In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...) I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions. (shrink)

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...) deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative responsedependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions. (shrink)

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View threatens (...) to collapse into the Perception View or any other view according to which emotions are evaluative at the level of content. In the latter case, the Attitudinal View does not stand up to an obvious alternative, namely that emotions can only be assessed with respect to extrinsic norms or conditions of correctness. (shrink)

Stéphane Lemaire | : Subjectivists about well-being claim that an object is good for someone if and only if this individual holds a certain type of pro-attitude toward this object. In this paper, I focus on the dispute among subjectivists that opposes those who think that the relevant pro-attitudes are actual to those who think that they are counterfactual under some idealized conditions. My main claim is that subjectivism should be stringently actualist, though our actual pro-attitudes may be (...) criticized from an intrinsic perspective. To defend this claim, I first present three desiderata that a subjectivist theory of well-being should fulfil. Two of these desiderata result from the fact that a subjectivist theory of well-being should not be implicitly paternalist, while the other is that it should be able to play a normative role. I then show that several actualist theories that introduce light forms of idealization or other conditions that have a similar aim, fail to satisfy at least one of the antipaternalist desiderata. This gives some legitimacy to a very stringent version of actualism. I then describe three features of the kind of stringent actualism that I want to defend, which will explain the ability of what is good for someone to play its normative role. Finally, I show how these features allow us to deal with the classic objection that the objects of actual “defective attitudes” cannot be good for the holder of these pro-attitudes. | : Les subjectivistes à propos du bien-être soutiennent qu’un objet est bon pour un individu si et seulement si cet individu possède un certain type d’attitude positive à l’égard de cet objet. Dans cet article, je me concentre sur le débat à l’intérieur du camp subjectiviste qui oppose ceux qui pensent que les attitudes positives pertinentes sont actuelles à ceux qui pensent qu’elles sont contrefactuelles sous une condition d’idéalisation. Ma thèse principale est que le subjectivisme devrait être rigoureusement actualiste bien que nos attitudes positives actuelles puissent être critiquées d’un point de vue qui leur est interne. Afin de défendre cette position, je présente d’abord trois desiderata qu’une théorie subjectiviste du bien-être devrait satisfaire. Deux de ces desiderata résultent du fait qu’une théorie subjectiviste du bien-être ne devrait pas être implicitement paternaliste, alors que le troisième résulte de ce qu’elle devrait pouvoir jouer un rôle normatif. Je montre ensuite que plusieurs théories actualistes qui introduisent des formes modestes d’idéalisation ou d’autres conditions ayant la même visée échouent à satisfaire au moins un des desiderata anti-paternalistes. Une version très rigoureuse de l’actualisme subjectiviste s’en trouve ainsi légitimée. Je décris ensuite les trois aspects de l’actualisme rigoureux que je souhaite défendre et qui permettront d’expliquer dans quelle mesure ce qui est bon pour un individu peut jouer un rôle normatif. Enfin, je montre comment ces aspects nous permettent de répondre à l’objection classique selon laquelle les objets d’« attitudes défectives » actuelles ne peuvent être bons pour ceux qui ont ces attitudes. (shrink)

It is often suggested that emotions are intrinsically normative or that they have conditions of correctness that are intrinsic. In order to assess this thesis, I consider whether the main argument in favor of the normativity of belief can be transposed to emotions. In the case of belief, the argument is that when we wonder whether to believe that p, we acknowledge that we must abide by some norms. This is understood as showing that these norms are intrinsic to the (...) concept of belief. In contrast, it appears that no similar constraint applies when we deliberate about emotions. Indeed, I argue that extrinsic norms are suf ficient to understand thoroughly the normativity of emotions. Therefore, the postulation of intrinsic norms or correctness conditions seems unmotivated. Worse, if emotions had intrinsic norms or correctness conditions, they would manifest themselves when we wonder whether an emotion is appropriate in this or that context. But they don’t. (shrink)

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

Research Articles Stéphane Lemaire, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, FirstView Article.

In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.

In this paper, I explain the processes undergone by the producer of an awoval. The conditions of its possibility and its effects on the subjet itself through the effects on those to whom the avowal is addressed. I finally wonder to what extent it may be considered a moral transformation.

