For more than 20 years, both here and abroad, significant efforts have been undertaken to provide equal access to nutritional food for all citizens. Yet, the numbers of under-nourished continue to rise, as do those afflicted with non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease. Clearly, current efforts are not working. Relying on the psychological phenomena of learned helplessness and fundamental attribution error, it is argued that certain individuals may not be willing, or able, to take actions (...) that are currently prescribed regarding access to nutritious food. The water is muddied regarding potential solutions as the various actors involved (e.g., corporations, governments, individuals) cannot agree on a starting point and continue to point fingers regarding responsibility. It is posited that emphasis needs to shift from the current “one-size-fits-all” approach to one that is more tailored to the various actors, specifically the individuals. Within the group of individuals (consumers), based on Wenar’s Least Cost Theory, even further distinction must be made between those who see themselves as capable actors and those who do not. In this conceptual piece intended to refocus the discussion surrounding food access, we propose that future research should approach these issues from a unit of analysis perspective in an attempt to identify the solutions most likely to succeed at various participating levels. (shrink)

In this essay, author?educator?photographer A.D. Coleman considers a number of dilemmas inherent in photographing private persons in public places. ?Street photography?; is a genre whose ethical dimensions are often overlooked, despite the photographer's efforts to humanize and universalize a moment in time. According to the author, the dilemmas of street photography are imagistic, general, and philosophical, as well as pragmatic, specific, and legislative.

Widely recognized as America's premiere photography critic, Coleman took an interest in emerging digital technologies long before his colleagues. In fact, the earliest text in this new book of essays concerning the advent of electronic media is from 1967. The intervening thirty years have found Coleman returning to topics such as digitized images, the shifting concept of intellectual property, the impact of computers on photography as a whole, and the social implications of the Internet and World Wide Web. (...) A wide-ranging selection of essays, lectures, and writings, The Digital Evolution makes for stimulating reading, and should be well received by those familiar with Coleman's previous collection of essays, Critical Focus. (shrink)

Despite worldwide attention given to food access, very little progress has been made under the current model. Recognizing that individual engagement is likely based on individual experiences and perceptions, this research study investigated whether or not a correlation exists between one’s socioeconomic status (SES) and perceived personal responsibility for food access. Discussion of results and implications provide fresh insight into the ongoing global debate surrounding food access. Outcomes also provide insight into willing and able participants and point to least-cost solutions (...) which may be better suited to implement and initiate change. Results indicate that the issue of food access is more complex than simply lobbying for better decision-making among individuals and populations, highlighting the importance of unit of analysis considerations. (shrink)

Miscreants, in the form of deviants and dark personalities, impact organizations more than we realize. Most management instruction on ethics issues focuses on helping students to understand how to evaluate difficult situations, make ethical decisions, and engage in ethical actions. While this approach works well for the individual decision maker, it fails to help students learn how to anticipate and proactively prevent the unethical actions of others. Using ethical codes as a backdrop, “Thinking Like a Bad Guy” is a provocative (...) classroom activity to elicit critical and creative thinking among business students. The goal of this exercise is to facilitate student learning so they can anticipate the behaviors of bad actors and alter organizational processes and procedures to mitigate the ability of others to violate organizational ethical standards. (shrink)

Business ethics education is most effective when students take an active approach and must respond to various demands and feedback. In this paper we describe a classroom exercise in which students are tasked with delivering an ethics briefing to “executive teams”. Through a combination of individual analysis and group work, students become immersed in real-world ethics problem-solving, in which there are no easy solutions. Students must defend their ethical recommendations as well as challenge those from other groups. The exercise concerns (...) an existing controversial business called Seeking Arrangement. Survey results from graduate students who have participated in the exercise reveal that it is effective in producing better ethics problem solving, as well as greater confidence in addressing ethical issues. (shrink)

