Viele Philosophen sind überzeugt, daß unser Wahrnehmungsbewußtsein phänomenale Charakteristika aufweist, die sich in ein physikalistisches Weltbild entweder gar nicht oder nur mit Schwierigkeiten integrieren lassen. Aber wie ist überhaupt unsere reflexive Einsicht erklärbar, daß unser Bewußtsein solche Charakteristika aufweist? An prominenten Beispielen läßt sich zeigen, daß dazu keineswegs die Annahme ausreicht, sie seien intrinsische Bestimmungen unserer Bewußtseinszustände. Vielmehr ist eine radikalere internalistische Konzeption der Inhalte unseres Bewußtseins erforderlich, wie sie Hector-Neri Castañeda entwickelt hat. Eine kritische Untersuchung von Castañedas Ontologie und (...) Wahrnehmungstheorie liefert die Theorieelemente, mit denen die phänomenologische Reflexion erklärbar wird. (shrink)

Modal dispositionalism is the view that possibilities are a matter of the dispositions of individual objects: it is possible that p if and only if something has a disposition for p to be the case. We raise a problem for modal dispositionalism: nothing within the theory rules out that there could be necessary, perfect masks, which make the manifestation of a disposition impossible. Unless such necessary perfect masks are ruled out, modal dispositionalism runs the risk of failing to provide a (...) sufficient condition for possibility, and indeed of engendering contradictions. But to rule them out, modal dispositionalism would have to revise a crucial tenet of the view, its localism. (shrink)

Inductive Metaphysics combines an anti-aprioristic emphasis on an empirical and scientific basis for metaphysics with an insistence on a specifically philosophical abductive theory-building. Since the latter specifically philosophical work is not empirical itself, it may in a liberal sense be called apriori. This paper highlights this apriori dimension within IM by a case study on Structuralism, the view that fundamental reality consists of a network of relations, which a number of philosophers consider to be suggested by modern physics. Focussing on (...) Dasgupta’s algebraic Generalism, the author argues that Structuralism suffers from a severe entailment problem, because the relations-spanning apparatus must stand for metaphysically fundamental forms. Schaffer’s contention that there are no entailment problems is rejected. Advocates of IM are well advised to take seriously their own insistence on metaphysical abduction and not to one-sidedly emphasise the empirical input: the elaboration of exact metaphysical theories and the apriori evaluation of their inherent tenability is a constituent of IM no less important than the consideration of scientific input. More traditional ways of metaphysical reasoning inevitably survive as an essential dimension within IM. (shrink)

Strong dispositional monism, the position that all fundamental physical properties consist in dispositional relations to other properties, is naturally construed as property structuralism. J. Lowe’s circularity/regress objection constitutes a serious challenge to SDM that questions the possibility of a purely relational determination of all property essences. The supervenience thesis of A. Bird’s graph-theoretic asymmetry reply to CRO can be rigorously proved. Yet the reply fails metaphysically, because it reveals neither a metaphysical determination of identities on a purely relational basis nor (...) a determination specifically of identities in the sense of essences. Asymmetry is thus not by itself sufficient for a solution to CRO. But it cannot even help to answer CRO when a model for the determination of essences is taken as a basis. Nor is asymmetry necessary for a reply, as property structures may well be symmetric. A metaphysics of dispositional properties as grounded in a purely relational structure faces serious obstacles, and the properties would not be fundamental. Since essence and grounding are notions of metaphysical priority, there can be no essentially dispositional metaphysically fundamental properties, and the prospects of a “coherentist” metaphysics of basic properties are dim. A modal retreat that refrains from a post-modal conception of essence and simply claims that fundamental properties play dispositional roles by metaphysical necessity is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Resemblance Nominalism About Perfect Naturalness is the view that perfect naturalness of classes is best defined by a conceptual primitive of resemblance between particulars. The adequacy of RNPN is defended by outlining nominalism as the strictly anti-constitutive view that the particulars’ being the fundamental ways they are is not constituted by anything further, supplying a doubly plural contrastive and graded resemblance predicate that allows for a definition of perfect naturalness on an actualist basis, and proving a representation and a uniqueness (...) theorem on the basis of a formal constraint on resemblance called “the Principle”, thereby revealing that bodies of nominalist resemblance facts are guaranteed to behave as if they were grounded in patterns of universals distributed over particulars. (shrink)

