The work of Gregory Bateson offers a metaphysical basis for a “process psychology,” that is, a view of psychological practice and research guided by an ontology of becoming—identifying change, difference, and relationship as the basic elements of a foundational metaphysics. This article explores the relevance of Bateson's recursive epistemology, his re-conception of the Great Chain of Being, a first-principles approach to defining the nature of mind, and understandings of interaction and difference, pattern and symmetry, interpretation and context. (...) class='Hi'>Bateson's philosophical contributions will be drawn into relationship with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language as use, Melnyk's theory of causal levels of explanation, Korzybski's account of map and territory, the rejection of the heuristic rigidity of substantialist ontologies, and a cybernetics communication science-informed approach to contextual bi-directionality of causality. We thereby arrive at an understanding of Bateson's process psychology that, given its ecological-systemic nature, is explanatorily applicable across the mind sciences. This process psychology equips us to answer the question: What is mind? Not by explanatory appeal to substantial entities contained within mind, but instead by recourse to the contextually relevant patterns for understanding mind to a particular purpose. We have thereby attended to the gulf between heuristics and fundamentals, between psychological models and an onto-epistemic account of reality. Insufficient attention has been given to characterising the vital nature of Bateson's philosophical oeuvre to psychological practice. This article draws out Bateson's relevance to establishing foundational principles for a process psychology capable of reinvigorating psychological thought. (shrink)

In this essay I bring Gregory Bateson together with Deleuze and Guattari (primarily with the latter) to show their ecological compatibility, especially with Guattari’s ecosophy. I do this against the backdrop of the Anthropocene which presents us not only with a ‘climate’ of post-truth and political corruption, but also with the so-called climate crisis. In the context of these two broad examinations, I ask what can an artisan-artist-designer do given this problematic context? My reply is to call on ‘speculative (...) design’ by an ‘avant-garde without authority’ to expose the symptoms of the Anthropocene era. (shrink)

William Bateson has long occupied a controversial role in the history of biology at the turn of the twentieth century. For the most part, Bateson has been situated as the British translator of Mendel or as the outspoken antagonist of W. F. R. Weldon and Karl Pearson's biometrics program. Less has been made of Bateson's transition from embryologist to advocate for discontinuous variation, and the precise role of British and American influences in that transition, in the years (...) leading up to the publication of his massive Materials for the Study of Variation. In this paper, I first attempt to trace Bateson's development in his early career before turning to search for the development of the moniker "anti-Darwinist" that has been attached to Bateson in well-known histories of the neo-Darwinian Synthesis. (shrink)

Bateson's belated acceptance of the chromosome theory came in two main stages, and was permanent, although he retained to the end reservations about some implications and extensions of the theory. Coleman's attempt to explain Bateson's resistance in terms of his conservative mode of thought is critically examined, and rejected: the attributes Coleman assigns to Bateson are all either inappropriate, or irrelevant to chromosome theory, or both. Instead, the diverse factors which contributed to Bateson's resistance are enumerated (...) and discussed. These include deficiencies in the evidence then available to support the theory; embryological difficulties; Bateson's aversion to microscopy combined with the lack of a close colleague skilled in cytology; his iconoclastic temperament, and the fact that he found T. H. Morgan, the leader of the Drosophila school, an uncongenial personality. Taken together, these factors suffice to account for his resistance. Bateson's position is contrasted with that of the other most eminent opponent, W. Johannsen, whose organismic outlook was the main obstacle to acceptance. (shrink)

The recognition of Gregor Mendel's achievement in his study of hybridization was signalled by the ‘rediscovery’ papers of Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns and Erich Tschermak. The dates on which these papers were published are given in Table 1. The first of these—De Vries ‘Comptes renduspaper—was in French and made no mention of Mendel or his paper. The rest, led by De Vries’Berichtepaper, were in German and mentioned Mendel, giving the location of his paper. It has long been accepted that (...) the first account of Mendel's work in English was given by the Cambridge zoologist, William Bateson, to an audience of Fellows of the Royal Horticultural Society in London on 8 May, 1900. This is based on two sources: the paper ‘Problems of Heredity as a Subject for Horticultural Investigation’, published in the Society's journal later that year and stated as ‘Read 8 May, 1900’, and Beatrice Bateson's account of the event over a quarter of a century later. Of the paper which her husband gave on that occasion she wrote:He had already prepared this paper, but in the train on his way to town to deliver it, he read Mendel's actual paper on peas for the first time. As a lecturer he was always cautious, suggesting rather than affirming his own convictions. So ready was he however for the simple Mendelian law that he at once incorporated it into his lecture. (shrink)