This article will examine the case of Ms B, a woman with tetraplegia for a year, who, prior to rehabilitation or return to community life, sought a ruling that doctors may turn off her ventilator. The authors are people with disabilities. Their analysis focuses on the manner in which the High Court framed the case in terms of mental capacity, addressed the issue of suicide and ambivalence, and resolved informed consent and treatment alternative issues. While the disability community in the (...) US does not oppose the general right to refuse treatment, there is significant concern about lack of informed consent and denial of desired treatment alternatives, and the cavalier manner in which these factors have been dismissed. (shrink)

The increased interest in exorcisms and demonology should be moderated by a proper understanding of the relationship between psychology and spirituality. There is an important link between psychological aberrations and possession, but too often and too quickly, a person’s mental health is dismissed or overlooked in favor of a diagnosis of demonic possession. The Church’s ritual of exorcism can be properly used only after psychological discernment, episcopal approval, and personal assent. Most priests are not prepared for the role of exorcist (...) and should spend their time more effectively addressing pastoral needs. The belief in demons is part of biblical witness and Catholic history. At the same time, we must avoid any tendency toward redemption by exorcism. (shrink)

Pope Francis has called for the Church to be a sign of mercy and hope to the world. Mercy stands at the center of the Gospel, and the family is a fundamental seat of mercy within the culture, responsible for bestowing the most valuable of God’s gifts, human life. Because of its mission to bestow life, marriage is necessarily a “lifelong covenant of love and fidelity between a man and a woman”. As the Church upholds the view of marriage exclusively (...) as the union of a man and a woman who are capable of reaching the deepest kind of unity, she also affirms that persons of the same sex can achieve unity in meaningful ways. Upholding the traditional, comprehensive view of marriage does not belittle the dignity of homosexual persons, because all are our brothers and sisters. (shrink)

There is no paucity of academic studies, medical literature, or media attention given to concerns about gender ideology and being transgender. When reporting their findings, however, some researchers and practitioners working from a purely secular perspective overstep medical observations to make metaphysical pronouncements. This causes considerable confusion and stifles dialogue that could occur if the line between medicine and philosophy were clearly delineated. Properly understood, transgender describes an observable distress due to incongruence between one’s birth sex and gender identity. Conversely, (...) gender ideology is a metaphysical conclusion, which argues that a person’s gender is fluid and open to personal choice. Clearly distinguishing between these can help families, clinicians, and society provide medically appropriate and culturally competent care to those with gender dysphoria, especially children. (shrink)

In Roman Catholic Moral Theology, a direct abortion is never permitted. An indirect abortion, in which a life threatening pathology is treated, and the treatment inadvertently leads to the death of the fetus, may be permissible in proportionately grave situations. In situations in which a mother’s life is endangered by the pregnancy before the fetus is viable, there is some debate about whether the termination of the pregnancy is a direct or indirect abortion. In this essay a recent case from (...) a Roman Catholic sponsored hospital in Phoenix is reviewed along with the justifications for and arguments against viewing the pregnancy termination as an indirect abortion. After review of several arguments on both sides of the debate, it is concluded that termination of the pregnancy itself as the means of saving the mother cannot be considered an indirect abortion and that the principle of “double effect” does not justify the termination. In addition, the importance of a breakdown in communication between the local bishop and the administration of the hospital is shown to have contributed to the ultimate loss of Catholic sponsorship of the hospital. (shrink)

There is continuing interest in action research in health care. This is despite action researchers facing major problems getting support for their projects from mainstream sources of R&D funds partly because its validity is disputed and partly because it is difficult to predict or evaluate and is therefore seen as risky. In contrast traditional health science dominates and relies on compliance with strictly defined scientific method and rules of accountability. Critics of scientific health care have highlighted many problems including a (...) perpetual quality gap between what is publicly expected and what is deliverable in the face of rising costs and the cultural variability of scientific medicine. Political demand to close the quality gap led to what can be seen as an elitist reform of policy on UK health research by concentrating more resources on better fewer centres and this may also have reduced support for action research. However, incompetent, unethical or criminal clinical practice in the UK has shifted policy towards greater patient and public involvement in health care and research. This highlights complementarity between health science and action research because action research can, as UK health policy requires, involve patients and public in priority setting, defining research outcomes, selecting research methodology, patient recruitment, and interpretation of findings and dissemination of results. However action research will remain marginalised unless either scientific research is transformed generally into a more reflective cycle or there is increased representation of action research enthusiasts within the establishment of health R&D or current peer review and public accountability arrangements are modified. None of these seem likely at this time. The case for complementarity is illustrated with two case studies. (shrink)