Recently, metaphysical coherentism has been propounded as an alternative to metaphysical foundationalism and infinitism. The view replaces the picture of reality as a hierarchy of levels with that of a network of objects or facts standing in symmetric or, more generally, cyclic relations of metaphysical dependence. This paper defends the orthodox picture of a well-founded hierarchy against the claimed superiority of coherentism. First, it will be argued that alleged theoretical advantages of coherentism do not hold up to scrutiny. Secondly, examples (...) that are claimed to support coherentism are either misdescribed as involving metaphysical interdependence, or foundationalist treatments fare at least as good and often better than coherentist interpretations. Thirdly, a similar diagnosis applies to a recently proposed coherentist interpretation of quantum entanglement. The more general diagnosis is that claims of metaphysical dependence are convincing only if there is a detailed account of how one item metaphysically explains another. While foundationalists can resort to various specific explanatory relations, coherentism seems to be incapable of providing detailed explanations. (shrink)

Minimalism is the view that our concept of truth is constituted by our disposition to accept instances of the truth schema ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’. The generalisation problem is the challenge to account for universal generalisations concerning logical truths such as ‘Every proposition of the form 〈if p, then p〉 is true’. This paper argues that such generalisations can be deduced using a single example of the logical truth in question and a single (...) corresponding instance of the truth schema, employing the logical method of reasoning with arbitrary instances of universal and existential generalisations. Suggesting an inferentialist construal of Minimalism, the paper introduces conditional and general acceptance dispositions, distinguishes inferential meaning constitution from implicit definition, highlights the inferential nature of acceptance of instances of the truth schema, sketches a suitable account of structured propositions, compares higher-order with first-order means of quantification, and argues that the conception of truth Minimalism attributes to ordinary speakers is essentially inferential. It finally applies the deductive strategy to generalisations concerning logical validity as well as more complex logical truths. (shrink)

A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations ‘as such’ and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or ‘self-made-ness’ of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations ‘as such’ should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack (...) the theoretical resources to clearly distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness or apperception properly so-called. (shrink)

This paper develops a valid reconstruction in first-order predicate logic of Leibniz’s argument for his complete concept definition of substance in §8 of the Discours de Métaphysique. Following G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, it construes the argument as resting on two substantial premises, the “merely verbal” Aristotelian definition and Leibniz’s concept containment theory of truth, and it understands the resulting “real” definition as saying not that an entity is a substance iff its complete concept contains every predicate of that entity, but iff its (...) complete concept contains every predicate of any subject to which that concept is truly attributable. An account is suggested of why Leibniz criticises the Aristotelian definition as merely nominal and how he takes his own definition to overcome this shortcoming: while on the Aristotelian basis the predication relation could generate endless chains, so that substances as endpoints of predication would be impossible, Leibniz’s definition reveals lowest species as such endpoints, which he therefore identifies with individual substances. Since duplicate lowest species make no sense, the Identity of Indiscernibles for substances follows. The reading suggests a Platonist interpretation according to which substances do not so much have but are individual essences, natures or forms. (shrink)

According to D. Lewis, fundamental physical quantities such as mass are families of perfectly natural properties. The best theory of naturalness, however, is nominalistic. But the nominalistic Lewisian has to account for the unity of the particular masses in terms of fundamental ordering and congruence relations among individuals. Such a first-order relational theory can do without perfectly natural mass qualities, without making the having of a particular mass extrinsic. This strictly relational account can be applied to fundamental vectorial quantities such (...) as the field strengths, too. So conceived, vector fields are compatible with Lewis ' hypothesis of Humean Supervenience. Even the denier of real possible worlds should seek to retain the advantages of this first-order, strictly relational theory. German D. Lewis zufolge sind physikalische Grundgrößen wie die Masse Familien von perfekt natürlichen Eigenschaften. Die beste Theorie der Natürlichkeit ist jedoch die nominalistische. Der nominalistische Lewisianer muss aber den Familienzusammenhalt der einzelnen Massequalitäten durch fundamentale Ordnungs- und Kongruenzbeziehungen zwischen den Masseträgern erklären. Eine solche erststufig-relationale Theorie kann auf perfekt natürliche Massequalitäten verzichten, ohne das Haben einer Masse zu einer extrinsischen Eigenschaft zu machen. Diese strikt relationale Theorie ist auch auf fundamentale Vektorgrößen wie die Feldstärken anwendbar. Derart konzipierte Vektorfelder sind mit Lewis ' Hypothese der Hume'schen Supervenienz vereinbar. Die Vorteile dieser erststufigen, strikt relationalen Theorie sollte auch der Gegner des modalen Realismus zu erhalten suchen. (shrink)

