The author argues that there is no such thing as a unique and general taxonomy of non-at-issue contents. Accordingly, we ought to shun large categories such as “conventional implicature”, “F-implicature”, “CI”, “Class B” or the like. As an alternative, we may, first, describe the “semantic profile” of linguistic devices as accurately as possible. Second, we may explicitly tailor our categories to particular theoretical purposes.

Many scholars claim that Frege's theory of colouring is committed to a radical form of subjectivism or emotivism. Some other scholars claim that Frege's concept of colouring is a precursor to Grice's notion of conventional implicature. I argue that both of these claims are mistaken. Finally, I propose a taxonomy of Fregean colourings: for Frege, there are purely aesthetic colourings, communicative colourings or hints, non-communicative colourings.

This paper offers a detailed reconstruction of Frege’s theory of side-thoughts and its relation to other parts of his pragmatics, most notably to the notion of colouring, to the notion of presupposition, and to his implicit notion of multi-propositionality. I also highlight some important differences between the subsemantic categories employed by Frege and those used in contemporary pragmatics.

What, exactly, is the difference between words such as ‘dead’ and ‘deceased’? In this paper, I argue that such differences in register, or style, ought to be construed as genuine differences in non-truth-conditional meaning. I also show that register cannot plausibly accounted for in terms of either presupposition or conventional implicature. Register is, rather, an instance of what I call pure use-conditional meaning. In the case of register, a difference in meaning does not correspond to a difference in the contents (...) speakers intend to convey. (shrink)

Frege's mature writings apparently contain two different criteria of sense identity. While in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892) and in "Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren" (1906?) he seems to advocate a psychological criterion, his letter to Husserl of December 12, 1906 offers a thoroughly logical criterion of sense identity. It is argued that the latter proposal is not a "momentary aberration", but rather Frege's official criterion; his psychological criteria only serve as a way of illustrating questions of sense identity by (...) appealing to the thoughts of completely rational thinkers. (shrink)

This paper is partly exegetical, partly systematic. I argue that Frege's account of what he called “colouring” contains some important insights on how communication is related to mental states such as mental images or emotions. I also show that the Fregean perspective is supported by current research in psycholinguistics and that a full understanding of some linguistic phenomena that scholars have accounted for in terms of either semantics or pragmatics need involve psycholinguistic elements.

Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range of presuppositional phenomena. This paper argues, in contrast, that he had good reasons for employing an extremely narrow notion of ‘Voraussetzung’. On Frege’s view, many devices that are now construed as presupposition triggers either express several thoughts at once or merely ‘illuminate’ a thought in a particular way. Fregean presuppositions, in contrast, are essentially tied to (...) names. (shrink)

Expressive-Assertivism, a metaethical theory championed by Daniel Boisvert, is sometimes considered to be a particularly promising form of hybrid expressivism. One of the main virtues of Expressive-Assertivism is that it seems to offer a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem. I argue, in contrast, that Expressive-Assertivism faces much the same challenges as pure expressivism.

In der neueren Sprachphilosophie ist wiederholt der soziale Charakter des Redens betont worden. Das Buch versucht, diese These auf der Grundlage einer genauen Untersuchung der Abfolge einzelner sprachlicher Handlungen zu verteidigen. Die orthodoxe Sprechakttheorie hat sich bislang weitgehend auf die Gelingensbedingungen einzelner sprachlicher Vollzüge konzentriert. Isolierte Redehandlungen stellen allerdings in der kommunikativen Praxis einen Ausnahmefall dar: Ein kompetenter Sprecher muss nicht nur die vom sprachlichen Kontext unabhängigen Korrektheitsstandards kennen; vielmehr muss er auch in der Lage sein, die eigenen Sprechakte im (...) Rahmen eines Textes kohärent miteinander zu verknüpfen und auf Redehandlungen anderer so zu reagieren, dass ein genuiner Diskurs zwischen den Parteien entsteht – im Gegensatz zu einer bloßen Aneinanderreihung “für sich” korrekter Äußerungen. Das Buch verfolgt das Ziel, das für die Struktur derartiger Rede(handlungs)sequenzen einschlägige Reglement in seinen wesentlichen Aspekten zu rekonstruieren und insbesondere die für ein solches Projekt relevanten sprachphilosophischen Grundfragen zu klären. (shrink)

