The 'postmodern condition,' in which instrumentalism finally usurps all other considerations, has produced a kind of intellectual paralysis in the world of education. The authors of this book show how such postmodernist thinkers as Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard illuminate puzzling aspects of education, arguing that educational theory is currently at an impasse. They postulate that we need these new and disturbing ideas in order to "think again" fruitfully and creatively about education.

This timely book addresses concerns about educational and moral standards in a world characterised by a growing nihilism.

This book addresses concerns about educational and moral standards in a world increasingly characterised by nihilism. On the one hand there is widespread anxiety that standards are falling; on the other, new machinery of accountability and inspection to show that they are not. The authors in this book state that we cannot avoid nihilism if we are simply _laissez-faire_ about values, neither can we reduce them to standards of performance, nor must we return to traditional values. They state that we (...) need to create a new set of values based on a critical assessment of contemporary practice in the light of a number of philosophical texts that address the question of nihilism, including the work of Nietzsche. (shrink)

"The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Education" is state-of-the-art map to the field as well as a valuable reference book.

This chapter contains sections titled: Characteristics and Development of Critical Theory The Educational Relevance of Critical Theory Distinctive Insights and Contributions Differing Receptions of Critical Theory Critical Theory and the Student Movement An “Other” Critical Pedagogy?

In this important survey, an international group of leading philosophers chart the development of philosophy of education in the twentieth century and point to signficant questions for its future. Presents a definitive introduction to the core areas of philosophy of education. Contains 20 newly-commissioned articles, all of which are written by internationally distinguished scholars. Each chapter reviews a problem, examines the current state of the discipline with respect to the topic, and discusses possible futures of the field. Provides a solid (...) foundation for further study. (shrink)

In this important survey, an international group of leading philosophers chart the development of philosophy of education in the twentieth century and point to signficant questions for its future. Presents a definitive introduction to the core areas of philosophy of education. Contains 20 newly-commissioned articles, all of which are written by internationally distinguished scholars. Each chapter reviews a problem, examines the current state of the discipline with respect to the topic, and discusses possible futures of the field. Provides a solid (...) foundation for further study. (shrink)

Ruth Jonathan, Nigel Blake; Philosophy in Schools: a request for clarification, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 221–2.

The Internet has recently enjoyed its thirtieth birthday. In 1969, a computer at the University of California sent a message down a wire to another in a research centre at Stanford. The message was just two letters, *LO’.1 Since then the development of the Internet—of the physical infrastructure of computers and the material or broadcast links between them, along with the digital protocols that enable it to function—has been largely an academic achievement. Up until six years ago, the world’s richest (...) entrepreneur, Bill Gates himself, was still unconvinced of its immense importance and economic potential.2 For the World Wide Web (WWW), the most popular and elaborate application on the Net, is itself only about six years old. It is its stunning exponential growth that makes it seem to some of us as if it has been with us forever. (shrink)

The Internet has recently enjoyed its thirtieth birthday. In 1969, a computer at the University of California sent a message down a wire to another in a research centre at Stanford. The message was just two letters, *LO’.1 Since then the development of the Internet—of the physical infrastructure of computers and the material or broadcast links between them, along with the digital protocols that enable it to function—has been largely an academic achievement. Up until six years ago, the world’s richest (...) entrepreneur, Bill Gates himself, was still unconvinced of its immense importance and economic potential.2 For the World Wide Web (WWW), the most popular and elaborate application on the Net, is itself only about six years old. It is its stunning exponential growth that makes it seem to some of us as if it has been with us forever. (shrink)

A curriculum that reflects a pluralist, multi-cultural society in a characteristically ‘Western’ way may seem to militate against traditionalist sub-cultures, but this outcome is less ‘Western’ than ‘modern’, in Habermas's sense.‘Modernisation’, involving the institutionalisation of rationality and the decentering of consciousness, and thus acceptance of the ‘Western’ solution, is possible within any culture, regardless of its content. In a Western society all are economically compelled to a partial ‘modernisation’, and in Habermas's view all cultures in modern societies suffer erosion by (...) the extension and intrusion of economic and administrative sub-systems. Cultural modernisation affords the strongest available resistance to this erosion. Thus, a supposedly ‘Western’ curriculum approach would strengthen sub-cultures, notwithstanding the demise of traditionalism [1]. (shrink)

Nigel Blake; Church Schools, Religious Education and the Multi-ethnic Community: a reply to David Aspin, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2.