Indymedia is a network of activist media centers which appeared in Seattle in 1999. The free software let the technical experts of the beginning organize and teach a lot of new groups. The groups themselves become collective medias instead of asking mainstream medias to speak about them. For Indymedia free software technology enables free speech if it is used in a basic manner giving access to everybody. Still, Indymedia teaches its new members a common culture. A process of collective integration (...) is thus made possible, although leftist and progressive groups are very diverse. (shrink)

The claim that distant simultaneity with respect to an inertial observer is conventional arose in the context of a space-and-time rather than a spacetime ontology. Reformulating this problem in terms of a spacetime ontology merely trivializes it. In the context of flat space, flat time, and a linear inertial structure (a purely space-and-time formalism), we prove that the hyperplanes of space for a given inertial observer are determined by a purely spatial criterion that depends for its validity only on the (...) two-way light principle, which is universally regarded as empirically verified. All (empirically determined) “spacetime” entities, such as the conformal structure or light surface equation, are used in a purely mathematical manner that is independent of and hence isneutral with respect to the ontological status that is ascribed to them. In this regard, our criterion is significantly stronger than thespacetime criterion recently advanced by D. Malament, which appeals explicitly to the conformal orthogonality of spacetime vectors and to the invariance of the conformal-orthogonal structure of spacetime under the causal automorphisms of spacetime. Once the hyperplanes of space for a given inertial observer have been determined by our empirical and purely spatial criterion, the following holds: there exists one and only one $\vec \varepsilon $ -synchronization procedure, namely the standard procedure proposed by Einstein, such that the planes of common time are thesame as the nonconventional hyperplanes of space for the inertial observer. It follows that our criterion provides an empirical even if indirect method for determining that the one-way speed of light is the same as the average two-way speed of light. In addition, two inertial observers that are not at rest with respect to each other necessarily havedifferent hyperplanes of space, and consequently their respective spatial views cannot be encompassed in a single three-dimensional space. Hence, our purely spatial criterion provides an empirical motivation for adopting the more comprehensive spacetime ontology. (shrink)

