than another acting entity if and only if the former is a component in the mechanism for the latter. Craver and Bechtel :547–563, 2007. doi:10.1007/s10539-006-9028-8) argue that a consequence of this view is that there cannot be causal interactions between acting entities at different mechanistic levels. Their main reason seems to be what I will call the Metaphysical Argument: things at different levels of a mechanism (...) are related as part and whole; wholes and their parts cannot be related as cause and effect; hence, interlevel causation in mechanisms is impossible. I will analyze this argument in more detail and show under which conditions it is valid. This analysis will reveal that interlevel causation in mechanisms is indeed possible, if we take seriously the idea that the relata of the mechanistic level relation are acting entities and accept a slightly modified notion of a mechanistic level that is highly plausible in the light of the first clarification. (shrink)

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic for implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski et al. (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious (...) and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA. (shrink)

Most defenders of the new mechanistic approach accept ontic constraints for successful scientific explanation (Illari 2013; Craver 2014). The minimal claim is that scientific explanations have objective truthmakers, namely mechanisms that exist in the physical world independently of any observer and that cause or constitute the phenomena-to- be-explained. How can this idea be applied to type-level explanations? Many authors at least implicitly assume that in order for mechanisms to be the truthmakers of type-level explanation they need to be regular (Andersen (...) 2012; Sheredos 2015). One problem of this assumption is that most mechanisms are (highly) stochastic in the sense that they “fail more often than they succeed” (Bogen 2005; Andersen 2012). How can a mechanism type whose instances are more likely not to produce an instance of a particular phenomenon type be the truthmaker of the explanation of that particular phenomenon type? In this paper, I will give an answer to this question. I will analyze the notion of regularity and I will discuss Andersen's suggestion for how to cope with stochastic mechanisms. I will argue that her suggestion cannot account for all kinds of stochastic mechanisms and does not provide an answer as to why regularity grounds type-level explanation. According to my analysis, a mechanistic type- level explanation is true if and only if at least one of the following two conditions is satisfied: the mechanism brings about the phenomenon more often than any other phenomenon (comparative regularity) or the phenomenon is more often brought about by the mechanism than by any other mechanism/causal sequence (comparative reverse regularity). (shrink)

The relationship between topological explanation and mechanistic explanation is unclear. Most philosophers agree that at least some topological explanations are mechanistic explanations. The crucial question is how to make sense of this claim. Zednik (Philos Psychol 32(1):23–51, 2019) argues that topological explanations are mechanistic if they (i) describe mechanism sketches that (ii) pick out organizational properties of mechanisms. While we agree with Zednik’s conclusion, we critically discuss Zednik’s account and show that it fails as a general account of how and (...) when topological explanations are mechanistic. First, if topological explanations were just mechanism sketches, this implies that they could be enriched by replacing topological terms with mechanistic detail. This, however, conflicts how topological explanations are used in scientific practice. Second, Zednik’s account fails to show how topological properties can be organizational properties of mechanisms that have a place in mechanistic explanation. The core issue is that Zednik’s account ignores that topological properties often are _global_ properties while mechanistic explanantia refer to _local_ properties. We demonstrate how these problems can be solved by a recent account of mechanistic completeness (Craver and Kaplan in Br J Philos Sci 71(1):287–319, 2020; Kohár and Krickel in Calzavarini and Viola (eds) Neural mechanisms—new challenges in the philosophy of neuroscience, Springer, New York, 2021) and use a multilayer network model of Alzheimer’s Disease to illustrate this. (shrink)

The disagreement between defenders and opponents of extended cognition is often framed in terms of constitution. The underlying principle of this discussion is what I will call the co-location principle: cognition is located where its constituents are located. The crucial question is under which conditions something is to be counted as a constituent of cognition. I will formulate three criteria of adequacy that an account of constitution must satisfy to be applicable to the dispute on extended cognition. I will evaluate (...) different accounts of constitution as to whether they satisfy the criteria of adequacy. Three different accounts of constitution can be identified in the literature on extended cognition, which I will call property-based constitution, diachronic constitution, and mechanistic constitution. I will show that none of the accounts satisfies all three criteria. Thus, the search for the mark of constitution does not seem to be a promising strategy for defending extended cognition. I will briefly sketch a new strategy of how to deal with this situation. (shrink)

