This is a one page handout outlining an interpretation of Simone de Beauvoir which draws heavily upon material from the analytic tradition of philosophy.

This paper contains a brief pastiche of analytic philosopher Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, responding to the sociological theories of Pierre Bourdieu.

The preface to A Theory of Justice includes the interesting suggestion that John Rawls’s system is consistent with W.V. Quine’s system. I raise a problem for achieving fair equality of opportunity granting Quine’s system: that one does not have to respond to apparent evidence that two candidates are equally suitable for a job in the desired way. There does not appear to be a logical inconsistency between the systems at this point, but in practice regular positive discrimination schemes are probably (...) required. (shrink)

This paper is about W. Somerset Maugham’s short story The Taipan. I identify two ideas that the story seems to be based on, some related strengths, but also a slight weakness.

Terence was studied, though not so much as Virgil, in monastery-schools. Their magistri bestirred themselves to get aid for pupils. Some famous magister— we know not who—had written, between the lines or in the margins, interpretations of difficult words in at least the three opening plays of the MS. which he used—Andr., Ad., Eun.—if not in all. These interpretations were collected from his MS. and found their way into many monastery-libraries. Goetz has published these glossae collectae of Terence (...) from a tenth century MS. in Vol. V. of his Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum, pp. 529–539; Mr. Austin has added more from a Leyden MS. , written apparently in Belgium or Holland, c. 800–815 A.D. . Probably Dr. Theander will add a further batch from a Paris MS. (shrink)

The Placidus Glossary was hailed in Ritschl's time as a new clue to Plautus' true text. And Buecheler, Ritschl's pupil, seized on its Alapari est alapas minari, etc., and foisted this verb on Plaut. True. 928. The great Latin Thesaurus quotes the line with this piece of new cloth put on an old garment: nil alapari satiust, miles, instead of the correct philippiari satiust, miles.

This collection of essays is dedicated to 'Joe' Karel Lambert. The contributors are all personally affected to Joe in some way or other, but they are definitely not the only ones. Whatever excuses there are - there are some -, the editors apologize to whomever they have neglected. But even so the collection displays how influential Karel Lambert has been, personally and through his teaching and his writings. The display is in alphabetical order - with one exception: Bas van Fraassen, (...) being about the earliest student of Karel Lambert, opens the collection with some reminiscences. Naturally, one of the focal points of this volume is Lambert's logical thinking and (or: freed of) ontological thinking. Free logic is intimately connected with description theory. Bas van Fraassen gives a survey of the development of the area, and Charles Daniels points to difficulties with definite descriptions in modal contexts and stories. Peter Woodruff addresses the relation between free logic and supervaluation semantics, presenting a novel condition which recovers desirable metatheoretic properties for free logic under that semantics. Terence Parsons shows how free logic can be utilized in interpreting sentences as purporting to denote events (true ones succeed and false ones fail) and how this helps to understand natural language. (shrink)

The statement that masks were not introduced on the Roman stage until after the time of Terence is still repeated by editors and has the support of Pauly Wissowa as well as Daremberg and Saglio ; it may, in fact, be regarded as generally accepted. Yet so long ago as 1912 A. S. F. Gow put forward strong arguments on the opposite side; his article, though mentioned with respect in Bursian and referred to by Schanz-Hosius , has not yet (...) been satisfactorily answered, so far as I am aware. Gow did not claim that a final solution of this problem could be attained on our present evidence, but he did show that the orthodox position is open to attack. I hope to prove that the arguments in favour of the early use of masks are even stronger than he claimed. (shrink)

Caper in his section on the preposition ex cited Ennius, Ann. 309:nauibus explebant sese terrasque replebant,and declared that Virgil used the verb with this antique sense in Aen. 6, 545:discedam; explebo numerum reddarque tenebris,i.e. ‘minuam vestrum numerum.’This we are told in Servius' note, which begins: Ut diximus supra, explebo est minuam. Thilo gives no reference to any such previous words of Servius, and I have failed to find them. Can it be that Servius has carelessly transcribed a note of Donatus, (...) and that Donatus had discussed ex minuens at Geo. 2, 65, or 4, 145? Donatus' note on Terence, Hec. 755, is Explere exinanire Terentianum est; the passage of Terence is:eas ad mulieres huc intro atque istuc iusiurandum idempolliceare illis: exple animum îs teque hoc crimine expedi,i.e., relieve their mind of suspicion against Pamphilus and free yourself from this charge. The phrase recurs in the next Scene :illis modo explete animum.i atque exple animum îs, coge ut credant. (shrink)

Professor Postgate speaks of ‘the regrettable silence of the principal editors of Plautus upon the subject.’ As a minor editor, I beg to defend my colleagues by pointing out that the scansions dĭŭtíus and dyūtius are subject of a note in Dziatzko's and Hauler's editions of the Phormio of Terence and in the Plautus Report in Bursian of 1879 . Also that a reference to the index of my larger edition of the Captiui will show that the word is (...) discussed in my section on Prosody : ‘The same doubt exists regarding the scansion of diutius , the by-form of the fuller form dĭūtĭŭs .’. (shrink)

There have in recent years been at least two important attempts to get to grips with Aristotle's conception of dialectic. I have in mind those by Martha C. Nussbaum in ‘Saving Aristotle's appearances’, which is chapter 8 of her The Fragility of Goodness, and by Terence H. Irwin in his important, though in my opinion somewhat misguided, book Aristotle's First Principles. There is a sense in which both of these writers are reacting to the work of G. E. L. (...) Owen on cognate matters, particularly his well-known paper ‘Tithenai ta phainomena’. Owen himself was in part reacting to what I suppose is the traditional view of how Aristotle regarded dialectic, as revealed in Topics I. 1. On that view dialectic is for Aristotle a lesser way of proceeding than is demonstration, the method of science. For demonstration proceeds from premises which are accepted as true in themselves and moves from them to conclusions which follow necessarily from those premises; and the middle term of such a demonstrative syllogism then provides the ‘reason why’ for the truth of the conclusion. Dialectic proceeds from premises which are accepted on a lesser basis ‘by everyone or by the majority or by the wise, i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them’, and proceeds deductively from them to further conclusions. (shrink)

There have in recent years been at least two important attempts to get to grips with Aristotle's conception of dialectic. I have in mind those by Martha C. Nussbaum in ‘Saving Aristotle's appearances’, which is chapter 8 of her The Fragility of Goodness, and by Terence H. Irwin in his important, though in my opinion somewhat misguided, book Aristotle's First Principles. There is a sense in which both of these writers are reacting to the work of G. E. L. (...) Owen on cognate matters, particularly his well-known paper ‘Tithenai ta phainomena’. Owen himself was in part reacting to what I suppose is the traditional view of how Aristotle regarded dialectic, as revealed in Topics I. 1. On that view dialectic is for Aristotle a lesser way of proceeding than is demonstration, the method of science. For demonstration proceeds from premises which are accepted as true in themselves and moves from them to conclusions which follow necessarily from those premises; and the middle term of such a demonstrative syllogism then provides the ‘reason why’ for the truth of the conclusion. Dialectic proceeds from premises which are accepted on a lesser basis ‘by everyone or by the majority or by the wise, i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them’, and proceeds deductively from them to further conclusions. (shrink)