Fine (J Philos Log 43:549–577, 2014) developed a truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is also called exact semantics, since it is based on a relation of exact verification between states and formulas. A natural question arises as to what are the limits of Fine’s approach and whether an exact semantics of similar kind can be constructed for other important non-classical logics. In our paper, we will generalize Fine’s approach and develop an exact semantics for some substructural logics. In particular, (...) we will provide a truthmaker semantics for the Non-associative Lambek calculus and some of its extensions. This generalization will reveal some interesting connections between Fine’s recent work on truthmaker semantics and his early work on relevant logic. (shrink)

We explore different ways to generalize Hintikka’s classic game theoretic semantics to a many-valued setting, where the unit interval is taken as the set of truth values. In this manner a plethora of characterizations of Łukasiewicz logic arise. Among the described semantic games is Giles’s dialogue and betting game, presented in a manner that makes the relation to Hintikka’s game more transparent. Moreover, we explain a so-called explicit evaluation game and a ‘bargaining game’ variant of it. We also describe a (...) recently introduced backtracking game as well as a game with random choices for Łukasiewicz logic. (shrink)

This paper traces the empiricist program from early debates between nativism and behaviorism within philosophy, through debates about early connectionist approaches within the cognitive sciences, and up to their recent iterations within the domain of deep learning. We demonstrate how current debates on the nature of cognition via deep network architecture echo some of the core issues from the Chomsky/Quine debate and investigate the strength of support offered by these various lines of research to the empiricist standpoint. Referencing literature from (...) both computer science and philosophy, we conclude that the current state of deep learning does not offer strong encouragement to the empiricist side despite some arguments to the contrary. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce erotetic search scenarios known from Inferential Erotetic Logic by using the framework of epistemic erotetic logic. The key notions used in this system are those of askability and epistemic erotetic implication. Scenarios are supposed to represent all rational strategies of an agent solving the problem posed by the initial question where the interaction with an external information source is seen as a series of updates of the agent’s knowledge.

In the majority of papers on probability in the framework of possible worlds the existence of a global probability distribution is taken for granted. The aim of the article is to discuss the epistemic aspect of this assumption in the connection to the status assigned to possible worlds. Two questions are discussed in particular: the justification of the global probability distribution and compatibility of the global probability assumption with the structure of the universe of the possible worlds.

This volume presents mathematical game theory as an interface between logic and philosophy.

[Subjective probability and realistic possible worlds].

The article deals with the problem of inductive learning and predicting in dynamic processes, which can be formally represented as time series of atomic events. The central notion of sequential event is characterised as a finite subsequence of adjacent atomic events in a series. In the first part of the article an algorythmic model of learning is introduced. The criterion of learning is based on the frequency of a particular sequential event and on the time-distance of its previous occurrences from (...) the moment of learning. The second part deals with the problem of evaluation of hypotheses in the process of predicting sequential events. A first order language of sequential events and axiomatic theory of sequential events are defined. The theory is proved to be consistent (a model of the theory is constructed). Then a probabilistic evaluation function for sequential events is defined as an analogy of Carnapian confirmation function. In the conclusion this probabilistic evaluation is discussed from the point of view of the foundations of probability. (shrink)

Belnap-Dunn logic, sometimes also known as First Degree Entailment, is a four-valued propositional logic that complements the classical truth values of True and False with two non-classical truth values Neither and Both. The latter two are to account for the possibility of the available information being incomplete or providing contradictory evidence. In this paper, we present a probabilistic extension of BD that permits agents to have probabilistic beliefs about the truth and falsity of a proposition. We provide a sound and (...) complete axiomatization for the framework defined and also identify policies for conditionalization and aggregation. Concretely, we introduce four-valued equivalents of Bayes’ and Jeffrey updating and also suggest mechanisms for aggregating information from different sources. (shrink)

