Using the example of Black people’s inequitable COVID-19 outcomes and their health outcomes prior to the pandemic, I argue that the pandemic has forever changed how we should think about the conceptual and practical nature of health equity. From here on, we can no longer think of health equity without the concept of intersectionality. In particular, we must acknowledge that discrimination (e.g. sexism, ableism, racism, classism, etc.) within our social institutions intersect to withhold resources needed for health from people who (...) themselves have intersecting identities that make them vulnerable to the effects of discrimination. To ignore intersectionality in our work on health equity would mean ignoring a great injustice imposed on some of the most overlooked people in our communities, which would also be a great disserve to bioethics’ professional longevity. (shrink)

After giving the name “burnout” to the experience of being overworked and undervalued and the physician and patient suffering that comes from it, many clinicians have sought to elucidate further wh...

Poor health is not inherently a part of Black Americans’ bodies; poor health is not in our DNA. But as Linda Villarosa says in Under the Skin “something about being Black has led to the documented poor health of Black Americans.”1 Like many other scholars of Black health have said, Villarosa proposes, and evidence supports, that “the something is racism.”2 Villarosa attributes Black people’s generally inferior health outcomes in areas like pregnancy and birth, pain care, and cardiology to racism and (...) not a lack of social resources such as money, education, and access to healthcare. Although not always explicitly stated in her text, the stories Villarosa uses to illustrate racism’s effects on health also demonstrate racism’s influence on who has access to the social resources that are needed to maintain health and treat illnesses. Villarosa is right that more education and more income cannot de facto give Black people better health. At the same time, we cannot ignore that although racism is the force, education, money, housing, and access to healthcare are the means by which racism adversely affects health. Education and other social goods only fail to confer better health to Black people because racism serves as a roadblock. (shrink)

Environmental health remains a niche topic in bioethics, despite being a prominent social determinant of health. In this paper we argue that if bioethicists are to take the project of health justice as a serious one, then we have to address environmental injustices and the threats they pose to our bioethics principles, health equity, and clinical care. To do this, we lay out three arguments supporting prioritizing environmental health in bioethics based on bioethics principles including a commitment to vulnerable populations (...) and justice. We also highlight and advocate for environmental law efforts that align with these priorities, focusing specifically on the need for a right to a healthy environment. Our intention is to draw attention to the legal and ethical concepts that underlie the importance of a healthy environment, and urge bioethicists to prioritize both legal and ethical advocacy against environmental injustices in their practice. (shrink)

Fabi and Goldberg raised important considerations regarding both research and funding priorities in the field of bioethics and, in particular, the field’s misalignment with social justice. W...

There are some long-standing social issues that imperil Black Americans’ relationship with health and healthcare. These issues include racial disparities in health outcomes, provider bi...

An argument in the cognitive enhancement literature is that using stimulants in populations of healthy but socially disadvantaged individuals mistakenly attributes pathology to nonpathological individuals who experience social inequalities. As the argument goes, using stimulants as cognitive-enhancing drugs to solve the social problem of poorly educated students in inadequate schools misattributes the problem as an individual medical problem, when it is really a collective sociopolitical problem. I challenge this argument on the grounds that not all types of enhancement have to (...) be explained in medical terms, but rather at least one conception of enhancement can be explained in social terms—opportunity maintenance. Therefore, I propose that as a moral requirement we ought to explore whether stimulants could be a means of remedying underprivileged children's experiences of social inequalities that are borne from inadequate schools for the sake of increasing their chances for opportunities and well-being. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S3-S11, March‐April 2022.

