Written by philosophers, cosmologists, and physicists, this collection of essays deals with causality, which is a core issue for both science and philosophy. Readers will learn about different types of causality in complex systems and about new perspectives on this issue based on physical and cosmological considerations. In addition, the book includes essays pertaining to the problem of causality in ancient Greek philosophy, and to the problem of God's relation to the causal structures of nature viewed in the light of (...) contemporary physics and cosmology. [Subject: Philosophy, Cosmology, Physics, Religious Studies]. (shrink)

Physics underlies all complexity, including our own existence: how is this possible? How can our own lives emerge from interactions of electrons, protons, and neutrons? This book considers the interaction of physical and non-physical causation in complex systems such as living beings, and in particular in the human brain, relating this to the emergence of higher levels of complexity with real causal powers. In particular it explores the idea of top-down causation, which is the key effect allowing the emergence of (...) true complexity and also enables the causal efficacy of non-physical entities, including the value of money, social conventions, and ethical choices. (shrink)

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of Part I. He responds first to Sara Green and Robert Batterman, before outlining his thoughts on Otávio Bueno’s piece.

The book includes contributions by Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, George F. R. Ellis, Christopher D. Frith, Mark Hallett, David Hodgson, Owen D. Jones, Alicia Juarrero, J. A. Scott Kelso, Christof Koch, Hans Küng, Hakwan C. Lau, Dean Mobbs,...

Digital computers carry out algorithms coded in high level programs. These abstract entities determine what happens at the physical level: they control whether electrons flow through specific transistors at specific times or not, entailing downward causation in both the logical and implementation hierarchies. This paper explores how this is possible in the light of the alleged causal completeness of physics at the bottom level, and highlights the mechanism that enables strong emergence to occur. Although synchronic emergence of higher levels from (...) lower levels is manifestly true, diachronic emergence is generically not the case; indeed we give specific examples where it cannot occur because of the causal effectiveness of higher level variables. (shrink)

Contextual emergence was originally proposed as an inter-level relation between different levels of description to describe an epistemic notion of emergence in physics. Here, we discuss the ontic extension of this relation to different domains or levels of physical reality using the properties of temperature and molecular shape as detailed case studies. We emphasize the concepts of stability conditions and multiple realizability as key features of contextual emergence. Some broader implications contextual emergence has for the foundations of physics and cognitive (...) and neural sciences are given in the concluding discussion. Relevant facts about algebras of observables are found in the appendices along with an abstract definition of Kubo-Martin-Schwinger states. (shrink)

Microphysical laws are time reversible, but macrophysics, chemistry and biology are not. This paper explores how this asymmetry arises due to the cosmological context, where a non-local Direction of Time is imposed by the expansion of the universe. This situation is best represented by an Evolving Block Universe, where local arrows of time emerge in concordance with the Direction of Time because a global Past Condition results in the Second Law of Thermodynamics pointing to the future. At the quantum level, (...) the indefinite future changes to the definite past due to quantum wave function collapse events. (shrink)

This chapter responds to claims that causal closure of the underlying microphysics determines brain outcomes as a matter of principle, even if we cannot hope to ever carry out the needed calculations in practice. The reductionist position is that microphysics alone determines all, specifically the functioning of the brain. Here I respond to that claim in depth, claiming that if one firstly takes into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic emergence, and secondly takes seriously the well established nature of (...) biology in general and neuroscience in particular, downward causation enables genuine causal powers to occur at higher emergent levels in biology and that causal closure is in reality an interlevel affair involving even social levels. (shrink)

The causal closure of physics is usually discussed in a context free way. Here I discuss it in the context of engineering systems and biology, where strong emergence takes place due to a combination of upwards emergence and downwards causation. Firstly, I show that causal closure is strictly limited in terms of spatial interactions because these are cases that are of necessity strongly interacting with the environment. Effective Spatial Closure holds ceteris parabus, and can be violated by Black Swan Events. (...) Secondly, I show that causal closure in the hierarchy of emergence is a strictly interlevel affair, and in the cases of engineering and biology encompasses all levels from the social level to the particle physics level. However Effective Causal Closure can usefully be defined for a restricted set of levels, and one can experimentally determine Effective Theories that hold at each level. This does not however imply those effective theories are causally complete by themselves. In particular, the particle physics level is not causally complete by itself in the contexts of solid state physics, digital computers, or biology. Furthermore Inextricably Intertwined Levels occur in all these contexts. (shrink)

