Determinism which denies freedom of action is a common philosophical view. Is the action of such determinists incompatible with Kant’s claim that a rationally willed being “cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom” [G 4, 448]? In my paper, I examine Kant’s argument for this claim at the beginning of the Third Section of the Groundwork and argue that it amounts to the assertion that one cannot act while being aware of being guided by invalid principles. Belief in (...) determinism does not necessarily amount to such awareness. A structurally similar argument based on the contrast between deliberation and prediction is examined and similarly found wanting. (shrink)

This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...) arise from our capacity to avoid Moore-paradoxical utterances. I argue that Bar-On’s expressivism and Wright’s constitutive theory suffer from a similar problem: They fail to explain how it is possible for us to instantiate the language structures that supposedly bring about first person authority. Shoemaker’s account does not suffer from this problem. But it is unclear whether the capacity to avoid Moore-paradoxical utterances really yields self-knowledge. Also, it might be that self-knowledge explains why we have this capacity rather than vice versa. (shrink)

En su artículo “On Knowing One’s Own Mind” (1988), Shoemaker argumenta en favor de tres afirmaciones: (1) se requiere un autoconocimiento directo (self-acquaintance) para la cooperación racional con otras personas (porque ésta depende de que podamos decirles qué es lo que creemos e intentamos hacer); (2) el autoconocimiento directo es necesario para la deliberación sobre qué creer y qué hacer (porque no podemos ajustar racionalmente creencias y deseos sin saber qué creencias y deseos tenemos); y (3) el autoconocimiento directo es (...) una consecuencia inmediata de nuestra capacidad para reconocer el carácter paradójico de oraciones que ejemplifican la paradoja de Moore. En este capítulo trato de mostrar que las afirmaciones (1) y (2) no son correctas; la cooperación se puede llevar acabo comunicándonos exclusivamente sobre (supuestos) hechos y acciones y el ajuste racional de creencias normalmente sucede de una manera automática a un nivel de primer orden. Sin embargo, la afirmación (3) indica una relación interesante entre nuestras capacidades conceptuales y lingüísticas, por un lado, y, por el otro, nuestra capacidad de “contestar la pregunta de si creo que p poniendo en marcha el proceso (cualquiera que éste sea) mediante el cual respondo a la pregunta de si p” (Evans, 1982: 225). (shrink)

Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...) theories of self-knowledge, neatly encapsulated in Byrne’s epistemic rule (BEL): If p, believe that you believe that p (Byrne 2005). In this paper, I examine an objection to Carruthers’s theory in order to see whether it opens up space for a transparency theory of self-knowledge: Is it not the case that in order to interpret someone I have to have some direct access to what I believe (cf. Friedman and Petrashek 2009)? (shrink)

Four different notions of freedom can be distinguished in Kant's philosophy: logical freedom, practical freedom, transcendental freedom and freedom of choice ("Willkür"). The most important of these is transcendental freedom. Kant's argument for its existence depend on the claim that, necessarily, the categorical imperative is the highest principle of reason. My paper examines how this claim can be made plausible.

What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view (...) attributed to Moran. I rebut the charge of circularity, but also reject the theory as an adequate interpretation of Moran. (shrink)

In "Individuals", Peter Strawson talks about identifying, discriminating and picking out particular objects, regarding discriminating and picking out as ways of identifying. I object that, strictly speaking, identification means to say of two things that they are the same. In contrast, discriminating an object from all others can be done by just ascribing some predicate to it that does not apply to the others. Picking out an object does not even seem to require to distinguish it from all others. The (...) object picked is distinct in that it is the picked one, but it is not clear - even in the context of sensorily picking out - that I have to be aware of this in order to do the picking. (shrink)

¿Qué relación existe entre la autoridad de la primera persona y el conocimiento de las propias acciones? Una posibilidad es que gracias al conocimiento de las razones que tenemos para actuar sabemos qué es lo que hacemos y, análogamente, gracias al conocimiento de las razones que tenemos para admitir [avow] una creencia sabemos qué es lo que creemos. Carlos Moya atribuye una teoría de este tipo a Richard Moran y la critica por ser circular. En este trabajo examino la teoría (...) atribuida a Moran, refuto la idea de circularidad, pero también rechazo la teoría como una interpretación adecuada de Moran. (shrink)

