Material Ecocriticism offers new ways to analyze language and reality, human and nonhuman life, mind and matter, without falling into well-worn paths of thinking. Bringing ecocriticism closer to the material turn, the contributions to this landmark volume focus on material forces and substances, the agency of things, processes, narratives and stories, and making meaning out of the world. This broad-ranging reflection on contemporary human experience and expression provokes new understandings of the planet to which we are intimately connected.

An international and interdisciplinary team of scholars offer innovative models of thinking about environmentality in the humanities and in Anthropocene discourse in the environmental sciences.

This article examines one of Italo Calvino’s most beloved novels, (1957), contextualizing it in its landscape and exploring the multifaceted strands of its environmental creativity. Unsuspected paths of political ecology, environmental history, and even biosemiotics and plant neurophysiology will emerge, thus showing the timeliness and clairvoyance of his books vis-à-vis our planetary crises. Written in a seminarrative form, this piece is an invitation to read literary works not only along with their landscapes, but their landscapes, and to consider the potential (...) of more-than-human stories for the shaping of our ethical-environmental imagination. (shrink)

In un periodo in cui la storiografia filosofica italiana andava ridefinendo la sua identità, dopo la crisi dell’"egemonia" crociana e gentiliana, quella di Valerio Verra è stata senz’altro una delle figure più notevoli. A lui si deve infatti la ridefinizione di alcune tra le più importanti categorie storiografiche, e l’idea che la ricerca storica sia indispensabile per riconoscere, al di là di preconcetti teorici, la natura e i compiti della filosofia contemporanea. A due anni dalla morte, queste pagine ne analizzano (...) l’attività di storico della filosofia nel contesto in cui si è formata, mettendone in evidenza tematiche, metodi e criteri. (shrink)

Ende des Sommers 1818, während seines Aufenthalts in München, trifft Victor Cousin Schelling und läßt sich Fichtes Leben in Jena für seine Fragments philosophiques schildern. Der Philosoph wird als »le plus sincère, le plus vertueux, mais aussi le plus obstiné des hommes« charakterisiert. Er stellt ihn dann Goethe gegenüber, damals Geheimrat des Großherzogs Karl-August von Sachsen-Weimar: »Jamais deux hommes ne se convinrent moins que le grand poète et le grand philosophe«, sagt Cousin. Und die Gründe für diese Urteile sind mannigfaltig. (...) Wenn einerseits Fichte in Jena als Verfasser des Beitrags zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publikums über die französische Revolution auch erkannt worden war und - obwohl er jede auffälligen Äußerungen zu vermeiden suchte - er auch kein Geheimnis aus seinen demokratischen Überzeugungen machte, hatte sich andererseits Goethe sowohl in seinen Werken als auch in seiner politischen Tätigkeit immer gegen jede gewalttätige Revolution erklärt, die danach strebte, die angestammte Obrigkeit zu vernichten. Diese seine Haltung entspringt unmittelbar Goethes Idee, daß die Natur - und mit ihr die Geschichte - im Grunde eher der Ort ununterbrochener und langsamer Metamorphosen als unvorhersehbarer Brüche sei. Hier wirkt das gleiche Motiv, daß sich Wilhelm Meister von einem angehenden Schauspieler durch Einfluß einer geheimen Gesellschaft auch seelisch zu einem Arzt wandeln läßt, und es ist im Grunde auch das Gleiche, wenn Goethe in der Geologie den Neptunismus Werners dem Vulkanismus vorzieht. Der Vielseitigkeit der Interessen eines Goethe, der gleichsam Dichter und Naturforscher, Minister und Weltmann war, steht die Gestalt eines Fichtes gegenüber, der sein ganzes Leben der monolithischen Konstruktion der philosophischen Wissenschaftslehre gewidmet hat. Aber auch philosophisch trennt sie ein Abgrund zutiefst. (shrink)