While ideal interventions are acknowledged by many as valuable tools for the analysis of causation, recent discussions have shown that, since there are no ideal interventions on upper-level phenomena that non-reductively supervene on their underlying mechanisms, interventions cannot—contrary to a popular opinion—ground an informative analysis of constitution. This has led some to abandon the project of analyzing constitution in interventionist terms. By contrast, this paper defines the notion of a horizontally surgical intervention, and argues that, when combined with some innocuous (...) metaphysical principles about the relation between upper and lower levels of mechanisms, that notion delivers a sufficient condition for constitution. This, in turn, strengthens the case for an interventionist analysis of constitution. (shrink)

Cartwright et al. in European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10 and the new mechanists agree that regular behaviors described in cp laws are generated by mechanisms. However, there is disagreement with regard to the two questions that Cartwright at al. ask: the epistemological question and the ontological question. Most importantly, Cartwright et al. argue that the explanation involved is a CL-explanation, while the new mechanists insist that mechanistic explanation and CL-explanation are competitors. In this reply, I will highlight some (...) worries regarding Cartwright et al.’s analysis of the relationship between mechanisms and cp laws and I will provide alternative answers to the two questions in line with the new mechanistic approach. (shrink)

While ideal interventions are acknowledged by many as valuable tools for the analysis of causation, recent discussions have shown that, since there are no ideal interventions on upper-level phenomena that non-reductively supervene on their underlying mechanisms, interventions cannot—contrary to a popular opinion—ground an informative analysis of constitution. This has led some to abandon the project of analyzing constitution in interventionist terms. By contrast, this paper defines the notion of a horizontally surgical intervention, and argues that, when combined with some innocuous (...) metaphysical principles about the relation between upper and lower levels of mechanisms, that notion delivers a sufficient condition for constitution. This, in turn, strengthens the case for an interventionist analysis of constitution. (shrink)

Das Unbewusste ist wieder in aller Munde: Populärwissenschaftliche Bücher, die den unbewussten Geist thematisieren, werden internationale Bestseller 1 und es gibt sicherlich keine populärwissenschaftliche Psychologie-Zeitschrift, die nicht schon mehrfach über das Thema berichtet hat2 . Dieses neue Interesse am unbewussten Geist ist vor allem neuen Erkenntnissen aus der kognitiven Psychologie und der Sozialpsychologie zu verdanken.

One assumption of the new mechanistic approach is that there are two kinds of mechanistic explanations: etiological and constitutive ones. While the former explain phenomena in terms of their preceding causes, the latter are supposed to refer to mechanisms that constitute phenomena. Based on arguments by Kaiser and Krickel (Br J Philos Sci 68(3):745–779, 2017) and Krickel (The mechanical world, vol. 13, Springer International Publishing, 2018), I will show that this view is too narrow. Indeed, three different types (...) of explanation are usually subsumed under the label “constitutive explanation”. However, one of those types of explanation is not a version of constitutive explanation. Rather it is a variant of etiological explanation. As a result, I will show that there are four types of mechanistic explanation, two variants of etiological explanation—which I will call output mechanistic explanations and input-output mechanistic explanations—and two variants of constitutive explanation—which I will call filler mechanistic explanations and dimensioned mechanistic explanations. Keeping these apart is crucial as they come with different ontological implications. An evaluation of the mechanistic approach regarding its stance on reduction, levels, and interlevel causation crucially depends on which notion of mechanistic explanation one has in mind. (shrink)

In this short commentary, I will first show why Kiverstein & Kirchhoff's (this volume) analysis of the CC-fallacy is inadequate in an important way and show why their strategy for avoiding the CC-fallacy based on diachronic constitution is problematic. Second, I will reply to their criticism of the mechanistic account of constitution.

A Correction to this paper has been published (changed to open access).