RésuméCet article offre une édition, une traduction et une analyse d'une préface adressée par Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, traducteur de Galien, à un mécène chrétien syro-oriental, le médecin Salmawayh ibn Bunān. Ḥunayn a composé cette Épître à Salmawayh ibn Bunān en syriaque, mais seule en a survécu une traduction arabe par son neveu. Le texte n'a reçu que peu d'attention depuis sa découverte, il y a plus de quatre-vingts ans; il n'a jamais été publié entièrement. L’Épître donne un nouvel aperçu des (...) débuts de Ḥunayn et du milieu chrétien dans lequel il évoluait, en montrant ses attaches au passé littéraire syriaque, bien illustrées par les préfaces d'un autre traducteur de Galien, son prédécesseur Sergius de Rēšʿaynā ; mais l’Épître indique aussi des éléments qui distinguent de leur prédécesseur les traducteurs abbassides comme Ḥunayn. Cette étude soutient que la demande accrue des mécènes et la lecture attentive des commentaires hippocratiques de Galien ont suscité un nouveau discours, dans l’Épître, selon lequel des lecteurs de tout niveau peuvent et devraient avoir accès aux textes scientifiques grecs. Cette Épître montre ainsi comment Ḥunayn comprenait son propre projet littéraire et scientifique et sa relation à la tradition grecque de l'Antiquité. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:139 HUME'S "DIALECTIC" Hume's treatment of contradiction in his discussion of external existence has generally been understood to resemble the Pyrrhonian model of dialectic; consequently, Hume has been viewed as a sceptic and an irrationalist. According to that model of dialectic, the sceptic, by showing that equally strong arguments can be constructed both for and against a proposition, raises doubts about the ability of reason to determine the truth (...) or falsity of 2 beliefs. However, I will argue that Hume's treatment of contradiction differs significantly from Pyrrhonian dialectic. I will further argue that his treatment of contradiction is strongly analogous to the Kantian model of dialectic. According to Kant, dialectic is a method which not only shows that reason generates contradictions but which also provides a critique of 3 the logic generating those contradictions. The goal of Kant's dialectic is thus distinctly different from the goal of Pyrrhonian dialectic. For Kant, dialectic is a method for resolving scepticism. The parallels between Hume's treatment of contradiction and Kant's dialectic will suffice to show that Hume's "dialectic" is also a method for resolving, rather than generating, scepticism. Two features of Pyrrhonian dialectic have been deemed relevant for Hume's treatment of contradiction in his discussion of external existence. The Pyrrhonist argues that (1) if equally strong arguments can be given for and against a proposition, it is impossible to assess the truth or falsity of the proposition on the basis of any argument; and (2) if it 140 is impossible to assess rationally the truth or falsity of propositions, we must content ourselves in practical life with following custom and convention in all matters of opinion. Hume describes the contradiction in our belief in external existence as an opposition between two equally natural and unavoidable modes of inference. Both modes of inference are operations of the imagination. Hume does not give a special name to the first of these modes of inference, but he describes it as an "irregular" inference based upon the resemblance A of two distinct mental operations (T 203-204). The second is reflective, or causal, inference based on observation of the constant conjunction of like objects. Causal reasoning is reflective insofar as it is regulated by rules and is, consequently, a check or monitor for judgments resulting from the irregular or unchecked operation of the imagination. These two principles of inference lead to two different judgments about the nature of our perceptions: The imagination tells us, that our resembling perceptions have a continu'd and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other. (T 215) Just as the Pyrrhonian sceptic maintains that the constructibility of equally strong arguments establishing contradictory propositions makes it impossible to decide which proposition is true, Hume similarly maintains that two opposing modes of inference have an equal influence on the mind and therefore are "unable mutually to destroy each other" (T 215). However, Hume's account of this contradiction would be Pyrrhonian only if he argued that these principles, in addition to being equal in psychological 141 force, also have the same epistemic status. Only their having the same epistemic status makes it impossible to decide rationally whether one of the two principles is a reliable guide for making sound empirical inferences. Popkin, a defender of the Pyrrhonian reading of Hume, maintains that this is just what Hume does argue. Reflection for Hume, he maintains, is no more -a rational principle than is unchecked imagination: There is no rational basis for believing that those objects that have constantly been conjoined in the past, will be so conjoined in the future. It is only custom, or "a certain instinct of our nature," that makes us believe that they will be so conjoined, and this instinct which may be hard to resist psychologically, may well be fallacious and deceitful. The basis for all factual and probable reasoning is thus irrational. 