Analyzing situations where information is partial, incomplete or contradictory has created a demand for quantitative belief measures that are weaker than classic probability theory. In this paper, we compare two frameworks that have been proposed for this task, Dempster-Shafer theory and non-standard probability theory based on Belnap-Dunn logic. We show the two frameworks to assume orthogonal perspectives on informational shortcomings, but also provide a partial correspondence result. Lastly, we also compare various dynamical rules of the two frameworks, all seen as (...) generalizations of classic Bayes’ conditioning. (shrink)

We recast subjective probabilities by rejecting behaviourist accounts of belief by explicitly distinguishing between judgements of uncertainty and expressions of those judgements. We argue that this entails rejecting that orderings of uncertainty be complete. This in turn leads naturally to several generalizations of the probability calculus. We define probability-like functions over incomplete algebras that reflect a subject’s incomplete judgements of uncertainty. These functions can be further generalized to inner and outer measures that reflect approximate elicitations.

The papers in this special issue are based on presentations delivered at the conference Epistemic Aspects of Many-valued Logics, held at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, in Prague, 2010. All papers consequently revolve around the application of non-classical logical tools—mathematical fuzzy logic and/or probability theory—to epistemological issues.Timothy Williamson employs a modal epistemic logic enriched with probabilities to generalize an argument against the KK-principle. He argues that we can know a proposition even if (...) our evidential probability for that proposition is low. In fact he argues that the evidential probability of a known proposition can be (arbitrarily) close to 0. The argument is first presented with a basic idealized model, which is then extended to much more complicated and realistic models. This then raises a problem for decision theory, since you can know that p, while your evidence tells you (strongly) that not p. Wil .. (shrink)

The study of weighted structures is one of the important trends in recent computer science. The aim of the article is to provide a weighted, many-valued version of classical intensional semantics formalised in the framework of higher-order fuzzy logics. We illustrate the apparatus on several variants of fuzzy S5-style modalities. The formalism is applicable to a broad array of weighted intensional notions, including alethic, epistemic, or probabilistic modalities, generalised quantifiers, counterfactual conditionals, dynamic and non-monotonic logics, and some more.

This article presents an extension of Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals to a graded framework. Unlike standard graded approaches, which use the probabilistic framework, we employ that of many-valued logics. Our principal goal is to provide an adequate analysis of the main background notion of Lewis’ approach—the one of the similarity of possible worlds. We discuss the requirements imposed on the analysis of counterfactuals by the imprecise character of similarity and concentrate in particular on robustness, i.e., the requirement that small changes (...) in the similarity relation should not significantly change the truth value of the counterfactual in question. Our second motivation is related to the logical analysis of natural language: analyzing counterfactuals in the framework of many-valued logics allows us to extend the analysis to counterfactuals that include vague statements. Unlike previous proposals of this kind in the literature, our approach makes it possible to apply gradedness at various levels of the analysis and hence provide a more detailed account of the phenomenon of vagueness in the context of counterfactuals. Finally, our framework admits a novel way of avoiding the Limit Assumption, keeping the core of Lewis’ truth condition for counterfactuals unchanged. (shrink)

We discuss two-layered logics formalising reasoning with paraconsistent probabilities that combine the Łukasiewicz [0, 1]-valued logic with Baaz ▵\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\triangle $$\end{document} operator and the Belnap–Dunn logic. The first logic (introduced in [7]) formalises a ‘two-valued’ approach where each event ϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\phi $$\end{document} has independent positive and negative measures that stand for, respectively, the likelihoods of ϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\phi (...) $$\end{document} and ¬ϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\lnot \phi $$\end{document}. The second logic that we introduce here corresponds to ‘four-valued’ probabilities. There, ϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\phi $$\end{document} is equipped with four measures standing for pure belief, pure disbelief, conflict and uncertainty of an agent in ϕ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\phi $$\end{document}.We construct faithful embeddings of and into one another and axiomatise using a Hilbert-style calculus. We also establish the decidability of both logics and provide complexity evaluations for them using an expansion of the constraint tableaux calculus for. (shrink)

In the light of the contribution of Majer, Punčochář and Sedlár, I develop a path-theoretic semantics for the conditional and briefly consider some of its applications.

