In this book, two philosophers use their training in arguments and reasoning to uncover the role of ungrounded beliefs when we fall in love. They illustrate the fallacies of love by drawing on personal experiences, literary characters and two imaginary individuals, providing examples of ungrounded beliefs in Aesop's Fables, Cinderella and Don Giovanni amongst others to illustrate love as an inexhaustible source of misperceptions, misunderstandings and misconceptions.

Drawing on the Agency-Stewardship approach, which suggests that manager profile may range from the agent model to the steward model, this article aims to examine how important CEOs are to corporate social responsibility (CSR). Specifically, this exploratory study proposes the existence of a relationship between manager profile and CSR practices and that this relation is mediated by the perceived role of ethics and social responsibility. After applying a mediated regression analysis using survey information collected from 149 CEOs in Spain, results (...) show that those closer to the steward model are more inclined to attach great importance to ethics and social responsibility, and to implement CSR practices in their companies. Results also provide support for the suggested mediating effect. Thus, this article extends research in understanding top managers as drivers for CSR and suggests new ways to deal with this issue empirically. (shrink)

This paper based on the distinction between the instrumental and normative views of stakeholder management explores how business education and personal moral philosophies may influence the orientation adopted by an individual. A mediated regression analysis using survey information collected from 206 Spanish university students showed that those exposed to management theories were less willing to consider stakeholders when making business decisions if the consequent economic impacts on the firm were omitted. The results also provided support for a negative effect of (...) business education on idealism and a mediating effect of the latter on the relationship between education and stakeholder management orientation. This study thus raises awareness on the influence of business education on individuals’ ethical decision-making processes and suggests some possible changes for business education. (shrink)

La piedra clave que sostiene el sistema simbólico de las religiones, es sin duda, la experiencia de salvación. F. Heiler afirmaba que el aroma de las religiones es la soteriología y R. Panikkar proponía definir el hecho religioso con tres simples palabras: "camino de salvación". Por ello, la realidad existencial del dolor y el sufrimiento son el gran reto lanzado a la experiencia religiosa: proponéis salvación, se puede decir a los creyentes, pero el dolor y el sufrimiento siguen existiendo. ¿Cómo (...) es posible? Por ello, todas las religiones de formas muy diferentes, responden a la pregunta por sufrimiento y proponen formas para integrarlo existencialmente. (shrink)

Fundamentos de filosofía de la ciencia es una obra de carácter general destinada principalmente a servir de guía a alumnos y profesores en la ensañanza universitaria de esta disciplina, en especial para los estudios de Filosofía, pero también para los de Humanidades y Ciencias Humanas y Naturales. La obra está estructurada en diferentes niveles para facilitar su utilización como libro de texto, tanto en cursos introductorios generales como en seminarios específicos. Aunque el público universitario es su principal destinatario, se ha (...) concebido para que cualquier lector interesado en la disciplina y con determinados conocimientos previos pueda acceder, con provecho, a las diversas partes de la misma. Ha diferencia de la mayoría de introducciones a la Filosofía de la Ciencia, la orientación de esta obra no es histórica sino temática, cubriendo los diferentes ámbitos conceptuales de la disciplina. Su contenido, dado que su finalidad es presentar los fundamentos de la materia, se centra en los grandes temas clásicos de la disciplina. El núcleo temático lo conforma la triada "conceptos-leyes-teorías" en torno a cuyos componentes se presentan los restantes temas: contrastación de hipótesis, medición, explicación, relaciones interteóricas, el problema de la inducción y el cambio teórico. En tanto que introducción general de la disciplina, en esta obra no se pretende ninguna tesis metacientífica o metafilosófica sustantiva, sino exponer de forma clara los principales problemas filosóficos que plantea la actividad científica y discutir las diferentes aproximaciones a los mismos.. (shrink)

En este año 2010 se celebra el primer centenario del comienzo del Movimiento Ecuménico con la Asamblea Misional de Edimburgo, 1910. Los problemas misionales protestantes llevaron en aquel momento a que las Iglesias jóvenes, especialmente de Asia y África contribuyeran a que quedara en primer plano que misión y unidad son inseparables: para que la Iglesia cumpla eficazmente con su vocación de misión debe estar unida, la división cristiana entorpece la extensión del Reino de Dios.

