Di er ci Qimeng (The second Enlightenment), by Wang Zhihe and Fan Meijun, is a timely book in Chinese about constructing a philosophical and practical way to contend with China's postmodernization. It combines Whitehead's process philosophy with a focus on Chinese modernity in order to map out a desirable postmodern society. It addresses the problem on several dimensions from policy making to basic value systems. The range of themes can be seen from the topics of the book's twelve chapters: (...) (1) Reverence for Land—Toward a Constructive Postmodern Agriculture; (2) Becoming Fully Human—Toward a Postmodern Organic Education; (3) Survival of the Harmonious-Toward a Constructive Postmodern Harmonious Culture; (4) Beauty .. (shrink)
A fundamental way in which human thought has developed has been constantly to explain the earliest "classics" that are the source of that thought. All in all, the number of such classics is not very high, their explanations are past counting. Moreover, they are constantly increasing, giving rise to an explanatory chain deriving from the classics. In the development of Chinese philosophy, this aspect is particularly noticeable, so that one can describe Chinese philosophy as a continual explanation of the classics. (...) This holds for both Confucianism and Daoism. The main classics of Daoism are the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. These two works have been constantly reread and reinterpreted throughout history. From the late nineteenth century onward, Chinese philosophy came into closer contact with Western philosophy. Foreign concepts were brought in to provide philosophers with new "insight." Some thinkers applied this new insight or these foreign concepts to the Daoist classics. In this way, they brought a new explanation of the Daoist classics and enriched the ways of interpreting the texts.1 Paving the way in this direction were Yan Fu. Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, and Hu Shi. (shrink)
In this article, I explore the relationship between desire and emotion in Descartes, Zhu Xi, and WangYangming with the aim of demonstrating 1) that Zhu Xi, by keying on the detriments of selfishness, represents an improvement over the more sweeping Cartesian suggestion to control desires in general; and 2) that WangYangming, in turn, represents an improvement over Zhu Xi by providing a more sophisticated hermeneutic of the cosmology of desire.
This essay attempts to contextualize the importance of WangYangming’s 王陽明 philosophy in terms of world philosophy in the manner of Goethe’s innovative plan for “world literature” (Weltliteratur). China has the long history of philosophizing rather than non-philosophy contrary to the glaring and inexcusable misunderstanding of Hegel the Eurocentric universalist or monist. In today’s globalizing world of multicultural pluralism, ethnocentric universalism has become outdated and outmoded. Transversality, which is at once intercultural, interspecific, interdisciplinary, and intersensorial, is a far (...) more befitting response than universality. In this context, what is focused and emphasized in Wang’s world philosophy is mainly fourfold. First, there is the unity or circularity of knowledge and action, that is, knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the consummation of knowledge. Second, sincerity is the moral soul of Sinism as it is the enabling act of making perform all other virtues, including ren 仁. Third, in Sinism, including Wang’s philosophy, there is no Cartesian dualism in that the mind and the body are inseparable soulmates. Fourth, if ethics is prima philosophia, then geophilosophy is ultima philosophia to sustain and perpetuate all life-forms on earth (geo). (shrink)
The activity of synsedimentary faults plays an important role in controlling the distribution of sand bodies in basins and furthermore the porosity and permeability of reservoirs. We have used fault interpretation, the method of image and granularity size analysis, and the seismic pumping effect to investigate the control of the activity of the Kongdong fault on the development degree of the dissolution pores and grain size, further studying the controlling mechanism of the activity of synsedimentary faults on reservoir quality. The (...) results showed that the slip rate of synsedimentary faults is one of the main factors in controlling reservoir quality. The slip rate controls the accommodation space and hydrodynamic conditions and it furthermore controls the grain size. The higher the slip rate, the bigger the grain size in the downthrow wall of synsedimentary faults; the seismic pump produced by synsedimentary faults activity also controls the development degree of dissolution pores. The development degree of dissolution pores in the downthrown wall of synsedimentary faults is greater than that in the upthrown wall. Dissolution pores are more developed in areas with a large slip rate of synsedimentary faults. Porosity increases gradually with the increase of plane porosity of dissolution pores, whereas the changes of permeability are not obvious. (shrink)
ABSTRACTRather than “selfishness,” a more accurate and revealing interpretation of Wang's use of siyuis “self‐centeredness.” One of the main goals in Wang's model of moral cultivation was to attain a state devoid of self‐centered desires. Wang relied a great deal on the exercise and cultivation of an emotional identification and feeling of oneness with others. In this paper, I first provide a brief summary of the role of Wang's concept of siyu in his moral psychology. I (...) then examine key passages in Wang's writings that reveal his nuanced understanding of siyu and, along the way, I draw on empirical research in psychology to help illuminate the significance of Wang's view of siyu to his overall model of moral cultivation. (shrink)
Scholars of early Chinese philosophy frequently point to the nontranscendent, organismic conception of the cosmos in early China as the source of China's unique perspective and distinctive values. One would expect recent works in Confucian ethics to capitalize on this idea. Reviewing recent works in Confucian ethics by P. J. Ivanhoe, David Nivison, R. P. Peerenboom, Henry Rosemont, and Tu Wei-Ming, the author analyzes these new studies in terms of the extent to which their representation of Confucian ethics reflects and (...) is consistent with the view that in early China the cosmos was conceived to be organismic, nontranscendent, and nondualistic. (shrink)
WangYangming’s discussions concerning evil mainly appear in two sets of texts, i.e., Chuanxilu 传习录 (Instructions for Practical Living) and gongyi 公移 (documents transferred to vertically unrelated departments). The former addresses evil in metaphysical terms, and the latter in social terms. These subtly different approaches show the nuance between self-cultivation and governance of others.