El artículo nos ofrece una mirada al hombre y a su vasto espectro del pensamiento, asumiendo la dificultad de intentar ‘atrapar’ el núcleo duro del proyecto bensoniano. Bateson es un personaje que transrecorrió disciplinas -comunicación, etnología y antropología, psiquiatría/psicología, genética, filosofía, biología, zoología, etología y etiología, cibernética- instalándose en lo que él llama la historia natural de las ideas o ecología de la mente. El presente artículo expone un apronte a este vasto pensamiento Batesoniano, y en particular su epistemología (...) para el cambio cultural. (shrink)

Anthropologist Gregory Bateson says that a sense of the fundamental unity of science was once achieved by successful specialist scientists expanding into borderline areas of research. I distinguish two ways in which this expansion can occur and note how one of these ways was, from Bateson’s perspective, troublesome for social anthropology.

William Bateson (1861-1926) has long occupied a controversial role in the history of biology at the turn of the twentieth century. For the most part, Bateson has been situated as the British translator of Mendel or as the outspoken antagonist of W. F. R. Weldon and Karl Pearson's biometrics program. Less has been made of Bateson's transition from embryologist to advocate for discontinuous variation, and the precise role of British and American influences in that transition, in the (...) years leading up to the publication of his massive Materials for the Study of Variation (1894). In this paper, I first attempt to trace Bateson's development in his early career before turning to search for the development of the moniker "anti-Darwinist" that has been attached to Bateson in well-known histories of the neo-Darwinian Synthesis. (shrink)

Gregory Bateson’s work continues to touch others in fields as diverse as communication, ecology, anthropology, philosophy, family therapy, education, and mental/spiritual health. The authors in this special issue of Cybernetics & Human Knowing celebrate the Bateson Centennial.

G. Bateson believed that the scientific school of the future would be ‘ecology of mind’. The first aim of this paper is to understand what he meant by ‘mind’, and the other is to understand how this concept emerged in his thought, i.e., how its meaning would become more flexible throughout his life and work. Furthermore, we will approach the epistemological implications of ecology of mind for scientific education in the West. Bateson’s concept of mind emerged when he (...) became aware (in 1926) of his own way of thinking, i.e., of his immense abductive capacity. This led him to search for patterns of similarity and difference between organisms (like in homology). Later, he identified this thought process as being abstract and formal, relating not just facts but also ideas. Afterwards, Bateson developed criteria for us to consider a system as being mental, with special emphasis on living and cybernetic systems. (shrink)

In order to set up a dialogue the author, first, will attempt to discern similarities and differences between the ideas of Gregory Bateson and those of the so-called Pragmatist philosophers, John Dewey and William James. Second, he will address connecting points and relevance to intercultural communication training and teaching. For both sides aesthetics are of central importance, for Bateson, coming from the direction of systems, more in the observation of the pattern that connects. For Dewey, the aesthetic experience (...) is embedded in the context potentially in any situation. For both Dewey and James human and other organisms actively experiencing environments as situations are the beginning and the end of any philosophy of pragmatic significance. For Bateson, the addition of aesthetics to ecology is necessary to highlight its global significance. (shrink)

Does all understanding consist in our using concepts to relate to the things around us, or do we also possess a more direct, spontaneous, bodily way of doing so? I explore this second possibility via Bateson's notion of “double description.” These phenomena are dynamic phenomena, in that they have their existence only in our embodied relations to the temporal unfolding of events in the two or more relevant sources. As such, as Bateson put it, they are of a (...) different “logical type” to their source events. Bateson did not, however, extend this important insight out into the ways in which can make ourselves ready to relate to the others and othernesses around us, not only in such a way as to intertwine our outgoing activities towards them in with the incoming activities from them in a subtlety responsive manner, but also come to use the relational understandings created in such dynamic interplays in an anticipatory fashion—thus to provide us with embodied, perceptual skills that enable us to go out to meet familiar circumstances with appropriate kinds of response “at the ready”, so to speak. Below, following Todes and Merleau-Ponty , I outline the kind of preparing activities required if we are to acquire new embodied “readinesses” that enable us to become more “at home” in surroundings which are in fact in continual change—a process that connects with Bateson's account of abduction, the process in which we can sense the existence of a “pattern that connects.” Overall, my purpose in all of this is to bring to the fore the ineradicable role of our bodies in spontaneously arriving at what counts as real for us, and which although unnamable by us, determines that of “which knowledge always speaks”. (shrink)