The purpose of this paper is to defend, contra Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (F&PP), that the theory of natural selection (NS) is a perfectly bona fide empirical unified explanatory theory. F&PP claim there is nothing non-truistic, counterfactual-supporting, of an “adaptive” character and common to different explanations of trait evolution. In his debate with Fodor, and in other works, Sober defends NS but claims that, compared with classical mechanics (CM) and other standard theories, NS is peculiar in that its explanatory models are (...) a priori (a trait shared with few other theories). We argue that NS provides perfectly bona fide adaptive explanations of phenotype evolution, unified by a common natural-selection guiding principle. First, we introduce the debate and reply to F&PP’s main argument against NS. Then, by reviewing different examples and analyzing Fisher’s model in detail, we show that NS explanations of phenotypic evolution share a General Natural Selection Principle. Third, by elaborating an analogy with CM, we argue against F&PP’s claim that such a principle would be a mere truism and thus explanatorily useless, and against Sober’s thesis that NS models/explanations have a priori components that are not present in CM and other common empirical theories. Irrespective of differences in other respects, the NS guiding principle has the same epistemic status as other guiding principles in other highly unified theories such as CM. We argue that only by pointing to the guiding principle-driven nature that it shares with CM and other highly unified theories, something no-one has done yet in this debate, one can definitively show that NS is not defective in F&PP’s sense: in the respects relevant to the debate, Natural Selection is as defective and as epistemically peculiar as Classical Mechanics and other never questioned theories. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present and defend an empiricist, neo-Hempelian account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding. The proposal aims to preserve what I take to be the core of Hempel’s empiricist account, by weakening it in some respects and strengthening it in others, introducing two new conditions that solve most of Hempel’s problems without abandoning his empiricist strictures. According to this proposal, to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological machinery (...) and using special, and non-ad hoc, non-accidental regularities. The new conditions are elaborated making essential use of two central structuralist ideas, namely T-theoreticity and specialization. I first introduce and qualify the project, then present the new account in detail and assess it vis-à-vis its rivals, and finally discuss some possible objections, concluding that the account fares better than its monistic rivals and well enough to qualify as a promising neo-Hempelian account. Even for those unpersuaded by its monistic goals, it has the merit of calling attention to two new necessary conditions not explicitly emphasized thus far and showing how they serve to answer many of the criticisms addressed against Hempel’s account. (shrink)

Within post - Kuhnian, philosophy of science, much effort has been devoted to issues related to conceptual change, such as incommensurability, scientific progress and realism, but mostly in terms of reference, without a fine - grained theory of scientific concepts/senses. Within the philosophy of language and of mind tradition, there is a large body of work on concepts, but the application to scientific concepts has been very tentative. The aim of this paper is to propose a general framework for a (...) theory for the individuation of scientific concepts. The general view about the individuation of concepts favored here is the possession - condition approach: to individuate a concept is to identify its possession conditions. The general metascientific tools for the analysis of scientific theories are model - theoretic, more specifically, structuralist: scientific theories, the entities to which scientifc concepts belong, are model - theoretic theory - nets. The general idea about the content of scientific concepts that inspires this proposal comes from: (i) our grandfathers’ "laws - plus - correspondence rules", (ii) Kuhns "laws applied to exemplars" views and (iii) moderate operationalism. The aim is to show that some clarification can be gained applying the possesion condition appproach to (an expansion of) these three elements using structuralist metascientific tools. First, I briefly present the two main structuralist ideas I shall use: the difference between observability and non - theoreticity, and the notion of theory - net. Second, I informally introduce the five components that come from my reading of the three traditional elements; these components are, or are not, plausible independently of how they will be integrated within a theory of concept - identity. Third, I present the kore of the theory of possession conditions for concept - identity that we shall use for the integration of such components. Finally, I propose the general traits of the possession condition that corresponds to each of these five components, I present some problems and point out some possible ways of dealing with them. (shrink)