When health professions learners’ primary pedagogical experience of Black people and how they become patients is through statistics, it becomes very easy for learners to think of Black people as data points rather than as individuals whose health is often at the mercy of racist institutions. When the human dimension of Black people’s health is ignored, specifically the ways that poor health affects individual wellbeing, one of the barriers to proper health for Black patients is how to be seen and (...) considered as a part of a larger problem of systemic racism and institutional injustices as well as individuals whose personal lives are affected by such larger problems. I propose an approach to health professions pedagogy—the experiential race testimonies approach—that can change the way health professions learners understand and treat Black patients, thus changing the future of Black health. The ERT approach pairs population data analysis with analysis of personal testimonies and the experiences they convey. (shrink)

Facilities that emit hazardous toxins, such as toxic landfills, oil refineries, and chemical plants, are disproportionately located in predominantly Black, Latinx, and Indigenous neighborhoods. Environmental injustices like these threaten just distribution of health itself, including access to health that is not dependent on having the right skin color, living in the right neighborhood, or making the right amount of money. Facilities that emit environmental toxins wrongly make people's race, ethnicity, income, and neighborhood essential to who is allowed to breathe clean (...) air and drink clean water, and thus, who is allowed to be healthy. This can be seen in the environmental crises in Louisiana; Mississippi; Houston, Texas; and Flint, Michigan. Since bioethics purports to concern itself with the principle of justice as applied to individuals and increasingly to populations, the field ought to concern itself more with environmental injustice. (shrink)

Some proponents of moral bioenhancement propose that people should utilize biomedical practices to enhance the faculties and traits that are associated with moral agency, such as empathy and a sense of justice. The hope is that doing so will improve our ability to meet the moral challenges that have emerged in our contemporary, globalized world. In this paper, we caution against this view by arguing that biomedically inducing more empathy may, in fact, diminish moral agency. We argue that this type (...) of increase in empathy would not be effective for addressing empathy’s vulnerability to the biases that can undermine moral judgment. Furthermore, doing so may undermine the important capacity to regulate empathy. We determine that if the moral enhancement project is to be a serious one, it must address these challenges. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S46-S49, March‐April 2022.

Torben Kjærsgaard’s argues that the term “cognitive enhancement substances” is an inappropriate term considering that stimulants do not enhance cognition, but rather only enhance motivation. Therefore, he concludes that stimulants are best described as “performance maintenance” and not “performance enhancement.” I challenge his conclusion on the grounds that both life’s ordinary, daily activities and life’s extraordinary activities are types of performances necessary for living the kinds of lives that we want to live, which can be enhanced, not just maintained, with (...) the effects of cognitive enhancing substances. “Cognitive enhancing substances” may be a misleading term, but referring to the effects of cognitive enhancing substances as “performance maintenance,” rather than “performance enhancing,” misguidedly minimizes the role that motivation plays into our self-determined lives. (shrink)

Black people experience lower quality and lesser quantity of sleep than white people. Researchers, however, do not believe that racial disparities in sleep sufficiency are caused by biological differences, but rather by various social differences, such as differences in sleeping environments and socioeconomic status. Racial disparities in sleep sufficiency are a matter of social justice because sleep is important to mental and physical health, meaning racial disparities in sleep sufficiency can contribute to unequal and unjust disparities in overall health. Racial (...) disparities in sleep may also be linked to other racial disparities in health that black people disproportionately experience such as hypertension and obesity. Sleep hygiene, common therapeutic advice given to help induce sleep, is often the first step to helping people sleep. Sleep hygiene, however, does not address the social, legal, cultural, and economic causes of racial disparities in sleep sufficiency. Sleep hygiene, as an ideal theory, addresses sleeplessness under ideal circumstances, only which a small group of privileged people live. Sleep hygiene ignores the unequal circumstances that contribute to some black people’s sleeplessness. Nonideal theory, however, acknowledges the less than ideal circumstances of certain groups, including people of color, and gives us a framework to develop solutions to racial disparities in sleep sufficiency. (shrink)