Quite a few scholars claim that many implicata are propositions about the speaker's epistemic or doxastic states. I argue, on the contrary, that implicata are generally non-epistemic. Some alleged cases of epistemic implicature are not implicatures in the first place because they do not meet Grice's non-triviality requirement, and epistemic implicata in general would infringe on the maxim of quantity. Epistemic implicatures ought to be construed as members of a larger family of implicature-like phenomena.

According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument.

Dem "Manifestationsargument" zufolge steht eine realistische Semantik der Wahrheitsbedingungen im Widerspruch zu dem Gedanken, dass das Verstehen von Sätzen eine Fähigkeit ist, die sich im Handeln manifestieren können muss. – Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass sowohl Realisten als auch Anti-Realisten die These aufzugeben haben, dass das Verstehen eines Satzes im Erfassen der jeweiligen Wahrheitsbedingungenbesteht. Die realistische Annahme der Existenz verifikationstranszendenter Wahrheiten steht – unabhängig vom Manifestationsprinzip – im Widerspruch zu einer wahrheitskonditionalen Semantik. Die von heutigen Anti-Realisten vertretenen Theorien des Verstehens sind (...) allerdings einem ähnlichen Einwand ausgesetzt, insofern sie gleichfalls nicht unsere Fähigkeit, unentscheidbare Sätze zu verstehen, erklären können. (shrink)

According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that all truths are knowable – ... – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ... –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of anti-realism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, not ..., (...) but .... Secondly, even if there were an intuitionistically acceptable proof of ..., i.e. an argument based on a different set of premises, the conclusion would have to be interpreted in accordance with Heyting semantics, and read in this way, the apparently preposterous conclusion would be true on conceptual grounds and acceptable even from a realist point of view. Fitch’s argument, understood as an immanent critique of verificationism, fails because in a debate dealing with the justification of deduction there can be no interpreted formal language on which realists and anti-realists could agree. Thus, the underlying problem is that a satisfactory solution to the “problem of shared content” is not available. I conclude with some remarks on the proposals by J. Salerno and N. Tennant to reconstruct certain arguments in the debate on anti-realism by establishing aporias. (shrink)

Die Idee, daß die Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke im Rückgriff auf ihren Gebrauch in der Sprache zu klären ist, ist seit Wittgenstein gängig. Das Buch verteidigt diesen Grundgedanken durch die Ausarbeitung einer prozeduralistischen Bedeutungstheorie, die zwei theoretische Strömungen zusammenführt: eine inferentialistische Semantik und eine konventionalistische Sprechakttheorie. Das Buch bietet darüber hinaus eine gründliche Diskussion realistischer und bescheidener Bedeutungstheorien sowie alternativer gebrauchstheoretischer Ansätze.

Die Arbeit untersucht, in welcher Weise Regeln die Bedeutung von Sätzen bestimmen sowie eine handlungsanleitende Kraft entfalten können. Auf der Basis einer Analyse der Rede von regulativen und konstitutiven Regeln wird gezeigt, dass semantische Regeln als bedingte Erlaubnisse zu rekonstruieren sind, die es ermöglichen, die Bedeutung von Ausdrücken zirkelfrei zu bestimmen. Derartige Regeln stellen unverzichtbare Prämissen in praktischen Syllogismen dar, deren Konklusion den Vollzug eines Sprechaktes gebietet.

Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be (...) equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it. (shrink)

Es gehört zu den sprachphilosophischen Gemeinplätzen, daß ein elementarer Satz aus zwei Teilausdrücken besteht – einem Nominator, mit dem wir einen Gegenstand der Rede spezifizieren, und einem Prädikator, mit dem wir dem so herausgegriffenen Gegenstand eine Eigenschaft zuschreiben können. Während der semantische Referentialist Nominatoren typischerweise als solche Ausdrücke definiert, die eine explizite Bezugnahme auf genau einen Gegenstand ermöglichen, wird der Vertreter einer pragmatischen Bedeutungstheorie umgekehrt versuchen, die ontologische Kategorie des Gegenstandes im Rückgriff auf den Begriff des singulären Terminus einzuführen. Hierzu (...) ist es zur Vermeidung eines Zirkels nötig, Nominatoren in einer rein lingualen Weise zu charakterisieren. Der Aufsatz setzt sich mit R. Brandoms Vorschlag auseinander, dem zufolge singuläre Termini solche substituierbaren Ausdrücke sind, die nur in symmetrischen Ersetzungsrelationen stehen. Es wird – vor allem anhand von "indefinite descriptions" – gezeigt, daß eine derartige inferentielle Symmetrie weder eine notwendige noch eine hinreichende Bedingung darstellt. (shrink)

Die Arbeit ist ein Versuch, die Paradoxie der Wißbarkeit aufzulösen, indem gezeigt wird, daß zumindest Anti-Realisten, die zum logischen Revisionismus tendieren, die scheinbar absurde Konklusion ... akzeptieren sollten. Dazu wird zunächst in Abschnitt 1 gezeigt, daß die prima facie unproblematische These ... insofern sonderbar ist, als alle möglichen Instanzen normale oder performative Widersprüche darstellen. Auf dieser Grundlage wird in Abschnitt 3 ein retorsives Argument für das Prinzip ... entwickelt. Um den Einwand zu entkräften, daß im Zweifelsfall nicht die These ... (...) aufzugeben ist, sondern die Prinzipien zu verwerfen sind, auf denen das retorsive Argument basiert, wird in Abschnitt 4 auf die unterschiedlichen Optionen, die in der Argumentation auftretenden Formeln zu interpretieren, eingegangen: Wenn logische Operatoren gemäß der „BHK-Interpretation“ gedeutet werden, erweist sich selbst die These ... als auch für den Realisten akzeptable begriffliche Wahrheit. In Abschnitt 5 wird schließlich diskutiert, in welcher Weise ein Intuitionist Thesen formalisieren kann, die eine bestimmte Art von epistemischer Bescheidenheit artikulieren. (shrink)

„Rechtsgefühl“ kann das individuelle Gerechtigkeitsempfinden, das Judiz der Richterin im Entscheidungsfindungsprozess, das emotionale Aufbäumen der unterlegenen Partei nach der Entscheidung, eine kollektive Rechtsüberzeugung bezeichnen. Verweise auf das „Rechtsgefühl“ werden oft genutzt, um Rechtssysteme oder einzelne Rechtsakte von innen oder von außen zu legitimieren oder zu delegitimieren. Als sozialer Kompass und normative Rechtfertigung versagt „Rechtsgefühl“ dagegen, wenn es mit zahlreichen gegenläufigen Rechtsgefühlen konkurriert. Dieser Frage nach dem Stellenwert divergierender Rechts- und Gerechtigkeitsempfindungen gehen die in diesem Band versammelten Beiträge aus praktischer, theoretischer (...) und historischer Perspektive nach. Mit Beiträgen von Prof. Dr. Gabriele Britz, Prof. Dr. Jeanne Gaakeer, Prof. Dr. Thorsten Keiser, Prof. Dr. Sylvia Kesper-Biermann, Prof. Dr. Frans-Willem Korsten, Prof. Dr. Greta Olson und Prof. Dr. Franz Reimer. (shrink)

