The first of 3 volumes of essays on Japanese philosophy, this work brings together essays that clarify its heritage and its practice, above all in the dynamic thought of Nishida Kitaro. Showing how philosophy takes shape through the translation of language and culture, the author examines the frameworks that have defined and confined Nishida’s thought and then charts new avenues of questioning Nishida and letting him question us. How should we envision the world at a time of environmental crisis, how (...) might we rethink our conceptions of history, religion and God; how is bodily awareness a way that the world knows itself, and just what can we make of Nishida'™s famous notion of nothingness—these are some of the questions that guide the meticulous explorations in this collection. (shrink)

The symposium »Does the Concept of ›Truth‹ Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?« hones on a methodological question which has deep implications on doing philosophy cross-culturally. Drawing on early Confucian writers, the anchor, Henry Rosemont, Jr., attempts to explain why he is skeptical of pat, affirmative answers to this question. His co-symposiasts James Maffie, John Maraldo, and Sonam Thakchoe follow his trail in working out multi-faceted views on truth from Mexican, Japanese Confucian, and Tibetan Buddhist perspectives (...) respectively. As these positions substantiate, the aforementioned non-Anglo-European traditions seem to draw on an integrated view of thinking, feeling, and living a human life. For their practitioners, truth is less of a correspondence with a given external reality. In fact, it enables human beings to strike the right path in living good, social lives. (shrink)

Nishida Kitarō was the most significant and influential Japanese philosopher of the twentieth century. His work is pathbreaking in several respects: it established in Japan the creative discipline of philosophy as practiced in Europe and the Americas; it enriched that discipline by infusing Anglo European philosophy with Asian sources of thought; it provided a new basis for philosophical treatments of East Asian Buddhist thought; and it produced novel theories of self and world with rich implications for contemporary philosophizing. Nishida's work (...) is also frustrating for its repetitive and often obscure style, exceedingly abstract formulations, and detailed but frequently dead end investigations. Nishida once said of his work, “I have always been a miner of ore; I have never managed to refine it” (Nishida 1958, Preface). A concise presentation of his achievements therefore will require extensive selection, interpretation and clarification. (shrink)

To answer the question of whether there is such a thing as Japanese philosophy, and what its characteristics might be, scholars have typi­cally used Western philosophy as a measure to examine Japanese texts. This article turns the tables and asks what Western thought looks like from the perspective of Japanese philosophy. It uses Japanese philo­sophical sources as a lens to bring into sharper focus the qualities and biases of Greek-derived Western philosophy. It first examines ques­tions related to the reputed sole (...) origin and the nature of philosophy in ancient Greece. Using the analyses of Robert Bernasconi, it con­cludes that this reputation is a bias instilled by philosophers such as Hegel in the modern era. It then uses the scholarship of Pierre Hadot to show that Greek philosophy was not argumentative discourse for its own sake, but a way of life where reason was in the service of spir­itual progress. This suggests a definition broad enough to accommo­date Asian and other non-Western philosophies. Under the lens of Japanese philosophy, however, Greek-based Western philosophy often displays a double detachment, from everyday life and from embod­ied existence. In contrast, Japanese Buddhist and Confucian philoso­phies evince an appreciation of embodied existence in the ordinary world. The article raises several questions for further investigation in the prospect that the lens of Japanese philosophy can refocus the task of philosophizing today. (shrink)

The chapters in this book focus on a phenomenon that is named by a conjunction of three terms: Japanese, Buddhist, philosophy. Each of these terms implies a distinction demarcating one domain of inquiry from other related domains: Japanese as distinct from Chinese, Korean, or Indian; Buddhist as distinct from Confucian or Shintō; and philosophy as distinct from religion or psychology. Each of these terms, the three in question as well as their contrasts, reflects a distinctly modern category that abstracts from (...) historical realities that blur the distinctions. With this qualification in mind, this chapter clarifies the terms in question, then selects two themes: language-reality-truth, and the nature of Buddhist practice, and gives a sample of philosophical methods and styles of argumentation that characterize “Japanese Buddhist philosophy.” For the most part, the selection here is limited to examples from pre-modern times, before Japanese Buddhists had encountered western philosophy and began to present Buddhism in its terms. (shrink)

