(or not oveA-complete.) . Let * be a unary operator defined on the set F of formulas of the language £ (ie, if A is a formula of £, then *A is also a ...

Background The post-trial period is the time period after the end of study drug administration. It is unclear whether post-trial arrangements for patient surveillance are routinely included in study protocols and consents, and whether research ethics boards (REB) consider the post-trial period. Objectives The objective was to determine whether trial protocols and consent forms reviewed by the REB describe procedures for post-trial period surveillance. Methods An observational study of protocols of randomised trials of chronic therapies for cardiac conditions, approved by (...) the REB of two academic institutions affiliated with the University of Toronto in Canada (University Health Network and Mount Sinai Hospital) from 1995 to 2007. Plans for patient surveillance in the post-trial period described in the protocol or in the consent form before and after REB approval were recorded. Results 42 studies were identified including 18 heart failure and 15 coronary artery disease trials. Only four studies planned a clinical visit after trial termination, and an additional three planned a telephone contact after trial completion. Five trials submitted consent forms to the REB with a discussion of the post-trial period. Conclusions The majority of protocols and consent forms did not discuss plans for post-trial period surveillance. The post-trial period and the REB approval process could be improved by systematic follow-up being described in the protocol and consent form. The small number of trial protocols evaluated in the study may impair the degree to which the results can be generalised. (shrink)

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

In this paper we study the systemsP andP * (see Arruda and da Costa,O paradoxo de Curry-Moh Shaw-Kwei, Boletim da Sociedade Matemtica de São Paulo 18 (1966)) and some related systems. In the last section, we prove that certain set theories havingP andP * as their underlying logics are non-trivial.

In this paper we study the systems P and $P^{\ast}$ (see Arruda and da Costa, O paradoxo de Curry-Moh Shaw-Kwei, Boletim da Sociedade Matemātica de São Paulo 18 (1966)) and some related systems. In the last section, we prove that certain set theories having P and $P^{\ast}$ as their underlying logics are non-trivial.

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

Como pensar a ética a partir das contradições de um mundo que, no mesmo espaço e ao mesmo tempo, produz uma ciência e intelectuais dedicados a pesquisar princípios de vida e armas de morte; progressos nas comunicações e mecanismos sutis e aberrantes de censura? Eis as questões: falso bem, falsa justiça, falsa liberdade, falsa virtude, que, ao criarem o homem da concórdia, da submissão e da boa-fé, o tornam duas vezes escravo: da superstição e das convenções. Os textos que compõem (...) essa obra, originalmente produzidos para o curso livre Ética, procuram, assim, pensar as razões pelas quais os homens se comportam de determinada maneira e por que a maioria das doutrinas morais conserva vestígios da servidão, no momento mesmo em que promete instaurar a liberdade.ÍndiceCenários - Adauto NovaesA tragédia grega e o humano - Nicole LorauxHumanidade e justiça na historiografia grega, V-I a. C. - Catherine Darbo-PeschanskiAs delícias do jardim - José Américo Motta PessanhaA culpa dos reis: mando e transgressão no Ricardo II - Antonio CandidoO retorno do bom governo - Renato Janine RibeiroAs fronteiras da ética: Maquiavel - Newton BignottoPolítica do céu (anti-Maquiavel) - Antonio Alcir Bernárdez PécoraDilemas da moral iluminista - Sergio Paulo RouanetUma reinvenção da ética socialista - Nelson LevyEstado e Terror - Paulo Sérgio PinheiroO eterno retorno do mesmo: tese cosmológica ou imperativo ético? - Scarlett MartonA mentira: um capítulo das relações entre a ética e a política - Celso LaferMoralidade pública e moralidade privada - José Arthur GianottiO sujeito e a norma - Gerd BornheimA mulher e a lei - Maria Rita KehlImpasses da ética naturalista: Gide e o homoerotismo - Jurandir Freire CostaBom dia, senhor Coubert! - Jorge ColiVer o invisível: a ética das imagens - Nelson Brissac PeixotoIlusões perdidas - José Miguel WisnikPúblico, privado, despotismo - Marilena Chauí. (shrink)

This paper aims at pointing out the parallel between the contradictions within the foundations of the Theory of Human Rights, according to Hannah Arendt’s approach, and the paradoxes in the democratic societies, in Alexis de Tocqueville’s and Claude Lefort’s points of view. Moreover, I would like to state the importance of the concrete efetiveness of human rights in contemporary democratic societies.