Why do American Black people generally have worse health than American White people? To answer this question, “Black Health” dispels any notion that Black people have inferior bodies that are inherently susceptible to disease. This is simply false racial science that has been used to abuse Black people since our African ancestors were brought to America on slave ships. A genuine investigation into the status of Black people’s health requires us to acknowledge that race has always been a powerful social (...) category. Race largely predetermines individuals’ social and political power and access to resources needed for health and wellbeing. And as a group, Black people have been intentionally denied this power and access. Systemic racism, oppression, and White supremacy in American institutions have largely been the perpetrators of differing social power and access to resources for Black people. It is these systemic inequities that create the social conditions needed for poor health outcomes for Black people to persist. An examination of social inequities reveals that it is no accident that Black people have poorer health than White people, instead in America, almost every institution has been designed to withhold what Black people need for proper health and wellbeing. Black Health provides a succinct discussion of Black people’s health, including the social, political, and at times cultural determinants of their health. This book examines the ways that Black people’s multiple identities—social, cultural, and political—intersect with anti-Black institutions, such as housing and health care to determine their poor outcomes in pregnancy, pain management, sleep, and cardiovascular disease. (shrink)

An argument in the cognitive enhancement literature is that using stimulants in populations of healthy but socially disadvantaged individuals mistakenly attributes pathology to nonpathological individuals who experience social inequalities. As the argument goes, using stimulants as cognitive-enhancing drugs to solve the social problem of poorly educated students in inadequate schools misattributes the problem as an individual medical problem, when it is really a collective sociopolitical problem. I challenge this argument on the grounds that not all types of enhancement have to (...) be explained in medical terms, but rather at least one conception of enhancement can be explained in social terms—opportunity maintenance. Therefore, I propose that as a moral requirement we ought to explore whether stimulants could be a means of remedying underprivileged children's experiences of social inequalities that are borne from inadequate schools for the sake of increasing their chances for opportunities and well-being. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 3, Page 233-234, March 2022.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is perhaps the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century, and certainly one of the most original in the entire Western tradition. Given the inaccessibility of his work, it is remarkable that he has inspired poems, paintings, films, musical compositions, titles of books -- and even novels. In his splendid biography, Ray Monk has made this very compelling human being come alive in a way that perfectly explains the fascination he has evoked. Wittgenstein's life was one of great moral (...) and spiritual depth. Although his work addresses problems of logic, language, mind, and knowledge, he often described it as having an ethical point, and once said that he "could not help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." In successfully bridging the gap assumed by many to exist between Wittgenstein's life and his work, Monk's biography helps to explain the interest in Wittgenstein's later philosophy on the part of Buddhist scholars. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic is negatively impacting people’s mental health worldwide. The current study examined the effects of COVID-19 lockdown on adult women’s eating, body image, and social media habits. Furthermore, we compared individuals with and without signs of orthorexia nervosa, a proposed eating disorder. Participants were 143 women, aged 17–73 years, recruited during a COVID-19 lockdown in Canada from May-June 2020. Participants completed self-report questionnaires on their eating, body image, and social media habits during the pandemic. The Eating Habits Questionnaire (...) assessed symptoms of orthorexia nervosa. Compared to the period prior to lockdown, women with higher total orthorexia nervosa scores reported eating a lot more than usual, feeling greater pressure to diet and lose weight, thinking about food more often than usual, experiencing greater weight gain, and perceiving more pressure from social media specifically to lose weight and to exercise, compared to their healthy counterparts. We examined associations between individual EHQ subscales and perceived changes to eating and weight. Women who scored high on EHQ-Problems reported seeing more weight loss content on their social media than those who reported fewer orthorexia nervosa symptoms. Conversely, those who scored low on EHQ-Feelings reported feeling a lot less pressure to lose weight, somewhat less or a lot less pressure to lose weight or to exercise from social media specifically, and trended toward less laxative use during lockdown, compared to those who scored higher on orthorexia nervosa. And those who scored low on EHQ-Knowledge reported feeling somewhat less or a lot less pressure to lose weight than those who reported more orthorexia nervosa symptoms. Together, the findings suggest that women with symptoms of orthorexia nervosa are experiencing an exacerbation of disordered eating thoughts and behaviors during COVID-19, and that social media may be a contributing factor. (shrink)