This article re-orients Heidegger’s analyses of things to cast light on two distinct ways of relating to things, one at the root of technological use and the other crucial to artistic creation. The first way, which we may call instrumental practice, denotes the activity of using something to accomplish some goal or objective. This practice underlies the analysis of use-things [Zeuge] that Heidegger presents in Being and Time. Heidegger’s contribution there is twofold: to show how understanding things as zuhanden, there (...) for us, is prior to taking things as objects in “nature,” and to clarify how the “phenomenon of the world” can show itself when a useful thing becomes dysfunctional. But Heidegger’s focus on the thing as zuhanden leaves in the dark a second kind of practice that we engage in when we relate to things, the practice of attending to an activity for its own sake, as I illustrate by the using or making of four things: the hammer, the Daoist cook’s cleaver, the Daoist-inspired empty jug or Krug, and the Japanese calligrapher’s brush. Heidegger’s dialogue on Gelassenheit anticipates but also cuts short this practice of attention: gelassenes Denken—the thinking that lets go of representations and expectations and simply lets things be—promises to open a way to experience our essential nature [Wesen], but the dialogue’s focus on things as already there or already made distracts from the practice of attention that goes into the art of making things like jugs. By re-orienting Heidegger’s thinking we are able to recast the question of technology: can the practice of attention performed for its own sake—caring for things simply to care for them, caring for the surrounding world simply to care for it—help salvage not only the environment but the very essence of being human? (shrink)

This article re-orients Heidegger's analyses of things to cast light on two distinct ways of relating to things, one at the root of technological use and the other crucial to artistic creation. The first way, which we may call instrumental practice, denotes the activity of using something to accomplish some goal or objective. This practice underlies the analysis of use-things [Zeuge] that Heidegger presents in Being and Time. Heidegger's contribution there is twofold: to show how understanding things as zuhanden, there (...) for us, is prior to taking things as objects in "nature," and to clarify how the "phenomenon of the world" can show itself when a useful thing becomes dysfunctional. But Heidegger's focus on the thing as zuhanden leaves in the dark a second kind of practice that we engage in when we relate to things, the practice of attending to an activity for its own sake, as I illustrate by the using or making of four things: the hammer, the Daoist cook's cleaver, the Daoist-inspired empty jug or Krug, and the Japanese calligrapher's brush. Heidegger's dialogue on Gelassenheit anticipates but also cuts short this practice of attention: gelassenes Denken—the thinking that lets go of representations and expectations and simply lets things be—promises to open a way to experience our essential nature [Wesen], but the dialogue's focus on things as already there or already made distracts from the practice of attention that goes into the art of making things like jugs. By re-orienting Heidegger's thinking we are able to recast the question of technology: can the practice of attention performed for its own sake—caring for things simply to care for them, caring for the surrounding world simply to care for it—help salvage not only the environment but the very essence of being human? (shrink)

Zen Buddhist Attitudes to War HIRATA Seiko IN ORDER FULLY TO UNDERSTAND the standpoint of Zen on the question of nationalism, one must first consider the ...

Alterity, the difference that being-other makes, is not an overt theme in the writing of Ueda Shizuteru, and yet by bringing alterity to the fore we are able to connect and examine several themes that Ueda does engage explicitly. It will turn out that several models of alterity are discernable in Ueda’s philosophy, and their common ground opens a mode of being-other that offers an alternative to dominant models of irreducible difference. Ueda’s philosophy of language suggests four alternative configurations that (...) increasingly allow for the dual emergence of authentic otherness and selfhood. Those configurations are intimated in his interpretations of Nishida’s pure experience, of the interplay of language and silence, of a dialogue envisioned in a Zen oxherding picture, and of the poetic form known as linked verse, which best models how discrete beings help create a world in common. (shrink)

In the past three decades in the West, literature about the Kyoto School and translations of its writings have proliferated. Yet the very scholarship that perpetuates the name has also created confusion about its reference. Which thinkers belong to the “Kyoto School”? What do they have in common? Do they represent something we can call Eastern philosophy, which pursues a way of thinking fundamentally different from that of the West? Is the core of that alternative philosophy, or alternative rationality, a (...) notion of absolute nothingness with roots in Buddhism? (shrink)

This is a set of essays and translations that covers comprehensively all of Japanese philosophy.