ABSTRACT: Confronted with the “wrong kind of reason problem”, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer (...) an analysis of final value and because it is relativistic. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons*Volume 51, Issue 1Stephane Lemaire DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000224Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons*Volume 51, Issue 1Stephane Lemaire DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000224Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons*Volume 51, Issue 1Stephane Lemaire DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000224Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Selon le subjectivisme à propos du bien-être, un événement contribue au bien-être d’un individu dans la mesure où cet individu a ou aurait une certaine pro-attitude à l’égard de cet événement dans des circonstances à préciser. Une telle approche doit donc spécifier un certain nombre d’éléments de cette définition, par exemple les circonstances pertinentes. Dans cet article, je me concentre sur la pro-attitude pertinente. Afin d’organiser la discussion, je soutiens que cette pro-attitude doit satisfaire trois desiderata. Elle doit permettre de (...) formuler une conception du bien-être qui serait extensionnellement adéquate moyennant une détermination satisfaisante des circonstances pertinentes. Elle doit offrir une conception du bien-être qui ne varie pas, peu importe que l’on considère des êtres humains à la naissance, jeunes ou adultes. Elle doit enfin exister effectivement. Ces desiderata posés, je montre qu’un subjectivisme faisant appel au désir, à une pro-attitude cognitive ou plus complexe, éventuellement comprise en termes de désirs, ne peut satisfaire à la fois le critère d’adéquation extensionnelle et le critère d’invariabilité. En réponse à cette difficulté, je suggère que le subjectivisme devrait adopter une pro-attitude de valorisation. Une telle pro-attitude a été introduite par différents auteurs, mais j’en propose une interprétation plus simple et je soutiens qu’elle est la seule à satisfaire les trois desiderata initialement présentés. (shrink)

Nous nous demandons souvent ce que nous aurions interet a faire ou ce que nous devrions faire, ce que les autres peuvent legitimement exiger de nous. Rien ne nous semble plus immediat que cette reflexion sur nos desirs et nos devoirs. Pourtant, des que l'on s'efforce de decrire les processus effectifs qui sont en jeu et les normes de rationalite ou morales qui pesent sur cette reflexion, l'evidence s'evanouit. Comment connaissons-nous nos desirs? Qu'est-ce qui sous-tend nos jugements moraux? Quelle place (...) les demandes de la morale laissent a nos desirs? La reflexion pratique ne nous sert-elle qu'a justifier nos actions a posteriori ou nous permet-elle de guider nos actions? Le present livre s'attache a repondre a ces questions, anciennes pour la plupart, en discutant les recherches recemment menees a leur sujet en philosophie de l'action, en philosophie de l'esprit et en philosophie morale, dans l'esprit de la tradition analytique. (shrink)

L’ambition de ce livre est de présenter les éléments d’une réévaluation de l’aveu. Introduit par une réflexion sur son usage contemporain dans le droit, il croise des approches philosophiques profondément distinctes si ce n’est opposées. La phénoménologie, la psychanalyse et la philosophie analytique sont autant d’éclairages sur ce phénomène multiforme.

Dans cette introduction, je situe en premier lieu la métaéthique vis-à-vis des autres recherches qui s’intéressent à la morale. Je distingue pour commencer la métaéthique de l’éthique normative et des éthiques appliquées. Alors que ces dernières s’intéressent à ce que la morale nous demande de faire, la métaéthique est une interrogation de second ordre sur la nature de la morale, du discours moral et sur la possibilité de justifier des jugements moraux. Je distingue ensuite parmi ces questions de second ordre (...) celles qui constituent plus proprement la métaéthique par opposition à la psychologie morale tout en soulignant leurs relations de dépendance. Pour finir, je présente assez brièvement les questions centrales propres aux différents sous-domaines de la métaéthique : la sémantique morale qui porte sur la signification des termes moraux, l’épistémologie morale qui porte sur la connaissance morale, et l’ontologie morale qui porte sur les faits moraux susceptibles d’expliquer pourquoi certains de nos jugements moraux sont vrais. Dans cette brève introduction à la métaéthique, notre ambition sera essentiellement de situer la métaéthique par rapport aux autres approches philosophiques de la morale. Nous nous efforcerons en outre de présenter assez sommairement les grandes questions qui structurent ce vaste domaine de recherche. (shrink)