In this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by epistemologists. Second, it illuminates the relationship between anxiety and risk. It is standard in psychology to conceive of anxiety as a response to risk, but psychologists – very (...) reasonably – have little to say about risk itself, as opposed to risk judgement. In this paper, I specify what risk must be like to be the kind of thing to which anxiety can be a response. Third, my account improves on extant accounts of epistemic anxiety in the literature. It is more fleshed out than Jennifer Nagel’s, which is largely agnostic about the nature of epistemic anxiety, focusing instead on what work it does in our epistemic lives. In offering an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotion, my account explains how it is able to do the epistemological work to which Nagel puts it. My account is also more plausible than Juliette Vazard’s, on which epistemic anxiety is an emotional response to potential threat to one’s practical interests. Vazard’s account cannot distinguish epistemic anxiety from anxiety in general, and also fails to capture all instances of what we want to call epistemic anxiety. My account does better on both counts. (shrink)

I discuss some questions of quantum physics, for instance the validity and limitations of the basic language of set theory to deal with problems related to elementary particles. I also present a sketch of a formalization of a “metaphysics of structures”, which might be useful for a kind of “ontic structural realism”, and briefly review the concept of quasi-truth, which underlies my way of understanding scientific theories and the scientific activity.

Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying definitions. It is emphasized that (...) the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors. (shrink)

This paper is a summary of a lecture in which I presented some remarks on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and their meaning for the foundations of physics. The entire lecture will appear elsewhere. doi: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p453.

This paper is a summary of a lecture in which I presented some remarks on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and their meaning for the foundations of physics. The entire lecture will appear elsewhere.

In view of the presertt state of development of non cktssicallogic, especially of paraconsistent logic, a new stand regardmg the relatzons between logtc and ontology is deferded In a parody of a dicturn of Quine, my stand may be summarized as follows To be is to be the value of a vanable a specific language with a given underlymg logic Yet my stand differs from Qutne's, because, among other reasons, I accept some first order heterodox logIcs as genutne alternatwes to (...) ciassical logic I aiso discuss some questions of non classical logic to substantzate my argument, and suggest that rny position complements and extends some uleas advanced by L Apostei. (shrink)

In previous essays (1973, 1975, 1977) I have praised Derrida's contributions to philosophical dialogue and also insisted on their limitations. The considerations raised in this present essay do not lead me to a position that is less ambivalent. Philosophy is a particular language-game. Like any other, it has its constitutive rules; or, perhaps better: its practice has certain distinctive features by means of which we recognize philosophizing and distinguish it from other linguistic activities. None of this can be set down (...) in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions, and there always will be large areas of controversy about the paradigms themselves. Nonetheless there are philosophers, and they generally acknowledge Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, and even some of their colleagues as also being philosophers. This acknowledgement holds even where there is philosophical disagreement - as must inevitably be the case, in view of the dialogical character of philosophical discourse. Derrida occasionally enters into the dialogue, as do many others - poets, novelists, critics, diplomats, attorneys, cooks, barbers, and babysitters. These occasional contributions to philosophical dialogue differ in focus, in style, and in lack of self-referentiality from the works which constitute the main corpus of philosophy. Some might wish to say, as if the matter were paradoxical, that such contributions are both philosophical and not philosophical, or that they are neither philosophy nor not-philosophy. That might be as good a thing to say as anything. The practice of philosophy is complex and has many levels. Those who are acknowledged as its finest practitioners have a focus, a style, and a respect for where questions begin and end. Derrida does not share these qualities, and does not care to share them. That is no reason to ignore his work, but it is sufficient to explain why philosophers do not recognize it as a contribution to the central corpus of philosophy. (shrink)

Three very different things present themselves under the title “politics,” even when we restrict the domain of politics to civic concerns. One is the highly partisan activity that begins with the distinction between friends and enemies and culminates in wars or elections. Another is legislation, litigation, and diplomacy, often making use of conciliatory negotiation with adversaries (no longer “enemies” but honorable fellows). The third is civic action aimed at limiting, circumventing, or constraining the role of the first two. I call (...) the first kind “zero-sum politics,” the second “integrative politics,” and the third “anti-politics,” anti-politics having affinities with what Pettit calls anti-power. My aim is to distinguish the three by sketching their salient differences. The important point, as Wittgenstein said, is that these language-games are played. Clarity about their differences can enhance both our understanding of public affairs and the quality of public discourse. (shrink)