Ende des Sommers 1818, während seines Aufenthalts in München, trifft Victor Cousin Schelling und läßt sich Fichtes Leben in Jena für seine Fragments philosophiques schildern. Der Philosoph wird als »le plus sincère, le plus vertueux, mais aussi le plus obstiné des hommes« charakterisiert. Er stellt ihn dann Goethe gegenüber, damals Geheimrat des Großherzogs Karl-August von Sachsen-Weimar: »Jamais deux hommes ne se convinrent moins que le grand poète et le grand philosophe«, sagt Cousin. Und die Gründe für diese Urteile sind mannigfaltig. (...) Wenn einerseits Fichte in Jena als Verfasser des Beitrags zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publikums über die französische Revolution auch erkannt worden war und - obwohl er jede auffälligen Äußerungen zu vermeiden suchte - er auch kein Geheimnis aus seinen demokratischen Überzeugungen machte, hatte sich andererseits Goethe sowohl in seinen Werken als auch in seiner politischen Tätigkeit immer gegen jede gewalttätige Revolution erklärt, die danach strebte, die angestammte Obrigkeit zu vernichten. Diese seine Haltung entspringt unmittelbar Goethes Idee, daß die Natur - und mit ihr die Geschichte - im Grunde eher der Ort ununterbrochener und langsamer Metamorphosen als unvorhersehbarer Brüche sei. Hier wirkt das gleiche Motiv, daß sich Wilhelm Meister von einem angehenden Schauspieler durch Einfluß einer geheimen Gesellschaft auch seelisch zu einem Arzt wandeln läßt, und es ist im Grunde auch das Gleiche, wenn Goethe in der Geologie den Neptunismus Werners dem Vulkanismus vorzieht. Der Vielseitigkeit der Interessen eines Goethe, der gleichsam Dichter und Naturforscher, Minister und Weltmann war, steht die Gestalt eines Fichtes gegenüber, der sein ganzes Leben der monolithischen Konstruktion der philosophischen Wissenschaftslehre gewidmet hat. Aber auch philosophisch trennt sie ein Abgrund zutiefst. (shrink)

Ende des Sommers 1818, während seines Aufenthalts in München, trifft Victor Cousin Schelling und läßt sich Fichtes Leben in Jena für seine Fragments philosophiques schildern. Der Philosoph wird als »le plus sincère, le plus vertueux, mais aussi le plus obstiné des hommes« charakterisiert. Er stellt ihn dann Goethe gegenüber, damals Geheimrat des Großherzogs Karl-August von Sachsen-Weimar: »Jamais deux hommes ne se convinrent moins que le grand poète et le grand philosophe«, sagt Cousin. Und die Gründe für diese Urteile sind mannigfaltig. (...) Wenn einerseits Fichte in Jena als Verfasser des Beitrags zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publikums über die französische Revolution auch erkannt worden war und - obwohl er jede auffälligen Äußerungen zu vermeiden suchte - er auch kein Geheimnis aus seinen demokratischen Überzeugungen machte, hatte sich andererseits Goethe sowohl in seinen Werken als auch in seiner politischen Tätigkeit immer gegen jede gewalttätige Revolution erklärt, die danach strebte, die angestammte Obrigkeit zu vernichten. Diese seine Haltung entspringt unmittelbar Goethes Idee, daß die Natur - und mit ihr die Geschichte - im Grunde eher der Ort ununterbrochener und langsamer Metamorphosen als unvorhersehbarer Brüche sei. Hier wirkt das gleiche Motiv, daß sich Wilhelm Meister von einem angehenden Schauspieler durch Einfluß einer geheimen Gesellschaft auch seelisch zu einem Arzt wandeln läßt, und es ist im Grunde auch das Gleiche, wenn Goethe in der Geologie den Neptunismus Werners dem Vulkanismus vorzieht. Der Vielseitigkeit der Interessen eines Goethe, der gleichsam Dichter und Naturforscher, Minister und Weltmann war, steht die Gestalt eines Fichtes gegenüber, der sein ganzes Leben der monolithischen Konstruktion der philosophischen Wissenschaftslehre gewidmet hat. Aber auch philosophisch trennt sie ein Abgrund zutiefst. (shrink)