Die Frage nach dem Menschen ist heute – im Zeitalter der zunehmenden Verschmelzung von Mensch und Technik, der Genom-Editierung und der fortgeschrittenen Naturalisierung des Menschenbildes – aktueller denn je. Der Autor präsentiert hier erstmals eine systematische und prägnante Darstellung der Idee einer neuen Anthropologie, welche die mundanen, transzendentalen und transphänomenalen Aspekte des Menschseins gleichermaßen berücksichtigt und die Reduktion des Menschen auf seinen biologischen Körper zurückweist. Diese ‚Fundamentalanthropologie‘ genannte Disziplin versteht sich als philosophische Grundlagendisziplin und als Herzstück der Philosophie als allgemeiner (...) Anthropologie. Außerdem werden in diesem Band zentrale und aktuelle philosophische Themen wie Selbstbewusstsein, Identität des Ich, das Wesen des menschlichen Geistes sowie die Zukunft des Menschen erstmals zum Gegenstand fundamentalanthropologischer Analysen gemacht. (shrink)

Susanne Langer was a student at Radcliffe College between 1916 and 1926---a highly transitional period in the history of American philosophy. Intellectual generalists such as William James, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce had dominated philosophical debates at the turn of the century but the academic landscape gradually started to shift in the years after World War I. Many scholars of the new generation adopted a more piecemeal approach to philosophy---solving clearly delineated, technical puzzles using the so-called “method of logical analysis”. (...) Especially at Harvard, the intellectual climate rapidly changed. The department hired several philosophers who had contributed to the development of symbolic logic---H. M. Sheffer, C. I. Lewis, and A. N. Whitehead---and Harvard quickly began to be viewed as a central hub for analytic philosophy in the United States. This chapter contextualizes Langer’s earliest work by reading it through the lens of this shifting academic environment. Though Harvard did not allow women to take its courses until 1943, Langer is one of the most significant fruits of this period. Her dissertation “A Logical Analysis of Meaning” and her first publications are all illustrations of the approach that came to dictate the American philosophical conversation. By exploring the increased focus on the logical-analytic method and Langer’s attempts to expand the new approach to what she later called “non-discursive” symbolisms, I situate her publications in the intellectual context of the 1920s. (shrink)

In vision research metacontrast masking is a widely used technique to reduce the visibility of a stimulus. Typically, studies attempt to reveal general principles that apply to a large majority of participants and tend to omit possible individual differences. The neural plasticity of the visual system, however, entails the potential capability for individual differences in the way observers perform perceptual tasks. We report a case of perceptual learning in a metacontrast masking task that leads to the enhancement of two types (...) of adult human observers despite identical learning conditions. In a priming task both types of observers exhibited the same priming effects, which were insensitive to learning. Findings suggest that visual processing of target stimuli in the metacontrast masking task is based on neural levels with sufficient plasticity to enable the development of two types of observers, which do not contribute to processing of target stimuli in the priming task. (shrink)

Robert Sinclair’s *Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction* persuasively argues that Quine’s epistemology was deeply influenced by C. I. Lewis’s pragmatism. Sinclair’s account raises the question why Quine himself frequently downplayed Lewis’s influence. Looking back, Quine has always said that Rudolf Carnap was his “greatest teacher” and that his 1933 meeting with the German philosopher was his “first experience of sustained intellectual engagement with anyone of an older generation” (1970, 41; 1985, 97-8, my emphasis). Quine’s autobiographies contain only a (...) handful of biographical references to Lewis and he regularly soft-pedaled the latter’s influence in private correspondence. In this note, I discuss some archival evidence that helps us better understand Quine’s reluctance to acknowledge Lewis’s influence. I contextualize the relation between Lewis and Quine and argue that the latter viewed his teacher as a retrograde force in modern epistemology, impeding the more rigorous approach that Carnap had been developing in Europe. Next, I briefly discuss Lewis’s contribution to the development of scientific philosophy in the United States and argue that Quine underestimated his teacher’s role in this process. In doing so, I hope to show that Quine’s zealous commitment to Carnap’s approach negatively affected his assessment of Lewis’s influence, thereby supplementing Sinclair’s praiseworthy reconstruction with an explanation of why Quine himself underestimated Lewis’s role. (shrink)