The epistemic status of Natural Selection has seemed intriguing to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that NS, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. Sober’s argument focuses on some “would promote” sentences that (...) according to him, play a central role in NS explanations and are both causal and a priori. Lange and Rosenberg criticize Sober arguing that, though there may be some unspecific a priori causal claims, there are not a priori causal claims that specify particular causal factors. Although we basically agree with Lange and Rosenberg’s criticism, we think it remains silent about a second important element in Sober’s dialectics, namely his claim that, contrary to what happens in mechanics, in NS explanatory conditionals are a priori, and that this is so in quite specific explanatory models. In this paper we criticize this second element of Sober’s argument by analyzing what we take to be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, and argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in NS can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to CM and other standard, highly unified theories. We conclude that this second claim is unsound, or at least that more needs to be said in order to sustain that NS explanatory models are a priori in a sense in which CM models are not. (shrink)

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010 ) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along (...) several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs! (shrink)

José A. Díez examines the reasons for claiming that models involve fictions. He opposes the claim that, in order to account for some key features of the practice of modeling in science, such as the existence of unsuccessful representations and also of successful yet inaccurate or idealized ones, it is necessary to accept fictional entities. In resisting such a view, he sketches an account of scientific modeling and argue that according to such account there is no need for (...) strong factionalism, only a weak, unproblematic fictionalist component is needed. (shrink)

Models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent something beyond itself? This paper details different aspects of this problem and argues that the semantic view of theories does not provide us with an adequate response to any of these.

"Estos dos modos de ver la explicación no son incompatibles entre sí; cada uno ofrece un modo razonable de analizar la explicación. De hecho, pueden ser tomados como representando dos aspectos diferentes pero compatibles de la explicación científica" (1989, p. 183). "[estos dos enfoques] se han desarrollado hasta el punto en que pueden coexistir pacíficamente como dos aspectos distintos de la explicación científica" (1992, p. 39). "No rechazo la posibilidad de una teoría [unificacionista] de este tipo; creo que ella no (...) entraría en conflicto con la explicación causal sino que la complementaría " (2001a, p. 10). (shrink)

Explanations in genetics have intriguing aspects to both biologists and philosophers, and there is no account that satisfactorily elucidates such explanations. The aim of this article is to analyze the kind of explanations usually given in Classical (Transmission) Genetics (CG) and to present in detail the application of an account of explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding to elucidate the such explanations. First, we present explanations in CG in the classical format of inferences with the explanans as the premises and (...) the explanandum as the conclusion and compare them with explanations in other paradigmatic explanatory fields such as Classical Mechanics. Second, we summarize the main aspects discussed in the literature with regard the peculiarities of genetic explanations. Third, we introduce the account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding making use of Sneedian structuralism, in particular the notions of theory-net, fundamental law or guiding principle, specialization, and special laws. Finally, we apply this account to the case of CG and show that this analysis sheds light to the intriguing aspects of genetic explanations and remove most of their alleged oddities. (shrink)

Lovers typically entertain two sorts of thoughts about their beloveds. On the one hand, they think that some qualities of their beloveds provide reasons for loving them. Romeo would say that he loves Juliet in virtue of the way she is. On the other hand, they regard their beloveds as irreplaceable. Romeo would never be willing to exchange Juliet with another maiden. Yet it may be asked how these two sorts of thoughts can coherently coexist. If some qualities of Juliet (...) justify Romeo’s love for her, shouldn’t another maiden with the same qualities be equally lovable for him? This paper draws some distinctions that we take to be crucial to the understanding of reasons for love. Its aim is to show that, even though the claim that beloveds as irreplaceable is plausible to some extent, there is at least one interesting sense in which lovers are replaceable. (shrink)

Many controversies within philosophy of science have been attempted to be explained in terms of the metaphilosophical prescription/description distinction over the goal of philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that the controversy between Popper and Kuhn about the ir/rationality of Normal Science cannot be fully explained in these terms, not even if we also take the truth/problem-solving distinction over the goal of science into account. It is argued that, to gain full understanding of this controversy, (...) it is necessary to take into account their differences regarding a topic apparently not involved in it, namely the structure of scientific theories. The conclusion is that both Popper and Kuhn were descriptive/prescriptive at the same time in their attempt to make the rules of scientific practice explicit, yet Kuhn did it better because he had a richer and more accurate idea of what scientific theories are. Although this work is mainly a piece of history of philosophy of science, it also aims at shedding some light on epistemological issues. If the conclusion is sound, it also shows how structural aspects of scientific theories may be relevant to the epistemology of science.Keywords: Falsificationism; Normal science; Rationality; Theories; Thomas Kuhn; Karl Popper. (shrink)