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to (...) be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges. (shrink)

IndividuelleFreiheitindividuelleAutonomieAutonomie wird allgemein als die Fähigkeit von Personen verstanden, über ihr eigenes Leben bestimmen zu können, ihr eigenes Leben zu führen anhand von Gründen, Überlegungen, Motiven, Wünschen, die ihre eigenen sind und ihnen nicht von anderen – aus persönlichen oder politischen Gründen – aufgezwungen, die aber immer in Beziehung mit anderen entwickelt werden. Deshalb begründet Autonomie VerantwortlichkeitVerantwortungFreiheit als Bedingung für Verantwortung und fordert Respekt von anderen. Autonomie ist seit der Aufklärung einer der zentralen, leitenden Begriffe sowohl in der Ethik wie (...) in der Politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

English summary: Beate Bengard deals with the ecumenical hermeneutics of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. His theory is of interest for ecumenical theology particularly in the area of ecumenical reception. The specificity of ecumenical reception is that it requires the acceptation of otherness - of the alterity - of the ecumenical partner. Obviously, this process goes far beyond the ratification of ecumenical documents. In order to clarify the process of reception, a hermeneutical model is needed which explains the interrelation (...) of the interpersonal recognition of otherness, the reception of texts, as well as of changing collective identities. A complex model of the reception process is deduced from the theory of Paul Ricoeur and Ricoeur's model is compared with three concrete ecumenical processes in France. This shows there is a high degree of accordance between these ecumenical examples and Ricoeur's hermeneutical process. The conclusion points to ways in which this contributes to building an ecumenical culture inspired by Ricoeur's philosophy. German description: Beate Bengard stellt erstmals der Beitrag des franzosischen Philosophen Paul Ricoeur zum okumenischen Dialog detailliert vor. Die Studie, die im Rahmen eines deutsch-franzosischen Promotionsprojekts entstanden ist, beruht auf teilweise bisher unveroffentlichten Zeugnissen. Fur die okumenische Theologie ist Ricoeurs Beitrag primar fur die Frage der 'okumenischen Rezeption' interessant. Die Besonderheit der okumenischen Rezeption gegenuber anderen Rezeptionsprozessen besteht darin, dass sie die Annahme des Anderen, d.h. die Rezeption der Alteritat des okumenischen Partners verlangt. Was das im Einzelnen bedeutet, kann nicht durch eine Rezeptionsforschung geklart werden, die sich nur auf die Ratifikation von okumenischen Dokumenten konzentriert. Zu seiner Klarung braucht es vielmehr ein hermeneutisches Modell, das den Zusammenhang von interpersonaler Anerkennung, Textrezeption und dem Wandel kollektiver Identitaten erklart. Eine solche komplexere Rezeptionstheorie rekonstruiert Bengard aus der Fulle von Ricoeurs philosophischem Werk und uberpruft dieses anschliessend auf ihre Plausibilitat hin. Dazu untersucht Bengard drei sehr unterschiedliche okumenische Rezeptionssituationen aus Frankreich: die Rezeption der Leuenberger Konkordie in den evangelischen Kirchen, die unabhangig fur den katholisch-evangelischen Dialog arbeitende Groupe des Dombes und die Communaute de Taize. Abschliessend gibt sie Anregungen fur eine Okumenekultur, die Inspiration aus dem Werk von Paul Ricoeur bezieht. (shrink)

The processing, representation, and perception of bodily signals (interoception) plays an important role for human behavior. Theories of embodied cognition hold that higher cognitive processes operate on perceptual symbols and that concept use involves reactivations of the sensory-motor states that occur during experience with the world. Similarly, activation of interoceptive representations and meta-representations of bodily signals supporting interoceptive awareness are profoundly associated with emotional experience and cognitive functions. This article gives an overview over present findings and models on interoception and (...) mechanisms of embodiment and highlights its relevance for disorders that are suggested to represent a translation deficit of bodily states into subjective feelings and self-awareness. (shrink)

Written by a select international group of leading privacy scholars, Social Dimensions of Privacy endorses and develops an innovative approach to privacy. By debating topical privacy cases in their specific research areas, the contributors explore the new privacy-sensitive areas: legal scholars and political theorists discuss the European and American approaches to privacy regulation; sociologists explore new forms of surveillance and privacy on social network sites; and philosophers revisit feminist critiques of privacy, discuss markets in personal data, issues of privacy in (...) health care and democratic politics. The broad interdisciplinary character of the volume will be of interest to readers from a variety of scientific disciplines who are concerned with privacy and data protection issues. (shrink)