5 If reflection is as irrational a principle as unchecked imagination, then the opposition between reflection and unchecked imagination would be an opposition between equally irrational principles. Consequently, a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:139 HUME'S "DIALECTIC" Hume's treatment of contradiction in his discussion of external existence has generally been understood to resemble the Pyrrhonian model of dialectic; consequently, Hume has been viewed as a sceptic and an irrationalist. According to that model of dialectic, the sceptic, by showing that equally strong arguments can be constructed both for and against a proposition, raises doubts about the ability of reason to determine the truth (...) or falsity of 2 beliefs. However, I will argue that Hume's treatment of contradiction differs significantly from Pyrrhonian dialectic. I will further argue that his treatment of contradiction is strongly analogous to the Kantian model of dialectic. According to Kant, dialectic is a method which not only shows that reason generates contradictions but which also provides a critique of 3 the logic generating those contradictions. The goal of Kant's dialectic is thus distinctly different from the goal of Pyrrhonian dialectic. For Kant, dialectic is a method for resolving scepticism. The parallels between Hume's treatment of contradiction and Kant's dialectic will suffice to show that Hume's "dialectic" is also a method for resolving, rather than generating, scepticism. Two features of Pyrrhonian dialectic have been deemed relevant for Hume's treatment of contradiction in his discussion of external existence. The Pyrrhonist argues that (1) if equally strong arguments can be given for and against a proposition, it is impossible to assess the truth or falsity of the proposition on the basis of any argument; and (2) if it 140 is impossible to assess rationally the truth or falsity of propositions, we must content ourselves in practical life with following custom and convention in all matters of opinion. Hume describes the contradiction in our belief in external existence as an opposition between two equally natural and unavoidable modes of inference. Both modes of inference are operations of the imagination. Hume does not give a special name to the first of these modes of inference, but he describes it as an "irregular" inference based upon the resemblance A of two distinct mental operations (T 203-204). The second is reflective, or causal, inference based on observation of the constant conjunction of like objects. Causal reasoning is reflective insofar as it is regulated by rules and is, consequently, a check or monitor for judgments resulting from the irregular or unchecked operation of the imagination. These two principles of inference lead to two different judgments about the nature of our perceptions: The imagination tells us, that our resembling perceptions have a continu'd and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other. (T 215) Just as the Pyrrhonian sceptic maintains that the constructibility of equally strong arguments establishing contradictory propositions makes it impossible to decide which proposition is true, Hume similarly maintains that two opposing modes of inference have an equal influence on the mind and therefore are "unable mutually to destroy each other" (T 215). However, Hume's account of this contradiction would be Pyrrhonian only if he argued that these principles, in addition to being equal in psychological 141 force, also have the same epistemic status. Only their having the same epistemic status makes it impossible to decide rationally whether one of the two principles is a reliable guide for making sound empirical inferences. Popkin, a defender of the Pyrrhonian reading of Hume, maintains that this is just what Hume does argue. Reflection for Hume, he maintains, is no more -a rational principle than is unchecked imagination: There is no rational basis for believing that those objects that have constantly been conjoined in the past, will be so conjoined in the future. It is only custom, or "a certain instinct of our nature," that makes us believe that they will be so conjoined, and this instinct which may be hard to resist psychologically, may well be fallacious and deceitful. The basis for all factual and probable reasoning is thus irrational. 5 If reflection is as irrational a principle as unchecked imagination, then the opposition between reflection and unchecked imagination would be an opposition between equally irrational principles. Consequently, a... (shrink)

