Previous theory and research on bounded rationality has emphasized how limited cognitive resources constrain people from making utility maximizing choices. This paper expands the concept of bounded rationality to consider how people’s rationality may be constrained by their internalization of a qualitatively distinct standard for sound judgment, which is commonly labeled reasonableness. In contrast to rationality, the standard of reasonableness provides guidance for making choices in situations that involve balancing incommensurable values and interests or reconciling conflicting points-of-view. We review recent (...) evidence showing that laypeople readily recognize the distinctions between rationality and reasonableness and thus are able to utilize these as distinct standards to inform their everyday decision-making. The fact that people appear to have internalized rationality and reasonableness as distinct standards of sound judgment supports the notion that people’s pursuit of rationality may be bounded by their determination to also be reasonable. (shrink)

Human lives are radically uncertain. Making sense of such uncertainties is the hallmark of wisdom. Sense-making requires narratives, putting them in the center stage of human everyday decision-making. Yet what if radical uncertainty is a narrative itself? Moreover, do laypeople always consider such narratives irrational? Here we pose these questions to enrich a theory of choice under uncertainty.

Understanding the components of clinical care that work best is a cornerstone of improving health care. And yet, the more we improve the quality of quality improvement and move to continuous learning about clinical care more broadly, the more we find ourselves in a regulatory environment that makes evaluation more difficult, expensive, and, in some situations, impossible. In their paper on the ethical underpinnings of the distinction between research and treatment, Ruth Faden and colleagues raise important implications for a wide (...) array of situations. These points give reason to rethink the definition of routine clinical operations to include evaluation of the processes and outcomes of care and dissemination of findings. We concur with the assertion by Faden and colleagues, and with previous work from The Hastings Center, that conducting continuous improvement activities such as these is an obligation of health systems and clinicians. We believe that rigorous, systematic evaluation should be considered part of normal, expected operations, rather than exceptional behavior that requires extraordinary regulatory control. (shrink)

In this article I offer a taxonomy of the major issues and options about qualities, quality-instances, and exemplification. So far as I know, this has not been done for some time and the task of offering such a taxonomy is a worthy one in its own right. But such a classification will also show that arguments such as the one above by Grossmann fail to make their case because of the tremendous vari? ety of positions about quality-instances. The mere (...) fact that a philosopher does not accept the identity of the referent of "the F of A" and "the F of B" does not entail that the philosopher is a nominalist. (shrink)

Essays by E. B. Allaire, May Brodbeck, Reinhart Grossmann, Herbert Hochberg and Robert G. Turnbull, most of which have already appeared since 1959. Half of the essays argue answers of a realist type to contemporary statements of traditional ontological problems. The second half of the volume studies the ontological "systems" of Ockhom, Berkeley, Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein, Quine and Dewey from a realistic standpoint. Three previously unpublished essays are included: "Particulars and Time", "Common Names", and "The 'Tractatus': Nominalistic or Realistic?". (...) An excellent beginning for a promising series.--D. P. B. (shrink)

The article seeks to understand Hannah Arendt's political thinking by relating it to an issue which is crucial to the thinking of the later Heidegger, i.e., the problem of originality ( Anfänglichkeit) and history. In opposition to Hegel's thesis of the “end of art,” Heidegger envisages in “great art” such as Hölderlin's poetry a new origin of thinking and history. The end of art, which Hegel holds to be necessary, is in Heidegger's view to be overcome precisely because art, for (...) him, entails an origin which is not a “Not yet” of a teleological perfection in Hegel's sense, but a “Not yet” of a future history. However, Heidegger's orientation towards a “pure” origin qua future leads him to poietically escape the realm of the Political and the questions of praxis and practical rationality.Like Heidegger, Arendt is taken with the problem of origin; but in contrast to her former teacher, she tries to regain what Heidegger thought he could leave, viz., the dimension of the genuine Political and of acting. The original sense of acting (for Arendt, the capability of human beings to make a new beginning) can be observed in the Greek polis as well as in the American Revolution in modern times: The revolutionary act of a total new beginning elucidates, according to Arendt, what “acting” means in the full and truly political sense. However, Arendt's notion of an epochal beginning seems one-sided, and her abstract concept of acting seems to foster a mere actionism and anarchy. Therefore, contrary to Arendt's claims, the concept of the Political which she shapes in accordance with the extraordinary experiences of an epochal acting has apolitical consequences. The task of thinking after Heidegger and Arendt thus remains one of determining the political character of action in a convincing manner. In this respect, the paper pleads for a rethinking of Hegel's concept of ethical life ( Sittlichkeit). (shrink)

