The author explores and criticises two arguments from ambiguity: S. Pinker’s argument from ambiguity in support of the ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis, and the argument from ambiguity proposed by K. P. Parsons against Davidsonian ‘semantics of truth-conditions’. Leaning primarily on G. Harman and D. Davidson he aims to demonstrate that the Pinker/Parsons arguments share a common strategy, on the one hand, and imply and/or suggest, as he claims, an implausible view of ambiguity, on the other. Discussing Pinker’s argument he further (...) attempts to elucidate the ways in which the modifications of public and inter-subjectively accessible aspects of the use of language reflect the differences in interpretations of an ambiguity. His exploration of the argument against ‘semantics of truth-conditions’ then aims to explain, contra Parsons, the sense in which talk about the truth conditions for ambiguity does not implicate a threat to Davidson’s perspective on the theory of meaning. Finally, the author argues for the view of ambiguity as a kind of ignorance/undecidability that, as he contends, represents both more realistic and more plausible theoretical option than the one on which both Pinker and Parsons found their arguments and which also comes out in Aristotle, K. Bach and W. Lycan. (shrink)

Autor razmatra i kritizira dva argumenta iz višesmislice: S. Pinkerov argument iz višesmislice za hipotezu takozvanoga ‘jezika misli’ i argument iz višesmislice protiv davidsonovske ‘semantike istinosnih uvjeta’ što ga je predložila K. P. Parsons. Oslanjajući se uglavnom na G. Harmana i D. Davidsona, on nastoji pokazati da Pinker/Parsons argumenti dijele jednu zajedničku strategiju i također impliciraju i/ilisugeriraju jedan, po njegovu sudu neprihvatljiv, pojam višesmislice. Raspravljajući o Pinkerovu argumentu, on nastoji objasniti na koji su način razlike u tumačenju višesmislice reflektirane u (...) promjenama javnih i svima dostupnih aspekata uporabe jezika. U diskusiji pak o argumentu protiv ‘semantike istinosnih uvjeta’ on, contra Parsons,nastoji objasniti u kojem je smislu moguće govoriti o istinosnim uvjetima za višesmislice, a da to ne znači prijetnju Davidsonovom pristupu teoriji značenja. Autor, na koncu, brani teoriju višesmislice kao jednoga vida neznanja/neodlučivosti i tvrdi da ta teorija predstavlja i plauzibilniju i realističniju teorijsku opciju od one nakojoj su Pinker i Parsons temeljili svoje argumente, a koju nalazimo i kod Aristotela , K. Bacha ili W. Lycana.The author explores and criticises two arguments from ambiguity: S.Pinker’s argument from ambiguity in support of the ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis, and the argument from ambiguity proposed by K. P. Parsons against Davidsonian ‘semantics of truth-conditions’. Leaning primarily on G. Harman and D. Davidson he aims to demonstrate that the Pinker/Parsons arguments share a common strategy, on the one hand, and imply and/or suggest, as he claims, an implausible view of ambiguity, on the other. Discussing Pinker’s argument he further attempts to elucidate the ways in which the modifications of public and inter-subjectively accessible aspectsof the use of language reflect the differences in interpretations of an ambiguity. His exploration of the argument against ‘semantics of truth-conditions’ then aims to explain, contra Parsons, the sense in which talk about the truth conditions for ambiguity does not implicate a threat to Davidson’s perspective on the theory of meaning. Finally, the author argues for the view of ambiguity as a kind of ignorance/undecidability that, as he contends, represents both more realistic and more plausible theoretical option than the one on which both Pinker and Parsons found their arguments and which also comes out in Aristotle , K. Bach and W. Lycan. (shrink)