Nous jugeons les réponses émotionnelles comme plus ou moins raisonnables étant donné leur objet et le contexte. Je soutiens que la légitimité de ces jugements repose sur le caractère raisonnable des désirs ou des dispositions émotionnelles qui expliquent ces réponses émotionnelles. Il est déraisonnable d’être triste de ne pas satisfaire un désir déraisonnable. Mais comment un désir peut-il être déraisonnable ? Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions (...) émotionnelles sont raisonnables à deux conditions : premièrement, qu’ils contribuent à une vie subjectivement heureuse ; deuxièmement, qu’ils soient moralement justifiés. (shrink)

Ce livre apporte des éclaircissements et des compléments à Passions et raison aujourd'hui à la lumière de Descartes et de Spinoza, en centrant encore davantage sur le monde actuel la description des passions ou affects, prolongée par l'étude de leurs relations avec la raison. Il est question en particulier de trois oppositions qui ne sont pas aussi tranchées qu'on le croit. En effet, ces philosophes sont proches l'un de l'autre en dépit de leurs différences de principe ; malgré les siècles (...) qui nous séparent d'eux, il existe des liens de proximité entre notre temps et le leur ; surtout, les passions et la raison ne sont pas forcément antinomiques. Des passions remarquablement analysées il y a plus de trois siècles prédominent aujourd'hui : en particulier les passions de l'opinion (comme la faveur et l'indignation) et celles du mimétisme (comme la compassion et l'envie). Outre ces analyses qui nous aident à ouvrir davantage les yeux sur notre temps, Descartes et Spinoza nous ont transmis une leçon : la mise en question des idées reçues, qui n'est pas moins nécessaire aujourd'hui. Ils ont écrit leurs oeuvres au début du grand développement de la raison scientifique, et ils ont toujours quelque chose à nous dire à ce sujet. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge that there is nothing distinctive about de se attitudes. The second half outlines a widely accepted and influential model of communication and various complications that arise in applying this model to the communication of de se thoughts. The final section provides an overview of the papers in this volume.

This article considers the origins of alphabetic writing, tracing its probable source to ancient Egypt, southern Levant or the Sinai during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom (17th century BCE). It supports the view that the earliest scripts were acrophonic representations of a West-Semitic language, whose use developed under the rule of the Hyksos in Egypt but was arrested there with the expulsion of this foreign dynasty at the end of the 16th century BCE. The development is then traced through the Levant, (...) with particular attention given to the emergence of cuneiform alphabetic scripts in Ugarit (c. 1300 BCE). This form of writing disappeared with the fall of Ugarit, but linear alphabetic scripts were preserved in a variety of Near-Eastern languages, notably Aramaic and Phoenician. These two languages, by becoming linguae francae respectively of the Syria-northern Mesopotamia and the Anatolia-Eastern Mediterranean regions, brought about the spread of alphabetic writing up until the 8th century BCE. The article concludes by examining the influence of the Phoenician script on Greek, Etruscan and ultimately Latin forms of writing. (shrink)

Just like humans, animals experience pleasure and pain. Animals can be intelligent, curious, and social, but they can't speak for themselves. So, activists speak out for those that lack basic necessities and suffer mistreatment.

This comprehensive new book introduces the core history of phenomenology and assesses its relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. From critiques of artificial intelligence research programs to ongoing work on embodiment and enactivism, the authors trace how phenomenology has produced a valuable framework for analyzing cognition and perception, whose impact on contemporary psychological and scientific research, and philosophical debates continues to grow. The first part of _An Introduction to Phenomenology_ is an extended overview of the history (...) and development of phenomenology, looking at its key thinkers, focusing particularly on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as its cultural and intellectual precursors. In the second half Chemero and Käufer turn their attention to the contemporary interpretations and uses of phenomenology in cognitive science, showing that phenomenology is a living source of inspiration in contemporary interdisciplinary studies of the mind. Käufer and Chemero have written a clear, jargon-free account of phenomenology, providing abundant examples and anecdotes to illustrate and to entertain. This book is an ideal introduction to phenomenology and cognitive science for the uninitiated, as well as for philosophy and psychology students keen to deepen their knowledge. (shrink)

