C'est un fait que nous distinguons entre la connaissance quantitative et la connaissance qualitative. L'analyse de cette distinction remonte à l'Antiquité. Depuis Aristote, elle semble être acceptée comme définitive. L'épistémologie réaliste du Stagirite Justine la distinction par la différence objective entre les catégories de qualité et de quantité, irréductibles l'une à l'autre. Selon cette optique, les deux modes de connaissance nous offrent deux perspectives différentes sur le monde matériel. Ces deux perspectives se complètent l'une l'autre. Il faut tout de même (...) se demander si les deux sont jugées également nécessaires pour la connaissance sensible du monde perceptible. La question est d'autant plus importante qu'on considère la connaissance sensible comme point de départ du processus intellectuel qui mène, ou doit en principe mener, à la connaissance substantielle de la réalité matérielle. (shrink)

C'est peut-être faire un faux pas que de placer une pensée d'Aristote en épigraphe à un essai sur un livre dont l'auteur est partisan de l'empirisme logique. Que les adhérents de l'École de Vienne veuillent bien excuser notre manque de tact, mais le mot du Stagirite nous semble tout indiqué pour servir de pensée liminaire au thème que nous nous proposons d'aborder.

La notion de cause fait corps avec le cadre noétique du système dans lequel elle apparaît. Elle ne peut pas être plus large ou plus profonde que le système lui-même. Qui veut comprendre le sens qu'on donne au concept de cause, doit faire une étude épistémologique du contexte dont il fait partie. Une telle analyse doit éviter de s'enfermer dans le cercle vicieux auquel l'expose le rôle tout à fait fondamental que joue la notion de cause dans la formation du (...) système. En effet l'idée qu'on se fait de la causalité exerce une influence déterminante sur l'ensemble des affirmations de base sur lesquelles repose le complexe d'explications philosophiques ou scientifiques. (shrink)

The so-called ‘type method’ widely employed in biological taxonomy is often seen as conforming to the causal-historical theory of reference. In this paper, I argue for an alternative account of reference for biological nomenclature in which taxon names are understood as descriptive names. A descriptive name, as the concept came to be known from the work of Gareth Evans, is a referring expression introduced by a definite description. There are three main differences between the DN and the causal account. First, (...) according to the DN account, rather than fixing a name to a referent, the assignment of a type specimen to serve as the name-bearer for a taxon should be seen as performatively establishing a synonymy between a name and a definite description of the form “the taxon whose type is t”. Each taxon name is therefore associated with a criterion of application, a semantic rule that establishes the connection between the name and the descriptive content. This is the second major difference from the causal account: taxon names do have some descriptive content associated with them. The final locus of dissent concerns the strength of the modality resulting from the usage of taxon names. In order to address this point, I use the DN account to focus on the debate between Matt Haber and Joeri Witteveen concerning misidentification of type specimens, misapplication of names, and the truth conditions of Joseph LaPorte’s de dicto necessary sentence “Necessarily, any species with a type specimen contains its type specimen”. Using a pragmatic variant of the distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, I argue that a metalinguistic version of the de dicto sentence is in fact falsified, as previously argued by Haber. (shrink)

This article is drafted on the basis of three complementary essays by Professor Jerzy Janik. The author takes a look at selected issues in the field of quantum mechanics – especially the problem of quantum superposition and supersymmetry – from perspective of great philosophical systems. The author draws attention to the fact that some of these issues reflect old philosophical problems, and – in some cases – philosophical perspective may save interpretations of quantum mechanics from paradoxes.

In this text, the word “anima” is the synonym of the notion of “conscious observer”. The paper discusses subjects from the field of physics and metaphysics in which there is a need to introduce such an observer, according to some authors.

In philosophy /ontology/ as well as in physics one deals with various kinds of ESSE. Quantum objects do not obey the Bell inequalities, which are natural for macroscopic objects. Some beings may be real but not actual. Actual beings are those which show up NOW. For a physicist this seems to correspond to a reduction of the wave packet. Existence in an atractor.

In this text, the word “anima” is the synonym of the notion of “conscious observer”. The paper discusses subjects from the field of physics and metaphysics in which there is a need to introduce such an observer, according to some authors.

In this text, the word “anima” is the synonym of the notion of “conscious observer”. The paper discusses subjects from the field of physics and metaphysics in which there is a need to introduce such an observer, according to some authors.

In philosophy /ontology/ as well as in physics one deals with various kinds of ESSE. Quantum objects do not obey the Bell inequalities, which are natural for macroscopic objects. Some beings may be real but not actual. Actual beings are those which show up NOW. For a physicist this seems to correspond to a reduction of the wave packet. Existence in an atractor.

