On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...) the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. The arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein’s views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...) by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self‐contradiction or self‐refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore‐paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore‐paradoxical proposition is one for which (...) the believer can have no non‐overridden evidence. the arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein's views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta‐epistemological implications. (shrink)

On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self‐contradiction or self‐refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore‐paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore‐paradoxical proposition is one for which (...) the believer can have no non‐overridden evidence. the arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein's views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta‐epistemological implications. (shrink)

Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske’s lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...) way of going wrong under Dretske’s lead. As the paper argues, Cartesian skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. The skeptic can make do with principles which are weaker than the familiar closure principles. But I will further claim that this is only a momentary reprieve for the skeptic. As it turns out, one of the weaker principles on which a skeptical modus tollens must rest can be shown false. (shrink)

Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...) like-minded philosophers—or stick with closure and surrender to relevantist claims of failure in truth-preservation aimed at classical rules of inference. Classicist closure advocates find the promise of a way out of the dilemma in the works of Roy Sorensen and John Hawthorne. The paper argues against their pro-closure move and renews Robert Audi’s call for a theory of closure-failure. (shrink)

The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

G. E. Moore identificou uma forma surpreendente de irracionalidade epistêmica. Wittgenstein a chamou “o Paradoxo de Moore”. Nenhum deles sabia, exatamente, do que estava falando. Mas, a vasta literatura sobre o problema se encarregou de mostrar sua importância. O que, no entanto, ainda não se havia notado, com suficiente clareza, é que o paradoxo está fortemente conectado a alguns dos debates mais fundamentais da agenda epistemológica contemporânea. Este artigo propõe uma resolução epistemológica ao problema e busca mostrar que o paradoxo (...) ameaça, de forma contundente, as teses de fecho dedutivo da racionalidade epistêmica e do conhecimento, inutilizando as manobras contextualistas pró-fecho. (shrink)

Moore′s paradox came of age when John N. Williams gave us a simple paradoxical argument according to which the Moorean believer must hold false belief while believing contingent propositions. Simplicity was key; it was groundbreaking for the topic. On Williams′s account, given only the notions of inconsistency and self‐refutation, the thesis that belief distributes over conjunction, and a tiny bit of classical logic, we can derive a paradox from the Moorean propositional schemata. But, as argued here, it′s easy to overestimate (...) the significance of his argument to a proper understanding of the problem. His fundamental claim can be established in a way that shows how the paradox arises for any propositional attitude that distributes over conjunction, which gives us the opportunity to reconsider the problem we have been calling “Moore′s paradox”, and to conclude that all of the available analyses of the problem are, at best, incomplete. On this new approach, we lose a little formal simplicity vis‐à‐vis Williams′s approach, but make conceptual economy, as we gain a farther‐reaching problem than the one we have known. (shrink)

G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yields (...) counter-examples to deductive closure claims for both epistemic rationality and knowledge that are immune to contextualist pro-closure maneuvers. (shrink)

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

The aim of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is argued that Frege's theory of meaning and denotation is the first successful non-psychologistic response to what has been called 'the puzzle of identity' and that, where Frege's theory differs most significantly from the theory of meaning and denotation developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics and in his unpublished manuscripts on logic of 1903-1905, Russell was right. Secondly, it is shown that Russell was again right when he claimed that (...) the central argument of 'On Denoting' completely discredits both his own and Frege's theory of meaning and denotation. An interpretation of the relevant passage of 'On Denoting' is put forward. The discussion makes evident that it is virtually impossible to disentangle that argument if one ignores his unpublished work on the topic. (shrink)

A concretização do direito à saúde deve ser viabilizada pelo Estado, com foco na efetivação das políticas públicas para garantia da implantação e funcionamento dos serviços demandados pelos respectivos grupos populacionais. Destarte, essa escrita objetivou analisar como o direito à saúde é contemplado em comunidades quilombolas de uma região geográfica baiana. Metodologicamente enquadra-se como de abordagem qualitativa, com informações obtidas por meio de entrevistas estruturadas (sobre a infraestrutura e/ou serviços públicos de saúde) desenvolvidas com as representações das Associações de Moradores (...) de 14 quilombos da região geográfica de Guanambi/Bahia durante o ano de 2016. Os achados indicam que uma comunidade possuía estrutura física específica para atendimentos básicos em saúde, no entanto, estava desativada. Três comunidades não tinham cobertura do Programa de Agentes Comunitários de Saúde (PACS). Entre as 11 que indicaram cobertura do Programa, em sete as(os) profissionais não residiam no território do quilombo. Diante da ampla ausência de infraestrutura e recorrente inadequação na prestação de serviços do PACS, evidencia-se a permanente negligência ao direito à saúde nesta população quilombola. (shrink)

Review of the book Um obscuro encanto: gnose, gnosticismo e poesia moderna , writen by Cláudio Willer. São Paulo, Editora Civilização Brasileira, 2010.

Translation of the initial chapters of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics into Portuguese and introduction, which addresses interpretative disagreements and translation choices.

