A system of philosophy of the sort presented in this and the following volumes begins with logic. Philosophy properly speaking is characterized by the kind oflogic it employs, for what it employs it assumes, however silently; and what it assumes it presupposes. The logic stands behind the ontology and is, so to speak, metaphysically prior. One word of caution. The philosophical aspects of logic have lagged behind the mathematical aspects in point of view of interest and develop ment. The work (...) of N. Rescher and others have gone a long way to correct this. However, their work on philosophical logic has been more concerned with the logical than with the philosophical aspects. I have in mind another approach, one that would call attention to the ontological (systematic meta physics) or metaphysical (critical ontology) aspects, whichever term you prefer. It is this approach which I have pursued in the following chapters. Since together they stand at the head of a system of philosophy which has been developed in some seventeen books, a system which ranges over all of the topics of philosophy, the chosen approach can be seen as the necessary one. But I have not written any logic, I have merely indicated the sort of logic that has to be written. (shrink)

In Plato’s _Laws_ is the earliest surviving fully developed cosmological argument. His influence on the philosophy of religion is wide ranging and this book examines both that and the influence of religion on Plato. Central to Plato’s thought is the theory of forms, which holds that there exists a realm of forms, perfect ideals of which things in this world are but imperfect copies. In this book, originally published in 1959, Feibleman finds two diverse strands in Plato’s philosophy: an (...) idealism centered upon the Forms denying full ontological status to the realm of becoming, and a moderate realism granting actuality equal reality with Forms. For each strand Plato developed a conception of religion: a supernatural one derived from Orphism, and a naturalistic religion revering the traditional Olympian deities. (shrink)

In Plato’s _Laws_ is the earliest surviving fully developed cosmological argument. His influence on the philosophy of religion is wide ranging and this book examines both that and the influence of religion on Plato. Central to Plato’s thought is the theory of forms, which holds that there exists a realm of forms, perfect ideals of which things in this world are but imperfect copies. In this book, originally published in 1959, Feibleman finds two diverse strands in Plato’s philosophy: an (...) idealism centered upon the Forms denying full ontological status to the realm of becoming, and a moderate realism granting actuality equal reality with Forms. For each strand Plato developed a conception of religion: a supernatural one derived from Orphism, and a naturalistic religion revering the traditional Olympian deities. (shrink)

The problem of knowledge.--The acquisition of knowledge.--The assimilation of knowledge.--The deployment of knowledge.--Knowing, doing and being.--Absent objects.--The mind-body problem.--The knowledge of the known.--The subjectivity of a realist.--Activity as a source of knowledge.--On beliefs and believing.--Adaptive responses and the ecosystem.--The reality game.

In Plato's Laws is the earliest surviving fully developed cosmological argument. His influence on the philosophy of religion is wide ranging and this book examines both that and the influence of religion on Plato. Central to Plato's thought is the theory of forms, which holds that there exists a realm of forms, perfect ideals of which things in this world are but imperfect copies. In this book, originally published in 1959, Feibleman finds two diverse strands in Plato's philosophy: an (...) idealism centered upon the Forms denying full ontological status to the realm of becoming, and a moderate realism granting actuality equal reality with Forms. For each strand Plato developed a conception of religion: a supernatural one derived from Orphism, and a naturalistic religion revering the traditional Olympian deities. (shrink)

physical realist heavily bverlaid with the interpretation afforded by linguistic analysis, so he changed, too. But at the time, which was approximately during the second decade of the twentieth century, they were no doubt very close in their views. Russell acknowledged the influence of Wittgenstein in several places in the 1918 lectures on logical atomism. Wittgenstein might not have written the Tractatus had Russell not given the lectures on logical atomism, or at least had he not maintained the views there (...) expressed. Certainly it is true in a very large sense that the Tractatus may be interpreted as a commentary on the 1918 lectures of Russell. Wittgenstein certainly did not hear them but, as Russell said, the topics were discussed together; and the debt of the Tractatus to the views of the contents of the lectures is obvious. Since Wittgenstein was the pupil and Russell the teacher, we may assume, despite the mutual influence, that the greater effect was Russell's. There is no space in which to go into a thorough analysis of the predecessors of Wittgenstein and of the influences upon him. In addition, there is not sufficient data. One clue, however, we are given. One of his friends has informed us that Wittgenstein "did read and enjoy Plato" and "recognized congenial features" in his philosophical method 1, although, to be sure, Wittgenstein is not said to have been a great reader of philosophy. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The following pages contain a theory of justice and a theory of law . Justice will be defined as the demand for a system of laws, ...