What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker, a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker and Byrne, claims that we can (...) reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them. I sketch responses to both objections. ¿Qué relación existe entre el razonamiento y el autoconocimiento? Según Shoemaker, cierto tipo de razonamiento depende de un autoconocimiento: no podemos revisar nuestras creencias racionalmente sin saber que las tenemos, en parte porque no podemos ver que la inconsistencia de un conjunto de proposiciones constituye un problema a menos que estemos conscientes de creerlas. En el presente artículo argumento que esta propuesta es errónea. Una segunda posición, versiones de la cual se pueden encontrar en Shoemaker y Byrne proclama que es posible razonar desde creencias sobre el mundo hacia un autoconocimiento sobre tales creencias. Mientras el zany argument de Shoemaker no logra mostrar cómo tal razonamiento puede resultar en un autoconocimiento, la teoría de Byrne, que se centra en la regla epistémica “Si p, cree que crees que p” tiene más éxito. Dos objeciones interesantes son que la regla epistémica incorpora una inferencia insana y que nos hace formar creencias de primer orden, en lugar de revelarlas. Esbozo respuestas a ambas objeciones. (shrink)

The model-checking problem for a logic L on a class C of structures asks whether a given L-sentence holds in a given structure in C. In this paper, we give super-exponential lower bounds for fixed-parameter tractable model-checking problems for first-order and monadic second-order logic. We show that unless PTIME=NP, the model-checking problem for monadic second-order logic on finite words is not solvable in time f·p, for any elementary function f and any polynomial p. Here k denotes the size of the (...) input sentence and n the size of the input word. We establish a number of similar lower bounds for the model-checking problem for first-order logic, for example, on the class of all trees. (shrink)

My thesis tests a novel definition of consciousness by applying it to theories of self-consciousness. This definition attempts to distinguish the phenomenon of consciousness from those of knowledge, belief, awareness, and perception by describing it as the noticing of objects and the registering of facts in thought. My investigation of self-consciousness is phenomenological in that it leaves aside questions as to whether selves exist or what their nature is and just examines what the contents of self-consciousness are. The main question, (...) throughout the thesis, is whether there are any contents that necessarily enter self-consciousness understood as consciousness associated with meaningful use of the first personal pronoun. My answer to this question is that there are not. This answer is reached after the discussion of a range of prominent theories that have emanated from Kant. All these theories have in common that they can be phenomenologically clarified with the help of my description of consciousness. Kant’s own views of “empirical self-consciousness” are phenomenologically relatively modest; but what he says about “transcendental self-consciousness”, incorporating a priori consciousness of one’s identity, cannot be phenomenologically supported. Similar restrictions apply to Fichte’s theory, which develops the notion of transcendental self-consciousness, explicating it as consciousness of “this very consciousness”. Strawsonian theories of self-consciousness (P.F. Strawson, G. Evans, Q. Cassam) claim that self-consciousness requires some awareness of oneself as a spatiotemporally located physical object. I argue that such a claim cannot be phenomenologically substantiated. The Strawsonian theories rely on a questionable “discrimination requirement”; but even if it is assumed that they are justified in claiming that, as self-conscious beings, we have to know, believe, perceive or be aware that we are physical objects, it still does not follow that we have to be conscious, in my sense, of ourselves as such objects. There is no particular type of object that is necessarily noticed and no particular type of fact that is necessarily registered in thought by a person who can meaningfully use the first personal pronoun. In the last part of the thesis, some of the results of the earlier chapters are applied to the problem of how to explain first person authority and an explanation which is compatible with those results is suggested. (shrink)

Emotion evaluations are assumed to play a crucial role in the emotion regulation process. We tested a postulate from our framework of emotion dysregulation (Nowak, U., Wittkamp, M. F., Clamor, A., & Lincoln, T. M. [2021]. Using the Ball-in-Bowl metaphor to outline an integrative framework for understanding dysregulated emotion. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 12, 118), namely that the extent to which individuals evaluate an emotion as harmful and their personal resources to modify and accept/tolerate the emotion as sufficient predict the subsequent (...) use of regulation strategies. Participants (n = 118) from a community sample took part in an experience-sampling assessment over 7 days including 10 daily paired measurements. The first measured momentary affective valence and arousal along with harmfulness evaluations and evaluations of personal resources to modify and accept/tolerate an emotion. The second followed three minutes later and measured emotion regulation strategies. The more harmful individuals evaluated an emotion, the more likely they were to use an emotion regulation strategy. The more harmful individuals evaluated an emotion, and the less sufficient they evaluated their personal resources to accept/tolerate an emotion, the more likely they were to use a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy. We conclude that emotions that people evaluate as harmful or difficult to accept are most likely to be regulated in a maladaptive manner. This implies that modifying beliefs about emotions could represent a promising treatment approach. (shrink)

