In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Explication or Explanation?Giovanni Stanghellini (bio) and Mario Rossi Monti (bio)Keywordsexplanation, explication, interpretation, phenomenology, psychopathologyMike Martin's paper raises questions about the process and the effectiveness of psychotherapy in the case of an Iraq war veteran, Colin, described by Dr. Bailey in his essay “A Painful Lack of Wounds”: does psychotherapy succeed? If so, why does it succeed? How far is and should psychotherapy be value free? The clinical (...) phenomenon discussed in this paper is defined as a serious but not severe depression occurring upon returning from the Iraq war. The impression, from the vantage point of a psychotherapist, is that too many details are lacking from the account that is provided and that the case is hurriedly explained away invoking a naturalistic evolutionary model.The psychotherapeutic, as well as the clinical (Stanghellini 2007) and the research (Stanghellini and Ballerini 2008) interview is a quest for meaning. Its first concern is an accurate unfolding of subjective experiences and the organization of these experiences according to a pattern of sense that is immanent to the experiences themselves; the interpretation or the explanation of these experiences according to a model that is not immanent in the clinical material itself may come as a later step.The first step may be called the explication of case material. It consists in bringing out the raw feelings of the patient's experiences and the personal meanings that the patient attributes to his experiences. Here is a list a questions that a clinician would (tactfully) address to Dr. Bailey's patient to enrich the clinical explication of this case (a great deal of questions, of course, can be found also in Martin's [2009] commentary): What are the phenomenal features of Colin's “depression”? Which thoughts and emotions are involved? Anxiety? Anguish? Fear? Frustration? Anger? Irritability? Sadness? Apathy? Guilt? Shame? Which other experiences are involved, for example, physical pains or somatic symptoms? What is it like for Colin not to have proven his “manhood” in Iraq? What does it mean for him to be a “man”? Why does he want to be a man? How does it look like his “ideal” man? How does he exactly feel and what does he mean by “being a wimp”?We also need to illuminate the internal relations of dependence between these experiences: are these phenomena each one independent form the others, or can we find a meaning organizer among them (Rossi Monti and Stanghellini 1996), for instance a core emotion that let us understand the manifold of symptoms as a unitary structure? Does Colin feel angry for not being assigned to a combat duty? Or guilty because he did not object to this? Or does he feel ashamed because he was judged not suitable for a combat duty? Apparently, there is a “basic” wound here, maybe a narcissistic one—the epicenter of a story that reminds us of Ajax's “madness” when the Greek generals did not offer [End Page 237] him Achilles’ weapons. Looking for this wound with Colin and through Colin's words is much different from endorsing an armchair theory of his “depression.” The latter reminds us of someone who feels full after reading the restaurant menu.We need to look for the relations between these clinical phenomena and the situation (event) in which they take place: what do we know about the pathogenetic situation? We know that the same person in different situations can behave and be valued in opposite ways. As Kretschmer pointed out, persons that in times of peace psychiatrists would label as psychopathic personalities in troubled times become celebrated heroes. In the same manner, a boy with an antisocial personality disorder can become a hero if he put his “qualities” to the service of military special forces. In particular, what did Colin expect from enrolling in the army? His expectations were his own or someone else's hopes? What happened exactly in Iraq? What does “Iraq” mean for the patient? What did he do and what did he not do to become a “man” or a hero there? Is Iraq the only place where someone can demonstrate to be a man? Is being a hero the only valuable way... (shrink)

Nella sua straordinaria opera scientifica, Franco Selleri si è sempre opposto alla rinuncia alla comprensione della struttura della realtà e della natura degli oggetti fisici, che egli considera come l’elemento caratterizzante delle principali teorie della fisica del Novecento e che è stata stigmatizzata da Karl Popper come tesi della “fine della strada in fisica”. Sin dalla fine degli anni ’60, egli ha sviluppato quella riflessione critica nei confronti delle teorie fondamentali della fisica moderna, in particolar modo della teoria delle particelle (...) elementari e della meccanica quantistica, e in un secondo tempo delle teorie relativistiche, che contraddistingue il suo programma di ricerca. Nel corso della sua intensa e infaticabile attività scientifica, Selleri è entrato in proficuo contatto con molti grandi fisici e filosofi della scienza, instaurando un intenso dialogo critico con Louis de Broglie, John Bell e Karl Popper. Le sue originali e non convenzionali ricerche lo hanno portato a risultati significativi non solo nell’ambito dei fondamenti della fisica, ma anche della storia e della filosofia della fisica. Per questo abbiamo voluto dedicare un numero speciale di Isonomia al nostro impareggiabile amico e collega, sia per la sua passione instancabile e la sua profonda conoscenza dei fondamenti formali, concettuali e filosofici delle teorie della fisica contemporanea, sia e forse ancor più come maestro di una prospettiva perennemente critica che egli ha sempre seguito e proposto con particolare rigore ed estrema determinazione. (shrink)