Dōgen Kigen (1200–1253 ce) is one of the most revered figures in the history of Japanese culture. A Zen master regarded by the Sōtō School as its spiritual founder, Dōgen is also considered by many to be Japan's greatest philosopher. (The other major contender is kūkai, with whose philosophy Dōgen's shares a number of features.) Possessed of a prodigious and subtle intellect, and master of a strikingly poetic style, he surely ranks among the world's most formidable thinkers.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida by John MaraldoJohn KrummelJohn Maraldo, Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida Nagoya: Chisokudō, 2017The present volume by John Maraldo is a collection of his essays, mostly on Nishida. It constitutes the first volume of a two-part collection on Japanese philosophy, this one focusing on Nishida while the second volume includes (...) works on other Japanese philosophers surrounding Nishida. I have long considered Maraldo to be the foremost scholar in English language works in this field, who has consistently produced thought-provoking and well-grounded work, based on his extensive erudition regarding both Japanese and Western traditions. For the last decade and a half, while reading through his fine articles on Japanese philosophy, I was hoping that eventually a book of his own on this topic would be published. Such a book has finally appeared. It is a book that would certainly benefit Anglophone students and scholars of Nishida and Japanese philosophy worldwide. The essays collected here have been previously published in journals or other volumes, or otherwise presented in conferences. But they have been “lightly revised” (1) for the present volume. The volume could have used additional copyediting to clean up some typos. Nevertheless, I would recommend this book to anyone studying or working on Nishida.The volume begins with the prologue’s caveat that “identities we call Japan, Europe, and philosophy are as shifting as they are settled...” (1). A recurring question, therefore, is how philosophy is defined, how it has traversed through time and place, how Nishida’s thought conveys philosophy, and how we can continue this process of translating philosophy (1). Maraldo’s commentary throughout this volume thus proves to be more than just intellectual history but is itself philosophical as he thinks along with the thinkers he discusses, and invites the reader to do likewise. In this he seeks to bring Nishida’s work into philosophical dialogue with the rest of the world, asking “how does the work of Nishida... contribute to the momentum of philosophy?” (1). Maraldo also inquires what the term “Japanese philosophy” (日本哲学) may mean and provides four possibilities [End Page 135] that were given previously in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook that he edited with James Heisig and Thomas Kasulis some years ago,1 while in addition providing possible objections to them (6–8). He tells us that he has come to understand Japanese philosophy as an “ongoing, creative endeavor,” as “philosophy in the making”—a phrase that describes for him all philosophical investigation as a “work in progress, subject to reappraisal and reformation, to rethinking” (10). This seems a reasonable—realistic and viable—approach to understanding philosophy, including Japanese philosophy. Moreover, this process of philosophy, as it crosses cultural and historical borders, inevitably involves translation, the “transmission and transmutation through time and through multiple languages” (11). Even within the West, the origin of philosophy cannot be reduced to its Greek origin when, as Maraldo points out, the ancient Greeks themselves drew from wellsprings of “non-Western” thought (17) and the question of a single origin thus proves to involve “crossroads and contingencies” (17). Philosophy as such “occurs via the trans-lation of texts, spoken and written” (11), which not only means the transference of texts through languages but also “the transformation of textually embedded problems, methods and terminologies both across and within natural languages,” “an inter-lingual and an intra-lingual transmission” entailing “the formation of textual traditions” (12). It not only transmits texts but transforms the language, which in turn transforms cultures and traditions (12). Maraldo views Nishida as such a “consummate trans-lator” of philosophy, who reworked both Asian and European sources into his own language while refining his positions throughout his life (13). But even while refusing to confine philosophy to its Greek origins, Maraldo refuses to exoticize Nishida’s works as yet another product of the Orient. Instead, he treats Nishida’s work as worthy of the philosophical attention of the rest of the world. That is to say that he treats Nishida foremost as a philosopher in the global setting, an equal partner in dialogue with philosophers of the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Japanese Philosophy in the Making 2: Borderline Interrogations by John MaraldoLeah KalmansonJohn Maraldo, Japanese Philosophy in the Making 2: Borderline Interrogations Nagoya: Chisokudō, 2019.Japanese Philosophy in the Making 2: Borderline Interrogations is the second in a series of three volumes featuring selections from John Maraldo’s work in Japanese philosophy over the years. The format might best be described as a hybrid text somewhere between (...) an edited collection and a single-authored book. All of the essays in Borderline Interrogations are updated versions of Maraldo’s own previously published works or records of unpublished talks. They are grouped thematically into five sections, with each section prefaced by a brief introduction to provide readers with context as well help them draw connections across the entire work. However, compared to the first volume, which was more or less unified via its focus on Nishida, this second volume offers a more disparate array of topics. This could be seen as a strength or a weakness, depending on whether readers approach the text expecting something more like a book or more like an edited collection. Hence, openness toward the hybrid format at the outset can help readers navigate the text and better appreciate its unique approach to philosophizing.In his introduction, Maraldo addresses questions of cultural borders and bridges, including issues of identity, translation, and disciplinarity. He selects the word “intercultural”—as opposed to multicultural, cross-cultural, or comparative—to describe the kind of philosophy developing in Japan during and after the initial impact of Nishida on the formation of the academic discipline at institutional centers in both Kyōto and Tōkyō. With this word choice, he invites readers to reflect on various Japanese philosophers’ engagements with German- and English-language texts. Familiarity with another language (whether this amounts to full fluency or basic academic competency) enables a style of philosophical conversation that Maraldo compares to a Gadamerian process of hermeneutic play. Crucially, the twists and turns of translation, or thinking across and between several languages at once, takes the lead in directing philosophical thinking, rather than the other way around. As Maraldo says, “What is [End Page 143] decisive is the moment of release from trying self-consciously to control all movement back and forth” (10). This interplay of multiple languages is a definitive feature of the intercultural philosophy that Maraldo associates with twentieth-century and contemporary Japan.He goes on to describe this kind of philosophizing via Ueda Shizuteru’s writings on the Japanese poem form of renku or “linked verse.” Such poetic practices are open-ended, allowing multiple participants to make creative connections arising from the ever-evolving context of the poem itself. The composition, in some senses, “lives” at this border between the verse just written and the verse yet to be added, being the sole property of neither verse’s author. So too, Maraldo suggests, does intercultural philosophy live at the border between various languages and intellectual traditions. Readers might appreciate thinking of the hybrid form of his collection itself on the renku model—various narrative and thematic threads do run through the book, but the work as a whole remains open-ended, marking a record of Maraldo’s own intercultural philosophizing over the many years of his career. It ends, but does not conclude, with a “cliffhanger” of sorts best appreciated with the conversational intercultural model in mind.Maraldo’s short introductions that precede each of the five sections of the book give ample context regarding the projects for which various works were written, Maraldo’s own interests at the time of writing, how his thinking has or has not changed over time, and so forth; but they do not go as far as they might in guiding readers to see the book’s larger themes. Hence this review will focus on bringing some of these themes into sharper focus.The opening section includes four essays on Watsuji Tetsurō’s ethical philosophy, the first of which is largely introductory, establishing the main concepts of personhood, community, and “betweenness” (aidagara 間柄) through a hermeneutic lens informed by Watsuji’s reading of Heidegger. The third and fourth essays are critical and constructive, respectively—the former... (shrink)