Gregory Bateson identified an array of difficulties in human relationships including double binds, confusion between complimentary and symmetrical relations, and the ‘sliding triad’. This essay presents a solution to these and other difficulties in the form of a ‘yoga’ of relationships in which participants take turns playing three different roles keyed to the three phenomenological categories of Charles Sanders Peirce.

The following three related contributions jointly serve to lift up elements of the thought of the anthropolo­gist Gregory Bateson that can be fruitfully compared with elements of Michael Polanyi’s thought. In a brief introduction, William Stillwell reviews Bateson’s life and developing interests. Stillwell also provides, in a creative dialog form akin to Bateson’s own dialogs, a short review article on Noel Charlton’s Understanding Gregory Bateson: Mind, Beauty and the Sacred Earth. The third piece is Jere Moorman’s (...) short 1991 essay (now out of print) discussing Polanyi’s ideas about tacit knowing and their connection with Bateson’s ideas about the double bind. (shrink)

Jakobson’s well-known model of communication includes implicit time and space message-to-code and contact-to-context relations. The symbolic displacement of humans from nature and the possible discovery of human nature occur in the embodied reversibility of these relations. Bateson’s view of the meta function in communication supports this postmodern turn, as does Peirce’s phenomenological conception of semiosis. In this abductive context, Bateson’s ideas are used to augment Peirce specifically onembodiment in semiosis. Communicology is nominated the “new science” and semiotic phenomenology (...) the “new paradigm” envisioned by Bateson. (shrink)

Jakobson’s well-known model of communication includes implicit time and space message-to-code and contact-to-context relations. The symbolic displacement of humans from nature and the possible discovery of human nature occur in the embodied reversibility of these relations. Bateson’s view of the meta function in communication supports this postmodern turn, as does Peirce’s phenomenological conception of semiosis. In this abductive context, Bateson’s ideas are used to augment Peirce specifically onembodiment in semiosis. Communicology is nominated the “new science” and semiotic phenomenology (...) the “new paradigm” envisioned by Bateson. (shrink)

This article argues that two important thinkers of the 20th century, Gregory Bateson and Eric Voegelin, developed a set of ideas that are of importance to the history of the human sciences. The article also argues that their ideas are, in essential ways, comparable and display similarities that have not yet been discussed within the larger history of the human sciences. The aim of the article is to show how the diagnostic terms provided by Bateson and Voegelin complement (...) each other toward an understanding of underlying tensions and social pathologies of contemporary civilization. (shrink)

Em 1866, Johan Gregor Mendel publicou um artigo sobre os padrões que governam a formação de híbridos, baseando-se principalmente em estudos de cruzamentos experimentais de ervilhas do gênero Pisum. Segundo alguns historiadores da ciência, esse trabalho foi ‘redescoberto’ em 1900, estimulando uma série de pesquisas que procuravam verificar se padrões hereditários descobertos em Pisum se aplicavam a outros organismos. O objetivo deste artigo é discutir algumas das contribuições de William Bateson em relação ao teste e divulgação dos princípios de (...) Mendel, comparando-as aos estudos realizados por Mendel. Conclui-se que Bateson desenvolveu um novo programa de pesquisa mendeliano, pois embora seguisse uma metodologia semelhante à de Mendel e divulgasse seu trabalho, não se dedicou simplesmente a testar, explicar e defender suas ‘leis’. Concentrou-se nas exceções e desvios dos princípios mendelianos, procurando explicá-los através de novas ‘leis’. Introduziu uma nova terminologia e alterou a simbologia mendeliana.In 1866 Johan Gregor Mendel published a paper on the patterns governing the formation of hybrids, mainly grounded in his studies dealing with experimental crossings in sweet peas . According to some historians of science, this work was “rediscovered” in 1900, stimulating several researches which tried to verify if the hereditary patterns found in Pisum would also apply to other organisms. The aim of this paper is to discuss William Bateson’s contribution in relation to the test and dissemination of Mendel´s principles, comparing it to Mendel´s own work. It is concluded that Bateson developed a new Mendelian research program. Although he adopted a methodology similar to Mendel´s and disseminated Mendel´s own work, he did not simply dedicate himself to testing, explaining or defending it. He focused his attention on the exceptions and deviations from Mendel’s principles, trying to explain them with new laws. Besides introducing a new terminology , he also modified the symbols used by Mendel. (shrink)