To analyze the role of automatic processes in the fulfilment of delayed intentions, we extended a typical prospective memory setting with a context signal to indicate whether the intended action is to be carried out or not. Building on dual-process models of cognition, we hypothesized that automatic and controlled processes are in opposition when the action is to be suppressed, because automatic processes trigger the associated response whereas controlled processes exert inhibition. Experiment 1 demonstrates the occurrence of false prospective memory (...) responses to cues with the “suppress” signal. Experiment 2 shows that the rate of false prospective memory responses is sensitive to a manipulation that strengthens the role of automatic processes in prospective memory. The findings support the use of false prospective memory responses for the study of automatic processes in the execution of delayed intentions. (shrink)

The problem of finding sufficient doxastic conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analyzed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. This allows to describe the structure of the game by a logical formula and consequently to treat beliefs about this structure in the same way as beliefs about rationality. A backward induction and a non-Nash equilibrium result based on higher level belief in rationality and the structure of the game are derived.

In metacontrast masking target visibility is modulated by the time until a masking stimulus appears. The effect of this temporal delay differs across participants in such a way that individual human observers’ performance shows distinguishable types of masking functions which remain largely unchanged for months. Here we examined whether individual differences in masking functions depend on different response criteria in addition to differences in discrimination sensitivity. To this end we reanalyzed previously published data and conducted a new experiment for further (...) data analyses. Our analyses demonstrate that a distinction of masking functions based on the type of masking stimulus is superior to a distinction based on the target–mask congruency. Individually different masking functions are based on individual differences in discrimination sensitivities and in response criteria. Results suggest that individual differences in metacontrast masking result from individually different criterion contents. (shrink)

The idea that Eastern and Western societies should do everything together because they're exactly the same and their interests are identical is not, as some would have it, a sign of evolutionary maturity or scientific insight, but a desperate form of political manipulation, new Western imperialism, and, yes, wishful thinking. Surely our cultural differences and identities make the world more colorful." Thorsten Pattberg's East-West Dichotomy discusses the philosophical concept that two diametrically opposed hemispheres exist - East and West. As (...) the Peking University scholar demonstrates with numerous examples, their cultures and way of thinking differ radically; one could say they are 180 degrees apart. Pattberg's underlying argument is that because of the dichotomy Westerners, who are mostly rugged individualists, are more analytic and deductive in their thinking, while Easterners, who are more focused on the collective, favor a more intuitive, inductive, "holistic" approach to life. Moreover, he explores the origin and the future of the dichotomy, and shows how it has shaped the West's and the East's different attitudes towards nature, philosophy (both epistemology and ethics), as well as gender and society. Pattberg also shows his willingness to take on any potential critic of his theory in his chapter "Problems with the Dichotomy." This book is a valuable resource for those eager to gain a better understanding of the "Western" and "Eastern" psyches and of how they both harmonize and clash. (shrink)

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated (...) in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework. Footnotes1 I would like to thank Wlodek Rabinowicz and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. (shrink)

Drawing on central research questions of memory studies, this article outlines various topics and divergent concepts about the relationship between the history of science and the public perception of scientists and scholars. The focus is on the different recurring trends and transformation processes, to which this culture of remembrance is subject and the various roles of historians in this context. The article also serves as an introduction to this special issue and its contributions, which use exemplary studies from the history (...) of medicine and pedagogy to shed light on the continual negotiation process of cultures of remembrance resulting from changing historical frames of reference, particularly in dealing with the legacy of National Socialism. (shrink)

This article challenges the view that sociological explanation is based on methodological individualism and suggests using relational concepts for constructing explanations of social phenomena. It develops a relational concept of social mechanisms based on sociological systems theory and illustrates its explanatory power by drawing on research on changes in educational organizations in Germany.