Following Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of WangYangming, this paper investigates the phenomenology of values and moral emotions in Max Scheler and the Confucian learning of heart, especially WangYangming. Part I illustrates the meaning of moral emotions in Confucianism and introduces WangYangming’s idea of pure knowing . Part II introduces Max Scheler’s idea of a priori value and feeling in order to explain how pure knowing could be both immanent and transcendental, both subjective (...) and objective. Part III explores the phenomena of value and feeling in Confucianism and WangYangming, giving a Schelerian interpretation of WangYangming’s teaching of four verses. Similar to Max Scheler, Confucian learning of heart affirms the intentional structure between hierarchy of values on the one hand and loving, preferring, and feeling of values on the other hand. This paper intends to clarify the basic structure of WangYangming’s thought; therefore, analyses on detailed moral emotions will be left to .. (shrink)
This volume serves both as an introduction to the thought of Mengzi and WangYangming and as a comparison of their views. By examining issues held in common by both thinkers, Ivanhoe illustrates how the Confucian tradition was both continued and transformed by WangYangming, and shows the extent to which he was influenced by Buddhism. Topics explored are: the nature of morality; human nature; the nature and origin of wickedness; self cultivation; and sagehood. In addition (...) to revised versions of each of these original chapters, Ivanhoe includes a new chapter on Kongzi's view of the Way. (shrink)
The main goals of this paper are two. First, it articulates what kinds of knowing pure knowing is in its narrow sense pure knowing as the capacity of moral judgment; pure knowing as moral knowledge and standard. Besides, it analyses pure knowing’s different features through a phenomenological description. All these aspects of pure knowing are tied by moral feeling. Second, this paper addresses two sets of theoretical problems that have been raised in Confucian discourse with respect to pure knowing and (...) Heavenly principle, primarily those that render Wang’s notion of pure knowing to be static recognition toward particular moral issues, or immediate response, which reading cannot really admit the possibilities of extension, reflection, moral cultivation, and reform of institution; and those that understand pure knowing to be merely abstract without concrete content, such as merely being a metaphysical substance. When properly understood, that is, from the perspective of moral emotions, WangYangming’s account of pure knowing provides for the possibilities of enhancement and cultivation, while insisting that the content of pure knowing is always accessible to us. (shrink)
In this article, I argue that WangYangming'sNeo-Confucian religious beliefs can bewarranted, and that the rationality of hisreligious beliefs constitutes a significantdefeater for the rationality of Christianbelief on Alvin Plantinga's theory of warrant. I also question whether the notion of warrantas proper function can adequately account fortheories of religious knowledge in which theaffections play an integral role. Idemonstrate how a consideration of Wang'sepistemology reveals a difficulty forPlantinga's defense of the rationality ofChristian belief and highlights a limitation ofPlantinga's (...) current conception of warrant asproper function. (shrink)
The present article is a slightly revised version of my article in Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39, no. 2 (2012): 174–91. I appreciate the opportunity to republish with very minor corrections. This article highlights sympathies between WangYangming’s notion of zhenzhi (real knowing) and Stanley Cavell’s concept of acknowledgment. I begin by noting a problem in interpreting Wang on the unity of knowing and acting, which leads to considering how our suffering pain figures in our “real knowing” (...) of another’s pain. I then turn to Cavell’s description of a related problem in modern skepticism, where Cavell argues that knowing another’s pain requires acknowledging it. Cavell’s concept of acknowledgment answers to Wang’s insistence that knowing and acting are one, and corrects Antonio Cua’s very different appropriation of “acknowledgment” to explain Wang’s doctrine. (shrink)
Admittedly there exists a considerable amount of contemporary literature on liangzhi that, to a certain extent, provides us with fruitful and insightful perspectives into WangYangming’s doctrine. And the majority of this literature, as if by tacit agreement, focuses on the interconnection between liangzhi and knowledge, whether it be innate, original, perfect, or moral knowledge. While this academic endeavor is credited with pushing forward studies of Chinese thought, it is the task of philosophy always to engage in the (...) examination of established practices as well as the quest for new possibilities.Take Wing-tsit Chan’s English rendition of Wang’s Chuanxi lu 傳習錄: the translations of liangzhi into “innate or... (shrink)
This article highlights sympathies between WangYangming's notion of zhenzhi (real knowing) and Stanley Cavell's concept of acknowledgment. I begin by noting a problem in interpreting Wang on the unity of knowing and acting, which leads to considering how our suffering pain figures in our “real knowing” of another's pain. I then turn to Cavell's description of a related problem in modern skepticism, where Cavell argues that knowing another's pain requires acknowledging it. Cavell's concept of acknowledgment answers (...) to Wang's insistence that knowing and acting are one, and corrects Antonio Cua's very different appropriation of “acknowledgment” to explain Wang's doctrine. (shrink)
In this essay I offer a new interpretation of WangYangming's 王陽明 well-known doctrine of zhi xing he yi 知行合一 by contextualizing it in his endeavor to seek an alternative way of Confucian learning other than Zhu Xi's 朱熹. Both Wang and Zhu Xi understand the ideal of a Confucian sage as cheng 誠, but propose different ways to attain it. To some extent, Wang's original concern has long been neglected. The recent scholarship on Wang's (...) unity of knowing and doing focuses on whether Wang's notion of zhi is restricted to moral knowledge, and whether the dictum makes sense when facing the challenge of weakness of will. Frisina takes Wang's notion of... (shrink)