Constructivism is at the heart of a pedagogical philosophy going back to Vico, whose view of the interrelationship of the arts and sciences sought to reconstitute the classical paideia. The Vichian idea that human beings can only know the truth of what they themselves have made has theoretical and practical consequences for Vico's pedagogy and view of the university. Vico's ideas on education are extended in the modern period by such thinkers as Cassirer, Piaget and Bateson. At the basis (...) of Cassirer's pedagogical philosophy is his theory of the symbol, the symbol being a universal and transcendent modality in culture. The result of this unifying theory is that symbolism, which is pervasive across the disciplines, provides a moral and ethical means for integrating communication about teaching. Cassirer's thought is compatible with Piaget's, which emphasizes the pluralism of experience and the role of dynamic learning in the construction of meaningful order. Piaget's constructivism assumes that an operational bridge exists to link together the hard sciences, the human sciences, and the historical disciplines. This systems view of epistemological matters is similar in many respects to the one advanced by Gregory Bateson, which is explored in the paper's final section. (shrink)

In this paper we portray the epistemological proposals of Descartes, Spinoza and Bateson as epistemological reforms that imply deep transformations in the way human beings are and behave in the world by changing their habits. We also suggest that rejecting the theological explanation and understanding of human beings as part of a systemic whole, as proposed by Bateson and Spinoza, is required in order to face the current environmental crisis.

The controversy between Biometricians and Mendelians has been called an inexplicable embarrassment since it revolved around the mistaken identification of Mendelian genetics with non-Darwinian saltationism, a mistake traced back to the non-Darwinian William Bateson, who introduced Mendelian analysis to British science. The following paper beings to unravel this standard account of the controversy by raising a simple question: Given that Bateson embraced evolution by natural selection and that he studied the causes of variation within a broadly Darwinian framework (...) of problems and questions, how are we to understand the claim that he was a non-Darwinian? A brief survey of possible responses to this question is followed by an alternative proposal: the controversy will be considered as a struggle among Darwinians about the future course of Darwinism. On this account, Darwin's own work led to the juncture at which Mendelians and Biometricians parted company, indeed, the Origin itself prepared the divergent methodological stances subsequently adopted by Bateson and his antagonists. The inexplicable embarrassment is dissolved through the parsimonious reconstruction of the profound substantive conflict between Biometricians and Mendelians as a chapter in the articulation and differentiation of the Darwinian research programme. (shrink)

A textbook by Norwegian anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen tells us that Gregory Bateson criticized the use of the term ‘function’ in social anthropology on the following grounds: it has no place outside of mathematics. But consulting the Bateson text referred to, he does not say that in his section on function and even endorses certain uses of the term “function” in anthropology. I look into these and his criticisms of functionalism, responding to the criticisms.

Gregory Bateson’s work on play led him to conclude that paradox is the ground of propositions and denotation. Working through the concepts of analog and digital communication, logical typing problems, and various dimensions of “framing” and meta-discourse, I broadly illustrate how what Bateson came to call “the paradoxes of abstraction” inevitably arise within denotative utterances. In addressing the root paradoxes of framing and denotation which Bateson’s work on play identified and sought to elucidate, this manuscript outlines and (...) advances some of Bateson’s main contributions to communication theory. (shrink)