Phenomenology of practice is a useful, rigorous way of deeply understanding human phenomena. Therefore, it allows research to be conducted into nursing's most sensitive and decisive aspects. While it is a widely used research approach and methodology in nursing, it is seldom addressed and made use of in its practical and applied value. This article aimed to approach the global outlook of van Manen's hermeneutic‐phenomenological method to better understand its theoretical background and to address and support the contribution this method (...) can make to nursing, if rigorously applied. For a professional discipline like nursing, van Manen's approach is especially interesting because, in addition to contributing to the body of knowledge of nursing, it provides a special kind of knowledge that allows nurses to act in a more reflective manner, and with tact and skill, in certain situations and relationships that arise in their daily practice. A more in‐depth understanding of this research methodology may help nurse‐researchers make good use of it and also harness knowledge derived from this type of research. This comes as a result of assuming that phenomenological texts, the final product of the research, have tremendous educational potential for people who read them carefully. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section (...) 2, first, I begin by briefly characterizing the relevant notion of inductivism that is at stake here; second, I present and discuss the main Popperian argument against it and show that in the only reading in which the argument is formally it is restricted to cases of predicted evidence, and that even if restricted in this way the argument is formally valid it is nevertheless materially unsound. In section 3, I analyze the desiderata that, according to Popper, any acceptable measure for evidential support must satisfy, I clean away its ad-hoc components and show that all the remaining desiderata are satisfied by inductuvist-in-strict-sense measures. In section 4 I demonstrate that two of these desiderata, accepted by Popper, imply that in cases of predicted evidence any measure that satisfies them is qualitatively indistinguishable from conditional probability. Finally I defend that this amounts to a kind of strong inductivism that enters into conflict with Popper’s anti-inductivist argument and declarations, and that this conflict does not depend on the incremental versus non-incremental distinction for evidential-support measures, making Popper’s position inconsistent in any reading.Keywords: Popper; Inductivism; Confirmation; Corroboration. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to identify what I take to be the main conceptual problem in Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals when the Limit Assumption is not satisfied, what I call the Discrimination Problem , and to present and discuss a modification of Lewis’ semantics that aims at solving DP. First, I outline Lewis’ semantics, highlighting the aspects that will be relevant for our discussion. Second, I present DP and discuss it with a heuristic example. Third, I present the (...) new proposal and comment some formal consequences and the objections they give rise to. Fourth, I present an allegedly equivalent version of the proposal and discuss the difference between counterfactuals and strict conditionals. Finally, I defend that the two proposals are different and argue for the first one as the best way of capturing two intuitions that seem in conflict when the LA is not satisfied. I conclude with a dilemma: either the proposal here defended works or LA is inescapable. Thus, if the proposal doe.. (shrink)

La finalidad de este trabajo es revisar una de las nociones centrales de la metateoría estructuralista, la noción de principio-guía, mostrar su fecundidad para abordar algunas cuestiones centrales tanto de filosofía general como de filosofía especial de la ciencia, así como de historia de la filosofía de la ciencia, y, por último, revisar y valorar algunas propuestas de elucidación de la misma. La conclusión es que se trata de una noción tan fructífera como difícil de analizar.

The no-miracles argument is the main inference-to-the-best-explanation kind of argument for scientific realism, and the pessimistic induction is considered a main, if not the main, challenge for a NMA-based scientific realism. Doppelt advocates a new kind of inference-to-the-best-explanation supported scientific realism that he labels Best Theory Realism. If successful in replacing standard selective realism as the best version of scientific realism, BTR would be particularly good since it is not committed to the partial truth of past theories and thereby it (...) is immune to the antirealist strategy of finding cases of past, predictively successful theories with predictively essential components not retained by later theories. The goal of this paper is to raise doubts about Doppelt’s attempt and argue that, other benefits of his proposal notwithstanding, it fails. In section 1 I summarize the main tenets of standard, retentive selective realism relevant for the present discussion. In section 2 I show that Doppelt’s main arguments against retentive selective realism do not work. In section 3, I argue that the way BTR faces the challenge posed by the historical record that motivates PI is unsatisfactory and puts Doppelt into a fatal trilemma: either he is committed to two claims that are untenable together; or endorses an extremely implausible form of present-science chauvinism; or unjustifiably discriminates explanation against prediction in historical record. The conclusion is that BTR falls short of substituting standard retentive selective realism as the most plausible realist position, and that thereby the cases of past successful theories with predictively essential parts not retained by posterior theories are still a real problem for a plausible realist position. (shrink)