Immer mehr Menschen verbringen ihren Lebensabend in Einrichtungen der Altenpflege. Zusätzlich zur Sorge um physische, psychische und soziale Belange gilt es, deren spirituelle Bedürfnisse zu berücksichtigen. Ziel dieser Arbeit war es, die spirituellen Bedürfnisse von alten Menschen in Langzeitpflegeeinrichtungen zu erfassen. Gleichzeitig wurde untersucht, welche spirituellen Bedürfnisse Pflegende bei den ihnen anvertrauten Bewohner/-innen wahrnehmen. Dabei wurden Übereinstimmungen bzw. Unterschiede identifiziert. Daten aus 28 Einzelinterviews mit Bewohnerinnen und Bewohnern und 9 Fokusgruppeninterviews mit Mitarbeitenden wurden mittels Qualitativer Inhaltsanalyse ausgewertet und unter die (...) Kernkategorien „Sinn“, „Verbundenheit“, „Transzendenz“ kategorisiert. Die Kategorien beider Befragtengruppen wurden einem Vergleich unterzogen. Trotz zahlreicher Übereinstimmungen in den Aussagen beider Gruppen bleiben Defizite in der Wahrnehmung von Pflegenden. Aus den Ergebnissen der Arbeit werden Schlussfolgerungen für die Einbeziehung der spirituellen Dimension der alten Menschen in die pflegerische Arbeit im Seniorenheim gezogen und Empfehlungen ausgesprochen. (shrink)

Quel est le substrat de la conscience? Qu'est-ce qui la fait? Poser la question signifie ne pas se satisfaire de la position naturaliste qui affirme que c'est le cerveau qui produit la conscience. En fait, toute explication qui situe son substrat dans le monde objectif est confrontée à une forme de circularité à la fois ontologique (la conscience est dans le monde qui est dans la conscience) et épistémique (la conscience explique le monde qui explique la conscience). La phénoménologie transcendantale (...) n'échappe pas à cette circularité. Et le caractère circulaire d'une vision globale de la réalité s'avère rédhibitoire dès lors qu'on est prêt à considérer subjectivité et objectivité sur le même niveau de dignité ontologique. Reste alors l'option d'aborder, sans préjugés, la question du substrat comme problème philosophique. Il s'agit de concevoir le substrat de la conscience comme un domaine d'être à part, situé en amont de toute objectivation. Un tel substrat est transcendantal, puisqu'il est condition de possibilité de toute connaissance. (shrink)

Scheint die Sache aussichtslos, wird das "Prinzip Hoffnung" beschworen. Dessen Urheber, Ernst Bloch, war allerdings nicht ins Scheitern, sondern ins "Gelingen verliebt" Für die Philosophie der "konkreten Utopie", die sich strikt vom utopischen Denken im Sinne eines "wishful thinking" abgrenzt, ist die gesellschaftliche Praxis Orientierungspunkt. Die Trias "Solidarität, Allianztechnik, Heimat" markiert ein Ultimum, das latent im Weltprozess vorscheint, aber der Realisierung durch das menschliche Subjekt immer noch bedarf. Ein entsprechendes philosophisches Begriffsinstrumentarium, dem der Gedanke vom "Prius der Theorie, Primat der (...) Praxis" zugrunde liegt, hat Bloch systematisch in seiner Kategorienlehre entwickelt. Gegenstand ist das universelle menschliche Sein als "Noch-Nicht-Sein". Akzentuiert wird die auf dem Prozesscharakter der Materie beruhende Möglichkeit der Veränderung. Dabei umfasst das Denken nicht nur Gesellschaft, Kunst und Religion, sondern auch die Natur - ein Gebiet, das zunehmend zu philosophischer Insichtnahme auffordert. Die wichtigsten Leitbegriffe der Bloch'schen Philosophie werden im Wörterbuch erläutert. (shrink)