RESUMO: Para Bateson, a mudança social radicaria numa mudança epistemológica profunda que incidisse sobretudo na educação e na comunicação. Essa revolução paradigmática, baseada na lógica formal de Whitehead e Russell, evitaria discursos ditos científicos destituídos de rigor. Aqui, analisamos hermeneuticamente o seu pensamento, salientando os limites que a lógica formal encontra nas experiências éticas, religiosas e estéticas. Sem essa revolução, encontramo-nos condenados à estagnação intelectual, pois formamos cidadãos sem capacidade de aprender a aprender, que possibilitaria a capacidade de produzir (...) abduções, inferência lógica tão necessária na produção do raciocínio humano; o seu desenvolvimento garantiria a capacidade de pensar/construir complexamente o mundo, interligando os saberes; poucos são também aqueles que explicitam e argumentam a favor das suas crenças, base axiomática da capacidade abdutiva. A organização social se constrói com sujeitos que raramente possuem mentes bem estruturadas, favorecedoras de passagem de patamares de aprendizagem para outros superiores. Antes se estimula a confusão de tipos lógicos, tomando o todo pela parte, por exemplo. Bateson critica também o sistema de avaliação quantitativo, diminuindo a possibilidade de formação do pensamento abstrato e formal, como a filosofia e a matemática exigem. ABSTRACT: For Bateson, social change must be rooted in a profound epistemological shift, focusing mainly on education and communication. This paradigmatic revolution, based on the formal logic of Whitehead and Russell, avoids discourse that is said to be scientific but is devoid of rigor. In this article we hermeneutically analyze Bateson's thinking on these issues, stressing the limits that formal logic has in facing ethical, religious and aesthetic experiences. Without this revolution, we are condemned to intellectual stagnation, because we would be training citizens without the capacity of learning to learn. This capacity makes possible the ability to produce abduction, the logical inference required in the production of human reasoning. Its development would ensure the ability to think/construct the world in a complex fashion, connecting various areas of knowledge. Few are those who explain and argue for their beliefs, but this is the axiomatic basis for abductive capacity. Social organization depends on subjects who rarely possess well-structured minds that can pass from one level of learning to a higher one; and it actually stimulates the confusion of logical types, such as taking the whole for the part, for example. Bateson also criticizes the quantitative evaluation system, which diminishes the possibility for training in abstract and formal thought of the kind required by philosophy and mathematics. (shrink)

Gregory Bateson’s work on play led him to conclude that paradox is the ground of propositions and denotation. Working through the concepts of analog and digital communication, logical typing problems, and various dimensions of “framing” and meta-discourse, I broadly illustrate how what Bateson came to call “the paradoxes of abstraction” inevitably arise within denotative utterances. In addressing the root paradoxes of framing and denotation which Bateson’s work on play identified and sought to elucidate, this manuscript outlines and (...) advances some of Bateson’s main contributions to communication theory. (shrink)

Gregory Bateson’s career from anthropologist, through his development of cybernetics and systems theory, to developing ideas around ‘the sacred’, has parallels with Roy Bhaskar’s intellectual journey. This paper proposes that as well as Bateson’s theory of cybernetics and systemic thought making a contribution to basic and dialectic critical realism, his final and posthumously published Angels Fear: Towards and Epistemology of the Sacred adds to our understanding of Bhaskar’s metaReality. Similarities between the development of Bateson’s work from 1936 (...) to 1987 and Bhaskar’s work from 1975 to 2016 enable the development of theory that adds to both of their respective appreciations of metaReality and the sacred. Thus, by starting a conversation between Bateson and Bhaskar, we can develop a higher order understanding of the world than proposed by Bhaskar’s metaReality alone. (shrink)

Gregory Bateson developed his transdisciplinary thinking in the shadow of sociology, but his ideas are not generally viewed as part of the field of classical sociology. This article will explain this exclusion by arguing that Bateson’s way of theorising – while attempting to make progress in the understanding of reality – returns to ideas that were already rejected within the field in which he first worked. Furthermore, as a reading of Bateson through the lens of Durkheim will (...) show, Bateson’s theories fail to provide a better understanding of social reality than those of his predecessors. This type of critical analysis demonstrates the weakness of some of Bateson’s central claims and contributes to a more in-depth understanding and reassessment of his ideas from a sociological perspective. Pointing out that Bateson’s critique of the modern worldview is based on a pre-critical and pre-modern philosophy of wholeness is not to invalidate Bateson’s foundational intuition that our current mode of thinking challenges our chances of surviving as a species. However, in order to make a theoretically convincing argument concerning how our thinking challenges our survival, a more critical understanding of the relation between mind and society than the one Bateson offers is required. (shrink)