To what extent does perceptual language reflect universals of experience and cognition, and to what extent is it shaped by particular cultural preoccupations? This paper investigates the universality~relativity of perceptual language by examining the use of basic perception terms in spontaneous conversation across 13 diverse languages and cultures. We analyze the frequency of perception words to test two universalist hypotheses: that sight is always a dominant sense, and that the relative ranking of the senses will be the same across different (...) cultures. We find that references to sight outstrip references to the other senses, suggesting a pan-human preoccupation with visual phenomena. However, the relative frequency of the other senses was found to vary cross-linguistically. Cultural relativity was conspicuous as exemplified by the high ranking of smell in Semai, an Aslian language. Together these results suggest a place for both universal constraints and cultural shaping of the language of perception. (shrink)

A partire dalla produzione saggistica e letteraria di Umberto Eco, l’articolo analizzerà l’immaginario del Medioevo inteso come culla di ogni genere di millenarismo. La trattazione prenderà avvio dal suo saggio Palinsesto su Beato ; tenendo conto dell’originalità della prospettiva strutturalista di Eco, si confronterà l’ultima riedizione di questo scritto con un quadro bibliografico sul ruolo dell’Apocalisse di San Giovanni in seno alla tradizione occidentale. Il primo riferimento sarà la tesi genealogica di Karl Löwith, il quale nel suo Significato e (...) fine della storia affermò che le moderne filosofie della storia rispondono alla stessa ispirazione millenarista della cultura cristiana. Il secondo confronto sarà con uno dei ritratti dell’eresiarca Fra Dolcino; nella fattispecie, sarà considerata la prospettiva del filosofo socialista Antonio Labriola, elaborata a fine Ottocento per distinguere le applicazioni scientifiche del materialismo storico dai suoi fraintendimenti escatologici. Questi due opposti interlocutori condurranno a problematizzare l’interpretazione del millenarismo per come rappresentato da Umberto Eco ne Il nome della rosa. Il romanzo intende infatti l’apocalittica dolciniana come la prefigurazione del terrorismo degli Anni di Piombo? O si tratta di una mera strizzata d’occhio, un gioco con il lettore, il quale è chiamato a non confidare troppo nella potenza simbolica delle analogie? Considering Umberto Eco’s articles and novels, the paper will examine the imaginary of the Middle Age as the cradle of every kind of millenarianism. The analysis will start from Eco’s essay Palinsesto su Beato. Looking at the originality of his structuralist view, I will compare the last editing of this text with a bibliographical framework about the role of the Apocalypse of St. John in the Western tradition. The first reference will be the genealogical thesis of Karl Löwith, who in Meaning in History affirmed that the modern philosophies of history have the same eschatological aim of the Christian culture. The second comparison will be with a portrait of the medieval heresiarch Fra Dolcino. In this case, I will consider the perspective of the socialist philosopher Antonio Labriola, who elaborated it at the end of the XIX Century to distinguish the scientific applications of historical materialism from his eschatological misinterpretations. These two opposite references will drive me to problematize the representation of millenarianism as it was depicted by Umberto Eco in his The Name of the Rose. Indeed, is Dulcinian millenarianism intended by the novel as a prefiguration of the political terrorism in Italy during the Years of Lead? Or is this only a wink, a joking interaction with the reader, who should be careful to rely not on the symbolic strength of analogies? (shrink)

Since the end of the 16th century, when the perfectly preserved remains of an ancient early Christian underground cemetery were discovered accidentally along the Via Salaria in Rome, Christian antiquities were studied mainly for apologetic propaganda purposes, i.e. to defend the primacy of the Church of Rome, which was faltering under the blows of the Protestant reformers. Everything changed, however, around the middle of the 19th century, thanks to Giovanni Battista de Rossi, a famous archaeologist whose 200th birthday (...) falls this year. This essay sets in the context of his biography the main coordinates of his training, his numerous and fundamental discoveries and his main publications, which brought him recognition in international cultural circles of the time as the “founder of Christian archaeology”, a science that was finally recognised as such, and no longer seen as just a learned pastime for amateur antiquarians. (shrink)