Physics and chemistry underlie the nature of all the world around us, including human brains. Consequently some suggest that in causal terms, physics is all there is. However, we live in an environment dominated by objects embodying the outcomes of intentional design (buildings, computers, teaspoons). The present day subject of physics has nothing to say about the intentionality resulting in existence of such objects, even though this intentionality is clearly causally effective. This paper examines the claim that the underlying physics (...) uniquely causally determines what happens, even though we cannot predict the outcome. It suggests that what occurs is the contextual emergence of complexity: the higher levels in the hierarchy of complexity have autonomous causal powers, functionally independent of lower level processes. This is possible because top-down causation takes place as well as bottom-up action, with higher level contexts determining the outcome of lower level functioning and even modifying the nature of lower level constituents. Stored information plays a key role, resulting in non-linear dynamics that is non-local in space and time. Brain functioning is causally affected by abstractions such as the value of money and the theory of the laser. These are realised as brain states in individuals, but are not equivalent to them. Consequently physics per se cannot causally determine the outcome of human creativity, rather it creates the possibility space allowing human intelligence to function autonomously. The challenge to physics is to develop a realistic description of causality in truly complex hierarchical structures, with top-down causation and memory effects allowing autonomous higher levels of order to emerge with genuine causal powers. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the architecture of downward causation on the basis of three central cases. We set out by answering the question of how top-down causation is possible in the universe. The universe is not causally closed, because of irreducible randomness at the quantum level. What is more, contextual effects can already be observed at the level of quantum physics, where higher levels can modify the nature of lower-level elements by changing their context, or even creating them. As (...) one moves up through higher levels, contextual effects on lower levels occur on various scales within nature, which is crucial in biology in general and the brain in particular. We then argue that there are important logical downward causes.objects have causal effects on material-energetic systems. It can be shown that abstract objects have measurable effects on lower levels, which needs to be accounted for by successful explanations of real phenomena such as intentional action. Intentional action has the form of deductive causation from logical structures to human agency. Without this assumption, we would not be warranted in believing that our physical theories latch onto a universe that is essentially the way we discover it to be. Denying top-down causation on account of the idea that the universe permits only bottom-up constitution of wholes from lower-level elements leads to undermining the very possibility of knowledge and science. Thus, it can be rejected as a global form of explanation. We sketch a model for mind-body interaction according to which the various levels of a human organism together enable the emergence of mental top-down effects. They are necessary conditions for the emergence of human mindedness. Once it is clear that downward causation is a widespread natural phenomenon, the apparent mystery of mental causation is, in principle, solved. (shrink)

There has been much controversy over weak and strong emergence in physics and biology. As pointed out by Phil Anderson in many papers, the existence of broken symmetries is the key to emergence of properties in much of solid state physics. By carefully distinguishing between different types of symmetry breaking and tracing the relation between broken symmetries at micro and macro scales, I demonstrate that the emergence of the properties of semiconductors is a case of strong emergence. This is due (...) to the existence of quasiparticles such as phonons. Furthermore time dependent potentials enable downward causation as in the case of digital computers. Additionally I show that the processes of evolutionary emergence of living systems is also a case of strong emergence, as is the emergence of properties of life out of the underlying physics. A useful result emerges: standard physics theories and the emergent theories arising out of them are all effective theories that are equally valid. (shrink)

Scientific exploration and thus our knowledge about the outside world is subject to the conditions of our experience.These conditions are condensed here into an interface model which,besides being physical,has an additional interface structure not reducible to physics. We suggest that this structure can dynamically be characterized by separate modes.Their selection and operation presupposes free will and a rudimentary concept of time and space. Based on some analogies with quantum networks it is argued that the 'observed' gets 'dressed'as a consequence of (...) the observing. Interface dynamics and system dynamics supplement each other without over- determination. (shrink)