Capturing a scientific change in thinking about personality and individual differences that has been building over the past 15 years, this volume stands at an important moment in the development of psychology as a discipline. Rather than viewing individual differences as merely the raw material upon which selection operates, the contributing authors provide theories and empirical evidence which suggest that personality and individual differences are central to evolved psychological mechanisms and behavioral functioning. The book draws theoretical inspiration from life history (...) theory, evolutionary genetics, molecular genetics, developmental psychology, personality psychology, and evolutionary psychology, while utilizing the theories of the "best and the brightest" international scientists working on this cutting edge paradigm shift. In the first of three sections, the authors analyze personality and the adaptive landscape; here, the authors offer a novel conceptual framework for examining "personality assessment adaptations." Because individuals in a social environment have momentous consequences for creating and solving adaptive problems, humans have evolved "difference-detecting mechanisms" designed to make crucial social decisions such as mate selection, friend selection, kin investment, coalition formation, and hierarchy negotiation. In the second section, the authors examine developmental and life-history theoretical perspectives to explore the origins and development of personality over the lifespan. The third section focuses on the relatively new field of evolutionary genetics and explores which of the major evolutionary forces--such as balancing selection, mutation, co-evolutionary arms races, and drift--are responsible for the origins of personality and individual differences. Existing as a seminal work in the newly emerging evolutionary psychology field, this book is a "must-read" for anyone invested in the development of psychology as a field. (shrink)

Band 1. Von Augustinus bis Nietzsche -- Band 2. Das 20. Jahrhundert.

Martin Heideggers Denken nach 1938 ist vor allem durch drei grosse Themen gepragt: den Wandel des Menschenbildes, die Einfuhrung eines neuen Begriffes vom Denken und den Nachweis, dass Sein Seyn in Beziehung ist. Dabei stutzt er sich auf das Denken Franz Rosenzweigs, das bereits in der Formulierung von Sein und Zeit erkennbar ist, in den Schriften der 40er und 50er Jahre aber in besonders intensiver Weise nachwirkt. Ausgehend von dieser Zusammenschau von Heideggers und Rosenzweigs Denken zeichnet sich auch eine neue (...) Bewertung des Denkens von Emmanuel Levinas ab. (shrink)

C'est sur la nécessité de l'absence d'une telle définition que Julien Busse invite à se pencher pour en analyser aussi bien les causes que les effets.

Excerpt from Die Weltanschauungen der Großen Philosophen der Neuzeit Der Hufforberung, Die I'leuauflage Diefes mit Beifall aufgenomme nen Büchleins 3u beforgen, glaubte ich mich um fo weniger ent3iehen 3u fallen, als mich mit Dem früh verftorbenen Derfaffer manche the meinfamieit Der über3eugung verbanb. Ba Der bisherige Umfang nicht wefenilüh uberfchritten werben follie, habe ich mich Darauf bee fchränit, Die bio; unb bibliographifchen Eingaben 3u revibieren, ein paar £iteraturvermerie hin3u3ufügen fowie einige ftiliftifche mängel3u befeitigen. Ilm übrigen erforberte Die Dietat Beibehaltung Des (...) Gertes auch Dort, wo Dem Derfaffer Die verantwortung überlaffen bleiben muß. Nur an wenigen Stellen habe ich eine. Durch Die Buchftaben R. 5. Als von mir herrührenb geienn3eichnete - Elnmeriung beigefügt. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Seit dem 2. nachchristlichen Jahrhundert werden die Schriften von Aristoteles kommentiert. Diese Ausgabe enthält griechische Kommentare zu seinem Werk vom 3. bis 8. Jahrhundert n. Chr., u. a. von Alexander von Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in griechischer Sprache.

Buss, S.R., The undecidability of k-provability, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 53 75-102. The k-provability problem is, given a first-order formula ø and an integer k, to determine if ø has a proof consisting of k or fewer lines . This paper shows that the k-provability problem for the sequent calculus is undecidable. Indeed, for every r.e. set X there is a formula ø and an integer k such that for all n,ø has a proof of k sequents if (...) and only if n ε X. (shrink)

Bis heute hält die Politische Philosophie an dem staatsphilosophischen Diktum einer in viele Staaten zerfallenden Welt fest, die stets Formen der Ausgrenzung und der Trennung hervorbringt. Ralf Rother thematisiert hingegen die Dekonstruktion des Politischen als eine Repolitisierung des politischen Denkens, indem er sich einer Diskussion um Heideggers Terminus »Mitsein« widmet, die von Levinas, Blanchot, Nancy und Derrida initiiert wurde. Im Fokus dieser Debatte steht die Frage: Wie ist ein Zusammenleben derjenigen möglich, die unter Rückgriff auf Hobbes'sche und Schmitt'sche Positionen (...) - z.B. aufgrund unterschiedlicher Herkunft oder Feindschaft - als nicht zusammengehörig verstanden werden? (shrink)