When do things change? When do things have some characteristics? I try to answer these questions by looking at different solutions Plato and Aristotle presented in their works. The famous analysis of change from the second half of Plato’s Parmenides claims that change happens outside of time, at an “instant”. On the contrary, Aristotle in the Physics explicitly argues that all change occurs only in time. However, both Plato and Aristotle also provide other analyses of change. How to deal with (...) this variety of explanations and tensions between them? In this paper, I argue that if we differentiate between several kinds of change, most of Plato’s and Aristotle’s analyses provide a thorough insight into the nature of change. For processes such as locomotion, change occurs exclusively within time. For changes where both the initial and final states occur only in time, such as a transition from motion to rest, change takes place in the ‘now’. However, for changes where both the initial and final states occur in both time and in the ‘now’ – for example, a qualitative change from being white to not being white – change does not occur in time nor in the ‘now’, but instead happens instantaneously. (shrink)

The essay presents Patočka’s intellectual relationship to Karl Jaspers on the basis of his texts from the 1960s and 1970s, with a starting point in the 1969 study What is Existence?. After introducing some general connections and differences, based in particular on the forms of heresy in both philosophers, the basic contours of the notion of existence are examined more closely. Patočka understands existence as the performance of a threefold movement that is in many respects problematic. The virtue of Jaspers’ (...) position, on the other hand, lies in its focused clarity. While both thinkers emphasize the concept of authentic performance, the key issue becomes its one-sidedness, which can be described as surrender without acceptance. (shrink)

Text usiluje o krátký kritický přehled některých prací sociálního psychologa Jonathana Haidta, s ohledem na to, jaké důsledky z Haidtových tvrzení vyplývají pro pojem morálky a možnosti filosofické diskuse o morálních problémech. Budu tvrdit, že jakkoli jsou Haidtova zjištění a jejich interpretace v mnohém pozoruhodná a přínosná, některé aspekty lidské morálky a morálního života zkreslují a spíše znesnadňují, než usnadňují jejich porozumění. V první části se dotknu Haidtova pojmu morální intuice a nejasností spojených s tím, jak mu rozumět. Vodítkem bude (...) způsob, jakým Haidt zavádí tento pojem a pracuje s ním ve svém příkladu sourozenců Marka a Julie. Ve druhé části naznačím, jaký dopad mají tyto nejasnosti pro Haidtovy politicko-psychologické analýzy. V poslední části poukážu na význam Haidtem přehlížené rozmanitosti filosofických teorií toho, co je to morálka. Společným jmenovatelem více mých kritických poznámek je to, že i když Haidt označuje svá zkoumání za čistě deskriptivní a pluralistická, fakticky implicitně předpokládá zhruba konsekvencialistické pojetí morálky, včetně jeho normativních aspektů. (shrink)

Problém svobodné vůle je tradičně považován za ryze metafyzický, a tedy neempirický. Díky současnému rozvoji kognitivních věd však narůstá množství argumentů založených na empirických poznatcích. Tento článek podává stručný přehled několika takových poznatků. Na jedné straně jde o výzkumy zabývající se otázkou kauzální potence vědomí a uvědomění si příčin svých akcí. Nejslavnější, avšak patrně nikoli nejvýznamnější, jsou zde bezpochyby experimenty Benjamina Libeta. Na druhé straně jde o zkoumání samotného prožitku svobodné agence. Zda danou akci vnímám jako svoji vlastní, závisí pravděpodobně (...) na prediktivních i postdiktivních faktorech, o čemž svědčí situace, kdy podkladové kognitivní mechanismy selžou a vedou k omylům. Závěrem příspěvku je zamyšlení nad důsledky vědeckých poznatků pro různá pojetí svobodné vůle: libertariánské a kompatibilistické. Argumentuji ve prospěch smysluplnosti kompatibilistické koncepce svobodné vůle, proti které lze vést námitky spíše z pozice psychologie než neurověd. (shrink)