This paper is a comment on both Bunamano and Rovelli (Bridging the neuroscience and physics of time arXiv:2110.01976. (2022)) and Gruber et al. (in Front. Psychol. Hypothesis Theory, 2022) and which discuss the relation between physical time and human time. I claim here, contrary to many views discussed there, that there is no foundational conflict between the way physics views the passage of time and the way the mind/brain perceives it. The problem rather resides in a number of misconceptions leading (...) either to the representation of spacetime as a timeless Block Universe, or at least that physically relevant universe models cannot have preferred spatial sections. The physical expanding universe can be claimed to be an Evolving Block Universe with a time-dependent future boundary, representing the dynamic nature of the way spacetime develops as matter curves spacetime and spacetime tells matter how to move. This context establishes a global direction of time that determines the various local arrows of time. Furthermore time passes when quantum wave function collapse takes place to an eigenstate; during this process, information is lost. The mind/brain acts as an imperfect clock, which coarse-grains the physical passage of time along a world line to determine the experienced passage of time, because neural processes take time to occur. This happens in a contextual way, so experienced time is not linearly related to physical time in general. Finally I point out that the Universe is never infinitely old: its future endpoint always lies infinitely faraway in the future. (shrink)

The present day standard cosmological model is a great theoretical achievement. This chapter surveys the main themes that have arisen and issues that are still oustanding.

Digital computers carry out algorithms coded in high level programs. These abstract entities determine what happens at the physical level: they control whether electrons flow through specific transistors at specific times or not, entailing downward causation in both the logical and implementation hierarchies. This paper explores how this is possible in the light of the alleged causal completeness of physics at the bottom level, and highlights the mechanism that enables strong emergence (the manifest causal effectiveness of application programs) to occur. (...) Although synchronic emergence of higher levels from lower levels is manifestly true, diachronic emergence is generically not the case; indeed we give specific examples where it cannot occur because of the causal effectiveness of higher level variables. (shrink)

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of part II. He responds first to Barbara Drossel, before outlining his thoughts on Thomas Luss’s and Ulf-G. Meißner’s piece.

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of part III. He responds first to Denis Noble, before outlining his thoughts on Larissa Albantakis’, Francesco Massari’s, Maggie Beheler-Amass’ and Giulio Tononi’s piece.

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of Part IV. He responds first to James Woodward, Richard Healey, Jan Voosholz, Simon Friederich and Sach Mukherjee, before outlining his thoughts on Max Kistler’s piece.

Kurt Gödel opposed the reductionist viewpoint of logical positivism. The arguments I give below show he is correct. The reductionist explanation he opposed is doomed to failure.

Accession Number: ATLA0001712277; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 751-766.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 765-766.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

Spekulative Theorien bedürfen laut einigen Forschern keiner experimentellen Überprüfung, um als wissenschaftlich zu gelten. Dieser Ansatz untergräbt die Wissenschaft.Im vergangenen Jahr nahm eine Debatte in der Physik eine beunruhigende Wende: Nicht alle fundamentalen Theorien lassen sich anhand von Beobachtungen überprüfen und so fordern einige Wissenschaftler, das Vorgehen in der theoretischen Physik anzupassen. Sei eine Theorie nur ausreichend elegant und aussagekräftig, so ihr Appell, müsse diese nicht experimentell überprüft werden – das bricht mit jahrhundertealter philosophischer Tradition, nach der wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis sich (...) erst durch empirische Befunde bewähren muss. Wir kritisieren den neuen Ansatz scharf, denn wie der Wissenschaftstheoretiker Karl Popper bereits feststellte: Jede wissenschaftliche Theorie muss falsifizierbar sein. (shrink)

Nancey Murphy has been influential in the religion‐and‐science field through her espousal of the work of Imre Lakatos, more recently developed into a three‐tier approach to the joint epistemology of scientific and religious thought incorporating also the ideas of Hempel and MacIntyre. She has proposed a substantial influence of the radical reformed tradition on science and has demonstrated the nature of social influences on the form of Darwinism. She has developed important links between ethics and the science‐theology debate and has (...) examined in depth ideas associated with hierarchical structuring, supervenience, and the nature of the soul. Together these form a unique and sharply focused contribution to the understanding of the relation between science and religion. (shrink)