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III.

Habermas's educational importance is usually misconstrued or underestimated, partly because the scope and implications of ideal speech conditions are generally misunderstood. These conditions are only relevant to discursive speech situations, but non-manipulative teaching need not be discursive. And not even discursive teaching is an appropriate occasion for ideal speech conditions. They properly apply to discourse institutions, at the ‘epistemic centre of modernity’. Thus, the concept of ideal speech conditions impinges on the relation of school to higher education and on curricular (...) change as an agency of modernisation, and illuminates the need for access to discourse institutions, if personal autonomy is an aim for school children, students or adults. Neo-Marxists, traditionalists and progressives all misunderstand the importance of discourse institutions. (shrink)

Nigel Blake; A Position in Society, an Intimate Constraint, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 26, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 271–276, https://doi.org/.

Nigel Blake; Intellectual Freedom and the Universities: a reply to Anthony O'Hear, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 25.

Nigel Blake; Justifying Peace Education: a reply to Professor Flew, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 257–264, https://.

Nigel Blake; Peace Education and National Security, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 27–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

The paper highlights the urgent and radical questions and problems which postmodernism poses for educational studies in general, and the philosophy of education in particular. First, it outlines and interrelates the legacies of modernism in social and cultural theory. Next, it describes the reactionary anti-modernism of the Right, and contrasts this with traditionalism. It is argued that the current political and economic context of education is largely anti-modernist, not traditionalist. The stirrings of radical doubts about modernism are described and contrasted (...) with the antimodernism of the Right. A salient theme to this point is the variety of conceptions of the relationship between knowledge and power. Mature postmodernism is characterised centrally in terms of a reconceptualisation of that relationship. The metamorphosis of the concept of the self in postmodernism is described and related to new problems about ethics and a newly emerging importance for the aesthetic. Finally, the paper argues that while the fundamental issues for philosophy of education are unchanged - problems about instrumentalism and various issues of autonomy - these are radically recast in postmodernism, and present new difficulties. (shrink)

Online tuition is a practice—practised by this writer—in which students form tutorial relationships with a teacher, and in some models with each other, by the modes of email, Web-mediated file exchange and asynchronous computer conferencing (the construction of multiple threads of conversation and dialogue, as in Web chat rooms). It may centrally revolve around an exchange of assignments and comments. It is quite different from simply referring students to the information and activities on various Web-sites. Centrally, tuition is conducted here (...) in personal interaction through the written word. (shrink)

Online tuition is a practice—practised by this writer—in which students form tutorial relationships with a teacher, and in some models with each other, by the modes of email, Web-mediated file exchange and asynchronous computer conferencing (the construction of multiple threads of conversation and dialogue, as in Web chat rooms). It may centrally revolve around an exchange of assignments and comments. It is quite different from simply referring students to the information and activities on various Web-sites. Centrally, tuition is conducted here (...) in personal interaction through the written word. (shrink)

Postmodernism precludes philosophical justifications for democracy. This undermines the role of philosophy of education and leaves us with weaker reasons for educational democracy than we need. If the ‘postmodern challenge’ is as Wilfred Carr conceives it, Jürgen Habermas meets that challenge. His work rests on neither Enlightenment essentialism nor foundationalism. Habermas can accept and explain that consciousness is historically and socially situated in discourse, yet still argue to the possibility of emancipation. I defend his conception of rationality from charges of (...) essentialism. Rational thinking can critique its own specific forms, so superior forms of rationality remain universalisable by rational means. A historicising account of such critique avoids situationist relativism. These considerations justify educational democracy and preserve a role for philosophy of education. (shrink)

This paper is a response to one published in the June 1997 edition of the BJES (Cole, Hill & Rikowski, 1997) which criticises the author's claims about the utility of postmodern analysis for studies in education (Blake, 1997).