The paper contributes to the reflection on how the 19th-century national events of wider appeal such as the Art and Industrial Exhibitions fostered the dissemination and enhancement of archaeological discoveries. The specific case of the ‘Exhibition of the City of Rome’, held during the Turin Exhibition in 1884, is examined as a paradigmatic example of the archaeologist Giovanni Battista de Rossi’s commitment to promoting Rome in united Italy, using archive and press documents of the time. The Roman pavilion (...) at Turin in 1884, for which de Rossi was responsible for the medieval section, is presented as a key event in the dissemination of Roman archaeological discoveries after 1870 and as a major event in the promotion of studies of Roman topography strongly desired by de Rossi, and which can be read as the starting point for the setting up of the Museum of the City of Rome. (shrink)

As already emerges in his 1961 book, Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune, Rossi-Landi reflects on sign and language relatedly to the American tradition in pragmatism from Peirce to Morris (he published a monograph on Morris in 1953). He also recovers the contribution made by Giovanni Vailati, who was among the first in Italy to recognize the importance of Peirce’s pragmatism. Through Peircean pragmatism, Rossi-Landi oriented his work from the very beginning in the direction of a semiotics of (...) interpretation in contrast to a semiotics – or better semiology in this case – of the code, of decodification. His “philosophical methodics” continues to be characterized in terms of “pragmatism,” from his works of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Linguaggio come lavoro e come mercato, 1968, and Semiotica e ideologia, 1972), to his last book Metodica filosofica e scienza dei segni (1985, the year of his death), in which recovering Wittgenstein he reconsiders the question of the “traps of language” in the Marxian terms of “linguistic alienation.”. (shrink)

This work is the first monograph devoted to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of chance in Physics II 4-6 and its implications and projections in other treatises, including an original and comprehensive account of the Aristotelian conception of chance, of accidental causality in the realm of nature, and of accidental causality in the realm of human action. One of the main interpretative issues around Aristotle’s discussion of chance is its relation to the four causes and to teleology. In this sense, (...) it is particularly difficult to find the common features which fortune (tyche) and spontaneity (automaton) share. This work, offers such an interpretation of Aristotle’s general concept of chance (i.e. common to fortune and spontaneity), which shows clearly its relation with his theory of causality (Phys. II 3), with teleology, and with the application of this theory to the study of nature. It also shows how fortune and spontaneity can be interpreted consistently with this general characterization of chance, and how the specific differences between them can be accounted for paying attention to the different structures of causality in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action. Regarding the specific concept of spontaneity (automaton), a crux interpretum, the book offers one of the few independent discussions this issue in Aristotelian literature, and proposes a sub-classification in two kinds of spontaneity based on an analysis of Aristotle’s different examples and characterizations: ‘mixed spontaneity’ (which shares some features with fortune), and ‘pure spontaneity’ (which takes place strictly in the realm of nature). These different structures had not been recognized in specialized literature before. The problem of chance has projections into Aristotle’s natural philosophy, as well as into Aristotle’s theory of action and practical philosophy. This ample perspective of Aristotle’s work, and of the different explanatory models and ontological structures therein involved, constitutes an interesting groundwork for future developments in some or many of these realms of investigation. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a defence of Value Realism that relies on the unusual combination of Values Realism with Sentimentalism. What this account, which we call “Sentimental Realism”, holds, in a nutshell, is that what makes evaluative facts special is their relationship to emotions. More precisely, Sentimental Realism claims that evaluative facts are fully objective facts, but that such facts are picked out by concepts that are response-dependent, in the sense that they are essentially tied to emotions. Our plan (...) is as follows. We shall start with a presentation of Sentimental Realism and a discussion of its main virtues. On the basis of this, we shall discuss an objection to Value Realism that draws on evolutionary considerations, the Evolutionary Debunking Argument. We shall argue that Sentimental Realism safely escapes from this dilemma. (shrink)

Cécile Laborde has argued that the freedom we think of as ‘freedom of religion’ should be understood as a bundle of separate and relatively independent freedoms. I criticise that approach by pointing out that it is insufficiently sensitive to facts about the sorts of entities that liberal states are. I argue that states have good reasons to mould phenomena such as religion into easily governable monoliths. If this is a problem from the normative point of view, it is not due (...) to descriptively inadequate accounts of religion, but a problem with a lack of realism about the sort of institutions states are. My conclusion is a three-way disjunction: either one must reckon with liberal states’ historically determined limitations in the management of changing social phenomena, or one should direct one’s frustration at the marriage of liberalism and the state, or the very existence of states is normatively problematic. (shrink)