John Maraldo’s Crossing Paths with Nishida assembles the life’s work of one of the leading voices in Nishida scholarship. Spanning over three decades, this brilliant collection of essays charts the path not just of Nishida’s philosophy, but also the path of deep inquiry of one of his most incisive commentators. In thirteen insightful essays, each reprinted with a new introduction by the author, Maraldo delves into the most critical issues in Nishida scholarship while rendering his philosophy germane (...) to a host of contemporary issues, such as environmentalism, nationalism, cognitive science, and phenomenology. A variety of systematic topics are explored, ranging from Nishida’s notions of “absolute nothingness” and “enactive intuition” to questions of religion, politics, and Nishida’s relation to Heidegger. This volume is essential reading for the specialist and for any reader with an interest in the most important thinker of the Kyoto School of Japanese philosophy. (shrink)

Building on his 2017 book, Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida, John Maraldo continues to shepherd his readers through an encounter with Japanese philosophy in this second volume. Departing from Nishida as the presumptive center, Maraldo interrogates the "borderlines" in his engagement with the thinking of Watsuji Tetsurō, Tanabe Hajime, and Kuki Shūzō, in addition to confronting important issues pertaining to politics and ecology. To speak of "shepherding" here is intentional; but it is (...) not meant to indicate any kind of paternalism, either in form or content. Rather, it is meant to capture the tremendous care with which Maraldo leads his readers down the path of his thinking. In... (shrink)

Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida, by John C. Maraldo, is the first of three volumes collecting his essays in Japanese philosophy. This volume, which is divided into two sections, gathers together thirteen essays reflecting on the thought of Nishida Kitarō. The first section, “Pathways to Nishida,” is comprised of three essays clarifying some of the metatheoretical, intellectual and scholarly contexts around the study of Nishida’s thought. The remaining essays represent “Pathways Through Nishida,” which (...) engage Nishida’s philosophy from a variety of analytic, thematic, and comparative perspectives. These pathways are genuinely penetrating and unfold around a handful of fundamental... (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.

For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.