This article examines one of Italo Calvino’s most beloved novels, (1957), contextualizing it in its landscape and exploring the multifaceted strands of its environmental creativity. Unsuspected paths of political ecology, environmental history, and even biosemiotics and plant neurophysiology will emerge, thus showing the timeliness and clairvoyance of his books vis-à-vis our planetary crises. Written in a seminarrative form, this piece is an invitation to read literary works not only along with their landscapes, but their landscapes, and to consider the potential (...) of more-than-human stories for the shaping of our ethical-environmental imagination. (shrink)

Toward a New Socialism offers a critical analysis of capitalism's failings and the imminent need for socialism as an alternative form of government. Dr. Richard Schmitt joins with Dr. Anatole Anton to compile a volume of essays exploring the benefits and consequences of a socialist system as an avenue of increased human solidarity and ethical principle.

We study connections between asymptotic structure in a Banach space and model theoretic properties of the space. We show that, in an asymptotic sense, a sequence $$ in a Banach space X generates copies of one of the classical sequence spaces $\ell_p$ or $c_0$ inside X if and only if the quantifier-free types approximated by $$ inside X are quantifier-free definable. More precisely, if $$ is a bounded sequence X such that no normalized sequence of blocks of $$ converges, then (...) the following two conditions are equivalent. There exists a sequence $$ of blocks of $$ such that for every finite dimensional subspace E of X, every quantifier-free type over $E +\overline{\rm span}\{y_n\mid n\in \mathbb{N}\}$ is quantifier-free definable. One of the following two conditions holds: there exists $1\le p 0$ and every finite dimensional subspace E of X there exists a sequence of blocks of $$ which is $$-equivalent over E to the standard unit basis of $\ell_p$; for every $\epsilon>0$ and every finite dimensional subspace E of X there exists a sequence of blocks of $$ which is $$-equivalent over E to the standard unit basis of $c_0$. Several byproducts of the proof are analyzed. (shrink)

We study a class of [0,1][0,1]-valued logics. The main result of the paper is a maximality theorem that characterizes these logics in terms of a model-theoretic property, namely, an extension of the omitting types theorem to uncountable languages.

Basic hybrid logic extends modal logic with the possibility of naming worlds by means of a distinguished class of atoms (called nominals) and the so-called satisfaction operator, that allows one to state that a given formula holds at the world named a, for some nominal a. Hence, in particular, hybrid formulae include “equality” assertions, stating that two nominals are distinct names for the same world. The treatment of such nominal equalities in proof systems for hybrid logics may induce many redundancies. (...) This paper introduces an internalized tableau system for basic hybrid logic, significantly reducing such redundancies. The calculus enjoys a strong termination property: tableau construction terminates without relying on any specific rule application strategy, and no loop-checking is needed. The treatment of nominal equalities specific of the proposed calculus is briefly compared to other approaches. Its practical advantages are demonstrated by empirical results obtained by use of implemented systems. Finally, it is briefly shown how to extend the calculus to include the global and converse modalities. (shrink)

The interactions among the components of a biological system can be given a logical representation that is useful for reasoning about them. One of the relevant problems that may be raised in this context is finding what would explain a given behaviour of some component; in other terms, generating hypotheses that, when added to the logical theory modelling the system, imply that behaviour. Temporal aspects have to be taken into account, in order to model the causality relationship that may link (...) the behaviour of a given component to that of another one. This paper presents a hypothesis generation method for linear temporal logic theories whose formulae have a restricted syntactic form, which is however sufficient to model cellular and molecular interactions, as they are often represented by biologists. The method exploits the duality between hypothesis generation and consequence finding, and can therefore be also used to infer the consequences of a given fact. It is based on a resolution system proposed by Cavalli and Fariñas del Cerro in 1984. (shrink)

We present a framework for model theoretic forcing in a non first order context, and present some applications of this framework to Banach space theory.