In reading the Tractatus, one gets the impression that Wittgenstein, having resolved to his satisfaction the problems about language, logic, science, and mathematics, sets these painstakingly articulated findings in a disproportionately skimpy setting. There is a perfunctory ontology at the beginning, which is highly original as well as austere and perplexing; and at the end he hurries even more than usual through ethics, aesthetics and religion—as if the silence was already coming upon him, prematurely. The Notebooks 1914–1916 help a good (...) deal in understanding this skimpy setting. They give little direct indication of the ontological overture, apart from their frequent reiteration that there must be simples of some sort if the sense of expressions is to be determinate, but they give a fuller treatment to the other topics. This is particularly true of the latter half of 1916, when this parcel of topics seems to have become uppermost in Wittgenstein’s mind. Though it is exceedingly difficult to know what to make of what are in effect discarded notes, some of the entries are just too interesting to ignore. I wish to consider what light they throw on his thought at roughly the Tractatus period, and in particular on the ontology that apparently springs up full grown at the beginning of the Tractatus. (shrink)

Contrary to the contemporary view that negation is a logical operation that modifies the mere content of a thought or judgment, but not the act of thinking or judging it, Kant maintains that negation is an act of logical apperception through which I exclude a thought or judgment from what ‘I think.’ In this paper, I argue against two interpretations of Kant’s account of logical negation. According to the first, negation is a subjective psychological act of excluding an erroneous judgment. (...) Against this, I will show that for Kant, negation is an operation of logical, not empirical apperception. The second interpretation views logical negation as an objective representation either of a relation of opposition or of non-being. I argue that, on the contrary, the logical function of negation is merely formal, not material, and therefore does not have semantic content. The paper’s final section develops a positive conception of logical negation as a formal function of judging. (shrink)

2. Thesis 2 I accept insofar as it asserts the relation of possibility to actuality to be a fundamental aspect of things. This relation is sui generis.

It would seem that "possibility," "concrete actuality," and "decision" are terms indispensable in describing my existence. It may also be that the meaning of no one of these three terms may be adequately conceived without reference to the other two. By preferring to follow Santayana, Mr. Eddins emphasizes concrete actuality. Now, as I read Santayana, existence like essence is a category, not strictly a "realm" of being, a category that we come to respect as we act and make decisions. It (...) should not, even in Santayana's materialism, be considered in abstraction from critical situations. Santayana's animal faith accepts the presence of a concrete actuality, the "realm" of matter conceived as a field of action. I might add that a human faith will accept our act of decision that makes its terms with the changing conditions constituting this realm. Thus I have asserted that "to exist is to have an unfinished history and a problematic future, the two being united in decision." When I think of my own existence or that of my friends, I bear this meaning more or less clearly in mind. My own existence is apparent to me every time I consider my past and my open future as the margins of a decision that is being formulated in my mind. Suppose now that someone convinces me that my decisions do not face an open future but stand to their future in a strictly chronological relation comparable, let us say, to the relation of earlier and later events as portrayed in an elementary text-book of history. Then I must face the difficulties latent in Leibniz' theology. (shrink)

It would seem that "possibility," "concrete actuality," and "decision" are terms indispensable in describing my existence. It may also be that the meaning of no one of these three terms may be adequately conceived without reference to the other two. By preferring to follow Santayana, Mr. Eddins emphasizes concrete actuality. Now, as I read Santayana, existence like essence is a category, not strictly a "realm" of being, a category that we come to respect as we act and make decisions. It (...) should not, even in Santayana's materialism, be considered in abstraction from critical situations. Santayana's animal faith accepts the presence of a concrete actuality, the "realm" of matter conceived as a field of action. I might add that a human faith will accept our act of decision that makes its terms with the changing conditions constituting this realm. Thus I have asserted that "to exist is to have an unfinished history and a problematic future, the two being united in decision." When I think of my own existence or that of my friends, I bear this meaning more or less clearly in mind. My own existence is apparent to me every time I consider my past and my open future as the margins of a decision that is being formulated in my mind. Suppose now that someone convinces me that my decisions do not face an open future but stand to their future in a strictly chronological relation comparable, let us say, to the relation of earlier and later events as portrayed in an elementary text-book of history. Then I must face the difficulties latent in Leibniz' theology. (shrink)