The very founding of the town Neuwied-am-Rhein was closely linked to policies and practices of religious toleration. It was the hope and intent of Count Friedrich of Wied (1618-1698) that a town, well planned and advantageously located, would bring economic relief and eventually prosperity to his small land, which had suffered particularly in the last years of the Thirty Years’ War. From the outset he saw that the best means of attracting residents would be to guarantee as large a degree (...) of religious freedom as possible.The Treaty of Westphalia provided a viable legal framework within which Protestants, adherents to the Augsburg Confession be they Lutherans or Reformed, and Roman Catholics could exercise their religion within the German Empire. The treaty basically defined three types of religious practice: the exercitium religionis publicum, which gave the members of the minority religion in any territorial unit full freedom to worship openly; the exercitium privatum, restricting the worship of the congregation to specific places; and finally the devotio domestica, which allowed the “individual exercise of religion by the common subject, practiced by him alone, without further ecclesiastical ceremony,... within the walls of his own living quarters.” The treaty further offered the beneficium emigrandi, and specified the conditions under which forced or voluntary emigration was to take place. (shrink)

Diese Einführung in die Ontologie zeigt die Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie als einen dauernden Kampf zwischen den Riesen und Göttern von Platons Sophistes. Auf der einen Seite gibt es die Philosophen, die die Auffassung vertreten, daß nur das physikalische Universum existiert und auf der anderen Seite gibt es solche Philosophen, die darauf bestehen, daß es eine weit 'größere' Welt gibt, die auch zeitlose und nicht-räumliche Dinge, wie z.B. Egenschaften enthält. Der Autor diskutiert detailliert diese wichtige metaphysische Debatte, die dem Kampf (...) zugrunde liegt, nämlich die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Naturalisten und Ontologen. Das Buch beginnt mit einer Untersuchung der Geschichte der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Nominalisten und Realisten über das Problem der Universalien. Danach erkundet der Autor die Natur und Existenz der Kategorien wie Relationen, Strukturen, Zahlen und Tatsachen. Im letzten Teil argumentiert er dafür, daß Existenz und Negation keine Kategorien sind, sondern eher Merkmale der Welt. Die Einführung in die Ontologie dient zugleich als Einführung in die Philosophie insgesamt und zeichnet sich durch Klarheit, gute Verständlichkeit und einen lebendigen Stil aus. (shrink)

Diese Einführung in die Ontologie zeigt die Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie als einen dauernden Kampf zwischen den Riesen und Göttern von Platons Sophistes. Auf der einen Seite gibt es die Philosophen, die die Auffassung vertreten, daß nur das physikalische Universum existiert und auf der anderen Seite gibt es solche Philosophen, die darauf bestehen, daß es eine weit 'größere' Welt gibt, die auch zeitlose und nicht-räumliche Dinge, wie z.B. Egenschaften enthält. Der Autor diskutiert detailliert diese wichtige metaphysische Debatte, die dem Kampf (...) zugrunde liegt, nämlich die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Naturalisten und Ontologen. Das Buch beginnt mit einer Untersuchung der Geschichte der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Nominalisten und Realisten über das Problem der Universalien. Danach erkundet der Autor die Natur und Existenz der Kategorien wie Relationen, Strukturen, Zahlen und Tatsachen. Im letzten Teil argumentiert er dafür, daß Existenz und Negation keine Kategorien sind, sondern eher Merkmale der Welt. Die Einführung in die Ontologie dient zugleich als Einführung in die Philosophie insgesamt und zeichnet sich durch Klarheit, gute Verständlichkeit und einen lebendigen Stil aus. (shrink)

The final section of the book considers two features of the world which transcend the categories, existence and negation.

A study of Jim Jones and the Peoples Temple. It features a prologue that considers the meaning of the tragedy for a post-Waco, post-9/11 world.

The volume collects classics of Marxist historiography of science, including a new translation of Boris Hessen's “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's ...

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp, Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record (...) of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself. Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true. (shrink)

The place of the emotions among the passions -- The analytic of the emotions I -- The analytic of the emotions II -- The dialectic of the emotions -- Pride, arrogance, and humility -- Shame, embarrassment, and guilt -- Envy -- Jealousy -- Anger -- Love -- Friendship -- Sympathy and empathy.

Interest in the topic of wisdom-focused education has so far not resulted in empirically validated programs for teaching wisdom. To start filling this void, we explore the emerging empirical evidence concerning the fundamental elements required for understanding how one can foster wisdom, with a particular focus on wise reasoning. We define wise reasoning through a combination of intellectual humility, recognition of world in flux/change, open-mindedness to diverse viewpoints, and search for compromise/integration of diverse perspectives. In this article, we review evidence (...) concerning how wise reasoning can be facilitated through experiences, teaching materials, environments and cognitive strategies. We also focus on educators, reviewing emerging evidence on how the process of explaining and guiding others impacts one’s wisdom. We conclude by discussing the development of wisdom-focused education, proposing that greater attention to the situational demands and the variability in wisdom-related characteristics across social contexts should play a critical role in its development. (shrink)

Judgments differ from decisions. Judgments are more abstract, decontextualized, and bear fewer consequences for the agent. In pursuit of experimental control, psychological experiments on bias create a simplified, bare-bone representation of social behavior. These experiments resemble conditions in which people judge others, but not how they make real-world decisions.