In no field of knowledge did Aristotle leave more writings than in biol­ogy. He conducted research for longer and more intensively in zoology than in any other field. In these writings he mentions a good 550 animal and 60 plant species. While this includes the internal anatomy of around 110 animals, he dissected 60 species himself. The present contribution deals with the epistemic motifs and the meaning of Aristotelian biology in the context of his scientific curriculum. It is thus demonstrated (...) that in De anima Aristotle’s actual explanations are preceded by an investi­gation of the principles, which aims to differentiate living objects from inanimate ones, and to develop a method of explanation based on the species-specific vital functions of living beings. This article provides an overview of the four main disciplines of Aristotelian biology: compara­tive anatomy, physiology, genetics and behavioral research. The text offers tabular overviews of the animals and plants dealt with by Aristotle. (shrink)

In the target article, Juslin & Vll (J&V) contend that neural mechanisms not unique to music are critical to its capability to convey emotion. The work reviewed here provides a broader context for this proposal. Human abilities to signal emotion through sound could have been essential to human evolution, and may have contributed vital foundations for music. Future learning experiments are needed to further clarify engagement underlying musical and broader emotional signaling.

Studies by Gardiner and colleagues connecting musical pitch and arithmetic learning support Rips et al.'s proposal that natural number concepts are constructed on a base of innate abilities. Our evidence suggests that innate ability concerning sequence ( or BSC) is fundamental. Mathematical engagement relating number to BSC does not develop automatically, but, rather, should be encouraged through teaching.

“Every surgeon carries within himself a small cemetery where from time to time he goes to pray—a place of bitterness and regret, where he must look for an explanation of his failures” René Leriche,...

In fr. 69 Smith, the Epicurean Diogenes of Oinoanda, like Lucretius 4.353–63, explains why a square tower viewed from the distance appears to be round. The explanation is that εἲδωλα, filmy atomic images, emanating from the tower, are forced out of shape by the air through which they pass on their way to our eyes. Diogenes’ account is fragmentarily preserved on a stone which I discovered in 1970. The stone bears the right half of one fourteen-line column and the left (...) half of a second one. I first published the text in 1971. When, twenty years later, I came to deal with it again, in preparing an edition of all the known fragments, I was able, thanks in no small measure to the discussions and suggestions of other scholars, whose names can be seen in my apparatus criticus, to print a text which represents a considerable advance on that of the editio princeps. However, with so much of what Diogenes wrote missing, there has remained scope for further progress, and in this note I correct an error—an error present not only in my text, but also on the stone itself. (shrink)

In fr. 69 Smith, the Epicurean Diogenes of Oinoanda, like Lucretius 4.353–63, explains why a square tower viewed from the distance appears to be round. The explanation is that εἲδωλα, filmy atomic images, emanating from the tower, are forced out of shape by the air through which they pass on their way to our eyes. Diogenes’ account is fragmentarily preserved on a stone which I discovered in 1970. The stone bears the right half of one fourteen-line column and the left (...) half of a second one. I first published the text in 1971. When, twenty years later, I came to deal with it again, in preparing an edition of all the known fragments, I was able, thanks in no small measure to the discussions and suggestions of other scholars, whose names can be seen in my apparatus criticus, to print a text which represents a considerable advance on that of the editio princeps. However, with so much of what Diogenes wrote missing, there has remained scope for further progress, and in this note I correct an error—an error present not only in my text, but also on the stone itself. (shrink)

The ninth and last poem in Book 4 of the Silvae is an amusing hendecasyllabic piece in which Statius, addressing Plotius Grypus, reproves him for having sent him for the Saturnalia a tatty, second-hand copy of a boring book in return for the fine, expensive, new volume which was Statius' present to him. The poem includes a long list of humble and/or poor-quality items, any of which, it is suggested, would have been more acceptable than Grypus' gift. Included in the (...) list are eggs. (shrink)

The ninth and last poem in Book 4 of the Silvae is an amusing hendecasyllabic piece in which Statius, addressing Plotius Grypus, reproves him for having sent him for the Saturnalia a tatty, second-hand copy of a boring book in return for the fine, expensive, new volume which was Statius' present to him. The poem includes a long list of humble and/or poor-quality items, any of which, it is suggested, would have been more acceptable than Grypus' gift. Included in the (...) list are eggs. (shrink)