One persistent question in jurisprudence relates to the role of morality in the concept of law. For instance, consider the question of whether unjust statutes are laws. Legal positivists say that they’re laws in every relevant sense, while natural lawyers say that they’re not. This article considers a different answer inspired by recent findings in experimental philosophy: there is one relevant sense in which unjust statutes are laws, but also a different relevant sense in which they aren’t. After considering the (...) ways in which this alternative differs from some of the mainstream theories in general jurisprudence, the article argues that it provides more elegant solutions to two problems that have puzzled legal philosophers in the past: the paradox of customary international law and the shifts in legal discourse over history. (shrink)

A educação em Kierkegaard e Paulo Freire : por uma educação ético-existencial -- Kierkegaard como educador -- Ética e política no pensamento de Kierkegaard e Paulo Freire -- O amor como fundamento da educação ético-existencial em Kierkegaard.

Si la pensée est universelle, nous ne pouvons toutefois pas nier la spécificité des modalités de pensées. Les études réunies dans cet ouvrage apparaissent ainsi comme une occasion d'interroger et de dégager les différentes modalités d'appropriation de la philosophie cartésienne au Brésil.

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

This article explores the ways in which suspects attempt to make putative victims/complainants at least partially responsible for the incidents for which they are investigated, transforming themselves into the victim and the other into the perpetrator. Drawing upon conversation analysis, I examine audio-recorded police interviews for low-level crimes in England and in which suspects have constructed what I refer as counter-denunciations. I argue that suspects accomplish these counter-denunciations through discursive practices that involve, for example (a) contrasting the complainant’s actions with (...) their own innocent conduct; (b) historicizing the event being investigated; and (c) discrediting the complainant’s character—stigmatizing. These practices have in common the suspects’ reliance on the relational and contextual character of the categories ‘offender’ and ‘victim’. (shrink)

The article presents an analysis of an extract from a Collective Philosophical Inquiry. Through this case study, we show the possible misunderstandings linked to the duality of two « worlds » : that of the teacher who experiments with CPI in her classroom and that of the researcher who is responsible for the design of this type of session. The « world » is defined as « conceptual, axiological and praxical background ». The confrontation between these worlds therefore questions both (...) the modalities of their necessary collaboration and the conditions of the construction and use of a true « professional genesis. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre o modo como as lutas locais e suas movimentações em torno do discurso dos direitos humanos podem ser alçadas à condição de ação política. Trata-se da tentativa de ampliar o conceito de política tendo em vista a potência de transformação contida nos coletivos de subjetividades portadoras de experiências comuns de violência e sofrimento. Fazendo uso do conceito de quilombo, em Beatriz Nascimento, buscaremos fundamentar o alargamento da ideia de política a partir de duas (...) configurações: a disputa por territórios e a conectividade entre saberes específicos e menores oriundos das lutas. Para tanto, cotejaremos o pensamento da autora com a filosofia contemporânea de Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari. Nossa hipótese é a de que o conceito de ação política demandaria um alargamento em sua formulação de modo a abranger as variadas e singulares formas de resistência cotidianas. (shrink)

Translated from the French, this book analyzes the paradoxes that fundamentally characterize Nietzsche’s philosophy and texts.

Este texto tem dois objetivos principais: apresentar o conceito de “lei natural” e aquilo que seria a sua expressão como “lei escrita” e, depois, reinterpretar este conceito a partir de uma perspectiva nietzschiana. Para alcançar este duplo objetivo urge, pois, em primeiro lugar, traçar, nas suas grandes linhas, as vicissitudes que atravessou a teoria da “lei natural” ao longo da tradição #losó#ca até a sua culminância naquelas correntes do direito natural, típicas dos tempos modernos. Convém também assinalar que este conceito (...) encerra no seu bojo, como derivações, as noções de necessidade, de #nalidade e providência. Eis por que, para interpretá-lo e criticá-lo, são utilizadas algumas intui- ções e análises de Nietzsche que, ao longo de sua obra, não cessa de se referir, direta ou indiretamente, a estas questões e, também, àquela de acaso. Não se trata, portanto, de simplesmente apresentar uma crítica de Nietzsche aos conceitos de “lei natural” e “lei escrita”, mas, principalmente, de examiná-los à luz de seu pensamento. (shrink)

This article will contribute to a synthetic understanding of the factors that influence the subject’s experience with digital data, in the presence of a new kind of ‘materiality’ that is formed in the confluence of physical matter and Information and Communication Technologies that I call Material-ict. The aim is to offer society a critical and creative way to deal with the process in which the electronic and physical dimensions of reality merge and enhance the awareness of the paradigm change that (...) the Internet of Things is bringing to our experience. The article can contribute to the development of a new cognitive paradigm to challenge the current view that objects and environments are inanimate, and the shaping of a framework from which to reconsider interactions between people, social processes, things and environments in the society of knowledge. This framework offers insights into educative, technological developments and cultural programmes to integrate actants (actor–network theory) and citizens in the hybrid experience in which Internet, social processes and matter merge. The objective is to construct the first steps of an analysis framework to understand a few of the most important features that support the emergent model of representation that is impacting the subject’s experience with digital data. In order to construct this framework, this research is grounded in the intersection of art, media and experience. The main dimensions analysed in the article are (1) the merging of digital and analogue forms of experience; (2) new actors and forms of interaction; (3) forms of heterogeneous knowledge construction; (4) lively interfaces and animated environments; and (5) biotechnological convergence. The article will show how the outcome of this confluence is taking shape in different forms of (1) indexation, (2) simulation, (3) translation of matter into data and (4) ubiquitous hybrid networks (social+matter/nature). (shrink)