In this text, the word “anima” is the synonym of the notion of “conscious observer”. The paper discusses subjects from the field of physics and metaphysics in which there is a need to introduce such an observer, according to some authors.

In this text, the word “anima” is the synonym of the notion of “conscious observer”. The paper discusses subjects from the field of physics and metaphysics in which there is a need to introduce such an observer, according to some authors.

In this text, the word “anima” is the synonym of the notion of “conscious observer”. The paper discusses subjects from the field of physics and metaphysics in which there is a need to introduce such an observer, according to some authors.

ABSTRACT: In this article, we intend to address the role of memory and narrative in the constitution of personal identity, based on Alice Munro’s short story “The Bear Came Over the Mountain” and the theoretical concepts of Paul Ricoeur (especially in Oneself as Another). This movement will allow us to underscore the idea that, contrary to what part of the analytical literature on identity and narrative has held, it is not just what we might call self-narrative that plays a role (...) in maintaining personal identity. Instead, we recover the Ricoeurian idea of a network of narratives or tangled of stories, in which self- and hetero-narratives are entangled, thus providing support to the identities it captures. (shrink)

This Special Issue brings a selection of peer-reviewed papers that were presented at the 12th Principia International Symposium: Models and Modeling in the Sciences, Florianópolis, Brazil, online, August 2021. In this preface, the chair and the secretary of the organizing committee comment the symposium's context and briefly present the issue.

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the phenomenon of life through the aspect of consciousness and in particular to analyze the role which consciousness plays in the living state (the L?state for short) as well as the consequences of the development of consciousness for the evolution of living beings. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon of knowledge. The discussion of the role of consciousness in life will have to involve an elucidation of the role of knowledge. This will be done (...) in light of and using the ideas of the theory of the Ecology of Knowledge developed by the author (Wojciechowski, 1975, 1986, 1989). Because of the special nature of consciousness, the paper will deal with the methodological problems of the study of consciousness, and, therefore of the study of the living state. (shrink)

We present some equivalent conditions for a quasivariety \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {K}}$$\end{document} of structures to be generated by a single structure. The first such condition, called the embedding property was found by A.I. Mal′tsev in [6]. It says that if \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\bf A}, {\bf B} \in \mathcal {K}}$$\end{document} are nontrivial, then there exists \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\bf C} \in \mathcal{K}}$$\end{document} (...) such that A and B are embeddable into C. One of our equivalent conditions states that the set of quasi-identities valid in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{K}}$$\end{document} is closed under a certain Gentzen type rule which is due to J. Łoś and R. Suszko [5]. (shrink)

Table of ContentsAndrzej KLAWITER, Krzystof #ASTOWSKI: Introduction: Originality, Courage and Responsibility List of Books by Leszek NowakSelected Bibliography of Leszek Nowak's WritingsScience and Idealization Theo A.F. KUIPERS: On Two ...

S. Jakowski introduced the discussive prepositional calculus D 2as a basis for a logic which could be used as underlying logic of inconsistent but nontrivial theories (see, for example, N. C. A. da Costa and L. Dubikajtis, On Jakowski's discussive logic, in Non-Classical Logic, Model Theory and Computability, A. I. Arruda, N. C. A da Costa and R. Chuaqui edts., North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977, 37–56). D 2has afterwards been extended to a first-order predicate calculus and to a higher-order logic (cf. the (...) quoted paper). In this paper we present a natural version of D 2, in the sense of Jakowski and Gentzen; as a consequence, we suggest a new formulation of the discussive predicate calculus (with equality). A semantics for the new calculus is also presented. (shrink)

S. Jaśkowski introduced the discussive propositional calculus D₂ as a basis for a logic which could be used as underlying logic of inconsistent but nontrivial theories. D₂ has afterwards been extended to a first-order predicate calculus and to a higher-order logic. In this paper we present a natural version of D₂, in the sense of Jaśkowski and Gentzen; as a consequence, we suggest a new formulation of the discussive predicate calculus. A semantics for the new calculus is also presented.

Jerzy Perzanowski s ideas were based on an original blend of logic and ontology in what he called onto/logic, where the slash is meant to suggest a quotient of ontology by logic. Perzanowski began as a logician, his early works being on modal logic, then gradually shifted his interest to logical philosophy, meaning not so much philosophy of logic as philosophy informed by logic. Perzanowski was a rare breed of analytical philosopher who thought that a philosophical theory of everything (...) was worthwhile. In this systematic spirit, he began with method. He presented his method of total analysis and synthesis quite simply: reduce the object of research to its simplest possible constituents, and then combine them in some way. Better still, combine them in every possible way, thereby producing a space of possibilities analogous to (and in certain cases identical with) the logical space. Thus, analysis and synthesis differ from a trivial disassembly and reassembly.". (shrink)