In 294 most modern scholars either accept rapidique or adopt Lachmann's rapideque. An exception is Romanes, who oddly favours rapidisque, which he takes with impetibus crebris, placing a comma after corripiunt. If rapidique is read, one has to assume that Lucretius is writing as though venti, not flamina, were the subject. There are parallels for this kind of grammatical irregularity , but there is no need to assume an irregularity here, for, as E. J. Kenney has pointed out to me, (...) the right reading is almost certainly rapidoque. rapidoque was favoured by Lambinus, but did not originate with him. He notes ‘ex libris scriptis alii habent, rapidoque rotanti, alii rapidique rotanti’, and Pius knew rapidoque, which is printed in the ed. Juntina . rapido…turbine is strongly supported by 1.273 rapido…turbine and 6.668 rapidus…turbo, also by subito…turbine in 1.279, a line which, as we shall see, is to be closely compared with 1.294. (shrink)

In 294 most modern scholars either accept rapidique or adopt Lachmann's rapideque. An exception is Romanes, who oddly favours rapidisque, which he takes with impetibus crebris, placing a comma after corripiunt. If rapidique is read, one has to assume that Lucretius is writing as though venti, not flamina, were the subject. There are parallels for this kind of grammatical irregularity, but there is no need to assume an irregularity here, for, as E. J. Kenney has pointed out to me, the (...) right reading is almost certainly rapidoque. rapidoque was favoured by Lambinus, but did not originate with him. He notes ‘ex libris scriptis alii habent, rapidoque rotanti, alii rapidique rotanti’, and Pius knew rapidoque, which is printed in the ed. Juntina. rapido…turbine is strongly supported by 1.273 rapido…turbine and 6.668 rapidus…turbo, also by subito…turbine in 1.279, a line which, as we shall see, is to be closely compared with 1.294. (shrink)

Afro-communalism has been largely conceptualized as a system in which individuals attain meaningfulness from the point of view of the community. We assess the implications of Afro-communalism on the individual’s rights. With particular focus on the transformative values of non-conformist features of individualism, this paper shows how Afro-communalism’s emphasis on the community is counter-productive. Our approach goes beyond the argument that Afro-communalism stifles the autonomy of the individual. Instead, we demonstrate how the community’s conformist expectations from the individual within the (...) Afro-communalist system, sets the community against the individual and against itself. We draw the conclusion that Afro-communalism as a project is no longer relevant and needs to end. We do this by showing how most of the interpretations of Afro-communalism are attempts to sustain a reductive contrast between the West and Africa. We also show how that contrast exaggerates the idea of community in Africa, to the detriment of a balance between the individual’s right and her duties to the community. Keywords: Afro-communalism, individualism, non-conformist expectations, community, individual autonomy, Africa. (shrink)

Tomás de Aquino distingue la cantidad como predicamento ( quantitas dimensiva ) de la medida de perfección de una cosa, su cantidad virtual ( quantitas virutalis or virtutis ). El Aquinate diferencia la cantidad virtual de la esencia, del ser y de la operación. El concepto de cantidad virtual juega un rol central en la metafísica de la participación, pues participar es como tomar una “parte” de un todo, y tal parte representa un determinado monto de perfección. Por esta vía, (...) la cantidad virtual se relaciona con la noción de virtus essendi . De la cantidad virtual derivan otros conceptos como los de igualdad virtual, contacto virtual, ubicación virtual, distancia virtual, etc., que reflejan la riqueza con que nuestro autor concibe el mundo cualitativo y espiritual. (shrink)

La psicología contemporánea parece caracterizarse desde sus propios orígenes por la multiplicidad de sus contenidos, además de por su casi infinita fragmentación en corrientes encontradas. Esto crea importantes dificultades, no sólo a quienes quieran tener una primera aproximación, sino también a los especialistas, que muchas veces no llegan a una opinión suficientemente clara sobre la naturaleza epistemológica de la psicología, ni sobre su unidad disciplinar. Esta obra, sin descuidar el problema global, se centra en un aspecto particular: el que presenta (...) la praxis de la psicología, en particular la psicoterapia y sus fundamentos teóricos. Se pone especial interés en una visión crítica del psicoanálisis, punto de referencia inevitable (positivo o negativo) para la mayoría de las corrientes de psicoterapia. Pero este intento de esclarecimiento epistemológico y práctico se lleva a cabo desde un punto de vista original: a la luz del pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274), conocido como uno de los más grandes teólogos y filósofos de la Iglesia Católica. Las calidades del Aquinate como epistemológico son sobradamente conocidas. Menos conocida es su faceta de psicólogo, que esta obra quiere poner de manifiesto con gran detalle para evidenciar la actualidad de las líneas maestras de la psicología de Santo Tomás, como también la posibilidad de practicar hoy la psicología bajo la guía fundamental del Doctor Humanitatis.\n. (shrink)