Článek je věnován odůvodnění, projasnění a také kritickému zhodnocení poněkud zkratkovitého hesla o „primátu praxe“, který v očích mnoha amerických interpretů představuje společného jmenovatele Heideggerova díla a pragmatismu v širokém slova smyslu. V mém podání nesměřuje Heideggerův důraz na praxi ani tak k převrácení tradiční hierarchie, podle níž svět nejprve poznáváme, abychom v něm mohli jednat, ale spíše k přehodnocení ontologického rámce, v němž byla otázka ohledně přednosti teorie či praxe až dosud kladena. V druhé části proto ukážu, jak Heideggerovo (...) osobité pojetí praxe souvisí s jeho revizí bytí věcí a nás samotných, a podám důvody, proč na rozdíl od Dreyfusova, Okrentova a Blattnerova vymezení primátu praxe odmítám chápat veškerou srozumitelnost lidského života a světa jako něco odvozeného z našeho každodenního, praktického obstarávání. (shrink)

By the Galvin–Mycielski–Solovay theorem, a subset X of the line has Borel’s strong measure zero if and only if $M+X\neq \mathbb {R}$ for each meager set M.A set $X\subseteq \mathbb {R}$ is meager-additive if $M+X$ is meager for each meager set M. Recently a theorem on meager-additive sets that perfectly parallels the Galvin–Mycielski–Solovay theorem was proven: A set $X\subseteq \mathbb {R}$ is meager-additive if and only if it has sharp measure zero, a notion akin to strong measure zero.We investigate the (...) validity of this result in Polish groups. We prove, e.g., that a set in a locally compact Polish group admitting an invariant metric is meager-additive if and only if it has sharp measure zero. We derive some consequences and calculate some cardinal invariants. (shrink)

The article discusses the case of Microsoft's Twitter chatbot Tay that “turned into a Nazi” after less than 24 hours from its release on the Internet. The first section presents a brief recapitulation of Alan Turing's proposal for a test for artificial intelligence and the way it influenced subsequent discussions in the philosophy of mind. In the second section, I offer a few arguments appealing for caution regarding the identification of an accomplished chatbot as a thinking being. These are motivated (...) principally by Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussions of mind and soul and by some Wittgensteinian philosophers' criticisms of AI endeavours. I will try to show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of AIs such as chatbots as thinking beings, rather independently of their technical perfection and accomplishment. In the third section, the case of the “Nazi chatbot” Tay will offer me material for some light to be shed on the peculiar character of our interconnected concepts of thinking, soul and person and on the importance of their further ramified connections. (shrink)

Many legal theorists and linguists have addressed the notion of legal language from different perspectives. Despite that, the definitions of legal language vary. Almost all of the approaches conclude that legal language entails several types of communication. Nevertheless, not all of these categories are sufficiently researched. Some types of legal communication seem to be neglected. This lack of interest might be rooted in the uncertainty of whether these texts or utterances even fall under the scope of the concept of legal (...) language. In order to avoid this superficiality in subsequent research, it is first necessary to come to a clear determination of which communicative acts can be considered a part of legal language and which cannot. Accordingly, in this search for the definition of legal language, we should not neglect the fact that language is executed in concrete communicative acts, and the only means to grasp the language is through communication. The aim of this article is therefore to clearly delineate the boundaries of this concept. Based on analysis of how the given term is currently defined, I draw out the common features and trace the characteristics in which they differ. Taking into account these findings, I propose a novel comprehensive demarcation of legal language. This concept argues that the ‘legal’ nature of language should be determined by the context and function of the particular statement or exchange, in connection with the role of participants in the communication. This means that a particular act may be considered a part of legal language not in accordance with a certain form or lexicon used, but mainly by extralinguistic circumstances in the context of which it is being performed. (shrink)

This work undertakes an innovative analysis of the feelings of shame and guilt. These feelings do not merely involve self-critical judgment. Instead, they are a form of anxiety about loss of recognition. People who achieve recognition have authority, and such authority is not based solely on good arguments. As a consequence, we should question whether feelings of shame and guilt are truly reconcilable with the ideal of autonomy.