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

Unlike many other early modern philosophers, Spinoza was not particularly troubled by scepticism. Spinoza's disdain for skeptics is backed up by remarkable epistemic confidence. Spinoza is thus concerned with at least three kinds of skeptics: with the methodological skeptic; the philosophical skeptic; with the fideist who gives epistemic priority to scripture or revelation over reason. The skeptic's recommendation to suspend one's judgment relies on a flawed metaphysical view of the thinking subject and its ideas. Spinoza has epistemological concerns about methodological (...) skepticism. Descartes's strategy of employing methodological skepticism in order to convince his readers of the existence of certain truths is risky. Spinoza's dismissal of the skeptics is bolstered by a demanding notion of ideas as acts of understanding, which presuppose and explain the existence of their objects. (shrink)

Local sustainable food systems have captured the popular imagination as a progressive, if not radical, pillar of a sustainable food future. Yet these grassroots innovations are embedded in a dominant food regime that reflects productivist, industrial, and neoliberal policies and institutions. Understanding the relationship between these emerging grassroots efforts and the dominant food regime is of central importance in any transition to a more sustainable food system. In this study, we examine the encounters of direct farm marketers with food safety (...) regulations and other government policies and the role of this interface in shaping the potential of local food in a wider transition to sustainable agri-food systems. This mixed methods research involved interview and survey data with farmers and ranchers in both the USA and Canada and an in-depth case study in the province of Manitoba. We identified four distinct types of interactions between government and farmers: containing, coopting, contesting, and collaborating. The inconsistent enforcement of food safety regulations is found to contain progressive efforts to change food systems. While government support programs for local food were helpful in some regards, they were often considered to be inadequate or inappropriate and thus served to coopt discourse and practice by primarily supporting initiatives that conform to more mainstream approaches. Farmers and other grassroots actors contested these food safety regulations and inadequate government support programs through both individual and collective action. Finally, farmers found ways to collaborate with governments to work towards mutually defined solutions. While containing and coopting reflect technologies of governmentality that reinforce the status quo, both collaborating and contesting reflect opportunities to affect or even transform the dominant regime by engaging in alternative economic activities as part of the ‘politics of possibility’. Developing a better understanding of the nature of these interactions will help grassroots movements to create effective strategies for achieving more sustainable and just food systems. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to challenge two prevailing views about religious accommodation. The first maintains that religious practices deserve accommodation only if they are regarded as something unchosen on a par with the involuntary circumstances of life people must face. The other view maintains that religious practices are nothing more than preferences but questions the necessity of their accommodation. Against these views, I argue that religious conducts, even on the assumption that they represent voluntary behaviours, deserve in certain circumstances (...) certain kinds of accommodation. They must be understood as one possible expression, along with nonreligious or secular beliefs, of a person's convictions of conscience, which are strong ethical commitments upon which depends the moral integrity of those having such convictions. I demonstrate that the main ground for religious accommodation is the need to protect fairly, through such rights as religious freedom and freedom of conscience, the ethical commitments and conscientious beliefs of all citizens. Finally, against the objection that such a view risks leading to the proliferation of demands for accommodation, I maintain that a deliberative approach to religious accommodation is in a good position to put serious hurdles in the path of unreasonable demands. (shrink)

This chapter explores how LEGO compare to the metaphysics of the real, actual world—our universe. LEGO worlds and real worlds at least differ in how many there are: there are many LEGO worlds, but only one real world. According to David Lewis, there are worlds in which people were saved from entering the dark ages. There are worlds where they have a billion bricks at their disposal. But there are also worlds where LEGO has never been invented. On Lewis's view, (...) other worlds are just as real as the actual world. Lewis's plausible thesis of Humean supervenience need not be combined with his extravagant claim that there is a real world for any possible arrangement of the fundamental building blocks. A pervasive and obvious phenomenon of our world, is absent in a LEGO world. Things change—cars move, babies grow, coffee goes cold, leaves turn brown. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'une structure?- Remarques sur la notion de potentialité.- De quelques mots clefs de la philosophie.