This searching examination of the life and philosophy of the twentieth-century Indian intellectual Jarava Lal Mehta details, among other things, his engagement with the oeuvres of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jacques Derrida. It shows how Mehta’s sense of cross-cultural philosophy and religious thought were affected by these engagements, and maps the two key contributions Mehta made to the sum of human ideas. First, Mehta outlined what the author dubs a ‘postcolonial hermeneutics’ that uses the ‘ethnotrope’ of the pilgrim to (...) challenge the philosophical hermeneutic emphasis on supplementation and augmentation. For Mehta, the hermeneutic encounter ruptures, rather than supplements, the self. Secondly, Mehta extended this concept of hermeneutics to interrogate the Hindu tradition, arriving at the concept of the ‘negative messianic’. In contrast to Derrida's emphasis on the 'one to come', Mehta shows how the Hindu bhakti model represents the very opposite, that is, the 'withdrawn other,' identifying thereby the ethical pitfalls of deconstructivism's emphasis on the messianic tradition. This is the only full-length study in English of this high-profile Hindu philosopher. (shrink)

This book tackles the most difficult and profound open questions about life and its origins from an information-based perspective.

Insofar as South Africa underwent a rapid transformation from apartheid to democracy, it may provide a unique laboratory for investigating aspects of revenge and forgiveness. Here we suggest that observations and data from South Africa are partially consistent with the hypotheses generated by MCullough and colleagues. At the same time, the rich range of revenge and forgiveness phenomena in real-life settings is likely to require explanatory concepts other than specialized modules and their computational outputs.

In this edition the text of The Examiner is presented as Swift wrote it, not as it was revised for publication by George Faulkner in 1738. And for the first time Swift's Examiners are juxtaposed with the Medleys of Arthur Mainwaring that replied to them every week. They bring the reader close to the actualités of London between November 1710 and June 1711. From the literary point of view The Examiner is important because it contains some of Swift's best (...) work. Even under the pressure of weekly publication he was still able to achieve, in Herbert Davis's words, 'an aloofness as if beyond bias and passion'. (shrink)

What is the nature of dialectic according to Hegel? And what is achieved by its means? These are the main questions that John McTaggart seeks to answer in this work, first published in 1896. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Cambridge-educated philosopher and fellow of Trinity College enjoyed a prominent position within the circle of idealist philosophers, and was regarded as one of England's leading Hegel scholars. Although a proponent of the German philosopher's dialectical thinking in general, McTaggart (...) was not uncritical of Hegel's philosophy and objected to his application of abstract thought. In this work, McTaggart not only gives the reader a thorough introduction to Hegel's understanding of the dialectic method but also exposes a number of points on which he considers Hegel's teaching to be inaccurate: one of these is Hegel's insistence that evil is merely a delusion. (shrink)

John McTaggart was a Cambridge philosopher, famous for his metaphysical theory that time is not real and that temporal order is an illusion. Although best known for his contributions to the philosophy of time, McTaggart also spent a large part of his career expounding Hegel's work. In this book, first published in 1901, he discusses which views on a range of topics in metaphysics and ethics are compatible with Hegel's logic and idea of 'the Absolute'. Some early work on theories (...) for which McTaggart later became well known can be found in this work, such as his beliefs that humans are immortal, that the Absolute is not in any sense a person, and that love is the relation that binds people together. In this book he also discusses punishment, sin, morality and whether Hegel could be considered a Christian. (shrink)

John McTaggart was a Cambridge philosopher, famous for his metaphysical theory that time is not real and that temporal order is an illusion. Although best known for his contributions to the philosophy of time, McTaggart also spent a large part of his career expounding Hegel's work. In this book, first published in 1901, he discusses which views on a range of topics in metaphysics and ethics are compatible with Hegel's logic and idea of 'the Absolute'. Some early work on theories (...) for which McTaggart later became well known can be found in this work, such as his beliefs that humans are immortal, that the Absolute is not in any sense a person, and that love is the relation that binds people together. In this book he also discusses punishment, sin, morality and whether Hegel could be considered a Christian. (shrink)