This article sets forward a new concept of reflection, to be contrasted with more usual reading of the concept for which we use the term `reflectivity'. The contrast is related to a distinction between normalizing education and counter-education. We claim that within the framework of normalizing education there is no room for reflection, but only for reflectivity. In contrast to reflectivity, reflection manifests a struggle of the subject against the effects of power which govern the constitution of her conceptual apparatus, (...) her knowledge, her consciousness and her limitations and possibilities for successful functioning. Reflectivity re-presents the hegemonic realm of self-evidence and the productive violence of social and cultural order. Reflection, by contrast, aims to challenge the supposedly self-evident and the present order of things. Reflection aims at transcendence and represents a moral commitment in respect of the otherness of the Other, which power relations in every realm of self-evidence oblige us to neglect, to destroy or consume. Transcendence is a concrete utopia, and so is the subject in her nonrepressive communication with the Other: they are part and parcel of our present possibilities, sometimes in microscopic arenas, struggled for, and from time to time even realized. (shrink)

The epistemic value of seemings is increasingly debated. Such debates are hindered, however, by a lack of consensus about the nature of seemings. There are four prominent conceptions in the literature, and the plausibility of principles such as phenomenal conservatism, which assign a prominent epistemic role to seemings, varies greatly from one conception to another. It is therefore crucial that we identify the correct conception of seemings. I argue that seemings are best understood as sui generis mental states with propositional (...) content and a distinct phenomenal character. Rival conceptions are shown to succumb to numerous difficulties. (shrink)

Introduction : the provocation of Levinas -- Being's other -- "Would you like to do a bit of theology?" : Levinas and theological turn -- The disturbance of theology -- Preferring the shadows : the "little faith" of Israel -- The return of God?

It is widely believed that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of argumentation is vulnerable to the charge of relativism. This paper provides a more charitable interpretation of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s normative views, one that properly considers the historical trajectory of their work and a wider range of texts than existing interpretations. It is argued that their views are better characterized as a form of “contrastivism about arguments” than any kind relativism. This more accurate depiction contributes to ongoing efforts to revive interest (...) in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work as well as build bridges with trends in contemporary argumentation theory. (shrink)

Alexander Campbell once declared “a solemn league and covenant” between philosophy and common sense. Campbell’s pronouncement is representative of a broader trend in the Restorationist movement to look favorably on the common sense response to skepticism—a response originating in the work of Scottish philosopher and former minister Thomas Reid. I recount the tumultuous history between philosophy and common sense followed by the efforts of Campbell and Reid to reunite them. Turning to the present, I argue that an epistemic principle known (...) as phenomenal conservatism best embodies the core insights contained within Reid and Campbell's common sense response to skepticism. I finish by arguing for phenomenal conservatism. (shrink)

If we know one thing about Karl Marx, it is that he denounced the modern economic system that we now call ‘capitalism’1 for being immoral and unjust, didn't he? To question whether Marx thought, an...

The problem of evil is broadly considered to be one of the greatest intellectual threats to traditional brands of theism. And William Rowe’s 1979 formulation of the problem in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” is the most cited formulation in the contemporary philosophical literature. In this paper, we explore how the tools and resources of experimental philosophy might be brought to bear on Rowe’s seminal formulation, arguing that our empirical findings raise significant questions regarding the ultimate (...) success of Rowe’s argument. Such a result would be quite notable within philosophy of religion, since this is considered one of the most formidable arguments against theism. However, further testing is needed before any firm conclusions can be drawn. -/- In section 1, we elucidate Rowe’s formulation of the problem of evil and the intuitions that seem to underwrite it. In section 2, we explore how the tools and resources of experimental philosophy might be brought to bear on Rowe’s formulation, outlining our hypotheses and our methods for testing them before showcasing our results. In section 3, we discuss the philosophical import of our results–arguing that our results, when taken together, pose an initial challenge to Rowe’s seminal argument. (shrink)

Do you have a problem? Maybe you can use an algorithm to fix it! Learn about the codes all around us in Algorithms: Solve a Problem! Sing along as you learn to Code It!