Wie kann eine Theorie der Ethik beschaffen sein, wenn sie aus dem gedanklichen Repertoire der Existenzphilosophie entworfen wird? Sie bedarf vor allem einer speziellen Sprachfindung, die einen Diskurs mit zeitgenossischen Ethik-Konzeptionen im ersten Moment zu erschweren scheint. Susanne Mobua zeigt auf, dass dieses nicht zwangslaufig gilt, wenn der strukturelle Rahmen, in dem die Ethik der Existenz sich artikulieren kann, in die Untersuchung einbezogen wird. Hier kommt das Konzept des Neuen Denkens zum Tragen, das 1925 von Franz Rosenzweig vorgestellt wurde. Zum (...) ersten Mal ist es moglich, die Bedeutung des Rosenzweig'schen Denkens fur die Entwicklung von Existenzphilosophie und Dekonstruktion darzustellen. (shrink)

Aus einer bestimmten Perspektive betrachtet, zeigt sich Martin Heideggers erste systematische Schrift "Sein und Zeit" als Konzeptualisierung des "Sterns der Erlosung" von Franz Rosenzweig. Diesen Befund gilt es anhand eines intensiven Vergleiches beider Texte zu bestatigen. Erganzend werden Heideggers Arbeiten uber rund zwanzig Jahre von seiner Dissertation bis zu den "Beitragen zur Philosophie" verfolgt, um die Phasen einer Rezeption zwischen Aneignung, Widerspruch und Negation rekonstruieren zu konnen, die in der Geschichte der westlichen Rationalitat ihresgleichen sucht. Denn es wird sichtbar, wie (...) stark Heideggers Begrundung eines angeblichen seinsgeschichtlichen Auftrages der Deutschen von jenen Aussagen Franz Rosenzweigs gepragt ist, in denen dieser das judische Volk charakterisiert. Ein vertiefender Blick auf das Selbstverstandnis Martin Heideggers zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus wird moglich, der dazu beitragen kann, die Frage seiner ideologischen Positionierung vor neuem Hintergrund zu stellen. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie traditionsreiche Deutsche Gesellschaft für Innere Medizin war durch ihr Agieren in der NS-Zeit belastet. Vor ihrem ersten Nachkriegskongress 1948 in Karlsruhe fiel dem Bonner Klinikdirektor Paul Martini die Rolle eines Reorganisators zu. Martini, der während der NS-Zeit in Opposition zum Regime gestanden hatte, wählte einen Kurs umfassender Integration. Verfolgte des NS-Staats versuchte er ebenso in die DGIM einzubinden wie einstige gemäßigte Nationalsozialisten. Zugleich bemühte er sich um die Bewahrung des gesamtdeutschen Charakters der Kongresse sowie um einen zügigen Anschluss an (...) die internationale Forschung. Dennoch führte der eingeschlagene Weg die DGIM in nur scheinbar unpolitische Wissenschaftlichkeit und Jahrzehnte weitgehender Kritiklosigkeit gegenüber ihrer NS-Geschichte. (shrink)

There is a widely accepted view in action theory (most prominently defended by Donald Davidson) according to which (1) actions are events, (2) reasons are intentional attitudes of the agent (pairs of beliefs and desires), and (3) acting for a reason entails that the reason rationalizes as well as causes the action. In the first part of my contribution I list seventeen difficulties for this standard account; in the second part I give an outline of how a more plausible conception (...) of reasons and actions could look like. According to this conception, which is based on Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of a mechanistic understanding of psychological concepts, agency is due to a special kind of disposition of the agent, namely the disposition to behave as if the agent were permanently deliberating about what to do. The conception has surprising consequences for the ontological status of intentional attitudes and actions and for the relationship between action and responsibility. (shrink)

Seit dem 2. nachchristlichen Jahrhundert werden die Schriften von Aristoteles kommentiert. Diese Ausgabe enthält griechische Kommentare zu seinem Werk vom 3. bis 8. Jahrhundert n. Chr., u. a. von Alexander von Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in griechischer Sprache.

Commentaries on Aristotle's writings have been produced since the 2nd century AD. This edition contains Greek commentaries on his work from the 3rd to the 8th centuries AD by, among others, Alexander of Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in Greek.