We present a self-contained exposition of the basic aspects of simple theories while developing the fundamentals of forking calculus. We expound also the deeper aspects of S. Shelah's 1980 paper Simple unstable theories. The concept of weak dividing has been replaced with that of forking. The exposition is from a contemporary perspective and takes into account contributions due to S. Buechler, E. Hrushovski, B. Kim, O. Lessmann, S. Shelah and A. Pillay.

XML documents and, more generally, semistructured data, can be seen as labelled graphs. In this paper we set a correspondence between such graphs and the models of a language of hybrid multimodal logic. This allows us to characterize a schema for semistructured data as a formula of hybrid multimodal logic, and instances of the schema as models of this formula. We also investigate how to express in such a logic integrity constraints on semistructured data, in particular some classes of constraints (...) widely considered in the literature. The contribution of this work is twofold: 1) We generalize the notion of schema, by proposing a definition of schema were references are “well typed”. 2) We formalize semistructured data, schema for semistructured data and integrity constraints in a unique framework, namely hybrid multimodal logic. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze some aspects of the question of using methods from model theory to study structures of functional analysis.By a well known result of P. Lindström, one cannot extend the expressive power of first order logic and yet preserve its most outstanding model theoretic characteristics (e.g., compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem). However, one may consider extending the scope of first order in a different sense, specifically, by expanding the class of structures that are regarded as models (e.g., (...) including Banach algebras or other structures of functional analysis), and ask whether the resulting extensions of first order model theory preserve some of its desirable characteristics.A formal framework for the study of structures based on Banach spaces from the perspective of model theory was first introduced by C. W. Henson in [8] and [6]. Notions of syntax and semantics for these structures were defined, and it was shown that using them one obtains a model theoretic apparatus that satisfies many of the fundamental properties of first order model theory. For instance, one has compactness, Löwenheim-Skolem, and omitting types theorems. Further aspects of the theory, namely, the fundamentals of stability and forking, were first introduced in [10] and [9].The classes of mathematical structures formally encompassed by this framework are normed linear spaces, possibly expanded with additional structure,e.g., operations, real-valued relations, and constants. This notion subsumes wide classes of structures from functional analysis. However, the restriction that the universe of a structure be a normed space is not necessary. (This restriction has a historical, rather than technical origin; specifically, the development of the theory was originally motivated by questions in Banach space geometry.) Analogous techniques can be applied if the universe is a metric space. Now, when the underlying metric topology is discrete, the resulting model theory coincides with first order model theory, so this logic extends first order in the sense described above. Furthermore, without any cost in the mathematical complexity, one can also work in multi-sorted contexts, so, for instance, one sort could be an operator algebra while another is. say, a metric space. (shrink)

Given a convergence theorem in analysis, under very general conditions a model-theoretic compactness argument implies that there is a uniform bound on the rate of metastability. We illustrate with three examples from ergodic theory.

In this paper we study proof procedures for some variants of first-order modal logics, where domains may be either cumulative or freely varying and terms may be either rigid or non-rigid, local or non-local. We define both ground and free variable tableau methods, parametric with respect to the variants of the considered logics. The treatment of each variant is equally simple and is based on the annotation of functional symbols by natural numbers, conveying some semantical information on the worlds where (...) they are meant to be interpreted.This paper is an extended version of a previous work where full proofs were not included. Proofs are in some points rather tricky and may help in understanding the reasons for some details in basic definitions. (shrink)

We introduce the concepts of Morley rank and Morley degree for structures based on Banach spaces. We characterize ω-stability in terms of Morley rank, and prove the existence of prime models for ω-stable theories.

The role played by real-valued functions in functional analysis is fundamental. One often considers metrics, or seminorms, or linear functionals, to mention some important examples. We introduce the notion of definable real-valued function in functional analysis: a real-valued function f defined on a structure of functional analysis is definable if it can be "approximated" by formulas which do not involve f. We characterize definability of real-valued functions in terms of a purely topological condition which does not involve logic.