Central and East Europeans have a great deal in common, both historically and culturally, with West Europeans and North Americans, but tend to be more interdependent. Interdependence has been shown to be linked to holistic cognition. East Asians are more interdependent than Americans and are more holistic. If interdependence causes holism, we would expect Central and East Europeans to be more holistic than West Europeans and North Americans. In two studies we found evidence that Central and East Europeans are indeed (...) more holistic than Westerners on three tasks, one of which examined categorization and two of which measured patterns of visual attention. These studies support the argument that cross-cultural differences in cognition are due to society level differences in independence/interdependence. (shrink)

(2008). The discrimination of angry and fearful facial expressions in 7-month-old infants: An event-related potential study. Cognition & Emotion: Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 134-146.

Some scientific categories seem to correspond to genuine features of the world and are indispensable for successful science in some domain; in short, they are natural kinds. This book gives a general account of what it is to be a natural kind and puts the account to work illuminating numerous specific examples.

The ArgumentFranz Borkenau's book,The Transition from Feudal to Modern Thought(Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild[literally:The Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World-Picture]), serves as background for Grossmann's study. The objective of this book was to trace the sociological origins of the mechanistic categories of modern thought as developed in the philosophy of Descartes and his successors. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, according to Borkenau, mechanistic thinking triumphed over medieval philosophy which emphasized qualitative, not quantitative considerations. (...) This transition from medieval and feudal methods of thought to modern principles is the general theme of Borkenau's book, and is traced to the social changes of this time. According to this work, the essential economic change that marked the transition from medieval to modern times was the destruction of the handicraft system and the organization of labor under one roof and under one management. The roots of the change in thought are to be sought here. With the dismemberment of the handicraft system and the division of labor into relatively unskilled, uniform, and therefore comparable activities, the conception of abstract homogeneous social labor arises. The division of the labor process into simple repeated movements permits a comparison of hours of labor. Calculation with such abstract social unities, according to Borkenau, was the source from which modern mechanistic thinking in general derived its origin.Grossmann, although he considers Borkenau's work a valuable and important contribution, does not believe that the author has achieved his purpose. First of all, he contends that the period that Borkenau describes as the period of the triumph of modern thought over medieval should not be placed at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but in the Renaissance, and that not Descartes and Hobbes but Leonardo da Vinci was the initiator of modern thought. Leonardo's theories, evolved from a study of machines, were the source of the mechanistic categories that culminated in modern thought.If Borkenau's conception as to the historical origin of these categories is incorrect in regard to time, Grossmann claims it follows that it is incorrect also in regard to the social sources to which it is ascribed. In the beginning, the factory system did not involve a division of labor into comparable homogeneous processes, but in general only united skilled handicraftsmen under one roof. The development of machinery, not the calculation with abstract hours of labor, is the immediate source of modern scientific mechanics. This goes back to the Renaissance and has relatively little to do with the original factory system that was finally superseded by the Industrial Revolution.While Borkenau, in tracing the social background of the thought of the period, relies chiefly on the conflicts and strife of political parties, Grossmann regards this as one element only in the formation of the general social situation, which in its entirety and in the interaction of its elements explains the development of modern thought. (shrink)

By the time of his death in 2006, Sir Peter Strawson was regarded as one of the world's most distinguished philosophers. Unavailable for many years,_ Scepticism and Naturalism_ is a profound reflection on two classic philosophical problems by a philosopher at the pinnacle of his career. Based on his acclaimed Woodbridge lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1983, Strawson begins with a discussion of scepticism, which he defines as questioning the adequacy of our grounds for holding various beliefs. He then (...) draws deftly on Hume and Wittgenstein to argue that we must distinguish between 'hard', scientific naturalism; or 'soft', humanistic naturalism. In the remaining chapters the author takes up several issues in which sceptical doubts play an important role, in particular the nature of transcendental arguments and including the objectivity of moral philosophy, the mental and the physical, and the existence of abstract entities. _Scepticism and Naturalism_ is essential reading for those seeking an introduction to the work of one of the twentieth century’s most important and original philosophers. This reissue includes a substantial new foreword by Quassim Cassam and a fascinating intellectual autobiography by Strawson, which together form an excellent introduction to his life and work. (shrink)