John Perceval (1803-1876), who suffered from schizophrenia, published two books on his experience, in 1836 and 1840. More than a century later, the anthropologist Gregory Bateson discovered in Perceval's memoirs a lucid anticipation of his own theories on schizophrenia. To Bateson, Perceval describes the interactive patterns between himself, his family, and the hospital psychiatrists, as examples of "double bind" interactions, in which he played the role of a "sacrificial victim." The article underlines the strong convergence between Bateson's (...) theory of schizophrenia and René Girard's theory of the scapegoat. In the anthropological theory of Girard, the sacrificial ceremonies are the main way of constructing social order. In that perspective, the schizophenic can be considered as a particular example of a scapegoat, that is, as an important figure in social life, and not as a mere phenomenon of psychopathology. This theoretical convergence is remarkable, in particular, because both anthropologists explain the sacrificial processes through a theory of social life based on the idea that the main unit of analysis is not the individual, but the interactive dynamic as a whole: patterns of relationships, to Bateson; reciprocal imitation (mymesis), to Girard. (shrink)

In 1894, William Bateson objected to the terms “heredity” and “inheritance” in biology, on grounds of contamination with misleading notions from the everyday world. Yet after the rediscovery of Mendel's work in the spring of 1900, Bateson promoted that work as disclosing the “principles of heredity.” For historians of science, Bateson's change of mind provides a new angle on these terms at a crucial moment in their history. For philosophers of science, the case can serve as a (...) reminder of the potential of Putnam's hypothesis of a division of linguistic labor for analyzing the semantic lives of scientific kind terms. (shrink)

As a defender of the fundamental importance of Mendel’s experiments for understanding heredity, the English biologist William Bateson did much to publicize the usefulness of Mendelian science for practical breeders. In the course of his campaigning, he not only secured a reputation among breeders as a scientific expert worth listening to but articulated a vision of the ideal relations between pure and applied science in the modern state. Yet historical writing about Bateson has tended to underplay these utilitarian (...) elements of his program, to the extent of portraying him, notably in still-influential work from the 1960s and 1970s, as a type specimen of the scientist who could not care less about application. This paper offers a corrective view of Bateson himself—including the first detailed account of his role as an expert witness in a courtroom dispute over the identity of a commercial pea variety—and an inquiry into the historiographic fate of his efforts in support of Mendelism’s productivity. For all that a Marxian perspective classically brings applied science to the fore, in Bateson’s case, and for a range of reasons, it did the opposite during the Cold War. (shrink)

Early in the 20th century Bateson, Doncaster and Punnett formed a cooperative collective to share research findings on the chromosome theory of heredity (CTH). They cross-bred plants and animals to correlate behaviour of chromosomes and heredity of individual traits. Doncaster was the most enthusiastic proponent of the new theory and worked for years to convince Bateson and Punnett on its relevance to their own research. The two younger biologists collaborated with Bateson, the preeminent geneticist in England. As (...) their own reputations developed, their research findings allied with the consensus on the importance of the CTH by the broader scientific community. After Doncaster’s tragic death in 1920, major objections to the theory had been resolved; Bateson and Punnett then utilized the CTH to construct chromosome maps detailing locations of specific genes on particular chromosomes in several different species. The marriage of heredity and cytology enhanced confidence that the theory was an accurate mechanism to explain inheritance in both plants and animals. (shrink)

In a world that is becoming more ‘networked’ than ever, especially on the personal-everyday level—with for example digital media pervading our lives and the Internet of Things now being on the rise—we need to increasingly account for ‘networked realities’. But are we as human beings actually well-equipped enough, epistemologically speaking, to do so? Multiple approaches within the philosophy of technology suggest our usage of technologies to be in the first instance oriented towards efficiency and the achievement of goals. We thereby (...) neglect the actual systemic, networked nature of technology, or its wider impacts. With regard to the pressing issue of how to cross the ‘gap’ between these two ‘modes,’ the paper at hand engages with the work of Gregory Bateson, reading him as a philosopher of technology. Bateson’s notions of “conscious purpose” and “learning” offer excellent tools to understand our predicament of living in a networked world but being partly unable to sufficiently grasp and come to terms with this situation. Moreover, as the article endeavors to demonstrate, Bateson’s thought is to be cast as a crucial addition to the body of theory being developed in the philosophy of technology. (shrink)