Propositions are the things we believe, intend, desire, and so on, but discussions are often less precise than they could be and an important driver of this deficiency has been a focus on the objects but a neglect of the attitudinal relations we bear to them. In what follows, we will offer some thoughts on what it means for a proposition to be the object of an attitude and we will argue that an important part of the story lies with (...) the attitude relations rather than the propositions. As we will see there are infinitely many relations we might bear to a proposition, but the propositional attitude relations are special amongst them. Accounting for what makes them special will be an important component in the discussion that follows. We will argue that once one appreciates certain facts about propositional attitude relations, various claims that metaphysicians often make regarding propositions themselves begin to look undermotivated. In fact, many views on the metaphysical nature of propositions come to look like plausible candidates for being that to which our propositional attitudes relate us. As will emerge, we will see that the principle role of propositions in the theory of mind is simply to keep track of how our attitudinal states represent things as being. But, we argue, in order to do this work, very few constraints must be placed on the nature of propositions themselves. In particular, contra much of the recent work on the metaphysics of propositions, they need not represent nor must they be structured. In light of these observations, we conclude by sketching our own favored minimalist view of propositions. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that our use of vague language poses an intractable problem for any account of content and communication on which (i) the things we assert are propositions and (ii) understanding an assertion requires recognizing which proposition the speaker asserted. John MacFarlane has argued that this problem concerning vague language is itself a species of an even more general problem for such traditional accounts – the problem posed by “felicitous” underspecification. Repurposing certain ideas from Allan Gibbard, MacFarlane (...) offers a novel theory of vagueness, plan-expressivism, as an account that can handle both vagueness and such underspecification in communication. -/- In this paper, I argue that despite its many virtues, plan-expressivism fails as a general account of meaning and communication. In particular, I show that when it comes to the problem of felicitous underspecification, plan-expressivism fares no better than the more traditional accounts of content and communication it is intended to replace. Along the way, I argue that the problem of felicitous underspecification puts considerable pressure on an assumption that is at the core of both plan-expressivism and the accounts of its more traditionalist rivals - namely, that in cases of successful linguistic communication, we must always be able to find something -- whether a propositional content or a conversational update -- that the speaker is intending to share with her audience. (shrink)

Narratives have allowed us to show the limits of positivism in humanistic disciplines and to challenge dominant presuppositions. A recent development in feminist philosophy, epistemic injustice describes the ways in which marginalized peoples are unfairly deprived of the ability to participate in society's knowledge‐ and meaning‐making practices. Marginalized groups can respond with their own ways of thinking, speaking, acting, and organizing, thus resisting an oppressive status quo. Much like an economic monopoly, a “hermeneutical monopoly” exists where people are forced, both (...) by coercion and by lack of alternatives, to consume and use the dominant hermeneutical resources. The chapter describes an overlooked problem in the context of mass incarceration and thus to point to the need for a solution. The problem is the hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical marginalization of prisoners, which is not adequately addressed by scholars who simply attend to the narratives of the oppressed. (shrink)

I argue that if intentions are what Grice, and most contemporary action theorists, take them to be, they are inessential for acts of speaker meaning. More specifically, my primary aim is to show that the consensus view of speaker meaning is in deep tension with certain plausible, and widely accepted, cognitive constraints on rational intention pertaining to an agent’s assessment of her prospects of achieving her goal. My secondary aim is to offer an initial case for thinking that the best (...) way to resolve this tension is to give up the claim that meaning is fundamentally a matter of intention. In pursuing this strategy, we will see some of the potential benefits of Bratman’s (1987) work on intentions, plans, and practical reasoning for the theory of meaning, including some interesting consequences of his rejection of the so-called ‘Simple View’ on which we intentionally do only those things that we specifically intend to do. Moreover, our discussion will help to illustrate how some familiar tools from decision theory might find new use in discussions of meaning and communication. (shrink)