Una parte de la explicación del gran florecimiento en los EE. UU. de la filosofía analítica, particularmente la filosofía analítica del lenguaje, después de la segunda guerra mundial está sin duda en la amplitud de la comunidad de filósofos que un país grande en dimensiones permite. Pues conseguir un buen nivel de excelencia en la práctica de este modo de entender la filosofía requiere una amplia comunidad de colegas en que difundir y contrastar nuevas ideas. Conscientes de esto, los filósofos (...) analíticos continentales estamos embarcados en la tarea de ampliar recíprocamente nuestras comunidades, aprovechando el impulso del proyecto de mayor unión política europea. Aunque, a diferencia de lo que ocurría en EE. UU. en el tiempo a que nos hemos referido antes, existen importantes obstáculos culturales, hay buenas razones para ser optimistas. Existe claramente la voluntad, lo que ha permitido en la última década llevar a cabo con éxito proyectos tales como los de la European Society for Philosophy and Psychology y la European Society for Analytic Philosophy, así como establecer importantes lazos de conocimiento mutuo a través de pequeños seminarios bilaterales. Y existe también algo muy importante: el que los temas que más interesan a los filósofos del lenguaje continentales son muy próximos; algo que, aventuramos, lo explica parcialmente una formación que presta más atención a la tradición filosófica que la de nuestros colegas americanos. Estos temas incluyen típicamente la referencia, particularmente la referencia de expresiones indéxicas, así como cuestiones relativas a la objetividad, las condiciones de verdad, el realismo y el antirrealismo. (shrink)

En la actividad científica se pueden distinguir tres tipos principales de representación científica: proyectiva, subsuntiva y reductiva. Tras unas breves considcraciones introductorias, se presentan las características más destacadas de cada uno de estos tres tipos principales de representación científica y se abstrae a partir de ellas el esquema al que toda Teoría General de la Representación Científica (TGRC) se debe adecuar. A continuación se exponen las lineas generales de la principal propuesta presente en la literatura para desarrollar TGRC y se (...) hacen algunas consideraciones criticas. La conclusión provisional es que esta propuesta tiene, al menos por el momento, el problema de ser, o bien demasiado liberal, o bien demasiado conservadora. Por último, se propone un enfoque alternativo a explorar que pretende estar libre de los problemas deI anterior.We can distinguish three main types of representation in scientific practice: projective, subsuntive and reductive. After some brief introductory remarks, we present the more salient characteristics of these three main types of scientific representation and we abstract from them a scheme that any General Theory for Scientific Representation (GTSR) must fit. Then we offer the general traits of the main existing proposal for a GTSR and we make some criticisms. The provisional conclusion is that this proposal is, as it stands, either too liberal or too conservative. Finally, we propose to explore an alternative approach which intends to solve these difficulties. (shrink)

Despite the importance of network analysis in biological practice, dominant models of scientific explanation do not account satisfactorily for how this family of explanations gain their explanatory power in every specific application. This insufficiency is particularly salient in the study of the ecology of the microbiome. Drawing on Coyte et al. (2015) study of the ecology of the microbiome, Deulofeu et al. (2021) argue that these explanations are neither mechanistic, nor purely mathematical, yet they are substantially empirical. Building on their (...) criticisms, in the present work we make a step further elucidating this kind of explanations with a general analytical framework according to which scientific explanations are ampliative, specialized embeddings (ASE), which has recently been successfully applied to other biological subfields. We use ASE to reconstruct in detail the Coyte et al.’s case study and on its basis, we claim that network explanations of the ecology of the microbiome, and other similar explanations in ecology, gain their epistemological force in virtue of their capacity to embed biological phenomena in non-accidental generalizations that are simultaneously ampliative and specialized. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the special issue of the Spanish journal Ágora-Papeles de Filosofía (31/2, 2012) devoted to new Ibero-American contributions to metatheoretical structuralism.

The epistemic status of Natural Selection has intrigued to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that Natural Selection, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. In this paper, by analyzing what we take to (...) be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, we argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in Natural Selection can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to Classical Mechanics and other standard, highly unified theories. (shrink)