Saint Gregory understood the mind of man as the most essentially human element of the human composit. It is that spiritual, intelligible element of human nature which is brought into being in the image of God. The image of God in man refers to human nature, but the image of God in whom man is created refers to the Person of the divine Logos. The mind is way in that expresses freedom of human nature. Free will of man or freedom (...) (as possession of self) belongs to human nature, to man’s character as a being created in the image of God. In last analysis the mind according to Saint Gregory constitutes way of manifestation human freedom. The mind as image of God in man has not worth its self. The most important role of mind is knowledge of God. Man is made to exist from the very beginning as a creature in the image of God, so that the fundamental principle of his being is completed only in communion with God. For Gregory this in turn revels man’s nature and destiny to be in loving communion with the Holy Trinity through the ecstatic, transcending movement of the self into the personal, divine life of God. It is the knowledge of God in loving communion with him, God becoming man without ceasing to be God, so that man can become God without ceasing to be man. It is very significant that according to Saint Gregory the Theologian knowledge of God and communion or participation in God are bound together. More than that, knowledge of God and communion with God are explicitly considered as identical. (shrink)

Data gathered by investigators are used to test the validity of a specific scientific hypothesis. When the hypothesis relates to the biology of a disease or its treatment, then data sets may contain specific and identifiable medical information. Since the information in a clinical data set was gathered to test a specific hypothesis and there is usually a sponsor interested in the outcome, the issue of who owns the data is a critical one. In my opinion, data from both publicly (...) and privately funded research should be made available, in a format that protects confidentiality and intellectual property rights, to interested and responsible parties within a reasonable period of time after publication. (shrink)

Prikaz analize mogucnosti dijaloga, kao preduvjeta drustvenog i religijskog pluralizma, na temelju filozofije simbolickih formi Ernsta Cassirera, tema je ovog clanka. Sredisnji dio clanka obuhvaca prikaz osnovnih elemenata filozofije simbolickih formi, potom prikaz odnosa svijesti, simbolickih formi i slobode, zatim opcih postavki Cassirerove analize mita, te njegov opis tehnika modernih politickih mitova. Prikaz ovih elemenata Cassirerove filozofije ima za cilj pokazati aktualnost njegove misli s obzirom na problematiku dijaloga i pluralizma, te ukazati na primjenjivost njegove misli glede analize prisutnosti mitske (...) svijesti u modernim drustvima, pa tako i u drustvima na podrucju bivse Jugoslavije. U zakljucku se nastoji sabrati bogatstvo Cassirerovih analiza i to sazeto primijeniti na analizu situacije na naznacenim podrucjima te ukazati na pravce trazenja mogucih rjesenja. (shrink)

In this philosophical exploration, we investigate the concept of robotic moral environment interaction. The common view understands moral interaction to occur between agents endowed with ethical and interactive capacities. However, recent developments in moral philosophy argue that moral interaction also occurs in relation to the environment. Here conditions and situations of the environment contribute to human moral cognition and the formation of our moral experiences. Based on this philosophical position, we imagine robots interacting as moral environments—a novel conceptualization of human–robot (...) moral interaction with an inherent capacity for moral augmentation. To explicate this idea, we first define moral environments as moral systems providing moral affordances. We then intuit and explicate two constitutive conditions of moral environments: the environment’s moral ambiance and its moral atmosphere and compare them with real-life cases of moral environments—the moral landmarks. Based on these explications, we construct several explanatory cases to illustrate robots interacting as moral environments. Lastly, we set to evaluate the ethical challenges and wider social ramifications of using moral environment robots in the public space. (shrink)

“Give me a body then”: this is the formula of philosophical reversal. The body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself, that which it has to overcome to reach thinking. It is o...

At the heart of Drazen Prelec’s chapter is the distinction between outcome utility and diagnostic utility. There is a particular distinction in the literature on causal networks (Pearl 2000), namely the distinction between observing and intervening, that maps onto Prelec’s distinction between diagnostic and outcome utility. I will explore the connection between both frameworks.

Despite what many critics see as an inability to deliver much in the way of therapeutic value (Hunter and Drazen 2019), genetics remains a bottomless source of fascination, trepidation, and reflect...