« La démocratie est de plus en plus une coquille vide. » Partant du malaise profond et de la violente crise de confiance que les peuples des démocraties modernes traversent vis-à-vis des institutions étatiques, Crouch avance que ces Etats sont entrés dans une phase « post-démocratique ». Explorant les forces sociales et économiques qui y sont à l'œuvre, il décortique les liens unissant aujourd'hui les conglomérats aux gouvernements et la perte de légitimité de ces derniers. Concis et subtilement argumenté, cet (...) essai offre une réponse cinglante aux chantres du néolibéralisme pour qui les sociétés dites avancées ont atteint le degré de démocratie le plus élevé possible ; et propose des pistes concrètes afin de redonner aux citoyens une réelle marge d’action. (shrink)

The law within each legal system is a function of the practices of some social group. In short, law is a kind of socially grounded norm. H.L.A Hart famously developed this view in his book, The Concept of Law, by arguing that law derives from a social rule, the so-called “rule of recognition.” But the proposition that social facts play a foundational role in producing law is a point of consensus for all modern jurisprudents in the Anglo-American tradition: not just (...) Hart and his followers in the positivist school, most prominently Joseph Raz and Jules Coleman, but also the anti-positivist Ronald Dworkin, who argues that law necessarily synthesizes moral considerations with social facts. But which group’s practices ground each legal system? In particular, which group’s practices undergird U.S. law? Positivists since Hart have universally pointed to either officials or judges as the “recognitional community” (my term): the group such that its rules, conventions, cooperative activities, or practices in some other sense are the social facts from which the law of a given legal system derives. So Hart and all other positivists would identify either U.S. officials or U.S. judges as the recognitional community for U.S. law. This Article grapples with the tension between the positivist’s official- or judge-centered account of the recognitional community and the “popular constitutionalism” now so widely defended by constitutional scholars such as Larry Kramer, Robert Post, Reva Siegel, Mark Tushnet, Jeremy Waldron, and many others. Surely the popular constitutionalist would want to claim that U.S. citizens, not judges or officials, are the recognitional community for U.S. law. I term this position “deep popular constitutionalism.” Indeed, it turns out that Dworkin’s account of law, in its ambition to generate associative moral obligations for the citizenry as a whole, implies deep popular constitutionalism. Here there is a disagreement, hitherto unnoticed, between Dworkin and the positivists. My solution to this disagreement – to the debate between deep popular constitutionalists and deep official or judicial supremacists -- is to dissolve it by providing a group-relative account of law. Social norms, such as norms of dress or eating, are clearly group-relative. A particular dressing or eating behavior may be socially appropriate relative to one group’s norms, yet socially inappropriate relative to another’s. This Article extends the group-relative view from social norms to law itself, with a particular focus on U.S. law and constitutionalism. Part I surveys the jurisprudential literature. It shows how Hart and successor positivists identify the rule of recognition as a social practice engaged in by officials or some subset of officials (judges), rather than citizens generally, and argues that Dworkin by contrast sees the citizenry as a whole as his recognitional community. Parts II and III defend a group-relative account of law. Part II argues, with reference to the U.S. experience, that multiple groups can simultaneously instantiate the kind of social fact that undergirds law, be it a convention, a social norm, a “shared cooperative activity” (SCA), or something else. At many points in U.S. constitutional history, multiple official or citizen groups, defined along departmental, partisan, regional, state-federal, religious, or other lines, have accepted competing rules of recognition for U.S. law. Part III argues that “law” functions, primarily, as either an explanatory or a normative construct, and that insisting on a single recognitional community for each legal system would be arbitrary, both for explanatory purposes and for normative purposes. Part IV considers the many implications of the group-relative account for U.S. constitutional theory – in particular, for popular constitutionalism. (shrink)

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...

The monograph shows that in the last 50 years theoretical linguistics remains a compendium of mutually contradicting doctrines on multiple levels: the level of general theories of language, the level of its main constituents (the lexicon, syntax, and the lexical-syntactic interface that connects them), and the lower levels of specific linguistic problems (such as lexical polysemy, grammatical meanings, etc.). The contradictions of contemporary linguistic theories are indicative of a deep crisis. Evolutionary-synthetic theory of language is aimed at overcoming this crisis. (...) It implements a multidisciplinary approach that describes the language a) in evolutionary and ontogenetic development and b) in close interaction with other human subsystems: the mental representation of the world, human activity and social interaction. Language is defined as a dual system developing in ontogeny: 'universal sensory sublanguage + ethnically specific functional sublanguage' where the sensory sublanguage is used to describe the 'visible' world (accessible to the senses), and the functional sublanguage is employed to describe the conceivable world ('comprehended by human mind'). Within the framework of the approach presented, many problems are solved: 1) the cognitive (non-verbal) language for representing language meanings; 2) diversity and unity of languages (using the structure alternative to Chomsky's Universal Grammar); 3) the main (original) function of the language; 4) the cognitive language of thought (its basis is the lexical and grammatical meanings of the sensory sublanguage); 5) dual (functionally prototypical) structure of human categories; 6) mechanisms in the early acquisition of lexical and grammatical meanings; 7) the meaning (assignment) of the syntactic structure of a sentence, etc. The book deals with a wide range of issues related to human cognition, glottogenesis and anthropogenesis, universal cognitive structures for the representation of objects, actions and situations, so it will be of interest not only to linguists, but also to psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers. (shrink)