Migration and Islamic Ethics, Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship addresses how Islamic ethical and legal traditions can contribute to current global debates on migration and displacement; how Islamic ethics of muʼakha, ḍiyāfa, ijāra, amān, jiwār, sutra, kafāla, among others, may provide common ethical grounds for a new paradigm of social and political virtues applicable to all humanity, not only Muslims. The present volume more broadly defines the Islamic tradition to cover not only theology but also to encompass ethics, customs (...) and social norms, as well as modern political, humanitarian and rights discourses. The first section addresses theorizations and conceptualizations using contemporary Islamic examples, mainly in the treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees; the second, contains empirical analyses of contemporary case studies; the third provides historical accounts of Muslim migratory experiences. (shrink)

In ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning’, Stephen Schiffer argues that many of the objects of our beliefs, and the contents of our assertoric speech acts, have what he calls the relativity feature. A proposition has the relativity feature just in case it is an object-dependent proposition ‘the entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to think of [the relevant object] in different ways’ (129). But as no Fregean or Russellian (...) proposition can possibly have such a feature, we must either (i) give up on these traditional theories of propositional content in favor of an account that can allow for the relativity feature, or else (ii) explain why the things we believe, and say, oftentimes seem to have this feature even though they, in fact, do not. Schiffer pursues the former option; in this essay, I pursue the latter. (shrink)

Essays: The language of values, by W. Moore. The languages of sign theory and value theory, by E. S. Robinson. Significance, signification, and painting, by C. Morris. Evaluation and discourse, by S. C. Pepper. Empirical verifiability theory of factual meaning and axiological truth, by E. M. Adams. The third man, by I. McGreal. A non-normative definition of "good," by A. C. Garnett. The judgmental functions of moral language, by H. Fingarette. Some puzzles for attitude theories of value, by R. B. (...) Brandt. The meaning of "intrinsic value," by H. N. Lee. Value propositions, by R. S. Hartman. A second sequel on value, by R. Lepley.--Comments and responses. (shrink)

In this long-awaited work, Ray L. Hart offers a speculative theology that profoundly challenges traditional understandings of God. Drawing on a lifetime of reading in philosophy and religious thought, Hart unfolds a vision of God perpetually in process: an unfinished God. Breaking out of the classical doctrine of divine persons, Hart reimagines Trinity as composed of theogony, cosmogony, and anthropogony an emerging Godhead in relation to origins, temporal creation, and human existence. The book s ultimate import is that all of (...) Being and Nonbeing emerges together in interrelation and interdependence. This divine reality, Hart explains, is unfinished, imperfect, still in the course of a living-dying process that implicates all things, existent and inexistent, temporal and eternal. Doctrinal closuresomething that every orthodox theology requiresthus becomes impossible, and rightly so. Hart confronts those orthodoxies by asking: How can thinking of God reach closure when the divine is itself unfinished and its appearance to us always amounts to new creation? Hart s insights open the potencies of the nothing to the actualization of freedomthe freedom to create. That is, the nothing is not for nothingit is procreative. In the domain of radical speculative theology, then, Hart offers a fully deconstructive revisioning of the Christian God as ever an emerging and self-transfiguring actuality. It is a work with which all serious students of theology will wish to contend.". (shrink)

Short inspirational selections from the great masters of Tibetan Buddhism, past and present--now part of the Shambhala Pocket Library series. Here is a portable collection of inspiring readings from the revered masters of Tibetan Buddhism.The Wisdom of Tibetan Buddhismincludes quotations from major lineage figures from the past such as Padmasambhava, Atisha, Sakya Pandita, Marpa, Milarepa, and Tsongkhapa. Also featured are the writings of masters from contemporary times including the Dalai Lama, Dudjom Rinpoche, Khyentse Rinpoche, Sakya Tridzin, Chogyam Trungpa, and others. (...) Topics include cultivating compassion, letting go of ego, learning to become more alert and present in our lives, and developing a clear perception of our own true nature. This book is part of the Shambhala Pocket Library series. The Shambhala Pocket Library is a collection of short, portable teachings from notable figures across religious traditions and classic texts.The covers in this series are rendered by Colorado artist Robert Spellman.The books in this collection distill the wisdom and heart of the work Shambhala Publications has published over 50 years into a compactformat that is collectible, reader-friendly, andapplicable to everyday life. (shrink)