Long description: Welche Betrachtungsmöglichkeiten ergeben sich aus den vielfältigen Verknüpfungen von Musik, Medien und Kunst? Der Band widmet sich dieser Frage aus wissenschaftlicher ebenso wie aus künstlerischer Perspektive. Zentrale Angelpunkte dabei sind Kommunikation, Technologie und Wahrnehmung als Gegenstände und/oder methodische Konzepte in Wissenschaft und Kunst. Die Beiträge machen unterschiedliche Blickwinkel auf gemeinsame Themenfelder sichtbar, um darin mögliche Schnittmengen, Übergänge und Bruchlinien zu erschließen.

Das Buch weist in exemplarischen Fallstudien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart die zentrale Rolle von Bildern für Prozesse der Vergemeinschaftung auf. Gegen Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts setzt in der akademischen Diskussion eine verstärkte Rückwendung zum Konzept der Gemeinschaft ein.

Chronology of the Manuscripts 1885–89. Appendix to KGW IX. After the completion of the topological manuscript edition in section IX of the Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke (KGW IX), the additional chronological indexing of the late Nachlass remained a desideratum. The current manuscript closes this editorial gap. As an appendix to KGW IX, the chronology of the manuscripts 1885–89 provides the date for each distinguishable layer of inscription for every manuscript and note edited in KGW IX. In the first part of (...) the following chronology, the dated inscription layers for all late manuscripts from notebook N VII 1 to the scattered notes are recorded topologically. In the second part, the inscription layers are indexed chronologically from spring 1885 to the beginning of January 1889. (shrink)

Starting from the given societal fact of an unequal ‘worth of freedom’ for men and women in pursuing possible plans of life, and the assumption that this difference is due to the distinction between the private and public realm, the author investigates into the gender-structure of recent political theories. Following the lines of the debate between communitarians and liberals she argues for the thesis that while communitarians try to ‘privatize’ the public sphere on the model of the ideal family or (...) given traditions of communities and thus cannot account for the idea of emancipation from given structures and roles, liberals have to ‘publicize’ the private in order to give substance to the idea of an ‘equal worth of freedom’ for men and women. Thus, liberalism has to rethink the theoretical distinction of the private and the public sphere and its practical consequences. (shrink)

This new book by Beate Rossler is a work of real quality and originality on an extremely topical issue: the issue of privacy and the relations between the private and the public. Rossler investigates the reasons why we value privacy and why we ought to value it. In the context of modern, liberal societies, Rossler develops a theory of the private which links privacy and autonomy in a constitutive way: privacy is a necessary condition to lead an autonomous life. (...) The book develops a theory of freedom and autonomy which sees the ability to pose the "practical question" of how one wants to live, of what a person strives to be, at the centre of the modern idea of autonomy. The question of privacy is emerging as an increasingly important topic in social and political theory and is central to many current debates in law, the media and politics. The Value of Privacy will be widely recognised to be a classic contribution to the subject. (shrink)

The philosophy and aesthetics of music have been shaped by the philosophy of life since the end of the 18th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, the relationship between the philosophy of music and the philosophy of life changed fundamentally – due to the development and popularization of various related cultural theories. From then on, the philosophy of life, the philosophy of music and cultural criticism formed a complex triangle. Many European and North American intellectuals availed themselves (...) of established concepts of the philosophy of life such as ‘non-rationality’, ‘organicity’ and ‘vitality’ as contrasting foils for their own cultural-pessimistic theories, which revolved around the ‘critique of technology’, ‘pessimism of progress’, ‘posthistoire’, ‘dehumanisation’, ‘the uncontrollable machine’ and the ‘hypertrophy of administration’. At the same time, cultural criticism transformed the philosophy of music having been shaped by the philosophy life. This chapter reconstructs the triangle by means of Theodor W. Adorno’s music philosophy, especially his theoremes on avant-garde music. It demonstrates how, in the middle of the 20th century, cultural-pessimistic and life-philosophical ideas mutually explained and questioned each other in light of the contemporary compositional techniques and the philosophical discourse on them. (shrink)