2. Without creation, becoming would be either a repetitive routine or a random movement, and no possibility would appear as an objective. But creative becoming embraces a determinable future containing unrealized objectives in the form of possibilities. It also maintains itself as a consistent continuation of the past. Thus I can accept Mr. Hartshorne's comment on Thesis 2. As I see it, the idea of creation involves a theory of endless becoming, a world without end. Creation is an adjustment of (...) pattern and context, a determinate embodiment of pattern in a context consistent with a relevant past and contributing toward a relevant future. Hence no first act of creation and no last act are called for, nor can creation be reconciled with a world history present as a totum simul. (shrink)

Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality presents a systematic discussion of the role that Kant assigns to concepts in making knowledge of objects possible. In this paper, I ascribe to Allais a version of non-conceptualism, according to which knowledge is a ‘hybrid’ or loose unity of concept and intuition; concept relates to intuition as form relates to matter in an artefact. I will show how this view has trouble accommodating the distinction between knowledge and accidentally true belief, and how it leads to (...) objectionable forms of idealism. (shrink)

In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does not (...) provide mere criteria for noting sameness and difference in things, but instead reflects the inner nature of things. Its form consists in the self-consciousness of a capacity to judge (i.e. the Concept is the ‘I think’). (shrink)

Feeling, for any animal, is a faculty of comparing objects or representations with regard to whether they promote its vital powers or hinder them. But whereas these comparisons presuppose a species-concept in non-rational animals, nature has not equipped the human being with a universal principle or life-form that would determine what agrees or disagrees with it. As humans, we must determine our mode of life for ourselves. Contrary to other interpretations, I argue that this places the human capacity for pleasure (...) and displeasure outside of nature and in a realm of spirit. (shrink)

This paper argues for Kantian “universalism,” according to which the subject of empirical cognition is not merely individual, but universal. In the first section, I consider the limitations of Hume’s individualist view of the subject of judgment, which is able to explain how another person exerts power over my judgments, but cannot explain how what she says can challenge or support my judgments. In the second section, I argue that Kant’s universalism accounts for the possibility of rational support both among (...) different judgments in me, and among judgments of different subjects. The third section looks at the consequences of universalism for Kant’s account of testimony. I argue that on Kant’s view, it does not matter whether I learn something from my own experience or from your experience. Testimony thus does not emerge in Kant’s philosophy as a significant topic. In the fourth section, I argue that the enlightenment project of overcoming prejudice and acquiring wisdom makes it imperative that knowledge be not only universally shareable, but also actually shared among members of an epistemic community. (shrink)

Robert Solomon has usefully set forth the outlines of an ontology of ethics for the employee. I seize upon three of the insights in his paper-specifically, relating to employee role, social nature, and virtue-and develop them along Aristotelean lines, showing along the way how classic "dilemmas" of the business ethics literature can be recast as problems of employee character and virtue.

In Good White People: The Problem with Middle-Class White Anti-Racism, Shannon Sullivan considers: "What can white people do to help end racial injustice?". As one response to this question, Sullivan argues that prescribing "white shame" and "white guilt" is useless, since promoting these ideas leads to self-hate and inaction on the part of white people. In this paper, I agree with Sullivan, but for different reasons. I argue that assuming that white people can feel ashamed simply about being white within (...) our current society is unfounded. I will maintain that the project of "promoting white shame" is fraught to begin with, and show the significance of this finding for conversations about white people's role in... (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt has become standard to treat Kant’s characterization of pure apperception as involving the claim that questions about what I think are transparent to questions about the world. By contra...

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, (...) but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it's perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it's not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality. (shrink)

The purpose of the present paper is to consider the traditional interpretive problems of quantum mechanics from the viewpoint of a modal ontology of properties. In particular, we will try to delineate a quantum ontology that (i) is modal, because describes the structure of the realm of possibility, and (ii) lacks the ontological category of individual. The final goal is to supply an adequate account of quantum non-individuality on the basis of this ontology.