One of the most significant philosophical voices of the twentieth century - the philosopher of 'the Other' - Emmanuel Levinas' work offers a challenge to the discipline of anthropology that claims knowledge of the human. Levinasian philosophy considers subjectivity and identity as 'secret'. For him an attempt to document humanity should then be placed in an ethics of ignorance and 'not-knowing' so that 'otherness' can be inspired. Anthropology thus reaches the Levinasian challenge of defining itself as a humanistic science as (...) well as a humanistic documentation of social life. This book endeavours to take Levinasian and anthropological precepts equally seriously and offers tentative conclusions. (shrink)

What is the fruit of a searching dialogue between faith and reason? This book collects theological and philosophical perspectives on the richness of the faith-reason dialogue, including examples from literature, continental and analytic philosophy, worship and liturgy, and radical approaches to issues of racism and prejudice. The authors strongly resist the temptations to either disregard the faith-reason dialogue or take it for granted. Through their explorations and reflections they open up new vistas and horizons on a topic more necessary than (...) ever. (shrink)

Whether evil provides evidence against the existence of God, and to what degree, depends on how things seem to the subject—i.e., on one’s perspective. I explain three ways in which adopting an atheistic perspective can increase support for atheism via considerations of evil. The first is by intensifying the common sense problem of evil by making evil seem gratuitous or intrinsically wrong to allow. The second is by diminishing the apparent fit between theism and our observations of evil. The third (...) is by lowering the initial plausibility of theism. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil” and argue that skeptical theism does not fully address it. (shrink)

The use of autonomous weaponry in warfare has increased substantially over the last twenty years and shows no sign of slowing. Our chapter raises a novel objection to the implementation of autonomous weapons, namely, that they eliminate moral cost-sharing. To grasp the basics of our argument, consider the case of uninhabited aerial vehicles that act autonomously (i.e., LAWS). Imagine that a LAWS terminates a military target and that five civilians die as a side effect of the LAWS bombing. Because LAWS (...) lacks moral agency, and in particular the capacity for moral emotions, moral cost-sharing is limited to dead civilians and their loved ones. We argue that's unjust insofar as those responsible for unjust harm to others ought to share in those costs. Our worry expands to other strategic uses of AI, e.g., cyber warfare. This presents a dilemma: Either we design autonomous weaponry capable of moral emotions, or we limit the use of autonomous weaponry. The former undermines the risk-mitigation purpose of creating autonomous weaponry and expands the number of sentient individuals whose welfare is risked in war. The latter risks worsening combatant casualties and achieving strategic aims. (shrink)

Doxastic involuntarists have paid insufficient attention to two debates in contemporary epistemology: the permissivism debate and the debate over norms of assertion and belief. In combination, these debates highlight a conception of belief on which, if you find yourself in what I will call an ‘equipollent case’ with respect to some proposition p, there will be no reason why you can’t believe p at will. While doxastic involuntarism is virtually epistemological orthodoxy, nothing in the entire stock of objections to belief (...) at will blocks this route to doxastic voluntarism. Against the backdrop of the permissivism debate and the literature on norms of belief and assertion, doxastic involuntarism emerges as an article of faith, not the obvious truth it’s usually purported to be. (shrink)

Deep moral disagreements exist between Christians and non-Christians. I argue that Christians should resist the temptation to pin all such disagreements on the irrationality of their disputants. To this end, I develop an epistemological framework on which both parties can be rational—the key being that their beliefs are formed from different perspectives and, hence, on the basis of different sets of evidence. I then alleviate concerns that such moral perspectivalism leads to relativism or skepticism, or that it prohibits rational discourse. (...) I end by exploring new avenues for resolving deep moral disagreements opened up by the perspectivalist approach. (shrink)

Does knowledge depend in any interesting way on our practical interests? This is the central question in the pragmatic encroachment debate. Pragmatists defend the affirmative answer to this question while purists defend the negative answer. The literature contains two kinds of arguments for pragmatism: principle-based arguments and case-based arguments. Principle-based arguments derive pragmatism from principles that connect knowledge to practical interests. Case-based arguments rely on intuitions about cases that differ with respect to practical interests. I argue that there are insurmountable (...) problems for both kinds of arguments, and that it is therefore unclear what motivates pragmatism. (shrink)