Awareness of intention je fenomenální zkušenost prožitku motorické intence, charakterizovaná jako vědomé uchopení akce, kterou se agent chystá provést. Typicky bývá ztotožňována s okamžikem, kdy si participant vzpomíná, že se rozhodl provést svou akci, reportovaným prostřednictvím pozice ručičky na ciferníku Libetových hodin. Intenzivní výzkum prožitku jednání (sense of agency) v posledních letech přinesl velké množství poznatků, ale také kritiku metodologických slabin, mezi které patří závislost výsledků na metodě reportování a závislost na arbitrárních vlastnostech reportovacích nástrojů. Filozofové si zase všímají intervenujících (...) klamů vědomí či chyby Karteziánského divadla. Význačnou otázkou je také značná heterogenita experimentálních výsledků. Východiskem textu je argument, že mnohé z problémů tohoto výzkumného program souvisí se sadou implicitně zastávaných postojů, které vnímají awareness of intention jako integrovaný, unitární proces charakterizovaný graduálním nárůstem premotorické mozkové aktivity a náhlým nástupem uvědomění. Tato konceptuální východiska jsou převážně nereflektovaná, kontingentní a představují významné omezení pro explanaci současných empirických pozorování. Těžištěm článku je nástin nového teoretického rámce, který jde za implicitní předporozumění integrované perspektivy a umožňuje integrovat rozporné behaviorální výsledky. Tato rekonceptualice staví na Schoolerově teorii meta-uvědomění a teorii access a phenomenal consciousness Neda Blocka a nachází také oporu v neurovědných studiích. Představená rekonceptualizace přichází s dichotomií fenomenálního awareness of intention, souvisejícího s přípravou motorické intence v prefrontální oblasti a reflexivního meta-awareness of intention, které patrně souvisí s procesy v parietálním kortexu. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to problematize the concept of school culture both as a concept and as a subject of investigation. It deals with the historical roots of this concept and the fact that it is shrinking—a consequence of the managerial imperatives of effectiveness and accountability in education. School culture, in relation to the quality of schools and the quality of education, has become the subject of audits, arrived at through a developed network of standardisation in education, testing (...) and evaluation. The methodology of evaluation currently lending particular substance to school culture, however, generates different methodological perspectives on investigating school culture and thus research is becoming an instrument of political power. In the research it is then necessary to either abandon the concept of school culture or to free it from spinning round the cycle of evaluation/self-evaluation—a change in school culture—improving the “quality of the school”—a new evaluation/self-evaluation. One way to do this is to employ ethnographic approaches in research into schools and to understand school culture as a system of texts. (shrink)

Surrogacy has long been discussed in reproductive medicine. In the Czech Republic, surrogacy is not legally regulated. Because of this legal vacuum, there are no official procedures or organizations that openly deal with surrogacy. Potential surrogate mothers and applicants do not have many options for obtaining or sharing information. The only source is the Internet. Online forums are a popular tool for gaining information and contacts regarding surrogacy. The goal of this research was to use qualitative research methods to survey (...) the most searched and discussed topics on Czech online discussion forum websites. We used discussions that we found on www.emimino.cz between 2009 and 2019. This article analyses the comments of the Internet forum discussants/participants, their involvement, knowledge of surrogacy, the information sought and their opinions. In particular, the participants discussed where to find a surrogate mother or how to become one. This article attempts to outline the discussions ordinary people have about surrogacy outside official expert forums. (shrink)

The role of artificial intelligence in the Turing test is to imitate human beings to such an extent that people will not realize it is a machine. With the rise of deep learning (a subcategory of AI), the situation is changing rapidly as the new systems do not focus on imitating human intelligence but emphasize thorough solutions to specific issues. The main difference between predefined AI and deep learning (DL) is that these systems are self-learning and have verifiable results. Firstly, (...) we need to analyse the application of the Turing test in the Loebner Prize because, there, the primary emphasis is on aspects of human intelligence – learning, reasoning and understanding. Secondly, in the Turing test, only general intelligence is considered, and this can be questionable. If DL does not possess this form of intelligence, by this reasoning, we should consider it unintelligent. However, is such understanding correct? The third and last aspect questions whether the Turing test is beneficial for an AI designed for specific tasks because the results do not bring any new data and conclusions. (shrink)