How do I handle difficult family members? What do I do if I can’t control my emotions? When do I correct others, and when do I hold my tongue? Too often we are late in realizing that we mishandled a situation, causing both resentment and frustration. But what if you could approach every situation with the mind of Christ? Distilled from his decades of experience as a clinical psychologist and a practicing Catholic, Dr. Ray Guarendi, popular radio and TV host, (...) offers here dozens of bite-sized reflections that combine sound spiritual advice with the best of modern psychology. Dr. Ray will help you address countless daily problems and create a plan of action for your most common troubles. With his trademark frankness and humor, Dr. Ray tackles all the topics that too often bring confusion and heartache, including: What to do when you’re easily offendedCommon excuses parents make for bad behavior in their children—and themselvesThe difference between speaking your mind and losing your emotions.The fine line between being a confident evangelist and being a jerk?What you should do when emotions overwhelm you?How to hold your children to high standards without causing resentmentThe difference between making an excuse and justifying an actionHow to tell people you’re angry without being nasty about it.What true humility is – and isn’t. Thinking Like Jesus is more than a self-help book. It will place you firmly into the mindset of a disciple of Christ so you can focus your attention on God and, ultimately, what it will take to spend eternity with Him in heaven. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Some Personal Prefatory Remarks Introduction: Wittgenstein's Chief Contribution? The Reception of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics in His Own Lifetime The Post 1956 Reaction.

Rich in case studies, practical photocopiable activities and downloadable resources, this is a beginner's guide to how values are formed and developed in varying professional contexts across health and social care services. It invites the reader to reflect on their own values, and on how these define the quality of the care they deliver.

Examining one of the fundamental issues in cognitive psychology: How does our conscious experience come to be the way it is?

"Truth, Lies and Representation," University of West Florida, 2011. "Meaning and Truth", Society for Exact Philosophy, Kansas City, 2010. Colloquium, UF Department of Philosophy, 2010. Florida Philosophical Association, Gainesville, 2009. "Cantor and the Gap", with Cassandra Woolwine, Logic Seminar, UF Math Department, 2010. "The Problem of Negative Existentials, Inadvertantly Solved", American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, 2010. Non-Existence and Fictional Reference, LOGOS, Barcelona, 2009 Society for Exact Philosophy, Edmonton AB, 2009. Florida Philosophical Association, Daytona Beach, 2008. "Even-Tempered Truth", Florida Philosophical Association, (...) Tallahassee, 2007. Society for Exact Philosophy, Vancouver, 2007. "Fifty-Two Pick Up", Florida Philosophical Association Presidential Address, Tampa, FL. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Greece Rome Conclusion Notes.

Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.

Already hailed as a masterpiece, Foundations of Language offers a brilliant overhaul of the last thirty-five years of research in generative linguistics and related fields. "Few books really deserve the cliché 'this should be read by every researcher in the field'," writes Steven Pinker, author of The Language Instinct, "but Ray Jackendoff's Foundations of Language does." Foundations of Language offers a radically new understanding of how language, the brain, and perception intermesh. The book renews the promise of early generative linguistics: (...) that language can be a valuable entrée into understanding the human mind and brain. The approach is remarkably interdisciplinary. Behind its innovations is Jackendoff's fundamental proposal that the creativity of language derives from multiple parallel generative systems linked by interface components. This shift in basic architecture makes possible a radical reconception of mental grammar and how it is learned. As a consequence, Jackendoff is able to reintegrate linguistics with philosophy of mind, cognitive and developmental psychology, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and computational linguistics. Among the major topics treated are language processing, the relation of language to perception, the innateness of language, and the evolution of the language capacity, as well as more standard issues in linguistic theory such as the roles of syntax and the lexicon. In addition, Jackendoff offers a sophisticated theory of semantics that incorporates insights from philosophy of language, logic and formal semantics, lexical semantics of various stripes, cognitive grammar, psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic approaches, and the author's own conceptual semantics. (shrink)