In diesem Aufsatz soll der Takt als ein moral- und tugendrelevantes Phänomen bestimmt werden. Ausgehend von einer kontrastierenden Abgrenzung gegenüber anderen Umgangsformen, wendet er sich wichtigen Theoriestücken zu, die sich explizit mit dem Takt befassen, um an ihnen entscheidende problematische Aspekte aufzuzeigen und zu korrigieren. Anschließend erfolgt die handlungstheoretische Erklärung als einer Form des Perspektivenwechsels. Diese erlaubt es zugleich, auch die moralische Dimension des Takts und seinen Status als Tugend zu fokussieren, die zwar nicht nur, aber vor allem in einer (...) multidimensional charakterisierbaren demokratischen Gesellschaft ihren relevanten Ort hat. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDepression is marked by rigid thinking and the inability to generate different and more positive views on the self. The current study conceptualises this a perspective-taking deficit, which is defined as a deficit in the ability to overcome one’s egocentrism. Previous research has demonstrated that individuals with depression are impaired in Theory of Mind reasoning and empathy – two social cognitions that involve cognitive and affective perspective-taking. Here, it was investigated whether these deficits generalise to visuo-spatial perspective-taking. To test this, (...) a convenience sample completed a test-battery including measures of cognitive and visuo-spatial perspective-taking and closely matched cognitive and visuo-spatial control tasks. The results showed that individuals exhibiting high levels of depressive symptoms were specifically impaired on both perspective-taking tasks but performed equally well on the cont... (shrink)

In this issue of Consciousness and Cognition, Bachmann comments on our study , which revealed two groups of observers with qualitative individual differences in metacontrast masking that are enhanced by perceptual learning. We are pleased that our study receives this attention and even more about Bachmann’s extremely positive comments. In this invited reply we argue that observers seem to be similar only at the beginning of the experiment but they have no choice as to which group to join. Findings strongly (...) recommend to look at the data of individual subjects. (shrink)

A Lost Book from J. Oswald Sanders Now Re-Released with a Beautiful New Cover "The complex strains and problems which the Christian encounters in the contemporary world find their answer, not in tranquilizers or stimulants, but in a correct understanding and application of scriptural principles." -J. Oswald Sanders, from the introduction J. Oswald Sanders (best known for his book Spiritual Leadership, which has sold over a million copies), touched hundreds of thousands of lives in his lifetime and continues to inspire (...) Christians today. His books Spiritual Leadership, Spiritual Maturity, and The Incomparable Christ are beloved and well-read to this day. But there are two of his books that readers haven’t had access to in over 30 years. A Spiritual Clinic is one of them. Life wears on us, we go through seasons of fatigue, strain and tension that take their toll, and we can easily fall into apathy. Sanders prescribes a powerful tonic of scriptural principles that lead to recovery and growth. For anyone who feels worn out from their Christian life and could use a little spiritual doctoring, A Spiritual Clinic is for you. (shrink)

In den letzten drei Dekaden ist es zu einer Renaissance des Republikanismus gekommen. Ein spezifisch republikanisches Freiheitsverstandnis und die Debatte um entpolitisierende Wirkungen komplexer liberaler Demokratien haben sich dabei als in hohem Masse anschlussfahig an eine Vielzahl gegenwartiger Diskurse - von Global Governance bis hin zu Postdemokratie - erwiesen. Das Verstandnis von Republikanismus als einer modernen politischen Theorie wurde so weiter gestarkt und republikanische Ansatze gelten wieder als der zentrale Gegenspieler eines liberalen Staats- und Politikverstandnisses. Der Sammelband greift diese Renaissance (...) auf und bietet einen fur den deutschen Sprachraum bis dato fehlenden Uberblick uber Entwicklungstendenzen und Debatten im modernen republikanischen Denken. Er liefert eine Systematisierung von Ansatzen und Stromungen und erortert die Leistungsfahigkeit republikanischer Theorie gerade mit Blick auf Gegenwartsfragen. Mit Beitragen von: Richard Bellamy, Dorothea Gadeke, Philip Holzing, Sebastian Huhnholz, Marcus Llanque, Horst Mewes, Andreas Oldenbourg, Emanuel Richter, Daniel Schulz, Winfried Thaa, Thorsten Thiel, Christian Volk, Florian Weber und Sabrina Zucca-Soest. (shrink)

In the so-called “international credit market crisis,” which started in the second half of 2007 in the US subprime mortgage market, financial derivatives, most notably credit default swaps (CDS), have been publically blamed for having caused, or at least aggravated, the economic and monetary debacle. However, sound economic [...].