Responding to bivalent stimuli slows subsequent performance. In prospective memory research, prospective memory targets can be considered as bivalent stimuli because they typically involve features relevant for both the prospective memory task and the ongoing task. The purpose of this study was to investigate how responding to a prospective memory target slows subsequent performance. In two experiments, we embedded the prospective memory task in a task-switching paradigm and we manipulated the degree of task-set overlap between the prospective memory task and (...) the ongoing task. The results showed consistent after-effects of responding to prospective memory targets. The specific trajectory of the slowing depended on the amount of task-set overlap. These results demonstrate that responding to prospective memory targets results in after-effects, a so far neglected cost on ongoing task performance. (shrink)

This new book by Beate Rossler is a work of real quality and originality on an extremely topical issue: the issue of privacy and the relations between the private and the public. Rossler investigates the reasons why we value privacy and why we ought to value it. In the context of modern, liberal societies, Rossler develops a theory of the private which links privacy and autonomy in a constitutive way: privacy is a necessary condition to lead an autonomous life. (...) The book develops a theory of freedom and autonomy which sees the ability to pose the "practical question" of how one wants to live, of what a person strives to be, at the centre of the modern idea of autonomy. The question of privacy is emerging as an increasingly important topic in social and political theory and is central to many current debates in law, the media and politics. The Value of Privacy will be widely recognised to be a classic contribution to the subject. (shrink)

A rich philosophical examination of why it matters to live an autonomous life.

The paper focuses on processes of normalization through which dis/ability is simultaneously produced in specific collectives, networks, and socio-technological systems that enable the construction of such demarcations. Our point of departure is the cochlear implant, a neuroprosthetic device intended to replace and/or augment the function of the damaged inner ear. Unlike hearing aids, which amplify sounds, the CI does the work of damaged hair cells in the inner ear by providing sound signals to the brain. We examine the processes of (...) the CI’s genesis as well as its specific uses by and interrelations to the different and divergent actors that the CI assembles. We argue that the technological device and the implicated normalization process mobilize complex effects in varying socio-technical arrangements. The CI is conceived as a “boundary object” [89] or a “quasi-object” [49, 83], i.e., a metastabilized medium of translation that coordinates social, cultural, and technological action. Although intended to transform non-hearing or hard of hearing people into competent and “normal” hearing subjects, the CI system reproduces the asymmetrical structures of the disability discourse [14] through its function of “developing and maintaining coherence between intersecting social worlds” [89, 393]. Additionally, it initiates controversial discourses that have resulted in new forms of biosocial collectivities ranging from cochlear implantees with normal human hearing to human configurations who have passed through human enhancement. Our approach is thus situated at the intersection of disability and media studies and tackles the particular conditions technological media configurations impose upon the production of dis/ability. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDas Verhältnis zwischen Ethikkonsultation und der bspw. in psychiatrischen Arbeitsfeldern und im Palliativbereich etablierten psychologischen Supervision ist bisher wenig untersucht. Dieser Vergleich und die Abgrenzung von Ethikkonsultation stellen eine Forschungslücke dar. Anhand von zwei Fallvignetten aus der Praxis von EK und PS werden unter Kontrastierung mit dem jeweils anderen Ansatz Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten im methodischen und praktischen Vorgehen sowie Kriterien der Unterscheidung analysiert. Als Ergebnis wird eine systematische Gegenüberstellung präsentiert, die folgende Merkmale umfasst: 1. Ziele jedes Ansatzes, 2. Einberufung, 3. (...) Gegenstand, 4. Fokus, 5. Methode/Prozess, 6. Rolle des Beraters, 7. Ergebnisse, 8. Dokumentation, 9. Bearbeiten von Emotionen, 10. Bearbeiten ethischer Fragestellungen. Trotz Überschneidungen der beiden Arbeitsformen erscheinen EK und PS nicht wechselseitig austauschbar; eine Vermischung wird nicht empfohlen. Als Fazit werden Hinweise zur Indikationsstellung von EK oder PS gegeben; dabei spielen auch die Motivation der Teilnehmenden und die zeitnahe Verfügbarkeit der Beratungsangebote eine Rolle. (shrink)