The abbey of Conques and its dominant church dedicated to St Foy are today one of the most prominent examples of the harmonic relationship between medieval sacred architecture and nature. This article considers the medieval landscape of Conques from an environmental-historical perspective by analyzing early medieval writings about the abbey. It focuses on early descriptions, which often contain literary, hagiographical topoi depicting ideal, symbolic, or imagined landscapes - sometimes, however, also partially reflecting reality. These descriptions serve, with caution, to investigate (...) the local environment, its transformation, and its effect on the early history of the monastery. In addition, the article delves into the eleventh-century Liber miraculorum sanctae Fidis to investigate strategies that the monastic community used to control St Foy’s estates not only close to the abbey but also in the wider region. Analysis reveals the environment conditions, their impact on the history, and ways in which the monastic community sacralized the landscape through real processions and miracle stories to control it. (shrink)

Biology is the most extensive field in the Corpus Aristotelicum. In his fundamental work De anima, Aristotle tries to fix the borders of this life science. The term ψυχή has a twofold explanatory status. On the one hand, ψυχή is understood as a principle of all living beings. On the other hand, it is understood as a cause of the fact that all living beings are alive. The paper is divided into three sections. The first part shows why Aristotle discusses (...) these issues in a work entitled Περὶ ψυχῆς. Since Pythagoras and Heraclitus, ψυχή was understood as a life principle: Pythagoras believed that men, animals and plants share the same nature: they are all ἔμψυχα and they are homogenous qua ψυχή. The second part of this article deals with Aristotle’s definition of the soul in DA II: ψυχή is the principle of all living things. This establishes the external criteria to divide living and non-living beings and the internal criteria to divide living beings. The third part of this paper is concerned with the methodological consequences of this definition: the life functions are the central explanandum in Aristotle’s biology. De anima II defines such various life-functions as nourishment, sense-perception and locomotion. These capacities contour the main fields of the philosopher’s biological investigation. For Aristotle, the faculty of reproduction is a subtype of nourishment. Reproduction is the most important and most natural function of all living beings. Genetics is, therefore, the most important field in Aristotle’s biology. (shrink)

What made Socrates so special that he became the object of mockery, slander and hate? The answer in the Apology is expressed in the formula of the ‘Socratic pragma’. Plato claims that Socrates’ philosophical enterprise was a reaction to the Delphic oracle according to which no living Greek was wiser than Socrates. But does this really explain what it pretends to explain? The paper argues that this explanation tells us more about Plato’s philosophical approach than about this alleged turning point (...) in Socrates’ life. Our understanding of Socrates’ philosophical development should be based on other Platonic dialogues and the Old Comedy as well, for they inform us about the historical shift of philosophical interest from questions of physics to questions of ethics and political anthropology. (shrink)

The core thesis of the paper is that the constitution of biological science begins with a conceptual innovation with far-reaching consequences with effect up to the present: by conceiving the parts of living beings as organs (that is, as tools), Aristotle laid the foundation stone for a functional explanation of animate nature. Comparative anatomy is thus transformed from a merely descriptive to an explanatory theory. The point of the discussion is above all that a functional explanation must not be confused (...) with the sort of teleology according to which the function of an organ is understood as the cause of its existence. The first section outlines the theoretical motives that Aristotle adduces in arguing for biology (against contemporary contempt for biological research). The second step addresses the significance of the parts of animals in Aristotle's larger collection of zoological material, the Historia animalium . The third section demonstrates how in the major explanatory work De partibus animalium the term organon takes on the status of a key methodological concept. Finally, the fourth section discusses the significance of the Aristotelian determination of the organic with respect to current discourses in natural science. (shrink)

By fostering bonding, music illustrates marvelously its ability to induce emotional experience. But, music can induce emotion more generally as well. To help explain how music fosters bonding and induces other emotions, I propose that music derives this power from the evolution of what I term “gestural messaging.”.

Much was accomplished in the last decade in understanding how the adaptive immune system evolved to combat pathogens. Essential features of antigen presentation and T lymphocyte recognition were decipherd, setting the stage for further studies that elucidated basic elements of lymphocyte differentiation (including positive and negative selection during lymphocyte ontogeny) and the major interactions that occur among cells in secondary lymphoid organs in an ongoing immune response. The major challenges of today are found in the burgeoning fields of programmed cells (...) death, enzymology of recombination and somatic mutation, development of memory, and the recognition of pathogens by unconventional lymphocytes. (shrink)