There is an intuitive connection between well-being and happiness. Accordingly, many theories of well-being hold that well-being consists in (either unqualified or properly qualified) happiness. Traditional happiness-based theories are subject, however, to several important objections. The goal in this chapter is to offer a new happiness-based theory that is immune to the main objections raised against traditional happiness-based theories. The authors’ own fitting happiness theory of well-being can be seen as the combination of the following claims. The first is that (...) happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of affective states such as emotions, moods, and sensory pleasures. The second is that emotions, moods, and sensory pleasures are different kinds of perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. The third claim is that, insofar as happiness is constituted by states that have fittingness conditions, it is possible to assess happiness itself as fitting or unfitting. The last claim is that well-being consists in fitting happiness thus defined. (shrink)

Ensayos-homenaje en el primer centenario del nacimiento del fil sofo espa ol, que abordan diversos aspectos de la obra de Ortega. Los cuatro trabajos dibujan con rigor algunos de los horizontes planteados por el maestro y respetan la debida modernidad conceptual. la compilaci n estuvo a cargo de Fernando Salmer n, Alejandro Rossi, Luis Villoro y Ram n Xirau.

Is there more to the recent surge in political realism than just a debate on how best to continue doing what political theorists are already doing? I use two recent books, by Michael Freeden and Matt Sleat, as a testing ground for realism’s claims about its import on the discipline. I argue that both book take realism beyond the Methodenstreit, though each in a different direction: Freeden’s takes us in the realm of meta-metatheory, Sleat’s is a genuine exercise in grounding (...) liberal normative theory in a non-moralistic way. I conclude with wider methodological observations. I argue that unlike communitarianism (the previous contender for the discipline’s renewal), realism has the potential to open new vistas, though their novelty is to a large extent relative to the last forty years or so: realism is best thought of as a return to a more traditional way of doing political philosophy. (shrink)

This is the first book to provide a coherent overview over the ethical implications of AI-related technologies in medicine. It explores how these technologies transform practices, relationships, and environments in the clinical field. It provides an introduction into ethical issues such as data security and privacy protection, bias and algorithmic fairness, trust and transparency, challenges to the doctor-patient relationship, and new perspectives for informed consent. The book focuses on the transformative impact that technology is having on medicine, and discusses several (...) strategies for dealing with the resulting challenges. It also introduces innovative methods of ethics research for addressing existing desiderata and future challenges. This book is written to inform health care professionals, policy-makers, and researchers in medicine, health sciences, nursing science, social sciences, and ethics, but may also function as a primary textbook for graduate as well as undergraduate university courses. (shrink)

Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism, as well as realist responses to those attacks, unduly conflate distinctively political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctively political normativity depends on assuming moralism (...) as the default view, which places an excessive burden on the viability of realism, and so begs the question. Our discussion, though, does not address the relative merits of realism and moralism, so its upshot is relatively ecumenical: moralism need not be the view that all apt normative political judgments are moral judgments, and realism need not be the view that no apt normative political judgments are moral judgments. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se centra en identificar si, dentro del debate actual sobre el rol de la tecnología y sus implicancias en la vida de las personas, la filosofía de Langdon Winner indaga en la naturaleza y el significado de las construcciones artificiales desde una posición determinista. De modo que, buscaremos descubrir los caminos argumentales que propone Langdon Winner para explicar cómo se elige y se construye un sistema técnico que involucra a los humanos como partes de su funcionamiento. Entendiendo (...) que un sistema técnico es una forma de vida. En primer lugar, abordaremos el debate sobre sobre el papel de la tecnología y sus implicancias ético- políticas, para esto compararemos las principales teorías que son parte del debate antes mencionado: la teoría instrumental, la teoría sustantivista, la teoría crítica y el determinismo tecnológico. En segundo lugar, analizaremos el rol de la tecnología en el pensamiento de Langdon Winner. Podemos resaltar tres formas, que se relacionan entre sí, en que Winner considera a la tecnología como fenómeno político, como forma de vida y como técnica incontrolada. En tercer lugar, buscaremos demostrar que su teoría no pertenece al determinismo tecnológico. Para esto, abordaremos el determinismo como problema filosófico luego explicaremos en qué consiste el determinismo tecnológico y las condiciones que debe cumplir una teoría para ser enmarcada como determinista. Para, finalmente, contrastar estas condiciones con la teoría filosófica de Langdon Winner y definir si puede o no ser considerada determinista. (shrink)