We show that a formula φ(x, y) is stable if and only if φ is the pairing map on the unit ball of E x E * , where E is a reflexive Banach space. The result remains true if the formula φ is replaced by a set of formulas $p(\bar{x},\bar{y})$.

We present a new proof of the existence of Morley sequences in simple theories. We avoid using the Erdős–Rado theorem and instead use only Ramsey’s theorem and compactness. The proof shows that the basic theory of forking in simple theories can be developed using only principles from “ordinary mathematics,” answering a question of Grossberg, Iovino, and Lessmann, as well as a question of Baldwin.

We take kelp as material entities immersed in a multitude of relations with other creatures (for whom kelp serves as both nourishment and shelter) and inorganic elements of the milieu it resides in, on the one hand, and as a figuration: a material-semiotic “map of contestable worlds” that encompasses entangled threads of “knowledge, practice and power” (Haraway 1997, 11) in its local and global sense, on the other. While drawing on our field notes from the congress and feminist posthumanities and (...) environmental humanities literatures (e.g. Alaimo 2016; Åsberg & Braidotti 2018; Sandilands & Erickson 2010; Iovino & Opperman 2014) – with a special focus on the so-called blue humanities/oceanic humanities (e.g. DeLoughrey 2019) – that unpack human/nonhuman relations in the context of the current environmental crisis and the accompanying “slow violence” (Nixon 2011), we mobilise a reflection on and make a proposal for “thinking with kelp” as a multi-faceted methodology of transversal and transdisciplinary knowledge production and practices: situated (Haraway 1988), enfleshed, transcorporeal (Alaimo 2010), collaborative, and committed to an ethics of multispecies response-ability (Haraway 2008). (shrink)

We describe an infinitary logic for metric structures which is analogous to Lω1,ω. We show that this logic is capable of expressing several concepts from analysis that cannot be expressed in finitary continuous logic. Using topological methods, we prove an omitting types theorem for countable fragments of our infinitary logic. We use omitting types to prove a two-cardinal theorem, which yields a strengthening of a result of Ben Yaacov and Iovino concerning separable quotients of Banach spaces.

By utilizing the topological concept of pseudocompactness, we simplify and improve a proof of Caicedo, Dueñez, and Iovino concerning Terence Tao's metastability. We also pinpoint the exact relationship between the Omitting Types Theorem and the Baire Category Theorem by developing a machine that turns topological spaces into abstract logics.

Environmental ethics deals with discussing the ethical framework of environmental values, their organization and regulation, and their ethical premises. One of the main cul-de-sacs that environmental ethics has is its anthropocentrism that can be observed through its diverse ethical approaches—even ecocentric ones, developed as non-anthropocentric egalitarian alternatives. This article aims to question the exclusiveness of Anthropos, the practices, values, and discourses that determine the scope and course of environmental ethics, and the exclusion of nonhuman animals or more-than human beings from (...) its focus. It first examines the main approaches in environmental ethics (land ethic, deep ecology, social ecology, and postmodern environmental ethics)—biocentric, ecocentric, anthropocentric, socialist, postmodern—and reveals that they are but limited to the human perspective, deeply rooted in human exceptionalism. All of these approaches provide us with a critical frame that still needs to be deconstructed so that they will not project an anthropocentric orientation. This article posits that the compass of environmental ethics, recently aligning itself to embrace the more-than-human world in its ecocentric attitude, still needs to be revisited for its discourses of exclusion. At this point, new materialism functions as a prolific theoretical site as it diminishes the classical boundaries between human and animal or subject and object that anthropocentric environmental ethics relies on. With such concepts as “agential realism” (Barad), “transcorporeal ethics” (Alaimo), “vibrant matter” (Bennett), or “storied matter” (Oppermann and Iovino) the new materialist view of the human and the nonhuman evolves to end set dualities in the discourses of environmental ethics. This article concludes that the new materialist theory destabilizes any anthropocentric position in environmental ethics and includes more-than-human beings in its ethical focus, discarding any dualities that serve anthropocentrism or human exceptionalism. (shrink)