There remains only the obligation to thank those who have helped me with specific suggestions and the editors who have kindly granted permission to reprint material which first appeared in the pages of their journals. To the former group belong Alan B. Brinkley and Max O. Hocutt Portion of chap ters I and VI were published in Philosophy of Science; of chapters IV and V in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine; of chapter VIII in Dialectica; of chapter IX in The (...) British lournal for the Philosophy of Science; and of chapter XIII in Synthese. J.K.F. New Orleans, 1971 PREFACE In this book I have tried to describe the scientific method, understood as the hypothetico-experimental technique of investigation which has been prac ticed so successfully in the physical sciences. It is the first volume of a three-volume work on the philosophy of science, each of which, however, is complete and independent. A second volume will contain an account of the domain in which the method operates and a history of empiricism. A third volume will be devoted to the philosophy of science proper: the metaphysics and epistemology presupposed by the method, its logical structure, and the ethical implications of its results. (shrink)

There remains only the obligation to thank those who have helped me with specific suggestions and the editors who have kindly granted permission to reprint material which first appeared in the pages of their journals. To the former group belong Alan B. Brinkley and Max O. Hocutt Portion of chap ters I and VI were published in Philosophy of Science; of chapters IV and V in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine; of chapter VIII in Dialectica; of chapter IX in The (...) British lournal for the Philosophy of Science; and of chapter XIII in Synthese. J.K.F. New Orleans, 1971 PREFACE In this book I have tried to describe the scientific method, understood as the hypothetico-experimental technique of investigation which has been prac ticed so successfully in the physical sciences. It is the first volume of a three-volume work on the philosophy of science, each of which, however, is complete and independent. A second volume will contain an account of the domain in which the method operates and a history of empiricism. A third volume will be devoted to the philosophy of science proper: the metaphysics and epistemology presupposed by the method, its logical structure, and the ethical implications of its results. (shrink)

In the following pages I have endeavored to show the impact on philosophy of tech nology and science; more specifically, I have tried to make up for the neglect by the classical philosophers of the historic role of technology and also to suggest what positive effects on philosophy the ahnost daily advances in the physical sciences might have. Above all, I wanted to remind the ontologist of his debt to the artificer: tech nology with its recent gigantic achievements has introduced (...) a new ingredient into the world, and so is sure to influence our knowledge of what there is. This book, then, could as well have been called 'Ethnotechnology: An Explanation of Human Behavior by Means of Material Culture', but the picture is a complex one, and there are many more special problems that need to be prominently featured in the discussion. Human culture never goes forward on all fronts at the same time. In our era it is unquestionably not only technology but also the sciences which are making the most rapid progress. Philosophy has not been very successful at keeping up with them. As a consequence there is an 'enormous gulf between scientists and philosophers today, a gulf which is as large as it has ever been. ' (1) I can see that with science moving so rapidly, its current lessons for philosophy might well be outmoded tomorrow. (shrink)

With this issue we initiate the policy of expanding the scope of Tulane Studies in Philosophy to include, in addition to the work of members of the department, contributions from philosophers who have earned advanced degrees from Tulane and who are now teaching in other colleges and universities. The Editor THE LOGIC OF OUR LANGUAGE ROBERT L. ARRINGTON Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus that "logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. " 1 In line (...) with his suggestion that a proposition is a 'picture', Wittgenstein argued that propositions 'show' the logical structure of the real. He was insistent, however, that "the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. " 2 As a result of this we can misunderstand the structure of fact. Philosophical problems arise just when "the logic of our language is mis understood. " 3 It is common knowledge that much of this view of logic was rejected by Wittgenstein himself in the Philosophical Investi gations. There we are told that language has no ideal or sublime 4 logic which mirrors the structure of the extra-linguistic world. Consequently, inferences from the structure of language to the structure of that extra-linguistic world are invalid. Reality can be 'cut up' in any of a number of ways by language. Wittgenstein adopted a view of philosophy which would render that discipline a non-explanatory, non-critical study of the multiple ways in which language can be used. (shrink)

The religiously inclined have always rejected materialism. The thesis of this study is that there may have been good reasons for them to do so until comparatively recent times but that the same reasons no longer exist. Our knowledge of matter has not only increased, it has also been altered so completely that there is no more justification for disapproving of materialism on religious grounds.